The Royal Treasure:
Muslim Communities
under the Crown of Aragon
in the Fourteenth
Century
John Boswell
Chapter 8
Acculturation, Loyalty, and the War With Castile
[372] We must not admit, even for a moment, that intolerance and lack of understanding toward the conquered people which we have so often read about in some monographs (Roca Traver, "Un Siglo," p.12).There can be little doubt, as the preceding chapters have demonstrated, that the general level of tolerance and co-operation among the disparate elements of Aragonese society in the fourteenth century was surprisingly high in view of the hostile religious attitudes of the era, and of the events which had resulted in the propinquity of the various Iberian ethnic groups. Muslims and Christians worked together, formed companies together, lived in close proximity with each other, had recourse to the same low life, even committed crimes together.(1) They operated joint "vigilante" groups to protect their cities and villages.(2) Christian nobles, farmers, and clergy allowed Mudéjares to use their lands and their homes to hide property subject to royal taxation.(3) Runaway Muslim slaves were protected and helped by Christians.(4) Christian religious orders interceded with the king for the well-being of Muslims mistreated by their lords and masters.(5) Christians regularly had recourse to Jewish and Muslim doctors and surgeons.(6) Members of all three religious groups borrowed and lent money to each other, and prominent Jews and Muslims advanced large [373] sums of cash to the Crown itself.(7)
The monarchy used Muslims as its
most trusted servants, and showered them with favors. Muslims not personally
in the king's employ also obtained his favors, and letters of commendation
to Christian officials.(8) Peter entered
into treaties with Muslim rulers guaranteeing the safety and well being
of his Mudéjar subjects,(9) exempted
Jews by royal decree from general inquisitions,(10)
and tried (unsuccessfully) to get special tax relief for non-Christian
subjects during the war levies of 1362.(11)
At times, in fact, the Aragonese
symbiosis seems almost utopian, as when the Christian king sends his personal
Jewish physician to attend a favorite Muslim who has been wounded fighting
in the king's service.(12) The uniqueness
of this co-existence struck the Aragonese themselves: when French troops
were passing through Lérida in 1365, the king ordered very special
precautions taken by local authorities so that the French, not used to
the tolerance taken for granted by the Catalan populace, would not harm
the large Jewish community there.(13)
It is, nonetheless, easy to exaggerate this rosy and appealing [374] picture, to draw it a little larger than life, to omit certain unsightly details which seem to mar its harmonious contours. Significant progress was made in Iberian human relations between the time of the reconquista and the war between Aragon and Castile, as a glance at the development of law in the country will show. In the first redaction, for example, of what was to become the Fueros of Aragon, Christians were forbidden to stand as witnesses for Muslims, because Muslims were "enemies of the Cross," "plotting day and night to bring harm to Christians."(14) The final version of this same law simply suggested that Jews and Muslims have at least one witness of their own faith, since Christian witnesses would be unlikely to undergo an ordeal for a Muslim or Jewish defendant.(15)
The fact remains, however, that Iberian law codes consistently referred to Islam as "paganismo," and frequently classed Muslims in the category of "slaves, horses, mules, donkeys, cows, or other animals";(16) that Muslims were excluded from any official position in Christian government and severely disadvantaged. before the law; that Muslims and Christians both in city and country were officially [375] segregated both for the Muslims' protection and because they themselves did not wish Christians or Jews to live among them.(17) In fact, there was frequent and bitter acrimony between Muslims and Jews as well as between both groups and Christians, so great in some cases that the king had to intervene to protect one group from general harassment by the other two.
...we have learned that numerous inhabitants of the city of Borja, Christian as well as Saracen, despise the Jews of [the city's] aljama, and seek to injure them, severally and singly, confiscating their property and committing other injustices against them with no justification for their actions.... Wherefore we commend the said aljama and its members to your protection, guardianship, and defense....(18)The Christian populace of Valencia was notably mistrustful of its Mudéjar compatriots, and not only falsely accused them of selling Christians to Granada, but induced the monarchy to curtail their right to emigrate for fear of their betraying secrets to "the enemy."(19) The king himself, moreover, exhibited considerable suspicion of Valencian Mudéjares, and "fearing an uprising," asked the Governor of Valencia to terminate subtly both their annual meetings and their right to wander freely about seeking alms.(20) Any unusual gathering [376] of Mudéjares apparently aroused the suspicions of both the king and the populace: in 1362, during the war with Castile, a number of Muslims of Elche gathered their wives and children together in one place, and the monarch immediately dispatched an official to see "if there were too many Moors, and if so, to have as many as [he] should see fit forcibly removed."(21)
Peter, in fact, considered that Muslims "could not discern right from wrong," and that they were "burdened by the yoke of an inferior law"; he publicly addressed even the exalted Belvis family as "tu" rather than "vos," the customary form of address for adults with status.(22) Indeed, in the entire documentation for the period only one Mudéjar is addressed as "vos," and one has the impression this was due to the carelessness of the scribe.(23)
The picture seems even less rosy when one considers that these suspicions of the king and populace were not unfounded. Sometime prior to June of 1360 a Muslim named Cilim organized. an uprising in Valencia, inducing a "very large number of Mudéjares to commit... sedition and rebellion in the kingdom of Valencia against [his] royal majesty, and murder, rape,theft, assaults on towns..., highway robbery, and various other horrible crimes."(24) An inquisition was [377] begun in June on a small scale, with the principal aim apparently to make money for a proposed embassy to Granada,(25) but it gathered momentum throughout the summer months as local lords sought and received the right to try their own Mudéjares for complicity and to inflict such bodily punishment "that from it a horrifying example should remain forever."(26) Once the needed money for the expedition had been collected, however, the king began to put a damper on the process against the Muslims, and in July and October effectively quashed it by reserving to himself personally jurisdiction in all royal areas (that is, in most of Valencia, since those areas not controlled by the king were mostly in the hands of Eleanor or Prince Ferdinand).(27) In May of 1361 the first of a long series of pardons and amnesties was granted to various aljamas "whether or not they were involved in the conspiracy," on condition that they pay court expenses to date, and in April of 1362 the issue was more or less laid to rest along with its initiator, Cilim, who was burned at the stake with this chief collaborators.(28)Revolt in Valencia was not new: there had [378] been several before, and another one took place in 1364.(29) There is no indication in any of the documents that that of Cilim related in any way to the war with Castile, and one is led to infer that it resulted rather from more permanent tensions.
Converts provide an interesting focus for discussions of acculturation. Ramos y Loscertales advanced the opinion that the very small number of Muslim converts to Christianity during the period of Christian rule was proof that Mudéjares did not feel any need to escape their hard lot as a religious minority, especially when compared to the frequency of conversions among Christians in Muslim lands.(30) This is questionable in the extreme. There were, it is true, very few converts from Islam to Christianity in the fourteenth century, but it is far more likely that this was due to the Muslim's fear of worsening his lot than his satisfaction with the status quo. Although legislation forbade that any convert to Christianity suffer loss of his goods as a consequence of his conversion, the same legislation declared his estate confiscated to the Crown after his death, so that any Mudéjar who became a Christian did so to the manifest detriment of his descendants.(31) Moreover, frequent efforts on the part of the monarchy to curtail the harassment of converts imply [379] that Mudéjares actually lowered their status in the eyes of Christians by abandoning their faith. In Valencia "numerous persons" were in the habit of "shouting out loud various harsh and injurious words of insult, whenever they felt like it, against those who ... converted to the Catholic faith, and of calling them names such as 'dogs, 'sons of bitches, 'renegades."(32)
There is, in fact, only one documented case of a conversion to Christianity during the decade 1355-65, and this under duress of a sort,(33) whereas numerous instances of conversions from Islam to Judaism occur. This is the more remarkable in view of the fact that such conversions were punishable with death:
It has been humbly brought to our attention on behalf of the Muslim aljamas of the kingdom of Valencia that Muslims are permitted by their law to put to death any Muslim or Muslims converted(34) to the Jewish faith, yet when it happens that some Moor or Mooress is converted to the said Jewish faith, numerous Christians nonetheless endeavor to defend the said converted Jews and to prevent justice being done to them according to their law, to the detriment of the Muslims, and in flagrant [380] violation of their law. We, therefore, in response to the humble entreaty made to us on their behalf, direct and command you that whenever it should happen that a Moor or Mooress is converted to the Jewish faith, you shall permit them to be judged and punished totally by Muslim qadis, according to their law, without mercy, financial compromise, or any sort of remission or interference whatever.(35)In Catalonia this provision was enacted into law by the general Corts as well.(36) The fact that Christian monarchs would acquiesce in the execution of converts from Islam to Judaism implies several interesting things. There must have been a large number of such converts to evoke the demands from Muslim communities in the first place, and this could imply -- among other things -- that conditions were on the whole better for Jews than for Muslims.(37) On the other hand, the fact that the king would favor the Muslim cause, as it were, against the Jewish one, implies a rather stronger bargaining position for the Mudéjares.(38) At the very least, the situation bespeaks a close co-existence between the Muslim and Jewish communities of Aragon, since the conversions were on the whole apparently the result of [381] dialogue and conviction rather than ulterior motive.(39)
Names provide, if not an index of acculturation, at least an interesting comment on the degree to which Mudéjares became part of the Christian culture in which they lived. Christian names became increasingly common for Muslims throughout the fourteenth century. The aim was not necessarily to "pass" as Christian: Mahomat Alfoll kept his obviously Muslim first name while adopting a clearly Catalan surname, as did Mahoma Ballistarius, and Mahoma Tintorer. Some Muslims maintained two names, both of which appear in Christian records: "quidam sarracenus vocatus Lopello de Serrha, mahometi modo cognominatus Abraham"; others simply adopted wholly Christian names: Jassia Ferris, Garcia Gomez, Mateu Mercer, Joan Tandero.(40)
Two reasons suggest themselves for this phenomenon. The first is quite obvious. Christians had a great deal of trouble with Arabic names, as is evidenced not only by the inaccurate transcriptions of them into Chancery documents, but also by the uneasiness of lawmakers before what they considered the indistinguishability of Mudéjar appellations.(41) The second is that the Muslims themselves, at least in the North, appear to have been rapidly losing what little Arabic they [382] knew in the fourteenth century. Muslim learning and literature evaporated from the kingdoms under the Crown of Aragon with surprising celerity once their sustaining patrons among the aristocracy had fled to "partes Barbarie" in the thirteenth century, and it is quite likely that most northern Mudéjares read little if any Arabic in the middle of the fourteenth century. In 1363 the king sent to Lérida for a translator for some Arabic documents, since he had "been given to understand that here in Lérida there is a Moor who can read and translate written Arabic."(42)
Merely finding a Mudéjar who
knew how to read Arabic, however, was not the end of the king's problem,
as a note from the translator of a letter sent to Peters predecessor, Alfonso
IV, by the Sultan of Damascus eloquently demonstrates. This note is written
on the back of a Romance translation of the letter, in the same hand, which
strikingly resembles Arabic script. Although the writer professes to have
had trouble with the Arabic of the letter, his Romance is difficult and
uneducated, and the letter as translated would not seem to have presented
any unusual difficulties. An approximate translation of the note follows:
This is translated from a letter from the Sultan of Damascus which was sent to the very noble king, Don Alfonso, by the Grace of God King of Aragon, of Valencia, of Sardinia, of Corsica, and Count of Barcelona.Due either to the Crown's inability to locate bi-lingual Mudéjares or to their inability when found to cope with formal Arabic, Peter the Ceremonious generally relied on interpreters from the Muslim kings themselves to read him letters from their masters ("...Abd ar-Rahman ibn al-Adwi wa Mus'ud, the interpreter, brought you this letter and translated it for you word for word..."),(44) or had the letters sent to him with a Romance translation by his ambassadors in the country of origin: "Two copies were made of this treaty: one in Arabic and one in Romance, both of which have been brought to you by your emissary, the aforesaid Francesch Sacosta, so that you may [384] examine and understand what is written in them."(45)
[383] The person who translated this letter says that no one who saw it was able to say what this Arabic meant, .. .but that it is executed with great skill, in verses of enormous subtlety of the type which is effected with Arabic grammar.
In many places he was not able to translate words, because such words do not exist in Romance, or he had to translate the meaning.
This is the translation which follows.
The most difficult part is when he speaks in the third person.(43)
In the South the problem was the reverse: Mudéjares knew and wrote Arabic but did not know Romance, and, official translators were required in each town to execute documents and interpret royal edicts. Christians, Muslims, and Jews were all employed in this capacity, and Muslim translators even accompanied tax officials.(46) The king occasionally relied on these minor officials for royal business, but does not seem to have had recourse to them for diplomatic documents.(47)
The Iberian symbiosis may have been beautifully woven of human tolerance and interdependence, but it was not one of those webs whose symmetrical patterns is readily visible, nor whose regular and harmonious spacing charms the eye. Incredibly complex, overlaid again and again with criss-crossed and tangled patterns, it was held in place more by the tension of its weaving than the genius of its arrangement. In the South the vast majority of the Mudéjares did not speak the language of the dominant culture. They were viewed with suspicion by their Christian neighbors, and not without justification, since they were given to revolts, and clamored for the privilege of [385] emigrating to Muslim lands. Yet they were the backbone of the society there, manufacturing its goods, constructing its buildings, producing its foodstuffs, even fighting its wars. In the North, the majority of Muslims spoke poor Romance but could not read Arabic at all. They were far less disaffected, and emigrated in a slow, albeit steady trickle. Although less crucial in many areas, they were nonetheless visibly necessary to the Christian economy, and in great demand, especially as artisans and skilled laborers. Somewhat better trusted than their southern brethren, they were subject to the same exploitation and oppression, often denied basic civil rights, and viewed by the monarchy largely as children incapable of regulating their own lives.
Across this complex and tangled web cut, beginning in 1355, the broad, blunt sword of the war with Castile, a war fought mostly within the lands of the Crown of Aragon and at huge cost to the inhabitants of those lands. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to discover how much of the web remained after the sword had passed through it.
The economic effects of the war on the Crown's lands as a whole were devastating. The Aragonese florin, already devalued in 1352, was devalued again in 1362 and once more in 1365, only three years later.(48) Salaries rose drastically in Valencia from 1351 to 1370, owing to the extreme shortage of manpower occasioned by the [386] combination of the plague and the war with Castile.(49) The price index for Aragon, after falling steadily from 1326 to 1350, had approximately doubled by the mid-point of the war, only ten years later, and continued to rise, doubling again in the following decade, after which it began to drop.(50) The suffering of the citizens was staggering. Only two years after the outbreak of hostilities the population of Borja was practically destitute.(51) By the early sixties practically all of Valencia west of Játiva was destitute and depopulated. Taxes could not be collected, and lords and masters of formerly prosperous lands were trying desperately to attract new serfs and farmers to populate their empty property, abandoned by ruined peasants: "all of their things were burned, and they were all totally undone by the war, because they had to sell the land they lived on and take refuge in the mountains..."(52) Countless individuals lost all they had, and many had to flee when their farms, their villages, or even major cities were occupied and destroyed.(53) Mudéjares fled in such numbers, and those who remained were so ruined, that the aljama of Valencia, once one of the major sources of wealth for the Crown, could not raise [387] 100 sueldos in 1365 to pay the salary of its treasurer, and the aljama of Játiva, the wealthiest under the Crown of Aragon, could not pay any of its taxes in 1366, all of which had to be remitted by the Crown.(54)
Far-reaching and almost inevitably disaffecting changes in Mudéjar life-styles and economic position were occasioned by the war. Numerous Muslims previously exempt from royal exactions were made liable to royal taxes for the first time during the war with Castile, even some of those personally serving in the kings army.(55) Huge amounts of property passed out of Muslim hands, thus reducing the tax base of the aljamas; new laws were passed by the Crown limiting the sale of property by Mudéjares.(56) The financial affairs of some aljamas, most notably that of Zaragoza, passed out of their control altogether.(57) The export of grain from one town to another was prohibited.(58) Muslims were forced to spend the small amount of cash they had in fortifying sections of the aljama or city.(59) In almost all of Valencia the crops were either burned or trampled, and Muslims were sometimes forced to burn their own fields; they were in any case prevented from planting in much of the realm by [388] open warfare.(60) Huge numbers of necessary facilities were bricked. up, burned, or razed, often leaving Muslims with no mills or granaries for years after the war.(61) Yet during this period most aljamas were forced to pay their officials salaries at pre-war rates or higher, and many did not receive exemptions or remissions of royal taxes.(62)
Of course, as has been pointed out previously, the Crown was on the whole indulgent about collecting taxes from impoverished Muslim conmunities, and it cannot be denied that some Mudéjares made money out of the war. Many Valencian Muslims sold the Crown goods and products needed for the war effort,(63) and in Aragon the much needed laborers in war-related projects received double benefits: not only were their salaries increased with the demand, but, to get them to work, they were paid back wages which were owed them by the Crown:
Since we have urgent need of the machine-makers Garcia, Mahoma, and Garcia Gómez, for making machines and other devices in Tarazona, we direct and expressly command you to pay them immediately, out of whatever fund of ours [are at hand], whatever is still owed them of the 500s which we ordered paid to them in another letter by way of salary...(64)[389] Much of the property confiscated, from Jews and Muslims suspected of collaborating with the enemy was returned to Muslim hands, and many Muslim communities co-operating in the war effort were given or lent supplies, animals, and even cash.(65)
The changes in Mudéjar lives were not, of course, wholly economic. As in any war, there were widows, orphans, wounded and maimed. Homes were destroyed, factories, livelihoods. Meat markets were torn down or burned, precipitating a moral crisis for Muslims with no access to approved meat.(66) Many officials were summarily relieved of their positions when military commanders were appointed to govern cities or countrysides.(67) The pace of enslavement of Mudéjares -- both legal and illegal -- quickened, and under the smokescreen of the war went largely unchecked.(68) Muslims suffered a considerable decrease in their personal mobility: royal Mudéjares were prohibited, from exercising their traditional right to move to other domains,(69) those who moved out of towns out of fear of the war were ordered. to move back in,(70) and the right to wander about [390] begging alms was effectively terminated.(71) Many ancient privileges were abridged or ended, such as the right of the Muslims and Jews of Daroca to be taxed only in the presence of the bailiff; towns which surrendered to the King of Castile lost all their privileges, including, of course, any which had been promised them by him.(72) Many Mudéjares changed jurisdiction as a consequence of the war: the Jews and Muslims of Ejea were removed from the jurisdiction of the Vice-governor of Aragon and placed under the supervision of Luppus de Gurrea, a knight; the Mulim aljama of Almonazir was removed from the jurisdiction of Segorbe and made independent; Mudéjares who moved into the city of Játiva out of fear of the war in the countryside found themselves the object of long and bitter jurisdictional disputes between the city and the aljama.(73) Some of these changes represented the desire of the Mudéjares themselves: of the many aljamas coming under the control of the queen as a result of the war, at least one, Eslida, did so at the request of the Muslim population itself.(74) Others, such as that of Vilafalig, were shuffled around from lord to lord at the whim of the monarchy and the Christian aristocracy.(75)
There were, of course, gains as well, many of which have been [391] pointed out in preceding chapters. Many communities, especially in Valencia, wrung from the desperate Crown concessions which they could never have obtained under normal conditions: tax reductions, changes in feudal duties, guarantees of religious rights, concessions of merimperium, pardons for crimes, amnesties from fines, intervention against noble abuse and exploitation.
The question is, were such concessions and favors necessary to maintain the loyalty of the Mudéjar population, and if so, why? Did they work? Unlike many questions involving Muslim-Christian relations, the answers to these are relatively simple, albeit generalized. The bare facts are eloquent, although they do not reveal whole story. In the North, only one aljama defected to Castile, and rather few individuals. The aljama was that of Torellas, located quite near Tarazona. It had been captured along with the city in 1357, when the Castilians overran the area. Peter had been so enraged at the surrender of the city that he slew the messengers who brought him the news. The aljama returned to the king's service even before the Christian populace, and the Crowns anger does not appear directed at all towards the Mudéjares, who could hardly have held out when the fortified city could not.(76)
In Valencia, on the other hand, the case was quite different. Beginning in 1363, defections by Mudéjar communities and individuals snowballed into staggering proportions. Between that year and 1365 [392] all or most of the Muslims either abandoned or surrendered to Castile the aljamas of Bechí, Chelva, Fanzara, Muntroy, Dues Aygues, Serra, Eslida, Artana, Castro, Valldigna, Alfandequiella, Benalguazir, Elche, Segorbe, Ondara, Verger, Real, Beniharb, Eig, Miraflor, Pamies, Vinyals, Espada, Enveyó, Benicandut, Alcudia, Xenguer, Ayhi, and Atzuena. Of course, it would be rash to assume that mere disaffection was the overriding factor in each of these cases. Both monarchs made constant efforts to entice the other's vassals, Christian and Muslim, over to their side. In many cases aljamas were simply conquered by superior force, and in others they faced specific threats or vague fears which inspired them with sufficient dread to surrender. In a few cases, in fact, they may not have collaborated at all, but only annoyed the Crown by not resisting "to the death," as he commanded the Mudéjares of Artana to do if Castilian forces should try to retake the town after be regained it.(77) The fact that property which belonged to Muslims or Jews merely "suspected" of disloyalty was regularly granted away as if the case were definitely settled suggests a certain rashness of judgement on the part of the Crown in the matter.(78)
But such a massive scale of defection cannot be adequately explained in this way. In the first place, the effect of enticement worked both ways, and the Muslims attracted to Aragon came from Castile in groups of two or three individuals, not by the score of [393] towns.(79) The element of fear also worked both ways: many aljamas whose loyalty the Crown doubted were threatened with confiscation and enslavement in the early years of the war (and the threat was carried out),(80) and, when this failed of its effect, the Crown began taking hostages from important aljamas to ensure their loyalty.(81) Moreover, in the vast majority of cases the king was still negotiating for the return of the Muslims to his service long after the Castilians had left the area. In some instances the entire aljama had even moved to Castile, and the king had to persuade them to move back to Aragon.(82) Perhaps the most telling fact is that in none of the cases recorded did the Christian population of Valencia defect along with the Muslims; in one or two places the Christians were occupied and surrendered, but no Christian population had to be wooed back to the kings service as did the Mudéjar groups listed on the previous page.(83)
What prompted so many communities to abandon the Crown of Aragon, and why did they return to its service after doing so? To understand this properly, it is essential to bear in mind the history of the area, and the nature of its social structure. No doubt the lower [394] classes of Muslims living in Valencia under the Crown of Aragon were disaffected and alienated. They doubtless felt little attachment to the Crown itself, and probably even less to its "causes," especially when these causes involved the destruction of their homes and crops. They most likely entertained only little more affection for their immediate rulers (except in a few cases), and viewed their Christian compatriots with cool indifference, if not suppressed hostility. Wholesale disloyalty under the circumstances was hardly surprising. But what is crucial here is that wholesale disloyalty was a tradition in Muslim Spain. It was not a question of Muslim vs. Christian, of Mudéjar vs. Conquistador, or even of Aragon vs. Castile. From the time of the Muslim conquest of Spain in the eighth century there had been massive disloyalty, wholesale defections, and self-interested and shifting patterns of loyalty among both the Christian and Muslim populations of the area. The ancestors of Peter's Mudéjar subjects had shown no less alacrity in abandoning one Muslim lord for another in the twelfth century, or a Muslim for a Christian in the thirteenth. They were not assimilated, it is true, but they had never been assimilated, and there is no reason to believe that they resented unintelligible, Romance-speaking overlords any more (or less) than unintelligible Berber ones.
Nor, however, should their return to Peter's service be taken as more than it really indicates. It is true that Peter offered the rebellious Muslims new privileges, amnesties, pardons, tax advantages, and various other royal favors to attract them back, but it is highly unlikely that these achieved the desired end. What in fact brought [395] the majority of aljamas back under the Crown of Aragon was the extraordinary effort put forward to achieve this by Muslim leaders. Despite the many privileges offered the Moors of Fanzara, for instance, as incentive to return to their previous loyalty -- privileges which included all those formerly enjoyed under Peter of Exerica, as well as "greater and better ones"(84) -- it was, in fact, the personal efforts of the amin of Eslida which effected their return, and not the offers of the Crown.(85) It was two amins of Segorbe who effected the capitulation of the city's Muslim population, the amin of Millars who persuaded the aljamas of Muntroy and Dues Aygues to surrender, two Mudéjares of Cunyega and Artana who achieved the submission of Eslida, and the amin of Eslida who got his Mudéjar brethren in Serra to give in to the blandishments of the king.(86) The list could be expanded to cover very nearly every rebellious aljama.
In most cases such Muslim notables were specifically deputed to their roles as mediators for the king, and. granted by him full power to arrange any sort of settlement they might wish:
We wish you to know that we are sending to you Ali Xarra, a Moor from Artana, regarding certain affairs of yours and ours, and that [he is] fully informed of our desires. We therefore implore you to accept whatever he may tell you on our behalf and to comply with it fully, because we promise you on our royal honor that everything the said Ali may promise you in our name we will [396] fulfill and be bound by without any exception.(87)It is tempting to imagine a class of loyal servants of the king acting from pure devotion to bring back their recalcitrant and ungrateful compatriots from their treachery, and some of these emissaries may have been doing just that. The majority, however, were clearly following another Iberian tradition, one embodied in such heroes as the Cid and, kept alive by the great Granadan and Catalan mercenary companies who served whichever king made them the most attractive offer: the tradition of self-interest. In return for their efforts, the amins and others who so persuasively enticed their Muslim brethren back into Peter's service were granted property, fields, houses, orchards, exemption from all royal taxes, rights over mills and granaries, and high positions in aljama governments.(88) Even this might not evoke too much cynicism about their own loyalty to the Crown, if it were not for the fact that the single most common reward granted to the Mudéjar negotiators was the right to emigrate to Muslim lands without royal interference of any kind. In fact, this privilege, granted to the recipient and his family, was frequently conceded along with a morería position, such as the alcadia of some [397] aljama, implying that the Moor would hold the position for a certain number of years and then retire, as it were, to an Islamic country(89) -- almost like British civil servants going home to England after years in India. (Most such British retirees, however, had not been born in India.)
Indeed, a certain cynicism seems to have pervaded the actions and attitudes of all sides during the period in question. After being promised "on the royal honor" that they would not be taxed for the war with Castile if they returned to the king's service, the Muslims of Fanzara quickly found themselves being dunned by royal tax collectors for 2,000s worth of back war taxes, and complained vehemently to the king. Although Peter acceded to their demands and instructed the officials not to force them to pay, his motivation was notably unrelated to any questions of justice or "royal honor": "This might be most disadvantageous to our interests," he observed coldly, "since the men in other places which the King of Castile has seized from us, and who have decided to return to our service, could draw an example from this, and it could be that we would lose such places."(90)
Of course, one must bear in mind that Christians, too, defected to Castile, albeit in vastly smaller numbers, that it was not uncommon [398] for medieval monarchs to find flagging loyalty among any type of subject during long and costly wars, that in the North many individual Muslims and even some whole communities served the king with loyalty and enthusiasm, and that the Crown itself, although not single-minded about it, was probably sincerely grateful to those Muslims to whom it granted rewards after the war was over.(91) Indeed, that convivencia based on mutual acceptance and supra-ethnic loyalty which so many Iberian scholars seem determined to find in their medieval heritage may actually have existed -- to a degree -- in Aragon and Catalonia, where Mudéjares were so acculturated that they could not have survived in a more Islamic environment and almost had to concern themselves with the welfare of the monarch who protected them. Emigration for them was not a realistic alternative, since they probably knew a poor Arabic, if any at all, and since they had become so thoroughly enmeshed in the Mudéjar culture of Aragon that they could have left it only by abandoning all that was familiar for new and alien surroundings and a culture almost wholly unknown to them. Both the small number of émigrés from northern lands and the general loyalty of Aragonese and Catalan Mudéjares during the severe crisis of the war with Castile are testimony to the general success of Catalan-Aragonese convivencia, as are the superior organization of Aragonese and Catalan aljamas, the generally fairer [399] attitude of the Crown to northern Muslims in such matters as honoring agreements and safeguarding their (limited) independence within the morería, and their slightly more advantaged position before the law in regards to mobility, dress codes, etc.
In Valencia the word convivencia
must be understood in a more mechanical sense. Muslims, Jews, and Christians
all lived in close proximity and engaged in the same activities in all
areas of life. Mudéjares enjoyed many rights, grew prosperous, and
were indispensable to the welfare of the realm. That real cultural interaction,
however, which smaller numbers, longer years, and a more stable social
matrix had made both possible and necessary for Aragonese Mudéjares,
was wanting in Valencia. Here Christians harbored deep suspicions of Mudéjares,
and the Muslims in turn resented the Christians who ruled them. Muslims
sought to leave the kingdom both legally and illegally, and those with
wealth or influence generally managed to do so. Few, if any, prominent
Valencian Muslims became part of the civil service éite exemplified
by Aragonese families such as the Belvis. Instead, they found outlets for
their energies either in their own private lives and communities or in
revolting against or abandoning the dominant Christian society. They spoke
little if any Romance, and came into contact with the Crown which ruled
them through the office of translators, often Christian or Jewish. As a
consequence [400] of all this, they had little or no loyalty to
the society of which they were part, or to the monarchy which ruled it,
and when called upon to support either one in a time of internal crisis
either refused or used the opportunity to wrest power and concessions from
those who needed their aid. Compared to the sort of co-operation and cultural
absorption visible among Mudéjares in Aragon, co-existence between
the
ethnic groups in Valencia was simply that: co-existence. It was characterized
by the physical proximity of the groups, and the absence of conflict, but
little more. Perhaps this was enough for a society used to internal strife
and instability; perhaps the mere absence of conflict constituted a sort
of miracle on soil fertilized with blood shed over the names of prophets
and gods; perhaps Peter was not so dismayed as one might suppose by the
wholesale defection of his Muslim subjects. But if so, that word so favored
by writers on the subject -- convivencia -- must be applied with
extreme caution, for its implications, however vague, go far beyond the
tense stalemate which prevailed in the sunny realm of Valencia.
3. C 701:32 (May 14, 1360); C 705:178 (July 22, 1361).
7. E.g., C 986:48 (Sept.5, 1365), C 1210:84 (Apr.25, 1365).
8. An example of such a letter for a member of the royal household, Faraig de Belvis, is translated on p.146. For others, see C 1149:54 (Jan.12, 1357), and. C 1573:29 (May 1, 1364).
11. C 907:204 (Sept.26, 1362).
13. C 1387:182 (Dec. 18-19, 1365).
14. Ramos y Loscertales, "Recopilación," s.121: "...et certe numquam debet aliquis christianus testari pro mauro vel iudeo, tum quia sunt inimici crucis Christi, per quam totus mundus saluatur et vite salus reparatur, tum quia sunt proditores et die et nocte cogitant christianis fraudes multimodas laqueare, et contra quod maius est numquam sompniant eis bonum.."
16. Ibid., p.160, and passim; Furs of Valencia, IX.17.9.
17. See Chapter II, pp.64ss; Chapter VII, p.368, n.15.
18. "...perpendimus [ut] aliqui habitatores ville Burgie tam Christiani quam sarraceni odio habentes judeos aljama ipsius ipsos et eorum singulares vilipendere conantur, pignorando et alias injusticias nulla de causa pereuntes, ut fertur, eis faciendo.... Idcirco nos in tuitione, presidio ac defensione vestra commendamus aljamam jamdictam et singulares de eadem..." C 691:166 (Jan.31, 1358). Cf. C 1566:106 (Jan.12, 1357).
19. C 1209:128 (June 3, 1365); C 1506:20 (Mar.22, 1363).
20. C 1068:1314 (June 16, 1365); C 1075:71 (June 28. 1363); cf.. p. 288.
21. "Pregam que vos sapiats si en lo dit loch ha massa moros, e si ni ha massa, quen façats traure aquells que us sera semblant" C 10714:130 (June 25, 1362). Cf. C 1075:71 (Jan.28, 1363), C 1075:111 (Apr.3,1363).
22. ". . .malum a bono discernere nesciunt..." C 1071:173 (Jan.114, 1360); "...illos humilioris legis gravat condicio..." C 913:33 (Sept.16, 1366).
24. "...seditionem et rebellionem in regno Valentie contra nostram regiam magestatem, ac homicidia, rapinias, et furta ac expugnationes locorum committendo, vim publicam et alia nonnulla enormia crimina..." C 907:74 (Apr.10, 1362).
25. C 1071:173 (June 14, 1360), C 1072:164 (Aug.30, 1360), and ibid., bis.
26. "...ut ipsarum penarum exemplum terribilem perpetuo relinqueritur..." C 1494:12 (July 10, 1360) and C 704:51 (July 7, 1360); cf. C 1072:162 (Aug.30, 1360).
27. C 1072:83 (July 11, 1360), C 904:183 (Oct.7, 1360), C 904:185 (Oct.3, 1360).
28. C 905:175 (May 28, 1361); Cf. C 905:177 (May 28, 1361), and ibid., C 905:181 (May 28, 1361), C 708:213 (Apr.6, 1362), and C 1073:197 (Apr.16, 1362).
29. C 986:13 (Aug.23, 1365). Cf. Piles Ros, Estudio, p.299, #819.
31. From the laws conceded to Játiva in 1252, quoted by Roca Traver ("Un Siglo," p.34, n.82) from the unpublished work of Miguel Gual Camarena, Cartas pueblas del Reino de Valencia. This was to prevent the Crown's losing the special prerogatives it enjoyed over Muslim real property, as is implied in the law itself: ". . .et possimus eas [= hereditates sarracenorum] dare sarracenis et non christianis." It was, on the other hand, clearly in the interest of Muslim slaves to convert: Verlinden, L'Esclavage, pp. 425, 534; Piles Ros, Estudio, p.256.
32. ". . .contra illos qui. . .ad fidem catholicam se convertunt diversa gravia et enormia injuriarum verba ad libitum prorumpe clamando, et dicendo hec verba vel similia: 'canes, 'filios canum, 'retallats'" C 1176:8 (May 19, 1361). This was prohibited under a fine of about 700s, of which one-third was the king's and one third belonged to the parish in which the incident took place: a clear incentive to report such doings, and an indication of the king's sincerity. Cf. Tilander, Fueros, pp.l60-l, where Christians are forbidden to call converts "tornadiço ni renegado ni otra semblant palaura."
33. See Chapter VII, p.346. C 695:155 (July 20, 1357) mentions the trial of Berengar de Apilia, who is described as "conversus habitator civitatis Valentie, filius Açan Abenxa, sarraceni menescalli civitatis prefate." If Abenxa = Abenxoa, this is an interesting note on the Muslim civil service aristocracy (see pp.43ss).
34. The Latin has perversos rather than the usual conversos: a concession to Mudéjar sentiment?
35. C 862:121 (Jan.12,1337), in Appendix. Instead of "without mercy, financial compromise. . . ," the text may mean "without benefit of financial compromise.."
36. Described in 1358 as "recently enacted" (C 691:232 [May 18, 1358]): "...iuxta quamdam contitutionem generalem Cathalonie dudum in civitate Tarraçone editam sive factam, nullus sarracenus nec nulla sarracena valeat seu presumat quovismodo ad legem judaycam se transferre, et si contrarium per aliquein sarracenum vel sarracenam fit, quod incurrat ille talis penam corporis et bonorum..."
37. C 691:232, as above, C 690:31 (Aug.12, 1356), C 899:60 (Aug. 22, 1356), C 905:68 (Jan.4, 1361). Cf. Verlinden, L'Esclavage, p. 459.
38. Nonetheless, in the case cited at C 905:68 (above), the Jewish aljama of Barcelona was pardoned by the king for having "persuaded" a Muslim to convert to Judaism.
39. See note above. Verlinden cites a case of a Jew converting to Islam: L'Esclavage, p.536; Christians who did so could move to Muslim land with impunity: Roca Traver, "Un Siglo," p.30, n.72 (= C 39:162).
40. C 905:68 (Jan.14, 1361). Christian names became more common in the fifteenth century: see Piles Ros, Estudio, #s 116, 332, 333, 548, etc., and Macho y Ortega, "Condición," pp.l97ss.
41. See Costums, VI.9.5. Note that the description of the oath Muslims were required to swear by is regularly so garbled in Christian law Codes that (if at all recognizable) it would violate the conscience of a Muslim to repeat it: e.g., "Et mauro qui voluerit iurare ad christiano ei dicat, 'Alamin canzano et talat teleta" (Ramos y Loscertales, "Fuero," p. 37.) It often states, in fact, something on the order of "by God than whom there are other Gods." See Tilander, pp. 266-9.
42. C 1075:66 (Jan.19, 1363): "E haiam entes que aqui a Leyda ha i moro que sap liger e esplanar letra morisca." On the decline of learning in the post-crusade era, see Burns, Islam, pp.4l3ss.
43. The letter is dated March 23, 1330. The text is as follows: "Este es translado de una carta del Ssoldan de Damasco que fue enbiada al muy noble Rey, Don Alfonsso, por la gracia de Dios Rey d'Aragon, de Valencia., de Çardena, de Corçego, Comte Barchilona. Dize el que traslado esta carta, non sse cuyde niguno que viese esta carta que es de entendeder este arauigu della segundo la lengua espeçial, ante es fecha a gran maestria por viesos vesifagados de gran soteleza, del que la fizo en la gramateca del arauigo. En muchos logares non se pudo trasladar los viervos, ca non auie tales viervos en romançe, o ve de tarasladar la entiçion. Este es el trasladu que sse ssigue. Lo mas es como quan ffabla a terçera persona."
44. M. Alarcón Santón and R. García Linares, Los documentos árabesdiplomáticos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón (Madrid-Granada, 1940), p.197. This document is incorrectly dated by Alarcón: the Arabic date, the 29th of rajali, is the equivalent of Oct.2, not Sept.14, during the Muslim year 751 (= A.D. 1350). Translators were often loaded with gifts by the grateful suzerain: González Hurtebise, Libros, p.371 (l666-9).
45. Alarcón Santón, Documentos, p.324. Alarcón has misread the date of this document as the twenty-ninth of jumâda although the Arabic clearly says the twenty-seventh. It should therefore be dated May 15, 1360, rather than March 18, as is given in the text.
46. See p.74, n.41, and pp.94-5, n. 116. Cf. the case of the Fuster property in RP l708:l8ss (1362), where a Christian was paid is to translate Arabic wills into Romance.
47. But see C 11401:78 (May 19, 1355).
48. Hamilton, Money, pp.13-14; cf. p. 86.
49. Hamilton, Money, pp.68-9. Hamilton does not list either the war or the plague as causes of this increase.
51. C 1381:33 (June 21, 1357).
52. "...totes les coses lurs son cremades, e ells tots deffeyts per raho de la guerra, car hagueren a desemperar les alquaries on estauen e pujar en la serra..." C 1209:44 (Mar.l4, 1365). Cf. C 983:85 (Jan. 21, 1359), C 1569:102 (July 6, 1361), C 1569:134 (Mar.28, 1362).
53. E.g., C 1197:19 (Feb.26, 1364), C 715:50 (Oct.13, 1363). Both of these incidents involved Mudéjar families.
54. C 1209:125 (May 29, 1365), C 910:120 (Sept.16, 1366).
55. E.g., C 688:91, 908:79 and 84, 1183:158, all discussed above, in Chapter V. Ballistarius was serving in the king's army during the dispute discussed on p.214.
56. C 712:117 (Feb.18, 1363), C 723:158 (Dec.20, 1365), C 1206:44 (Aug.20, 1365), C 1573:127, 128 (May 6, 1365).
59. E.g., C 1566:115 (Mar.3, 1357).
60. C 1204:3,27 (May 4, 1365), C 1209:87 (May 4, 1365), C 1209:68 (Apr.8, 1365), C 1573:148 (June 28, 1365), C 912:167 (June 5, 1366), C 694:208 (Sept.20, 1358).
61. C 1569:118 (Sept.10, 1361), C 1569:145 (Aug.17, 1362).
62. C 966:96 (Feb.10, 1357) specifies that morería officials' salaries should not be reduced because of the war. On taxes, see C 1569:20 (Oct.1, 1359), where the queen declines to remit taxes owed by the desperate aljama of Elche; but cf. C 1569:25 (Oct.17, 1359), where she remits a different tax to the same aljama.
63. Especially cloth: RP 1710:147, 148 (1365).
64. "Quia Garciam et Mahomam et Garciam Gomecii, magistros machinarum, pro faciendis machinis et aliis artificibus in civitate Tirasone festine necessarios habemus, ideo vobis dicimus et expresse mandamus quatenus incontinenti de quacumque peccunia nostra solvatis eis quicquid eis restet ad solvendum ex illis quingentis solidis barchinonensibus quos ipsis cum alia littera nostra dari providimus pro eorum salario..." C 1170:160 (May 9, 1360).
65. Property: C 903:290 (May 7, 1360), C 909:714 (Dec.11, 1363); animals: C 718:87 (Nov.30, 1364); cash: HP 1711:29 (1366).
66. E.g., C 1571:89 (Feb.14, 1363).
67. C 1569:108 (Aug.15, 1361).
68. See C 986:90 (Oct..14, 1365), in Appendix.
72. C 699:220 (Apr.23, 1360); C 1536:80 (Sept.16, 1366); C 912:191 (June 18, 1366); C 1572:63 (Oct.15, 1366).
73. C 713:58 (Aug.25, 1362), C 1205:69 (Apr.7, 1365), C 1206:151 (Oct.15, 1365).
76. C 1175:186 (Feb.4, 1360) contains the king's offer to the Muslims; the Christians did not surrender till the twenty-third of the month.
77. "...mortem ultronei subeatis.. ." C 1205:35 (Mar. l, 1365).
78. "... in casu quo dictus iudeus nunc sit nobis rebellis et vasallus regis Castelle..." C 903:290 (May 7, 1360).
79. See C 912:166 (May 27, 1366), C l189:224 (July 23, 1363).
80. C 1385:148 (Sept.5, 1363); cf. C 986:93 and C 1207:145, discussed in Chapter I, p. 40.
81. See Chapter VII, pp.335ss.
82. E.g., the case of Benalguazir, C 1206:146 (Oct.7, 1365). Note that the letter is addressed to the faqi who had defected with the rest of the aljama.
83. The king bitterly remarks on this in several places, e.g., in C 986:93 (see note 80, above) and C 720:77 (Aug.30, 1365).
84. ". . . sed etiam aliis majoribus et melioribus. .." C 909:75 (Dec.11,1363).
86. C 720:77 (Aug.30, 1365), C 1197:129 (May 6, 13614), C 1211:36 (Mar. 24, 1365), C 1209:57 (Mar.29, 1365), C 1205:37 (Mar. l, 1365), C 1211:26 (Mar.21, 1365), and see note 87, below.
87. "Ffemos vos saber que nos enbiamos Ali Xarra, moro d'Artana, sobre algunos aferes nostros e vostros, de la nostra entencion plenament enformado. Por que us rogamos que lo creades de lo que us dira de part nostra, e aquello cumplades pro obra. Por que vos prometemos en nostra buena fe real que todo lo quel dito Ali vos prometra de part nostra, aquello cumpliremos e tendremos sin falta alguna" C 1210:52 (Mar.17, 1365).
88. E.g., C 720:77, C 1205:37, C 1205:41, C 1209:56, C 1211:36, C 1573:127, C 1573:128 (long series of such grants here). All are from 1365.
89. E.g., C 1209:56 (Mar.20, 1365), to a Muslim of Fanzara; C 1209: 64 (Mar.12, 1365), to the former faqi of Eslida, who became thereby its qadi, and received at the same time the right to emigrate.
90. "...de aço se puxa seguir gran dampnatge a nostres afers, car los homens dels altres lochs quel Rey de Castella nos ha occupats e han voluntat de tornar a la nostra senyoria ne porien pendre exempli e poria esser quen podriem [sic: sc. 'perdriem] los dits lochs" C 1209:50 (Mar.18, 1365).
91. Many Christians left royal territory during the war in Sardinia to avoid military service, and Muslims and Jews took their places: C 980:95 (1355). For an example of voluntary loyalty in Aragon, see C 1379:93 (Dec.24, 1356). Even in Valencia, some Muslims returned without royal promises or friendly persuasion, sometimes despite stiff fines facing them on their return (for abandoning their homes in defiance of royal edict): see RP 1709:19 (1364), where two Muslims of Alcocer pay 200s for such a fine. More frequently, however, such fines were remitted, e.g., C 1205:69 (Apr.5, 1365), and C 1210:95 (May 23, 1365).