[95] Historians have rendered varying judgments on the importance of the cortes in foreign affairs. Martínez Marina, after commenting on the disasters attendant upon wars unleashed by kings without the consent of their subjects, argues that the Castilian cortes "always had the right to intervene in military deliberations, in matters of war and peace, and in the conclusion of treaties of alliance, confederations and truces, and nothing was done without its consent and counsel." Colmeiro, on the contrary, holds that the kings sought the consent of the cortes to make war and to provide the money necessary to do so. Piskorski puts it somewhat more strongly when he insists that the right to consent to declarations of war, the conclusion of peace, or the signature of treaties was one of the most important rights of the cortes. In more recent times, Pérez Prendes qualifies Piskorskis judgment as optimistic, and enters a cautionary note when he insists that in such matters "the mission of the cortes is consultative, but the king is not bound to follow its counsel, but only to give it knowledge of the enterprises being undertaken."⁽¹⁾

[96] Piskorski based his judgment on article 3 of the decreta enacted by Alfonso IX in the curia of León in 1188. The king established a fundamental principle concerning foreign affairs when he declared that he would not make "war or peace or treaty except by the counsel of the bishops, nobles, and good men by whose counsel I ought to be guided." In emphasizing what had been and would continue to be the practice of medieval rulers, the king was acknowledging that without the collaboration of the chief men of the realm he could not realistically carry on war, or expect peace to prevail or an alliance to be effective. Contrary to those who argued that the king was also promising to include representatives of the towns among those whose counsel he would seek, Procter pointed out that the good men mentioned here were probably members of his council.⁽²⁾ Indeed, it is unlikely that the king was binding himself at that time to consult with the towns, but once the cortes developed with regular participation by the townsmen, one may say that they, together with the prelates and nobles, had a role in foreign affairs. War and peace and treaties were matters that touched all the men of the realm, and as such necessitated consultation and oftentimes consent. The extent and nature of counsel and consent varied, however, according to circumstances.

Relations with Christian Powers

Relations with other Christian powers were sometimes treated in the cortes. Representatives of fifty towns, along with several bishops, princes, and nobles, swore to uphold the marriage contract between Berenguela and Conrad of Hohenstaufen, drawn up in the curia of San Esteban de Gormaz in 1187. The betrothal was celebrated in the curia of Carrión in 1188, and Conrad received the accolade of knighthood from Alfonso VIII.⁽³⁾ Because of Conrads early death, the alliance with the Holy Roman Empire projected by this marriage never came to fruition.

Alfonso IX, the new king of León, also was knighted by Alfonso VIII during the curia of Carrión in 1188, and he kissed Alfonso VIIIs hand in sign of vassalage. The subordination which that implied never sat well with Alfonso IX and for many years he maintained a hostile attitude toward Castile. Perhaps for this reason when he returned to his own kingdom he promised the curia of León in 1188 that henceforth he would not make treaties or go to war without seeking proper counsel.⁽⁴⁾

[97] Alfonso X convened the cortes of Toledo 1254 in part to witness the resolution of his pretensions to Gascony, derived from his great-grandmother, Eleanor, the daughter of Henry II of England. In a treaty signed at Toledo on 31 March 1254, he yielded his rights to his sister Leonor and her betrothed, Prince Edward, the son and heir of King Henry III. Their marriage was solemnized in the cortes of Burgos in November. Alfonso Xs objective in all this was not Gascony, but rather Africa. In exchange for surrendering his claims, for whatever they were worth, he persuaded Henry III to promise assistance for a projected invasion of North Africa. Henry III, it seems, never seriously considered fulfilling this pledge.⁽⁵⁾ Although there is no sign that the king asked the cortes to approve or reject the treaty of Toledo, he certainly needed support for his African policy and probably informed the cortes of the substance of the treaty.

Whether Alfonso Xs claims to supremacy over Navarre were also aired in the cortes is uncertain. Ever since the time of Alfonso VII (1126-1157), the kings of Castile had planned to annex Navarre or to partition it with Aragón. With the intention of imposing his suzerainty, Alfonso X was present at Vitoria on the Navarrese frontier from 2 December 1255 to 24 January 1256. Pedro Marín, the prior of Santo Domingo de Silos at that time, reported that "King Thibault of Navarre came to his cortes and became his vassal." Although Alfonso X was accompanied by his usual entourage of some nobles, some prelates, and some towns summoned to provide military support, it is unlikely tbat he had called the cortes to such an eccentric location as Vitoria. Thibault I, moreover, was not recorded in any charter as Alfonso Xs vassal for Navarre, though on 1 January 1256 he did receive the towns of San Sebastián and Fuenterrabia for life, and probably did homage for them at Vitoria.⁽⁶⁾

One of the issues most persistently presented to the cortes were the claims of the infantes de la Cerda, which, in varying degrees, concerned France, Aragón, and Portugal. As this topic has already been discussed at length in Chapter 5, a summary will be sufficient here. The problem had its origin in the marriage of Fernando de la Cerda to Blanche of France in the cortes of Burgos 1269, and Alfonso Xs subsequent recognition of Infante Sancho instead of Alfonso de la Cerda as heir to the throne.⁽⁷⁾ The cortes of Valladolid 1295 recognized Fernando IVs rights against Alfonso and also encouraged his marriage to a Portuguese princess in the hope of gaining the support of King Dinis. With the consent [98] of the towns in the cortes of Valladolid 1298, Maria de Molina appealed to Dinis to help her son retain his crown. The cortes of Valladolid 1300 and Burgos and Zamora 1301 responded positively to the proposed marriage and voted funds to obtain a papal dispensation and legitimation. When the king was urged, during the cortes of Medina del Campo 1302, to make peace with Alfonso de la Cerda, he replied that he would take counsel with the cortes, though we know nothing further of this. In these several instances the cortes, and particularly the townsmen, were actively involved in the determination of policy. Not only did the cortes stand fast in its allegiance to the king, rejecting counterclaims and proposals to partition the realm, but it also vigorously promoted an alliance with Portugal.⁽⁸⁾

Alfonso X and the Holy Roman Empire

Alfonso X presented his quest for the crown of the Holy Roman Empire to the cortes on several occasions. In order to win the votes of the electors in April 1257 and to counteract his rival Richard of Cornwall, Alfonso X had to expend great sums of money. Jofre de Loaysa remarked that the king incurred almost unbelievable expenses on this account and had "to ask the men of his kingdom for servicios and to impose unaccustomed levies upon them." The royal chronicle also commented that his quest for empire "brought great poveryy to the kingdoms of León and Castile."⁽⁹⁾

The empire may have been discussed during the cortes of Valladolid 1258, a few months after Alfonso X accepted election. The solemnity of the occasion was enhanced by the arrival on 3 January of Princess Kristin of Norway, who was to marry one of Alfonso Xs brothers. A Castilian-Norwegian alliance was intended to further the kings imperial ambitions and his projected crusade in North Africa. The king and his future sister-in-law were met at the gates of the city by a "numberless force of knights, barons, archbishops, bishops, and both Christian and infidel envoys." This last reference suggests that possibly representatives of the Moorish kings of Granada, Murcia, and Niebla attended the cortes. Kristins wedding to the kings brother Felipe was solemnized on 31 March, probably after the conclusion of the cortes.⁽¹⁰⁾

As Alfonso X had already begun to issue privileges and pensions to his German supporters, his financial needs may have prompted him to [99] ask the cortes for a subsidy. When he confirmed the exemption of the knights of Toledo from moneda forera on 6 February 1260, he stated that in the previous year they owed him two monedas, one "which they had to give us by right" because the seven-year period was up, and the other for "the affair of the empire."⁽¹¹⁾ The second moneda was an extraordinary levy intended to assist him in pursuing his imperial ambitions, and as such was probably approved by the cortes of Valladolid 1258.

The quest for the imperial crown was the reason for the convocation of the cortes of Toledo 1259. There are no extant cuadernos, but on 6 February 1260 Alfonso X declared, "we thought it well to hold our cortes in the noble city of Toledo concerning the affair of the empire." In a letter to the bishop of Cuenca, dated 20 June 1264, he stated that he had held "our cortes in Toledo concerning the affair of the empire."⁽¹²⁾ The business at hand, in the kings words, was "the affair of the empire," but what was precisely determined is a matter of conjecture. Richard of Cornwall had gone to Germany to be crowned, and Alfonso X seems to have hoped to go to Rome to be crowned by the pope, though he would have first needed to set domestic affairs in order and assure peace with his neighbors. While continuing his diplomacy abroad, he may also have wished to exhibit the magnificence appropriate to his imperial rank, not only to his own subjects but also to the many foreign lords who were now bis vassals, some of whom may have come to the cortes.⁽¹³⁾ Perhaps at this time, with the intention of displaying a grandeur worthy of an emperor, he gave money to Marie de Brienne--wife of Baldwin II, the Latin emperor of Constantinople--to enable her to redeem her son, Philip of Courtenay, who had been mortgaged to the Venetians. This action might have served Alfonso Xs imperial aims, but it caused another great drain on his treasury.⁽¹⁴⁾

In addition, Alfonso X may have chosen this occasion to proclaim his hegemony over the entire Iberian peninsula, thereby resurrecting the imperial claims of the kings of León, who claimed to be heirs of the Visigoths who had ruled all of Spain. Fernando III had wished to revive the Hispanic empire but had not done so because the time was not propitious; however, bis son may have concluded that he could now link Leonese aspirations to imperial rule in Spain with his own claims to the Holy Roman Empire. Alfonso X would first need to obtain the recognition of his fellow peninsular monarchs, which may have been a principal reason for summoning the kings of Granada, Murcia, and Niebla [100] to the cortes. That his peninsular claims were not mere fantasy is indicated by the decision of his father-in-law, Jaime I of Aragón, to appoint a procurator to oppose any assertion that Alfonso X "should be emperor of the Spains and that we and our kingdoms and lands should be in any subjection to him by reason of empire" (27 September 1259).⁽¹⁵⁾

News of the death of his archrival, Richard of Cornwall, in April 1272, encouraged Alfonso X to believe that the Germans and the newly elected pope, Gregory X, would unite in accepting him as emperor. His current objective was to set his kingdom in order so that he could journey abroad to secure recognition of his rights. With this in mind he summoned the cortes to Burgos in the fall of 1272, "concering the business of sending knights to the empire."⁽¹⁶⁾

The confrontation with the magnates in the cortes of Burgos 1272 forced him to postpone his departure, but the cortes apparently granted him a subsidy to make his journey possible. The royal chronicle (whose account of these events is jumbled) recorded the following:

He took counsel with his people as to how he should go to the empire. And to facilitate this he asked the men of the realm to give him every year, until the affair of the empire was concluded, two servicios besides the tributes and rents that they owed him. And all the magnates, infanzones, knights and men of the cities and towns of his kingdoms granted it to him.⁽¹⁷⁾

Alfonso X apparently intended to send a contingent of men to Italy while he personally tried to persuade the pope to acknowledge him as emperor. At the end of the following year the rebellious nobles returned to their allegiance, and the king of Granada also renewed his vassalage, promising payment of 3 00,000 maravedís annually in tribute and making a special contribution of 250,000 maravedís for the journey to the empire.⁽¹⁹⁾

In preparation for the most important journey of his career, Alfonso X summoned the cortes to Burgos in early March 1274. A royal charter of 13 April, given in the year "when we held the cortes in Burgos concerning the matter of sending knights to the empire of Rome," is the [101] only direct reference to it. A description in the royal chronicle of a meeting held in March to prepare for this journey also seems to refer to the cortes of Burgos, although the chronicle places the event in Toledo, probably confusing it with the cortes held there in 1259.⁽²⁰⁾

The business of the cortes was three-fold: to establish Fernando de la Cerda as regent during his fathers absence; to arrange for a retinue of knights who would accompany the king on his journey; and to obtain the necessary financial aid. The king reminded the cortes that the Lombards had often entreated him to come to them, but it was only now that he could do so, as the realm was at peace with the Moors and the rebellious magnates had returned to their former loyalty. Fernando was duly designated as regent, arrangements were made for the defense of the frontier, and the cortes consented to a subsidy for two years so the king could complete "the affair of the empire."⁽²¹⁾

Alfonso X's plea before Gregory X at Beaucaire in May 1275 was a futile one because the pope had already acknowledged Rudolf of Habsburg, whom the German princes had elected as emperor in 1273.⁽²²⁾ Although the overwhelming weight of reality indicated that his pretensions would never be fulfilled, Alfonso X probably never abandoned them. His decision to give a large sum of money to the marquess of .Monferrat, whose daughter married Infante Juan at Burgos in 1281, and to send troops to Lombardy to uphold the Ghibelline cause angered Sancho and others, not only because of the diversion of men and money from the war against the Moors but also because it was apparent that Alfonso X had not surrendered his imperial illusions.⁽²³⁾

The Wars Against the Moors

As the most significant aspect of Castilian foreign relations, the reconquest could not have taken place without the collaboration both of the nobility, who served personally with their vassals, and of the towns, who were obliged to provide troops and consent to essential tax levies. Not surprisingly, then, the king consulted with the cortes about future campaigns.

Alfonso VIII, for example, after taking counsel with the prelates and nobles in September 1211, probably at Toledo, ordered all the men of the realm to prepare for war. Perhaps at that time, the clergy pledged half their yearly income to finance the campaign. Fernando III celebrated a curia at Carrión in July 1224 concerning his first campaign [102] against the Moors, but the documentation is inadequate to determine to what extent he planned his later campaigns in the cortes.⁽²⁴⁾

Alfonso X seems to have often discussed relations with the Moorish kings of Spain and Morocco in the cortes and other assemblies. The Estoria de Espanna reported that Ibn al-Ahmar, the king of Granada, pledged homage and fealty to Fernando III in 1246, promising to attend his cortes and to pay an annual tribute. Ibn Mahfûz, king of Niebla, and Ibn Hûd, king of Murcia, probably made similar commitments. To affirm his supremacy over Muslim Spain, Alfonso X summoned all of his Moorish vassals to the cortes of Toledo in March 1254; the Anonymous of Sahagún testified that Alfonso X was "then much preoccupied with the Moabite and Moorish kings, his vassals." Ibn al-Ahmar was received with great honor and lodged outside the city, and he confirmed his previous agreements with Alfonso X.⁽²⁵⁾

The African Crusade

During this period of apparent tranquility, Alfonso X discussed his plans for an invasion of North Africa in several cortes held early in the reign. The belief that Morocco had once been part of the Visigothic realm provided the ideological justification, but in practical terms the king wished to close the Straits of Gibraltar to any further Moroccan incursions. Preparations for an African expedition may well have been presented to the cortes of Toledo 1254; further evidence includes the attendance of the Moorish kings, the first appearance of the admiral of the fleet being readied for this venture, and Henry III of Englands commitment to participate in it.⁽²⁶⁾

Various sources reveal a continuing preoccupation with the African affair. With the hope of securing the most effective military service, Alfonso X (at Segovia in 1256) granted certain fiscal exemptions to the knights of the Castilian and Extremaduran towns, provided that they maintained horses and arms suitable for war.⁽²⁷⁾ During the cortes of Valladolid in 1258, he urged the towns of Galicia and Asturias to make certain that their sailing ships were ready for the projected crusade against Cádiz in May.⁽²⁸⁾

Developments following the cortes of Toledo 1259 suggest that the African affair was also considered at that time. Not only did Alfonso X seek the counsel of the king of Granada and persuade Jaime I to allow [103] his subjects to take part in the enterprise, but, filled with a great desire "to carry forward the affair of the crusade beyond the sea," he appointed Juan García de Villamayor as adelantado mayor de la mar. Then in September 1260, a Castilian fleet assaulted the port of Salé on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.⁽²⁹⁾

Elated, even though no permanent occupation was effected, the king sought the counsel of the cortes of Seville 1261 concerning "the affair of Africa that we have begun." Responding as loyal vassals, they pointed out that there were certain matters injurious to the well-being of the realm that required reform.⁽³⁰⁾ The cortes probably also stressed the importance of securing the coastal regions against a possible Moroccan invasion, because soon afterward the king laid siege to Niebla, the seat of the Moorish kingdom west of Seville. Inasmuch as the king many years later ordered an accounting of taxes in arrears since the campaign of Niebla, it is possible that the cortes consented to a tax levy to finance the expedition. Niebla surrendered in February 1262 after a siege of ten months.⁽³¹⁾

Although the king was determined to press on, the Extremaduran towns, which had been summoned to serve on the frontier, voiced their complaints about high taxes at Seville in April 1264 and asked Queen Violante to intercede. After taking counsel the king confirmed the tax exemptions given to the knights in 1256 and extended them to their dependents, with the intention of making their position more attractive and thus maintaining his military strength.⁽³²⁾

Soon afterward, Ibn al-Ahmar, the king of Granada, incited a general revolt among the mudejars of Andalusia and Murcia. He considered his own situation to have become more precarious by Alfonso Xs conquest of Niebla and his demand for the cession of Gibraltar and Tarifa (ports giving access to the peninsula). For the next several years Alfonso X, aided by his father-in-law Jaime I, was occupied with the suppression of the uprising and the pacification of the frontier.⁽³³⁾ Several Andalusian towns, threatened by the rebellion, formed an hermandad at Andújar on 26 April 1265 to defend the realm against the Moors; each town promised to send two knights to the annual assembly of the hermandad to be held at Andújar two weeks after Easter.⁽³⁴⁾

Once Ibn al-Ahmar returned to his allegiance, Alfonso X convened an assembly at Jerez (January 1268) with the hope of restoring peace and prosperity to the realm. The expulsion of the Moors of Jerez who [104] had taken part in the rebellion, and the introduction of Christian settlers, gave cause for celebration; most important, however, a number of economic measures were taken, such as the regulation of prices and wages, in an attempt to repair the economic distress caused by the war.⁽³⁵⁾

An uneasy peace prevailed between the two kingdoms for the remainder of Ibn al-Ahmars reign. After the cortes of Burgos 1272, the rebellious nobles, led by the kings brother Felipe, repudiated their allegiance and went into exile to Granada, where they assisted Muhammad II (1273-1302) in securing the throne. Once Violante had negotiated peace, Alfonso X sealed the agreements at Seville in December 1273 and conferred knighthood upon Muhammad II, who became his vassal and resumed payment of annual tributes.⁽³⁶⁾

The Struggle for the Straits of Gibraltar

In the last decade of his reign, Alfonso X convened the cortes and other assemblies to defend the realm against the Benimerines of Morocco, who invaded the peninsula for the first time in the spring of 1275. The kings son and heir, Fernando de la Cerda, died suddenly on his way to meet them, but Infante Sancho temporarily stemmed their advance. Consulting Sancho and the nobles and townsmen who were on the frontier at Alcalá de Henares in late December, and again at Toledo in January 1276, Alfonso X convinced the towns to grant his request for a subsidy in view of the gravity of the situation.⁽³⁷⁾ In the cortes of Burgos in the spring of 1276, the king updated the privileges granted to the towns twenty years before, exempting knights and their dependents from tributes, provided they were suitably equipped for war. The prelates also consented to a tax levy.⁽³⁸⁾

With an eye to a likely invasion by the Benimerines, the king gained the consent of the cortes of Burgos 1277 to an annual tribute payable for the rest of his life. In order to deal with "the affair of the frontier," he also sought agreement concerning the modification of the coinage.⁽³⁹⁾ Quite possibly the cortes of Segovia 1278 granted him a tax levy for the siege of Algeciras, whose capture would help shut off the invasion route from North Africa. Only the demonstrated vulnerability of the peninsula to repeated invasion from Morocco would have persuaded the cortes to make such an exceptional concession.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Problems relating to the siege of Algeciras were the principal reason [105] for the convocation of "the knights and good men of the towns of Castile, Extremadura and beyond the mountains" at Toledo in the spring of 1279. Complaining about several matters, they agreed to an additional tax to support the siege.⁽⁴¹⁾ The destruction of the Castilian fleet, however, compelled Alfonso X to lift the siege in July and to conclude a truce with Morocco. Continuing to press the war against Granada, he informed the cortes of Seville 1281 of his intention to devalue the coinage rather than impose a new tax.⁽⁴²⁾ Ironically, after being dispossessed at Valladolid in 1282, Alfonso X had to borrow from the emir of Morocco, who now ravaged the peninsula apparently as his ally.⁽⁴³⁾

The situation along the frontier remained quite critical during the reign of Sancho IV. In view of arrangements made in the spring of 1285 to collect arrears of taxes going back to 1275, it seems likely that Sancho IV discussed the Moroccan threat in the cortes of Valladolid in the fall of 1284.⁽⁴⁴⁾ After successfully defending Jerez against a Moroccan siege in the summer of 1285, he concluded a truce which allowed him a respite of several years. Upon the expiration of the truce, he obtained a tax levy from the prelates at Medina del Campo in 1291 that enabled him to equip a fleet to close the Straits to access from Morocco. Following the capture of Tarifa in October 1292, he summoned the cortes to Valladolid in the spring of 1293 to celebrate his triumph and reward his people for their help. A Moroccan attempt to recover Tarifa was repulsed in the following year.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Despite the strategic importance of that port, Infante Enrique (who shared the regency for Fernando IV with Maria de Molina) proposed the sale of Tarifa to Muhammad II of Granada, reasoning that this would end hostilities and would raise enough money to forestall the imposition of new taxes. Aware of Marias opposition, he did not dare to act without first consulting the cortes. As expected, when he informed the cortes of Cuéllar 1297 of his plan, Maria expressed her strong dissent, pointing out that the money raised would scarcely resolve the crowns financial problems. She argued further that to yield the city that Sancho IV had captured after the expenditure of so much energy would be a grave blow to Christendom and would raise the danger of a new Moroccan invasion, and a possible conquest of Spain as in the time of the Visigoths. In the cortes of Valladolid 1298 Enrique again urged the sale of Tarifa, but the queen opposed him once more. As in so many instances, she carried the day, and Enrique found himself thwarted and [106] the plan abandoned. If he had attempted unilaterally to sell Tarifa, the cortes, urged by Maria de Molina, might have ousted him as regent.⁽⁴⁶⁾

The cortes of Medina del Campo 1302 (art. 11 E, 13 L), the first of Fernando IVs majority, urged him to take counsel so that people on the frontier could be protected against attacks launched by Muhammad III, the new king of Granada. When Fernando IV asked for a tax levy for this purpose, the towns willingly granted the money in their concern for the security of the frontier. The Castilian towns assembled in the cortes of Burgos 1302 also gave consent, similarly mindful of the Muslim threat.⁽⁴⁷⁾

With the expectation of carrying out a joint campaign against the Moors, Fernando IV and Jaime II of Aragón concluded an alliance at Alcalá de Henares on 18 December 1308. Fernando IV then announced his intentions to the cortes of Madrid in February 1309, explaining that he wished to serve God as his predecessors had, and asked for a subsidy so that he could do so. The towns hesitated at first, stressing their poverty, but when the king explained his plans, they consented to the tax. Perhaps some objection to the proposed cession of a portion of the kingdom of Granada to Aragón was also raised.⁽⁴⁸⁾

The military campaign had mixed results. After taking Gibraltar in September, Fernando IV had to abandon the siege of Algeciras, and Jaime II had to give up the siege of Almería. The two kings renewed their alliance in 1311, and Fernando IV persuaded "all the men of his realms" to consent to new taxes in support of the war in the cortes of Valladolid 1312. The campaign was aborted, however, as he fell ill shortly after the surrender of Alcaudete and died on 7 September 1312.⁽⁴⁹⁾

After the unification of the regency for Alfonso XI, Infantes Pedro and Juan persuaded the Castilians meeting in the cortes of Valladolid in June 1318, and the Extremadurans and Leonese in the cortes of Medina del Campo in September, to finance their planned expedition against Granada. Disaster struck, however, when both Infantes died suddenly in June 1319 while campaigning in the plain of Granada.⁽⁵⁰⁾

Alfonso XI, on reaching his majority, asked the cortes of Valladolid 1325 for sufficient funds to fortify the castles on the frontier. Four years later, in the cortes of Madrid, he declared his intention to "conquer the land that the Moors, the enemies of the faith, kept from him by force," and requested funds so that he could pay the stipends of the nobility and arm a fleet. Pleased by his determination to prosecute the war against Granada, the cortes acceded to his request. Continued internal [107] disorder thwarted his efforts to mount a sustained campaign, however, and resulted in the loss of Gibraltar to the Moroccans in 1333. Looking to the future, he enacted an ordinance concerning the military obligations of the nobility in the assembly of Burgos in April 1338. This ordinance carefully spelled out the duties of royal vassals, the number of troops they were required to bring to the host, and the horses, arms, and armor with which they were to be equipped (art. l4-32).⁽⁵¹⁾

The establishment of these military requirements came at an appropriate moment, as the Moors resumed hostilities all along the frontier m 1339. In the fall, the assembly of Madrid consented to a levy of taxes which was put to good use, but even greater sums were required after the Castilian fleet was routed by the Moroccans and the combined Moroccan and Granadan forces besieged Tarifa in September 1340. The pope granted crusade indulgences and authorized Alfonso XI to utilize ecclesiastical resources for the war. Upon the approach of the Castilians, now joined by Afonso IV of Portugal and other foreign contingents, the Moors shifted their forces to the river Salado, where Alfonso XI won a decisive victory on 30 October 1340.⁽⁵²⁾

Flushed with victory, he informed "the procurators of the cities, towns, and places of his realms" assembled at Llerena (about ninety kilometers north of Seville) in early December, that as the Moors would surely attack again, he needed additional funds. Despite the burden of previous tax levies, they promised to assist him "for the protection and defense of the realm."⁽⁵³⁾

Concentrating his energy on the capture of Algeciras, the chief port of access between Morocco and the peninsula, Alfonso XI obtained the consent of assemblies at Burgos, León, Zamora, and Ávila in 1342 to the imposition of the alcabala--atax on all commercial transactions. As a consequence, Algeciras was taken on 25 March 1344. The assemblies held at Alcalá, Burgos, and León in the following year extended the grant of the alcabala so that Algeciras could be adequately defended. The king began his final effort against the Moors when he laid siege to Gibraltar in 1349, but he fell victim to the plague early in the following year and died.⁽⁵⁴⁾

Counsel and Consent

The foregoing pages should make clear that it would be a mistake to state categorically that the king was always bound to seek the [108] counsel and/or consent of the cortes in foreign affairs. The evidence reveals that the king concluded treaties, arranged truces, and carried on military campaigns without the prior consultation of the cortes. Yet the influence of the cortes on relations with other kingdoms was considerable. As the treaty with Henry III of England (concluded at Toledo in 1254 while the cortes was in session) touched on matters of great importance to both the king and the kingdom, it seems improbable that Alfonso X would not have informed the cortes of its impact on his interests in Gascony and Africa.

Although there is no evidence that he asked the cortes of Toledo 1254 to ratify the treaty, testimony that his imperial ambitions were discussed in the cortes of Toledo 1259, Burgos 1272, and Burgos 1274 is unambiguous. There is also good reason to believe that this issue was brought to the attention of the cortes of Valladolid 1258. Surely the king did not ask the cortes whether he should accept the imperial crown, but to attain his goal he required both the moral and financial support of the cortes.

The counsel and consent of the cortes was similarly needed during the continuing intervention of Aragón, France, and Portugal in the dispute over the rights of the infantes de la Cerda. The cortes of Valladolid 1295 decisively affirmed the rights of Fernando IV, and Maria de Molina consulted the cortes in subsequent years about the best means of thwarting her sons domestic and foreign enemies.

In considering the reconquest as the foreign policy issue most frequently brought before the cortes, three points must be taken into account: first, the objective to be attained; second, the strategy and tactics to be employed; and third, the military forces and the finances necessary to achieve it. The military objective might be a crusade to North Africa, an attack on the frontier of the kingdom of Granada, or the siege of Algeciras, Tarifa, or Gibraltar. Ordinarily the king and his military strategists determined the specific objective as well as the strategy and tactics to be employed, as was the case in 1340 when Alfonso XI proposed to his military council the relief of Tarifa, then besieged by the Benimerines.

Once the objective and tactics were clear, the king would inform the cortes of his plans. The sources say little about this stage, but it is possible that the representatives of the towns, whose militia forces were experienced in war, would endeavor to present their views, if only to [109] concur in the choice of objectives and strategies. The cortes of Seville 1261, for example, responding to Alfonso Xs request for counsel concerning the African crusade, may have advised him to concentrate his efforts on the capture of Niebla, rather than attempt any further overseas operations. In a similar manner, the negative reaction of the cortes of Cuéllar 1297 and Valladolid 1298 to Infante Enriques plan to sell Tarifa to the enemy forced him to withdraw it.

At times the cortes may have taken the initiative in foreign affairs, as when the cortes of Medina del Campo 1302 urged Fernando IV to take the necessary steps to protect the people on the frontier from Moorish assaults. In most cases, however, the king brought these issues to the attention of the cortes. Alfonso XIs announcement of his plans to attack the Moors, for example, drew the applause of the cortes of Valladolid 1325 and Madrid 1329.

The kings responsibility was to demonstrate to the cortes that he had given due consideration to all the possibilities and that the expedition he proposed had a reasonable chance of success. He did not require the consent of the cortes to act, but he did have to seek its counsel. When he requested counsel, he may not have considered himself bound by it, though in some instances he would have been foolish to act contrary to it. As he was dependent on the nobility and the urban militia forces for a significant part of his army, he had to present a reasonable case to win their enthusiastic support. Although they were bound to respond to his call to military service, there was little wisdom in summoning them if a proposed expedition seemed ill-planned or foolhardy. Fernando IV, for example, probably did not think it necessary to ask the cortes of Madrid 1309 to ratify his alliance with Jaime II, but in explaining his strategy for the war against Granada, it would have been to his advantage to point out that the king of Aragón was going to collaborate with him.

The means of carrying out a military strategy included the organization of the army and taxation. Any modification of the military obligations of the towns or the nobles required consent as well as counsel. The changes in the service of the urban militia enacted at Segovia in 1256 and again at Seville in 1264, and of the nobility enacted at Burgos in 1338, could be implemented only with the consent of those affected--the townsmen and the nobles.

Consent was also necessary when the question of financing an [110] expedition arose. Procter is certainly correct in saying that "it was the need of money, rather than the need of advice on, or consent to," foreign policy that prompted the king to summon the cortes,⁽⁵⁵⁾ but it is equally correct to say that without the consent of the cortes he could not execute his plans. To gain consent, the king had to present a clear and effective rationale to justify his foreign policy. Although the chronicles mention little of the discussion leading to the granting of taxes, it is obvious that it did not occur in a vacuum. The cortes did not give consent blindly, but complied only after questions of foreign policy were fully discussed. As Jaime II reported, the cortes of Madrid 1309 responded to Fernando IVs request for taxes only after he "told them why." ⁽⁵⁶⁾ Taxation, therefore, cannot be separated from the issues of foreign policy.

One may say, in conclusion, that the king recognized the wisdom of consulting the cortes in times of crisis--when he wished, for example, to mount a major campaign against the Moors, or when the kingdom was threatened by its Christian neighbors. In matters of military strategy he took counsel with the magnates, and in questions of marriages and alliances he normally acted with the advice of the bishops, magnates, and professional civil servants who formed his council. When his plans had been drawn they were presented to the cortes in plenary session. In this manner, the cortes was informed and its counsel requested, but it is not likely that any extensive debate was expected except in critical situations such as those just cited. The cortes could give its counsel and consent by declaring that what the king proposed would redound to the benefit of the entire realm. In practical terms, the townsmen, and occasionally the prelates, consented by providing the necessary means for him to execute his plans.

A European Perspective

Elsewhere in Europe, kings similarly consulted their advisors concerning marriage alliances, treaties, war and peace, and the like, but usually did not ask the consent of the estates of the realm. No parliamentary assembly gained the right to ratify treaties or to declare war. Yet kings could not make war without the support of the estates, and that required an explanation of why the war was being undertaken. Thus Pedro IV of Aragón asked the Catalan corts of Perpignan in 1350 [111] for funds to support his efforts to subdue Sardinia. Again at Perpignan in 1356 he needed help against the Genoese, and two years later he asked the corts of Barcelona to assist him in defending his realm against the assaults of Pedro the Cruel of Castile. In like manner, King John of France summoned the Estates of Languedoil in 1355 to counsel him how best to resist his enemies. Edward III also frequently asked the English parliament to grant subsidies for his French wars, but what is particularly interesting is the decision of the commons in the parliament of 1348 to excuse themselves, on account of their "ignorance and simplicity," from giving advice on foreign affairs. Like the commons, municipal representatives in other parliamentary assemblies surely came to realize that giving counsel entailed taking responsibility for the consequences, both good and bad; perhaps they were not always willing to accept it.⁽⁵⁷⁾

1. Chronique latine, 19, 21, 43, pp. 57-58, 62, 102; Rodrigo, De rebus Hispaniae, VII, 36, p. 126, and VIII, 3, p. 127.

2. González, Alfonso IX, II, no. 11, p. 24; Procter, "The Interpretation of Clause 3 of the Decrees of León (1188)," EHR 75(1970): 45-53.

3. González, Alfonso VIII, no. 471, p. 808; Chronique latine, II, pp. 39-40; Rodrigo, De rebus Hispaniae, VII, 24, pp. 166- 167; OCallaghan, "Beginnings," 1512, 1516.

4. González, Alfonso IX, II, no. 11, p. 14.

5. Chronique latine, 19, 21, 43, pp. 57-58, 62, 102; Rodrigo, De rebus Hispaniae, VII, 36, p. 126, and VIII, 3, p. 127.

6. Los miraculos romanzados, in Sebastián de Vergara, Vida y milagros de Santo Domingo de Silos (Madrid 1736), 131; Gregorio de Balparda, Historia crítica de Vizcaya y sus fueros (Madrid 1924), II, no. 387, p. 537; CAX, 3, p. 5; Procter, Curia, pp. 127, 284, n. 5.

7. Crónica de Jaume I, IX, 7-8; CAX, 66-67, pp. 52-53; Loaysa, Crónica, 19, p. 90.

8. CFIV, l, 4, 6-9, pp. 94, 111-113, 118-122, 129-131; Loaysa, Crónica, 77, p. 180; MFIV, II, no. 213, pp. 312-313.

9. Loaysa, Crónica, 7, p. 68; CAX, 17, pp. 12-13; Ballesteros, AlfonsoX, 177-189.

10. Bruce Gelsinger, "A Thirteenth-Century Norwegian-Castilian Alliance," Mediaevalia et Humanistica, New Series, 10 (1981): 55-80; CLC, I, 54-63.

11. AM Toledo, cajón 10, legajo 1, no. 1, excerpted in Ballesteros, Alfonso X, 22 5-228; OCallaghan, "Tbe Cortes and Royal Taxation," 382-383.

12. MHE, I, no. 71, pp. 154-155; Mingüella, Sigiienza, I, no. 225, pp. 599- 601; Ballesteros, "Itinerario," BRAH 108 (1936): 17, n. 1.

13. Besides the Moorish kings, royal vassals included Duke Hugh of Burgundy, Count Guy of Flanders, Duke Henry of Lorraine, Alfonso, Luis and Juan, sons of John of Brienne, former emperor of Constantinople, Viscount Gaston of Béarn, and Viscount Guy of Limoges. MHE, I no. 70, pp. 152-154 (2 October 1259).

14. Robert L. Wolff, "Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperors Son: Castile and the Latín Empire of Constantinople," Speculum 29 (1954): 45-84.

15. Setenario, ch. 9-10, ed. Kenneth Vanderford (Buenos Aires 1945), pp. 15-19; MHE, I, no. 69, p. 151; Ballesteros, Alfonso X, 214-243; Cayetano Socarras, Alfonso X of Castile: a Study on Imperialistic Frustration (Barcelona 1976).

16. Fernández del Pulgar, Palencia, II, 344-345.

17. CAX, 18, p. 13.

18. CAX, 47, p. 35; MHE, I, no. 37, p. 305; OCallagban, "The Cortes and Royal Taxation," 386-388.

19. CAX, 48-58, pp. 36-47.

20. Fernández del Pulgar, Palencia, II, 344-345; CAX, 59, p. 47.

21. CAX, 59, p. 47-48; Palacio, Madrid, I,119-122; Miguel Vigil, Oviedo, no. 36, p. 63; González, Colección, V, no. 59, pp. 189-190; Ubieto Arteta, Cuéllar, no. 30, pp. 73-74; AM León, no. 14; González Díez, Burgos, no. 42, pp. 127-128.

22. Ballesteros, AlfonsoX, 712-732; Socarras, AlfonsoX, 209-244.

23. CAX, 75, p. 59; Ballesteros, Alfonso X, 934-935.

24. Chronique latine, 19, 21, 43, pp. 57-58, 62, 102; Rodrigo, De rebus Hispaniae, VII, 36, p. 126, and VIII, 3, p. 127.

25. Primera Crónica general, II, ch. 1070, p. 746; CAX, 3, p. 5; El Anónimo de Sahagún, 74-75, p. 360.

26. MHE, I, no. 15, pp. 26-29; Rymer, Foedera, I, pt. I, p. 510.

27. Procter, Curia, 128; see above, Chapter 2, note 10.

28. Miguel Vigil, Oviedo, no. 22, p. 46.

29. MHE, I, nos. 72-75, pp. 155-160, 164-166; CAX, 19, pp. 13-14; Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo General de la Corona de Aragón, ed. Prosper de Bofarull (Barcelona 1847-1910), VI, nos. 34, 36, pp. 149-154.

30. Rodríguez Díez, Astorga, 715-720.

31. CAX, 6, pp. 6-7; MHE, I, no. 140, pp. 309-324.

32. Iglesia Ferreirós, "Privilegio general," 513-521; CAX, 9, p. 10.

33. Les Registres de Clément IV, ed. E. Jordan (Paris 1900-1945), nos. 15-17, 126, pp. 890, 896.

34. MHE, I, no. 101, pp. 22 1-223; Nieto Cumplido, Regionalismo, no. 5, pp. 122-125.

35. CLC, I, 64-85.

36. CAX, 43-58, pp. 32-47.

37. CAX, 61-65, pp. 48-52; González Diez, Burgos, no. 44, pp. 129-130.

38. Menéndez Pidal, Documentos, no. 201, p. 257; Ballesteros, Alfonso X, 791-793.

39. Ubieto Arteta, Cuéllar, no. 32, pp. 75-76; Escudero de la Peña, "Súplica," 58-59; Ballesteros, Alfonso X, 835-837.

40. CAX, 69-72, pp. 54-56; OCallaghan, "The Cortes and Royal Taxation," 392-393.

41. González Diez, Burgos, nos. 87-89, 92-94, 105, pp. 169-173, 175- 177 190-191; Ballesteros, Alfonso X, 908-909.

42. CAX, 75, pp. 59-60; Procter, Curia, 146-147.

43. CAX, 76-77, pp. 62-63.

44. Fernández "San Pelayo de Cerrato," no. 11, pp. 299-301; Ubieto Arteta, Cuéllar, no. 38, pp. 82-87.

45. CSIV, 2, 8-9, pp. 71, 86; CLC, I,106-117, 117-130.

46. CFIV, 2,4, pp. 107-108, 111.

47. 47.CFIV, 10, p. 125; Loaysa, Crónica, 87, p. 195.

48. CFIV, 16-17, pp. 161-164; MFIV, II, nos. 416-419, pp. 621-626; Giménez Soler, Juan Manuel, nos. 192-195, pp. 364-366.

49. CFIV. 17, l9-20, pp. 163-164,168-170; CLC, I, 197-221.

50. CAXI, 12-14, pp. 182-184; GCAXI, 14-21, vol. I, pp. 302-319; CLC, I, 330-336; Barrios García, Alba de Tormes, no. 29, pp. 97-99.

51. CAXI, 40, 80, 82, pp. 199, 222-224; GCAXI, 52, 101, 103, vol. I, pp. 378, 467-468, 472-473; CLC, 1, 443-456 (1338).

52. CAXI, 196, 243, pp. 298, 318-319; GCAXI, 296, vol. II, pp. 349-352.

53. CAXI, 253-255, pp. 330-331; GCAXI, 332-335, vol. II, pp. 443-449.

54. CAXI, 259-263, pp. 335-338; CLC, I, 477-483 (Alcalá, art. 8,12, 15), 483-492(Burgos, art. 8,11-12), 627-637 (León, art. 26-29).

55. Procter, Curia, 185.

56. Giménez Soler, Juan Manuel, nos. 192-195, pp. 364-366.

57. José Coroleu e Inglada and José Pella y Forgas, Las cortes catalanas, 2d ed. (Barcelona 1876), 185-190; Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises (Paris 1822-1833), IV, 734; Rotuli parliamentorum (London 1776-1777), II, 165.