[189] Both mentally and physically, the society of Córdoba and its region was becoming narrower and more restricted when Ferdinand died in 1516. In the political sphere, the apparently harsh repression of the marquis of Priego's revolt had not loosened the ever-tightening grip of the nobility on local government. Symptoms of this process were continued noble dominance of council offices, the rehabilitation in 1510 of the rebels of 1508, the continued allocation of governorships of royal castles to members of the upper nobility, despite local laws and protests, and the violence of Córdoba's disputes with the Count of Palma. The caballeros de premia's petitions of 1514 reflect lesser men's frustration at the Crown's active participation in the strengthening of the political power of the local aristocracy. At the highest social level, immobility was the main feature. No new families joined the ranks of the seignorial nobility as a result of gains made in the Granada war. Instead, royal grants of newly conquered lands were used to confirm the dominance of an aristocracy which had largely been created as a result either of the thirteenth-century Reconquest or of the Trastamaran accession to power in 1369. The achievement, in 1502, of permanent peace in the long-standing conflict between the houses of Aguilar and Baena brought stability to the area, but at the cost of a reversion of power from the Crown and its corregidores to the leading noble families.

The economy, too, showed signs of stagnation which predated the better-known difficulties of the mid-sixteenth century. Córdoba had always lived primarily from agriculture and this state of affairs continued, despite the problems of grain and meat supply in the period between 1502 and 1508. It has been argued in the case of grain, and the same may apply to meat, that the shortages were due to a refusal by producers, mainly nobles, to bring their goods to market, rather than a failure of production. There is no doubt, in any case, that the nobility gained considerable political advantage from the population's dependence [190] upon it for the means of subsistence. The history of Córdoba's grain supply in the first decade of the sixteenth century is, however, only a symptom of more deep-seated problems. Not only did secular lords hold more than a third of the land of the kingdom of Córdoba, together with about half of the population, but they also had enormous political and economic influence in the city and its possessions. There can have been virtually no citizen of Córdoba who did not in some way feel the influence of the aristocracy in his or her personal life. The nobles had town-houses and retinues, they or their supporters filled the council and represented the city in the Cortes. The surplus production of their estates, along with the rent and tithe income of the Church, dominated the markets. Thus even if the level of seignorial violence in Córdoba was significantly reduced by Ferdinand and Isabella's policies, the economic dominance of the nobility was undiminished.

The consequences of this fact are particularly obvious in the case of Córdoba's main industry, the manufacture of cloth. It is clear that cloth-producers in the city were gradually being defeated in the early sixteenth century by the commercial exploitation of the area's wool production. The aristocracy, in its role as a producer of raw material, had no particular interest in the development of local cloth manufacture and was content to use its political and economic power to cooperate with mercantile interests in the export of wool from the region. The nobility certainly had no inhibitions about engaging in trade, but its wealth and power removed any incentive to take risks of an entrepreneurial nature.

It is less clear what effect the burden of taxation had on economic activity. Possibly, the sales-tax, or alcabala, acted as a brake on trade and industry, but so little is known about the relationship between tax-yield and the productivity of the economy that a statistical approach to the problem is impractical. In theory, a small agricultural producer who lived in Córdoba might be liable for rent on his house and land, the tithe of his grain, wine or oil production and an alcabala of up to ten per cent on any market purchases. He would be included in the tax-list by the jurados of his parish and would thus have to contribute a sum in cash to Cortes levies and the city's share of the expenses of the Hermandad. The prices he paid for goods would also include customs-dues, notably the almojarifazgo, and often extra municipal taxes, the sisas. It is known that there were many anomalies in the working of the tax system but their effect on the individual taxpayer cannot be accurately assessed. Nonetheless, certain facts stand [191] out. The seignorial sector of the economy made a totally inadequate contribution to public revenues in comparison with its wealth. The burden of taxation very largely fell on those least able to bear it, in other words agricultural and urban workers who did not produce their own food and were thus dependent on the market. Major landholders not only escaped direct taxation because of social privilege, but also evaded indirect taxes through their economic self-sufficiency. There is no sign in the period of a wider distribution of land among the population. Indeed, if anything, the tendency was in the opposite direction, towards greater concentration of land-holding and the development of commercial crops, particularly wool, at the expense of those needed for subsistence.

The role of the Crown in this process was probably less conscious than has sometimes been thought. Ferdinand and Isabella tried to regulate all sectors of the economy, but their efforts were generally unsuccessful in restraining or diverting market forces. It is true that royal intervention did not encourage Castilian agriculture and cloth manufacture, but it is improbable that this was the intention. It seems more likely that the main obstacle to economic progress was the disproportionate amount of wealth and power which was concentrated in the hands of the seignorial nobility. The Crown was responsible in so far as it acquiesced in this state of affairs. As far as the cloth industry was concerned, a surfeit of control rather than a lack of official interest was probably the main factor in stifling innovation.

In contrast, royal policy appeared to be devastatingly effective in the area of relations between the Christian majority and the Jewish and Muslim minorities. It has been argued that the period saw the replacement of the former myth of coexistence in Castile by one of national unity, both political and religious. There is no doubt that relations between the three religions were particularly bad in Ferdinand and Isabella's reign and that some Christian contemporaries harked back to the last united Spanish state, the Visigothic monarchy, as an inspiration. While it does indeed appear that such notions were popular in royal circles, they do not seem to have had much effect on the ground. Christian reactions to Jews and Muslims varied from time to time, from place to place and from person to person. In general terms, though, it may be suggested that Christianity in Castile took on a particularly militant and formalistic character as a result of its long and by no means unconstructive confrontation with Islam and Judaism. It is tempting to see the growth of Christian bigotry in Ferdinand and [192] Isabella's reign as part of a more general narrowing of political, economic and social horizons.

The experience of Córdoba thus serves to illustrate the achievements and the limitations of the Catholic Monarchs. Political order was restored as a result of their visit to the city in 1478 and the gains thus made were consolidated by their almost annual return during the Granada war, between 1482 and 1492. It may well not be accidental that the local nobility began its return to power after 1500, when Córdoba remained unvisited by its rulers until Ferdinand arrived, breathing fire and slaughter, in 1508. It is equally clear, however, that the undoubted vigour of the Catholic Monarchs' rule was far from being exercised in the cause of a wider distribution of power and wealth. If their reign was revolutionary, it was a conservative revolution, confirming those distinctive features of Spanish society which were soon to cause such pain and misunderstanding in the country's relations with its European neighbours and with its new colonial subjects.