Jerónimo de Cevallo's poignant description of Castilian justice, written in 1623 to persuade the young Philip IV that reform of the royal judiciary should be of the highest priority, fits well with the generally accepted picture of the seventeenth century in Castile as an epoch of decline. ⁽¹⁾ But the use of "decline" to describe Castile in this century, so common among historians of Spain, can be deceiving. That the royal judiciary, in keeping with other branches of royal government, deteriorated both in quality and effectiveness under the rule of the later Habsburgs is almost beyond dispute. This development, however, must be interpreted as part of a larger, formative, and indeed creative process in which much of the day-to-day responsibility for the administration and governance of the kingdom passed out of the [211] hands of the monarchy to other elements of Castilian society. In military matters, the nobility benefited because the crown delegated responsibility for the raising, outfitting, and supplying of troops rather than attempting to do the job itself. Direct, centralized administration of the military gave way to a system of asientos whereby the crown contracted for whatever men and material it required. ⁽²⁾

A similar transfer of power and responsibility occurred in the administration of justice. The monarchy had attempted since the Middle Ages to gain firmer control of justice, using as its chief instruments the corregidor and the audiencia, both of which were designed to weaken municipal, seigneurial, and other jurisdictions outside royal control. Brought to fruition during the reign of Philip II, this policy was successful, but the overcrowded dockets, long backlogs of cases, and endemic corruption in the king's courts by the end of the century also suggest that the machinery of royal justice was not adequate to cope with the demand for legal services or even to carry out the many tasks it was assigned. Subsequently, the crown, which was seeking new ways to finance its dynastic and religious wars, allowed much of the authority vested in its courts to pass into the hands of local elites, principally the regidores who governed Castile's towns. Partly, this transfer of authority was an attempt by the monarchy to lighten its judicial burden, but the long-term effect was to diminish the power and effectiveness of royal tribunals and to increase that of tribunals under municipal control. In this context, it is clear that "decline" tells only half of the story of Castilian justice in the seventeenth century; "devolution" would be much more exact.

The reasons for this devolution of power are many; demographic, economic, administrative, and political forces all came into play. Indeed, the subject is so complex that it is again best to begin with a close examination of the experiences of the chancillería of Valladolid because the history of this institution, perhaps more than any other, exemplifies the degree to which local justice in the course of the seventeenth century gradually supplanted that provided by the crown.
 

[212] Owing to a lack of visitation records, the history of the chancillería under the later Habsburgs is relatively obscure. On the surface, its duties and prerogatives remained unaltered. Its magistrates continued to occupy high places within the royal judiciary, although increasingly they were the sons, nephews, and other relatives of important ministers in Madrid. Each looked forward with confidence to eventual promotion to one of the king's major councils, and in this respect the chancillería continued to serve as a "seminary" for the Royal Council of Castile. On the other hand, surety of promotion to higher office and freedom from accountability did little to encourage these magistrates to take their job seriously. As pointed out in the last chapter, there are numerous indications that many of these officials spent considerable time away from the chancillería, either attending to private business or going to Madrid in the hope of persuading the cámara to expedite their promotion to higher office. This lack of concern with judicial matters undermined the chancillería's public standing and sent litigants looking for other courts in which to resolve their disputes.

Making matters worse was a series of administrative crises that plagued this tribunal in the early years of the seventeenth century. The first occurred, without lasting effects, when the plague that struck Valladolid in 1598-99 forced the suspension of legal proceedings for nearly a year; the second when the royal court, on the orders of Philip III, returned from Madrid to Valladolid in 1601. The reluctant chancillería was forced to move to Medina del Campo and then, in 1604, to Burgos. By 1607, it was again back in its former home, but these comings and goings seriously interrupted its work for nearly six years. ⁽³⁾

The last of the administrative crises followed in the wake of the Ramírez Fariñas visita of 1618-21 when, in 1624, reports describing [213] "discords and disquiets" among the oidores began filtering into Madrid. ⁽⁴⁾ Francisco de Contreras, president of the Royal Council, ordered an investigation when it became clear that factional disputes among the judges were "seriously impairing" the administration of justice. ⁽⁵⁾ Lic. Gudiel y Peralta, who had recently been transferred to Valladolid from Granada, wrote Contreras that "he found in the chancillería a fire that was already out of control when His Majesty sent me to serve in it."⁽⁶⁾ Contreras then wrote directly to the king. informing him "that the chancillería is worse off than I have ever known any tribunal to be; a quick, efficient solution is essential." ⁽⁷⁾

As some of the oidores described them, these troubles originated in an attempt by the president of the chancillería, Lic. Francisco Gaceta de Márquez (in office 1619-25) to increase his own power vis a vis that of the magistrates. Apparently, Gaceta, possibly on the orders of Olivares, was attempting to complete the work of the Ramírez Fariña's visita by subjecting the chancillería to increased presidential supervision and control. His efforts, however, had succeeded only in splitting the magistrates into two warring factions. ⁽⁸⁾ In the end, Gaceta was isolated, his reforms unfinished. But the damage was done. The factional disputes his reforms had engendered almost brought the work of the chancillería to a halt.

One result of these crises was loss of reputation and prestige, but even more damaging to the fortunes of the chancillería were the disruptions in the court's everyday routine. In the meantime, the Royal Council of Castile took advantage of this situation by claiming for itself many of the cases that legitimately belonged to the chancillería. [214] This drain of cases away from the chancillería to the council began during its exile from Valladolid, but in subsequent years it grew even worse. Partly this was the fault of the monarchy; unlike his predecessors, Philip III did little to keep the pretensions of the Royal Council under restraint. But this shift in adjudication away from the chancillería was also connected to the growing importance of Madrid once Philip III, in 1607, decided to make this city his permanent home. In less than a decade, Madrid became a capital in every sense of the word. The city grew rapidly, both in size and in population. The court of Philip IV, moreover, provided courtiers with an endless round of plays, processions, hunts, and other entertainments, helping to persuade noblemen from all parts of the kingdom to settle in Madrid. Once there, these noblemen, many of whom were actively engaged in lawsuits, were anxious to avoid the time and the trouble involved in having their cases decided in Valladolid. They endeavored, therefore, to sidestep the authority of the chancillería and have their cases brought directly to the attention of the Royal Council of Castile. The council proved accommodating, taking advantage of the opportunity to expand its jurisdiction. One anonymous arbitrista complained in 1624 that "the council has extended its empire in such a way that, without any limitation, it decided civil and criminal suits from all parts of the kingdom; there is no lawsuit in which it does not have a hand, apportioning them by special commissions among its members and in such a way that the two chancillerías, which are the tribunals legally charged to determine such matters, are defrauded." ⁽⁹⁾

This arbitrista, who was also concerned that Madrid was so crowded with litigants and the council "so choked with lawsuits" that nothing ever got done, asked the king to intervene and remit most cases to the chancillerías, reserving for the council only important suits and others that came to it upon appeal (en grado de segundo suplicación), ⁽¹⁰⁾ But the council, defending its new prerogatives, stood fast. To preserve its [215] jurisdiction over cases that began in the city of Madrid the scribes attached to the council's sala de provincia offered the monarchy in 1635 a gift of 40,000 ducats (= 15 million mrs.) "so that lawsuits from Madrid finished in their chamber and not in the chancillería of Valladolid." ⁽¹¹⁾ The fiscal of the Royal Council, Diego de Riaño y Gamboa, advised Philip not to accept this offer because it was certain to spell disaster for the chancillería, but the monarch, who was desperately seeking new sources for cash to sustain his armies abroad, acquiesced. Consequently, as the fiscal had predicted, business in the chancillería fell off sharply.

The first evidence of such a decline was the complaints from lesser officials at the chancillería who had purchased their offices expecting a healthy return from the fees paid to them by the litigants who frequented this court. In 1636, Antonio Marcos, an escribano de cámara, wrote to the king: "I give my word that in the chamber in which I work . . . most of the days of audience there are no lawsuits to review." ⁽¹²⁾ A number of his colleagues filed similar complaints: "We have nothing to do" or "Most days all four of the civil chambers of the tribunal are closed after two hours since there is no business to dispatch." ⁽¹³⁾ Juan de Queipo de Llano, another scribe, explained, "The shortage and lack of lawsuits and other business at the chancillería is such that together there is scarcely enough work to occupy one chamber." ⁽¹⁴⁾ As a result of this lack of business, he also told Philip that the earnings of the attorneys, relators, scribes, and other officials attached to this court had fallen so low that it was "impossible to sustain themselves from their offices." He hinted that the king could correct this situation if he either reduced the number of venal offices in the chancillería or extended the chancillería's jurisdiction in such a way that its volume of business would increase. Finally, coming to the heart of the chancillería's troubles, Queipo de Llano asked Philip to have "the Royal Council rid itself of the great number of lawsuits which, by the laws of the realm, belong to the chancillería." He also [216] suggested that, in accordance with tradition, lawsuits should be left to the chancillería, whereas the Royal Council should be limited primarily to matters of governance of public policy.

Statistical evidence to support the scribes' claims is provided by the registers of the repartidador, the official who distributed incoming lawsuits to the chancillería's scribes. The number of new cases filed annually, for example, in the partido called villa frequently reached 3,000 or more during the reign of Philip II. In 1620, however, this partido received only 706 new cases, and after 1650 the number of incoming cases rarely exceeded 100. ⁽¹⁵⁾ Decline on a similar scale is evident in the partido eclesiástico, which was reserved for cases involving clerics. In 1595, it had received 2,500 new cases, but in 1640 only 859 new cases were registered and in 1690, only 625. ⁽¹⁶⁾ The partido perdido, which was intended for minor disputes and others that originated in the city of Valladolid, also registered sharp decreases in its volume of business. In 1563, nearly 2,800 cases had come into this partido, but the chancillería's records show that in 1620 this figure was only 667. By 1640 it had declined to 319 and in 1660, 229. ⁽¹⁷⁾

Nor was this sharp drop in the volume of business transacted at the chancillería confined to a decline in the number of new cases filed. As Figure 1 (chapter 1) indicates, the number of lawsuits decided at this tribunal between 1620 and 1640 fell by as much as half, but this precipitous decline proved to be only the beginning of a protracted period of stagnation. By 1660, the chancillería issued only 293 cartas ejecutorias and provisiones reales (another type of final writ), or one-third less than in 1640. There was some slight recovery in the following decades, but in 1700 the number of lawsuits decided at this court was only a fraction of what it had been late in the sixteenth century. Clearly, the former "key to civil justice" in Castile had lost much of its importance and prestige.

This dramatic reversal in the fortunes of the chancillería is further demonstrated in the decline in the number of advocates licensed to practice before it. In the late sixteenth century, the complement of advocates registered at the chancillería averaged forty or more, and even in the 1620s, when sharp fluctuations in the volume of its lawsuits first appeared, as many as twenty-five or thirty advocates were [217] listed in its rolls. In subsequent decades, however, the number of advocates declined sharply, and by 1660 the average number rarely surpassed fifteen (see Figure 2, chapter 2). In the absence of business to dispatch, most of the advocates formerly attached to the chancillería presumably moved elsewhere, especially to Madrid, where they could hope to capitalize on the abundance of litigation dispatched by various councils of the king. The number of advocates practicing in the capital increased rapidly in the course of Philip IV's reign, and some of these appear to have begun their legal careers in Valladolid. ⁽¹⁸⁾ Other alternatives for advocates seeking to abandon Valladolid were to enter the private service of a nobleman to work, for example, as a seigneurial judge or to emigrate to the New World, where the expanding colonial economies of Mexico and Peru offered ample opportunities for legal work. Whatever the eventual direction of their emigration, it is certain that the contraction in the amount of legal business brought to the chancillería was a major cause of the decline in the number of advocates in Valladolid.

Also affected by the decline in the chancillería's business were its attorneys (procuradores de número), who watched the market value of their offices decrease. The prices of these charges was largely determined by the amount of fees the incumbent could realistically hope to collect. At the end of the sixteenth century, when business at the chancillería was flourishing, such a position could easily fetch 2,500 ducats (= 937,500 mrs.), and in 1628 one attorney purchased his office for as much as 5,500 ducats (= 2,062,500 mrs.), a very large sum. ⁽¹⁹⁾ Thirty years later, times had changed, and in 1661, Rodrigo Varela purchased his office of procurador de número for as little as 300 ducats (= 112,500 mrs.) in copper money, a price that reflected the greatly decreased value of these once profitable offices. ⁽²⁰⁾ By 1690, moreover, various places of procurador, receptor, diligencero, and agente de negocios at the chancillería were vacant; apparently, few wished to invest in offices that offered little in the way of a secure return. ⁽²¹⁾

[218] Considered together, this evidence suggests that the chancillería, by the middle of the seventeenth century, was in serious trouble, but its predicament was far from unique. Litigation at the chancillería of Granada, for example, also registered a sharp decline, although not quite so precipitous as in Valladolid. The number of cartas ejecutorias issued by this tribunal decreased by as much as 50 percent in the years between 1640 and 1700. ⁽²²⁾ Little is known about the audiencia of Galicia during this century, but the audiencia of Seville suffered from the continuing failure of the monarchy to sort out the administrative muddle that hampered law enforcement in this important city. ⁽²³⁾ All in all, most of the king's appellate tribunals were having difficulties attracting litigants.

Ostensibly, the principal reason for this decline was the insatiable appetite of the Royal Council of Castile for lawsuits and other legal business. Unfortunately, statistical evidence that might help to chart the increase in the volume of judicial business brought to the council is far from complete. Six offices of escribano de cámara were responsible for the paperwork involved in the lawsuits that came to the council's sala de justicia, and their registers, with some limitations, provide a rough guide to the number of cases the council dispatched. ⁽²⁴⁾ These registers suggest that the anonymous arbitrista who wrote in 1624 that the council was "choked" with lawsuits was right inasmuch as the 1620s were a decade when the escribanos regularly handled large numbers of suits (Table 7). It is no accident, therefore, that in the early years of Philip IV's reign court literature dealing with lawsuits, lawyers, and related topics was most prevalent; presumably, authors such as Quevedo, Alonso de Castillo Solorzano, and Luís Vélez de Guevara sought to attract readers by writing about and satirizing familiar personages and everyday events. ⁽²⁵⁾

If in the course of the seventeenth century the volume of litigation at the Royal Council had expanded while that at the audiencias had decreased, one could easily surmise that the decline of the provincial tribunals was chiefly the result of increased competition from Madrid. But the parallel histories of each of these courts rules out such a possibility. Rather, it points to an apparent general decline in litigation throughout the kingdom, albeit one that most affected the courts and tribunals of the king.

The evidence to explain this decline is suggestive, though by no means abundant. During the first half of the seventeenth century, as a result of a combination of famine, plague, war, and continuing emigration to the New World, Castile's population, which totaled more than six million at the end of the sixteenth century, fell by as much as one-fifth. Presumably, fewer people meant less litigation, although the links between trends in litigation and population are not necessarily one to one. Most of the loss in population was among the poor, landless peasantry, a group that appeared only occasionally as litigants in the king's courts. In addition, the decline in the number of lawsuits brought to the chancillería continued well after midcentury, that is, when population had already begun to level off. Thus, population decline alone, although undoubtedly a factor influencing long range changes in the number of lawsuits brought to Castile's courts, was not the principal reason for the decline of the chancillería, let alone that of the Royal Council.

Much more important was the decline in the kingdom's economy. [221] In the years between the middle of the fifteenth century and the 1570s or 1580s, continued growth in Castile's economy had promoted litigation by enlarging the pool of litigants able to afford royal justice, by increasing both the number and value of commercial transactions, and by sharpening competition among merchants, landowners, and villages for such scarce commodities as credit and land. Expanding networks of commerce and trade also contributed to increased litigation by helping to bring previously separated, quasi-autarkical regional economies closer together. This meant more dealings among strangers and hence less recourse to informal methods of dispute settlement. The nucleus of this emergent national market of trade and finance was the trading fairs held annually in Medina del Campo, Medina del Rioseco, Villalón, and other cities of the central meseta. These fairs united merchants and traders from diverse parts of the kingdom as well as abroad. The scale of their transactions was such that only the king's courts could successfully monitor them because the jurisdiction of guild courts such as that of consulados of Burgos and Bilbao was much too limited in competence and scope. Likewise, trade on the national scale brought into contact bankers and merchants whose economic relationships depended primarily upon written contracts, letters of exchange, and other legal instruments. Under these circumstances, the lawsuit became a commercial device of considerable importance, helping to regulate and control the activities of merchants who did not know each other well and whose disparate geographical origins required the use of centralized courts and institutionalized justice as means of resolving disputes.

If these were some of the economic conditions that promoted wider use of the king's courts in the sixteenth century, it is likely that in the seventeenth century -- a prolonged period of economic stagnation and decline -- the opposite would hold true. Depression implied that the number of individuals able to afford the cost of litigating, especially in the higher, appellate courts, was decreasing. It may also suggest that both the number and value of commercial transactions were decreasing, thus further reducing the potential for expensive lawsuits. Also important were the changes in the structure of the kingdom's economy wrought by decline and depression. With the exception of the growing market provided by Madrid, ⁽²⁹⁾ the unified, national market characteristic of the sixteenth century gradually dissipated, [222] giving way to others that were primarily local or regional in scope. The decline of the trade fairs held formerly at Medina del Campo was one sign of such development, and an apparent resurgence of local markets and regionalized trading throughout Castile was another. ⁽³⁰⁾ Finance by the mid-seventeenth century was also becoming a regional affair. Tight credit and monetary uncertainty, much of it caused by manipulation of the currency by the monarchy, would have contributed to such a development. ⁽³¹⁾ The increasing insecurity of overland travel, especially in Andalusia, the Basque country, and regions close to the Aragonese-Valencian frontier where banditry was endemic, did so as well.

Accompanying the atomization of the Castilian economy and in some respects a product of it was the rise of independent, outward-looking economies in regions removed from the central meseta. The economy of the Cantabrian coast was certainly moving in this direction, and this evolution was reflected both in the decline of Castile's woolen textile industry and the decline of the city of Burgos, formerly a major entrepôt for goods intended for export. ⁽³²⁾ Royal support had long allowed Burgos to monopolize Castile's trade with England, France, and the Low Countries. By the reign of Philip IV, however, owing largely to the decline of the Castilian economy, merchants in coastal cities such as Castro-Urdiales, Santander, and San Sebastián, had gained control over much of this commerce, stripping Burgos of its livelihood and, in the process, most of its population as well. Burgos turned to the monarchy for aid, petitioning for the restoration of its former monopoly, but there was little the crown could do. ⁽³³⁾ The stagnant economy of the meseta -- isolated by mountainous terrain and poor transportation -- had little to offer peripheral parts of the peninsula. Structurally, therefore, the kingdom's economy was [223] becoming more and more regionalized, and this development worked to the disadvantage of centralized "national" courts such as the chancillería that were far removed from those regions where commerce was still vital.

The overall effect of these economic changes on the chancillería is difficult to document, but it appears that the depressed state of the economy made it difficult for many small merchants, traders, shopkeepers, and artisans to appeal to this court. Consequently, the chancillería's role in the regulation and control of Castile's mercantile life gradually diminished, an evolution that was reflected in the declining proportion of cartas ejecutorias dealing with matters of trade and finance (Table 5, chapter 3). It was also evident in the disappearance of artisans, merchants, shopkeepers, and the like from among the appellants who came to this court. Presumably, Castile's increasingly regionalized economy lent itself to "face-to-face" transactions among merchants who knew each other relatively well. Under these circumstances, merchants may have preferred to settle their cases through arbitration rather than risk the enmities, as well as the costs, that a lawsuit in the chancillería would be certain to incur. Virtually nothing is known about guild courts in the seventeenth century, but it would not be surprising to discover that the decline of the chancillería as a commercial court was at least partially compensated for by a resurgence in specialized, mercantile jurisdictions such as those of the consulados of Burgos and Bilbao.

Important as economic changes may have been in deciding the fate of the king's courts, they do not tell the whole story. Mounting corruption, sharp increases in the cost of paperwork, and administrative confusion also had a hand in keeping litigants away from the king's major tribunals. Crucial in this regard was Philip IV's readiness to issue cédulas de suspension that disrupted the judicial process and possibly tarnished the reputation of royal justice. ⁽³⁴⁾ By subjecting the judiciary to royal whim, Philip was personally responsible for increasing the risks and uncertainties of appealing to royal justice, and, in doing so, he may have persuaded many litigants, particularly those with grievances against an important nobleman or court favorite, to seek alternative means of resolving disputes.

Mounting corruption among the lesser officials attached to royal [224] tribunals had a similar effect. In the previous century, regular visitations had served to check some of the worst abuses, but the relaxed vigilance that characterized the administration of royal justice in the seventeenth century allowed those officials to do more or less as they wished. As one courtier warned, "those who have public offices take better care of their private interests than those of the common good," ⁽³⁵⁾ and in 1617 the Junta de Reformación expressed similar sentiments when it requested the monarchy to put an end to the rapaciousness of court officials who had purchased their charges. ⁽³⁶⁾ Arbitristas of the period also had doubts about the honesty and trustworthiness of the crown's judicial officers. Fray Antonio de Valencia, writing early in the 1620s, noted that royal scribes augmented their incomes by taking on tasks that legitimately belonged to other officials. He also condemned those scribes who had illegally raised their fees by so much that "the cost [of a lawsuit] for the litigants will double." Valencia, however, did not blame the scribes because he believed that "the disorders of the scribes . . . and of all the other lesser ministers have their beginnings in the license given them by their superiors." ⁽³⁷⁾

This was a veiled attack upon the monarchy, but, though worried about ministerial corruption, Philip IV and Olivares had little time for finding ways to keep minor court officials in line. In a period of financial necessity, half-hearted attempts at judicial reform quickly gave way to the creation and sale of a variety of new judicial offices, the costs of which were immediately passed on to the litigants who used royal courts. In 1630, for example, Philip created ten new positions of diligencero (a kind of legal agent) at the chancillería; in 1632, twenty new offices of agente de negocios; and in 1635, six new offices of contador del número (court accountant) that initially sold for 485,500 mrs. apiece. Despite the decline in the amount of business recorded at this court, the number of receptores (court receivers) increased from twenty in 1561 to fifty-seven in 1667; relatores from six to seventeen. ⁽³⁸⁾ This growing army of officials, each of whom collected fees [225] paid by the users of this court, constituted a heavy burden for litigants to pay. As early as 1628, it was reported that the constables attached to the chancillería of Granada were so numerous and corrupt that "nobody dares ask for justice." ⁽³⁹⁾ And this situation was replicated in each of the king's major courts.

Figures outlining the exact cost of litigation during this century are difficult to come by and often incomplete. It is known that the price of a carta ejecutoría at the chancillería of Valladolid, which cost no more than 4,000 mrs. in 1630, was well over 6,000 mrs. in 1665. ⁽⁴⁰⁾ Presumably, the fees charged for other documents increased at a similar rate. Depending on the work involved, the cost of individual lawsuits varied widely. Officially, however, the lawsuits of the city of Seville in 1671 each required an average expenditure of 22,400 mrs., a sum only slightly below the salary paid to its procurador mayor in Madrid for an entire year. ⁽⁴¹⁾

Rising court costs, therefore, combined with adverse economic circumstances to reduce the number of litigants appealing to royal justice and also to make certain that the relatively minor cases that observers in the sixteenth century regarded as a major burden for the king's audiencias had practically disappeared. In the second half of the seventeenth century, nearly all of the peasants who came to the chancillería did so collectively, as representatives of their local village councils. Other humble litigants had also disappeared, and this meant that the chancillería was given over increasingly to cases brought by municipalities, cathedral chapters, and other corporate institutions as well as noblemen, important ministers, and other wealthy litigants (Table 4, chapter 3). This change in clientele also accounts for the proportional increase in the number of cases involving issues of public law (boundaries, tax disputes, municipal privileges, and the like) and others involving testaments, mayorazgos, dowries, and other familial matters (Table 5, chapter 3). Such disputes occurred in all families, but the stakes were so high among the nobility that squabbles were litigated on a relatively routine basis. Thus, at the end of the Habsburg period, the chancillería was principally a court serving the nobility. [226] Apparently, the rest of the population had to be content with either local justice or alternate means of dispute settlement such as arbitration, with the help of lawyers, out of court.

Seemingly, therefore, economic, legal, and social factors joined together to undermine the authority of royal justice, but other, primarily political reasons also help to explain the decline in litigation registered in these tribunals. Monarchical weakness, for example, and the crown's interest in winning support for new economic and political programs contributed directly to the proliferation of independent jurisdictions, special legal fueros, and other juridical privileges, many of which granted to whole classes of individuals, among them the familiares of the Holy Office and members of the Military Orders, immunity from the "ordinary jurisdiction" of the king. ⁽⁴²⁾ The result was a continual drain of cases away from the king's tribunals to other institutions that provided justice for the members of particular groups.

Also affecting the volume of cases brought to the king's tribunals was the apparent resurgence of local and municipal justice. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the monarchy, relying principally upon the corregidor and the audiencia, aimed at extending the competence and authority of royal justice at the expense of local tribunals, both municipal and seigneurial. Such courts, important during the later Middle Ages when monarchical government was still in its infancy, had been weakened by royal policies that provided for easy access to the king's justice, free legal services to the poor, and such legal procedures as the caso de corte that allowed direct appeal to one of the king's audiencias. Philip II, it should be remembered, also ignored the advice of reformers who advocated that the minimum value of cases that could be brought to the audiencias be raised to keep up with inflation. ⁽⁴³⁾ His refusal to do so led directly to the flood of "minor lawsuits" about which so many contemporaries complained, but Philip undoubtedly recognized that any increase in this limitation would automatically reduce the authority of his audiencias at the expense of the municipalities and the nobility.

Meanwhile, the cities hoped to persuade the monarchy to raise the value of the civil cases in which their regidores (town councillors) [227] were entitled to serve as judges of last resort. For years this had been set at 6,000 mrs., but the Cortes repeatedly urged Charles V to raise the limitation to 10,000, 15,000, or even 20,000 mrs. on the grounds that "if they [the litigants] go to the royal audiencias, they spend more money than the case is worth." ⁽⁴⁴⁾ Charles eventually agreed to an increase from 6,000 to 10,000 mrs., but both he and Philip attempted to hold the line there. Beginning in the 1590s, however, the monarchy's efforts to collect a new tax on foodstuffs and other essential commodities, known as the millones, provided the Cortes an excuse to ask for a still higher limit. Philip III agreed that this limitation should be raised to 20,000 mrs., but in 1617, when the crown asked the Cortes's approval for a renewal of the millones tax worth 17.5 million mrs., the latter demanded several concessions, including an increase in the value of cases the regidores would be entitled to decide. ⁽⁴⁵⁾ Instructions to the representatives of Soria and Valladolid suggested that municipal governments be entitled to review cases worth as much as 50,000 mrs., more than double the previous limitation. If enacted, this reform would have sharply reduced the competence of the king's audiencias, but the representatives of the cities argued that it was necessary "because of the poverty and need of the king's vassals." They also emphasized that justice in the king's tribunals was both expensive and slow, whereas the cities were in a position to "administer justice at relatively little cost to those who litigate." ⁽⁴⁶⁾ To get his tax, Philip agreed the following year to a compromise that allowed regidores to decide cases worth as much as 30,000 mrs. This reform was partly an attempt on the part of the monarchy to adjust its jurisdiction to inflation, ⁽⁴⁷⁾ but the importance the cities attached to the issue suggests that real political issues were also at stake.

Initially, this measure, which seems to have been agreed to on a temporary basis, elicited little discussion but, in 1635, when the [228] millones were again up for renewal, a number of observers came forward to complain that the crown had sacrificed too much of its judicial authority in order to secure its revenues. One prelate warned that the king should not "cede and sell his authority for the price of money granted him," ⁽⁴⁸⁾ and the Royal Council of Castile specifically registered its opposition to allowing cases worth 30,000 mrs. to be decided by the town councils. ⁽⁴⁹⁾ Diego de Riaño y Gamboa, the royal fiscal, soon joined in the fight to persuade Philip IV to rescind this proviso. In a letter dated 12 August 1635, he suggested that cases being decided in the ayuntamientos should be heard in the chancillería of Valladolid, "where they are reviewed and dispatched quickly, especially nowadays since this tribunal has few of the important cases it had in the past." Furthermore, the fiscal warned that if this clause in the capítulos de millones was not revoked, "the doors allowing lawsuits to go to the town halls would be opened wide despite the fact that the regidores have no experience in judicial matters whereas those leading to the chambers of the king's great tribunals would be closed, thus denying these courts' jurisdiction only to give it to ignorant regidores." He believed the only reason the cities wanted this authority was to further the private interests of the regidores; broad jurisdictional powers would raise their personal income and thus increase the market value of their offices. Riaño y Gamboa also noted that it would give the regidores "greater control over the rest of the vecinos" and that the crown's agreement to this clause would prove a great mistake because the justice traditionally dispatched by the town councillors had offered "little satisfaction." ⁽⁵⁰⁾

The council and the fiscal were, of course, attempting to protect their own interests, but despite their opposition, the state of royal finances in the mid-1630s was such that the monarchy could not afford to risk any delay in the payment of the millones tax. Once again, financial necessity prevailed over raison d'état. The cities, therefore, got what they asked. This was, however, not the only issue in which [229] the monarchy was ready to sacrifice its judicial authority in return for financial support. The northern reaches of Castile were honeycombed with seigneurial estates, the owners of which had the right to dispense justice in the king's name. Royal justice in such areas as the Montaña and the Rioja was consequently weak even though Ferdinand and Isabella, in an effort to increase their power, dispatched to the region three itinerant judges with the authority to decide, both in the first instance and on appeal, the civil cases of vassals living on seigneurial estates. These magistrates, known as the adelantados mayores of León, Campos, and Castile (or Burgos), were the most important of the king's corregidores and among the best paid. Philip II reportedly referred to them as "checks upon the seigneurs," and he defended their jurisdiction against complaints by powerful nobles. ⁽⁵¹⁾

His successors, however, adopted a different point of view. Philip III, in a moment of generosity, exempted the estates of his favorite, the duke of Lerma, from the authority of the adelantado mayor of Castile and thus established a precedent for a new kind of merced which other noblemen sought to obtain for themselves. ⁽⁵²⁾ Soon the cities were asking for similar privileges, notably Burgos, which in 1617 asked Philip to place the seven thousand villages that belonged to the jurisdiction of the adelantado mayor of Castile under the authority of its own alcalde mayor. Those opposed to this request warned that it would increase the power of seigneurs in the region because the peasantry would find it difficult to bring their cases to Burgos. The city disagreed. It also told the king that if cases formerly heard by the adelantado mayor were decided in the city, the city's economy would benefit from the addition of one hundred householders belonging to the scribes, attorneys, and other officials who would have to move to Burgos as well as from the money disbursed by the "two hundred persons who ordinarily litigate in the tribunal of the adelantado." ⁽⁵³⁾

Anxious not to alienate one of the more influential cities in the Cortes at a time when the millones was up for review, Philip agreed [230] to the abolition of the jurisdiction of the adelantado mayor of Castile, apparently not worrying too much about its possible effects upon the administration of royal justice in Castile. In 1634, for example, in a long report to Philip IV about the results of Philip III's action, Antonio de Mixangos complained that peasants living in the region were living "without justice" because their cases were ordinarily too small to merit a costly journey either to Burgos or to the chancillería in Valladolid. He also pointed to other "inconvenientes," the most serious of which was the freedom accorded to the nobles with estates and seigneuries in the region to do as they wished. According to Mixangos, in the absence of the adelantado mayor, the rights and privileges of the nobles' vassals were continually being abused. He also alleged that the seigneurs "committed many treacherous murders, lived without the fear of God, and abused and mistreated the poor labrador with false imprisonments and other kinds of revenge." ⁽⁵⁴⁾

Mixangos, about whom little is known, may have been exaggerating, but the erosion of royal justice to which he alluded was evident elsewhere, albeit for different reasons. In the Basque country, for example, royal justice suffered not because of formal jurisdictional changes but as a result of a decline in the prestige of the king's courts. Lic. don Luís de Castilla y Villagutiérrez, corregidor in Guipuzcoa, wrote to the king in 1635 complaining vehemently about the "lack of justice" in this region and especially of the declining influence of royal judges in San Sebastián, Tolosa, and Azpeitia. He also noted that the corregidor in Azcoitia had no more than six lawsuits a day to dispatch, and on some days the officers of the corregidorial court had to go into the streets "to cry out if there was anyone with legal business to dispatch." ⁽⁵⁵⁾ Clearly, the authority of the king's magistrates in this region was waning; however, in the Basque country as well as in most other parts of the kingdom, it was not the landed aristocracy who benefited from this development but the municipalities and particularly the noble families who occupied important offices in local government. ⁽⁵⁶⁾

In theory, the royal corregidor, as an ex-officio member of the town council, kept an eye on these officials, and his court supposedly served as an alternative to that administered by the town councillors. In practice, most of the king's corregidores in the seventeenth century did little to represent the interests of the king. Olivares himself told Philip IV in 1624 that most of the corregidores were second-rate men who, once in office, did more or less as they liked, a charge that included conspiring with local authorities and failing to administer justice in the king's name. ⁽⁵⁷⁾ Some years later, the bishop of Córdoba, having witnessed the response of various corregidores to the bread riots that swept across Andalusia in 1659, wrote Philip: "I see some corregidores who are totally inept, others fallen from the grace of God." ⁽⁵⁸⁾ He also accused the corregidores of representing the interests of powerful local families rather than those of the king.

Unfortunately, information about the performance of the king's corregidores in the seventeenth century is sparse. In 1617, the Royal Council, responding to charges that corregidores regularly sold the offices of lieutenant corregidor, took charge of naming these officials, but this only led to corruption of another sort. The councillors distributed these offices "by favors," and their intervention in these matters was said to have sparked "civil wars, discords, and differences" between the corregidores and their lieutenants. It was also said that as a result of this situation the king's corregidores were "daily losing respect." ⁽⁵⁹⁾ Finally, in 1632, the king returned power to appoint their lieutenants to the corregidores, but a few years later these officials were up to their old tricks. According to one report, corregidores sold [232] the vara (staff of authority) of the lieutenant corregidor on a regular basis. ⁽⁶⁰⁾

Sales of the office of lieutenant corregidor, however, were only one manifestation of the increasing independence of the corregidor from royal supervision and control. In 1603, for example, one corregidor could still write that he "feared his residencia," ⁽⁶¹⁾ but by the middle of the century most of these inquests were little more than a farce. One author called them a "swindle" that benefited only the scribes asked to draw up the necessary papers. ⁽⁶²⁾ All pretense to secrecy in the investigation had been forgotten, and this omission meant that the local townsmen asked to testify were either partisans of the corregidor in question or wise enough to respond that they "knew nothing" -- a very common response -- to avoid possible reprisals. There is also evidence to suggest that many corregidores escaped residencias altogether. In 1648, for example, Diego Fernando de Angulo admitted that he had been a corregidor in four different cities "without ever having had a residencia." ⁽⁶³⁾

In the absence of effective residencias and other forms of royal control, corregidores did as they pleased. Some allied themselves with members of the local town council, expecting to divide the spoils of government with members of the municipal elite. Martín de Reina Carvajal, for example, corregidor of Murcia in 1647, was known for his ties with some local poderosos as well as with a group of bandits whom he protected from prosecution and arrest. It was also alleged that "in consideration of his personal friendships and connections, he failed to punish many crimes but instead molested those who came before him seeking justice." ⁽⁶⁴⁾ In addition, Reina Carvajal was actively involved in smuggling activities along the coast. A similar charge was levied against Jacome Pinelo, corregidor of Toro in 3648. He was accused of "only attending to his own interests," one of which was involvement in a lucrative contraband trade with Portugal. ⁽⁶⁵⁾ Another [233] corregidor who was actively engaged in such illicit activities was Diego de los Ríos y Guzmán, who, when stationed in San Lúcar de Barrameda, was notorious for his work as a contrabandista. ⁽⁶⁶⁾

To be sure, not all corregidores in the seventeenth century were alike, but most of the evidence suggests that these officials did little to protect or to promote the prerogatives of the king. Underpaid and often without prospects of promotion to a position on one of the royal audiencias, corregidores had little reason to put the crown's interests ahead of their own. The result was that justice in many of the corregidors' courts was so haphazardly administered and enforced that the local residents took their cases elsewhere. In 1661, for example, Lic. Juan Leria, corregidor in Becerril de Campo, was said to be so biased in his judgments that "many vecinos stopped coming before him to ask for justice." ⁽⁶⁷⁾ Similar conditions existed in Utiel, a town in La Mancha. The corregidor who was there in 1655 claimed that he was justified in not holding regular court sessions "because lawsuits and other legal business was so sparse." ⁽⁶⁸⁾ In Utiel and in many other cities, local residents were either taking their disputes to municipal tribunals or settling them privately with the help of lawyers and other arbitrators. The corregidor, in other words, together with the chancillería and the Royal Council, appears to have been playing an ever diminishing role in Castile's judicial life. It was almost as if justice for the majority of Castilians was predominantly a local, private affair, beyond royal supervision and control, as it had been in the Middle Ages.

In the final analysis, however, responsibility for the erosion of royal justice in Castile belongs to the king, not his officials. Philip III took relatively little interest in judicial affairs, whereas Philip IV, preoccupied with keeping his vast dynastic inheritance intact, was concerned only with the administration of justice, when, as on one occasion in 1634, he thought that the incidence of "public sins" was so great that the Lord was punishing Spain by allowing its armies to lose on the battlefields. ⁽⁶⁹⁾ Otherwise, Philip's major concerns were financial and political, not judicial, and as long as his kingdom provided him with [234] the money to fight his many wars, this monarch was willing to allow much of the responsibility for the administration of justice to pass to officials outside his immediate authority and control. By the end of his reign, therefore, royal tribunals such as the council and the chancillería attended primarily to matters related to public law -- the administration and collection of taxes, boundary disputes, jurisdictional conflicts -- whereas local authorities presided over most aspects of private as well as criminal law. The one exception was the inheritance disputes involving the great landed nobility, which, owing to their potential political repercussions, came within the orbit of public law. Even so, it is apparent that by 1700 the later Habsburgs had allowed much of the judicial authority, so painstakingly acquired by their predecessors, to slip beyond their control.

The implications of this change in direction are many. Local jurisdictions, especially those of the cities and Castile's seigneurs, were becoming more autonomous because the check formerly provided by appellate jurisdictions was no longer operative. This "localization" of justice accelerated the erosion of a monarchy already beset by multiple economic and political woes. Of course, it is easy to exaggerate the significance of justice as an indicator of the strength and vitality of a government, yet if viewed from the widest perspective, the decline of the king's courts was only one facet of the inability of Philip IV and Charles II to maintain an effective, centralized regime in Castile. Localism in the Iberian peninsula was (and is) powerful, and nowhere were the centrifugal forces stronger than in the realm of law. Local fueros have been an important factor in Iberian law and politics down to the present day. Yet monarchs in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, inspired by Roman principles of law and order, met the challenge of the fueros head-on. Initially, such efforts paid off; legal reform and refinements in the machinery of royal justice served to channel conflict into the king's courts. Simultaneously, they afforded the crown an effective weapon against local enclaves of power and privilege. But, as I have suggested in the second part of this study, this process of judicial centralization stopped after considerable progress in the course of the sixteenth century, defeated by an alliance of economic stagnation, monarchical weakness, and cities unwilling to vote for new taxes without getting something in return.

Viewed from this perspective, the decay of royal justice was but a small part of a wider redistribution of economic and political power [235] that affected all of Castile in the seventeenth century. The winners in this process were peripheral areas near the coast, the aristocracy, and, especially, the officeholding families in command of Castile's cities. The losers were the center of the peninsula, the old mercantile cities of Castile, and, especially, the monarchy. Contemporaries recognized that such a redistribution of power was occurring, but most, owing to a vision of an ideal state symbolized by Imperial Rome, labeled it, somewhat erroneously, a decline, a term historians of subsequent eras have continued to employ. The term devolution, as I suggested at the opening of this chapter, might be more appropriate.

1. Jerónimo de Cevallos, Arte real para el buen gobierno (Toledo, 1623), p 141.

2. See I. A. A. Thompson. War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620 (London,1976), esp. chap 10.

3. The cédulas ordering these dislocations were dated 7 June 1601, 1 Oct 1604, and 15 Oct. 1606. See ARCV: RC, leg. 3.

4. AGS: GJ, leg. 889, cédula, ? April 1624. This document also noted that the oidores were "divided into factions and groups."

5. Ibid., Letters of 30 Jan., 31 Oct 1624 Oidor Diego de Castillo reported that "as a result of these discords, the lawsuits are being studied and adjudicated carelessly."

6. AGS: GJ, leg. 889, Gudiel y Peralta to Contreras, 5 May 1625.

7. Ibid , Contreras to King, 2 Jan. 1625.

8. Apparently, Gaceta had attempted to persuade the oidores to follow what was described as "the evangelical precept." The result was a "general disillusionment" and disputes between Gaceta and the magistrates over matters of precedence, procedures, and the like. Furthermore, Gaceta attempted to intervene personally in the consideration of lawsuits that belonged exclusively to the oidores, an action that only increased his unpopularity. As one judge reported, "The president's behavior is variable and changing, and he fails to treat us with the courtesy that is necessary. Furthermore, in voting and deciding lawsuits, he does not allow us the independence necessary for our work."

9. AHN: Cons., lib. 1431, "De las muchas cosas que deve su magestad remediar ... ," fols. 86-87. According to Sempere y Guarimos, Baltasar Gilimón de la Mota, fiscal of the royal council, complained earlier to Philip III about the council's efforts to expand its area of judicial competence. Sempere, however, refers to a manuscript in his possession which I have not yet been able to locate See Juan Sempere y Guarinos, Historia del derecho español (Lima, 1847), p. 493.

10. AHN: lib. 1431, fols. 86-87.

11. ACB. lib. 110, Riaño y Gamboa to King, 17 Feb. 1635.

12. Ibid., Antonio Marcos to King, 14 Feb. 1635. Marcos also noted that two of the chancillería's four salas were closed because of a lack of business.

13. Ibid., Martín Jaradma to King, 15 Feb. 1635.

14. Ibid., Juan Queipo de Llano to King, 16 Feb. 1635. The remaining quotations in this paragraph are also taken from this communication.

15. ARCV: Libros Civiles, cajas 32, 35, 44-47.

16. Ibid., cajas 18, 24-27.

17. Ibid , cajas 48-52.

18. For advocates registered in Madrid, see Pedro Barbadillo Delgado, Historia del colegio de abogados de Madrid (Madrid, 1956), 1:179-221.

19. See Bartolomé Bennassar, Valladolid au siécle d'or (Paris, 1967), p. 370, and AHPV: Prots., lib. 2019, contract dated io April 1634.

20. AHN: Clero, leg. 7794.

21. AHN: Estado, leg. 6379, part 2.15 Aug. 1591.

22. ARCG: libros 326-84, de ejecutores In 1640, the chancillería issued about 376 ejecutorias (the figure is an estimate because the data for this year are incomplete), in ,1660, 243, in 1680, 206; and in 1700, 218.

23. For continuing complaints about the quality of justice in Seville, see ACB: lib 66, real decreto, 30 July 1650. This document noted that "the impediments to the civil and criminal jurisdiction in the city are increasing in grave prejudice of the respect and veneration which they are due."

24. The six offices were those of the escribanos Ayala, Carranza, Escariche, Granados, Pinilla, and Vicario. See AHN: libs. 3189-3256. Another glimpse of the judicial work of the council is provided by the Libros de Conocimientos de Procuradores, 1683-93. See AHN: Cons., legs. 51774-75.

25. For Quevedo's works. see chapter 2 at note 193. See also Castillo Solórzano's La Garduña de Sevilla (1642) and Vélez de Guevara's comedy Conde don Pero Vélez y don Sancho el Deseado, ed. Emilio Cotarelo y Mori, Luis Vélez de Guevara y sus obras dramáticas, (Madrid, 1917).

26. AHN: Cons., lib. 3227.

27. See Apéndice a la educación popular, ed. Pedro Rodriguez de Campomanes (Madrid, 1775), vol. 1, p. 289. This proposal is also referred to in Julián Juderías, España en tiempo de Carlos II el hechizado (Madrid, 1912), p. 151.

28. ACPM: Libros de Acuerdo, vol. 2, junta general of 31 Oct. 1691.

29. The importance of Madrid in Castile's economy has been examined by David R. Ringrose, "The Impact of a New Capital City. Madrid, Toledo, and New Castile, 1560-1660," Journal of Economic History 33 (1973):761-91.

30. See Carla Rahn Philips, Ciudad Real, 1500-1750 (Cambridge, Mass , 1979), p. 57. In the eighteenth century, many of these local markets were officially recognized by royal decree. See Angel García Sanz, Desarollo y crisis del antiguo regimen en la Castilla la Vieja (Madrid, 1977), pp 173-78.

31. The fiscal and monetary problems of Philip IV's reign are examined in Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, Política y hacienda de Felipe IV (Madrid, 1960).

32. See García Sanz, pp. 216-20.

33. ACB: lib. 16, contains a long memorial from Burgos to Philip IV in which the city begs the king to prohibit all trade between northern Europe and the Cantabrian ports unless the goods are funneled first through Burgos.

34. See above, chapter 2.

35. BNM: 8226, "Discurso sobre el gobierno que ha de tener V. M. [Philip III] en su monarquia para conservarla," fol. 18.

36. AGS: PR, leg. 15, fol 8v.

37. AHN: Cons., lib. 1431, fol. 88.

38. This information on the officials at the chancillería comes from a 1691 report on this tribunal that can be found in AHN: Estado, leg. 6379, part 2.

39. AHN: Cons., leg. 12445, Visita to the chancillería of Granada (1628).

40. ARCV: Libro 44, de sentencias.

41. AMS. Secc. II. carpeta 205 The official cost (that is, recorded fees) of the city's lawsuits varied from 2,380 to 61,404 mrs., depending on the complexity of the case. The procurador mayor's salary was 26,996 mrs. a year.

42. See chapter 2 for more on these private jurisdictions.

43. See chapter 3 at note 50.

44. CLC, vol. 4. Cortes de 1528, pet. 38, p. 467. For similar requests, see vol. 4: Cortes de 1534, pet 78, p. 600; vol. 5, Cortes de 1538, pet 26, p. 128; de 1542, pet 41, p. 248; de 1544, pet 13, p. 310; de 1548, pets 18, 19, p. 374; de 1556, pet 7, p. 630; de 1558, pet. 19, p 741.

45. ACC: 33:233. For a capsule history of these negotiations, see ACB: lib. 110. Riaño y Gamboa to King, 12 July 1635, and a consulta of 14 May 1635.

46. Cited in Manuel Danvila y Collado, El poder civil en España (Madrid, 1885), 6:87.

47. See Pedro Fernández de Navarrete, Conservación de monarchias (Madrid, 1621), p. 374. He wrote that an adjustment in the value of the cases that could be heard by the ayuntamientos was necessary owing to a decline in the value of Castilian money.

48. ACM: Secc. Histórica, leg. 81, no 2, "Discurso del Cardenal de la Cueva sobre que conviene subir los Juros y Censos."

49. ACB: lib. 110, consulta, 14 May 1635.

50. Ibid., Riaño y Gamboa to King, 12 July 1635. The only biography of this influential official is that of Ismael García Ramila, Don Diego de Riaño y Gamboa (Burgos. 1958). Unfortunately, the author failed to utilize Riaño y Gamboa's official papers which are housed in the ACB.

51. BL: Eg, 356, fols. 52-64 The adelantado mayor of Castile was once referred to as "the most prominent temporal office that Your Majesty awards to letrados in all Spain." See Archivo de los Condes de Cañilleros: Asuntos de Trujillo, leg. 30, Relación de méritos of Lic. don Alfonso Hurtado. This archive is located in Cáceres and now belongs to the vizcondes de Peñaparda.

52. BL: Eg 356, fol. 60.

53. Ibid., fols. 63-64.

54. See ACB: lib 6, a printed memorial entitled Por el Adelantamnento de Castilla, dated 1647. The payment of a 20,000 ducat servicio by the city of Burgos in 1643 assured that suppression of the adelantado mayor of Castile's jurisdiction would be permanent. See José Antonio Martínez Bara, "Obras de conservación en el archivo de Covarrubias en el siglo XVIII," Homenaje a Don Agustín Millares Carlo (Gran Canana, 1975), 1:539.

55. ACB: lib. 110, Castilla y Villagutiérrez to King, 29 July 1633.

56. Such was the case in the town of San Clemente (Cuenca) where local poderosos managed to gain control of the office of alcalde mayor and to diminish the power and influence of the royal corregidor. In 1618, it was reported that these poderosos used municipal offices "to have vengeance upon their enemies" and also to exploit common lands for their own use. See Diego Torrente Pérez, Documentos para la historia de San Clemente (Cuenca) (Madrid, 1975), 1:31. For complaints about the influence of poderosos in other localities, see AHN: Cons., leg. 7253.

57. John H. Elliott and José F. de la Peña, Memoriales y cartas del conde duque de Olivares (Madrid, 1978), 164-65.

58. Cited in Antonio Dominguez Ortiz, Alteraciones andaluzas (Madrid, 1973), p. 201.

59. AHN Cons., lib. 1431, fols 86-87.

60. Ibid., fols. 87-88, and lib. 2768, fol. 69v According to Benjamin González Alonso, El corregidor castellano (Madrid, 1970), p. 129, the office of corregidor was "patrimonialized" in the course of this century. He also reports on the sale of varas by corregidores (pp 183-85).

61. AGS: leg. 2636, consulta, 26 Aug 1603.

62. BNM: 10695, fol 99.

63. AHN: Cons., leg 32412, Residencia of Diego Fernando de Angulo.

64. Ibid., Residencia of Martín de Reina Carvajal (1647).

65. AHN: Cons., leg. 32411, Residencia of Jacome Pinelo (1648).

66. Ibid., leg 32522, Residencia of Diego de los Rios y Guzmán (1655). The corregidor of Granada in 1651 was also accused of contraband. See ACB: lib. 66.

67. AHN: Cons., leg. 32521, Residencia of Lic. Juan Lena (1661).

68. Ibid., leg. 32522, Residencia of Pedro de Calatayud y Arellano (1661).

69. Ibid., leg. 7154, consultas, 9 Jan , 20 Dec. 1634.