[317]We have seen that, in the progress of the Reconquest, as Moorish territories were successively won, the inhabitants were largely allowed to remain, under guarantees for the free enjoyment of their religion and customs. These Mudéjares, as they were called, formed a most useful portion of the population, through their industry and skill in the arts and crafts. When, in 1368, Charles le Mauvais of Navarre granted to the Mudéjares of Tudela a remission of half their taxes for three years, in reward of their assistance during his wars, especially in fortification and engineering, it shows that the conquering race depended on them not merely for manual labor but for the higher branches of applied knowledge. ⁽²⁾ As a rule they were faithful in peace and war, during the long centuries of internal strife between the Christians, and of struggles with their co-religionists.
 

It was the Jews against whom was directed the growing intolerance of the fifteenth century and, in the massacres that occurred, there appears to have been no hostility manifested against the Mudéjares. When Alfonso de Borja, Archbishop of Valencia (afterwards Calixtus III), supported by Cardinal Juan de Torquemada, urged their expulsion on Juan II of Aragon, although he appointed a term for their exile, he reconsidered the matter and left them undisturbed. ⁽³⁾ So when, in 1480, Isabella ordered the expulsion from Andalusia of all Jews who refused baptism and [318] when, in 1486, Ferdinand did the same in Aragon, they both respected the old capitulations and left the Mudéjares alone. ⁽⁴⁾ The time-honored policy was followed in the conquest of Granada, and nothing could be more liberal than the terms conceded to the cities and districts that surrendered. The final capitulation of the city of Granada was a solemn agreement, signed November 25, 1491, in which Ferdinand and Isabella, for themselves, for their son the Infante Juan and for all their successors, received the Moors of all places that should come into the agreement as vassals and natural subjects under the royal protection, and as such to be honored and respected. Religion, property, freedom to trade, laws and customs were all guaranteed, and even renegades from Christianity among them were not to be maltreated, while Christian women marrying Moors were free to choose their religion. For three years, those desiring expatriation were to be transported to Barbary at the royal expense, and refugees in Barbary were allowed to return. When, after the execution of this agreement, the Moors, with not unnatural distrust, wanted further guarantees, the sovereigns made a solemn declaration in which they swore by God that all Moors should have full liberty to work on their lands, or to go wherever they desired through the kingdoms, and to maintain their mosques and religious observances as heretofore, while those who desired to emigrate to Barbary could sell their property and depart. ⁽⁵⁾ It was the wise traditional policy of incorporating the conquered population in the state, on an equal footing with other subjects, and trusting to time to merge them all into a common mass, holding one faith and owing allegiance to one country.
 

Whether it was distrust of Christian good faith that impelled them, or a natural desire to leave the scene of their defeat, a large portion of the Granadan Moors, including most of the nobles, promptly availed themselves of the right of expatriation. Before the year 1492 was out, it was reported to the sovereigns that the Abencerrages had gone, almost in a body, and that, in the Alpujarras, few were left save laborers and officials. The emigration [319] continued and, in 1498, a letter of Ferdinand indicates that he was inclined to stimulate it. ⁽⁶⁾ While there might be good reasons for diminishing the large population of those recently vanquished, who presumably might cherish hopes of independence and had not forgotten the bitterness of unsuccessful struggle, this was accompanied with a readiness to increase the number of Mudéjares, who had adapted themselves to the situation, and who were regarded as in every way a desirable element in the community.. When Manoel of Portugal expelled the Moors who refused baptism, Ferdinand and Isabella welcomed them to Spain. Royal letters were issued, April 20, 1497, permitting their entrance with all their property, either to settle or in transit to other lands; they were taken under the royal protection and all molestation of them was forbidden. ⁽⁷⁾ Up to this time, at least, there was no recognition of the political necessity of unity of faith, which subsequently served as justification for cruel intolerance and unwise statesmanship.
 
Yet the statesmanship of the day, if not yet prepared to regard unity of faith as a political necessity, considered it politically advantageous, while pious zeal inevitably sought the salvation of the multitudes of souls thus brought under Christian rule. The "third king of Spain," González de Mendoza, Cardinal-archbishop of Toledo, and other prelates at the court urged upon the sovereigns that gratitude to God required them to give to their new subjects the alternative of baptism or exile. Ferdinand and Isabella, however, turned a deaf ear to this advice, either not caring to break the faith so recently pledged, or to provoke another war; the work of conversion had already been commenced with fair prospects of success and it could safely be left to time. ⁽⁸⁾ Isabella's confessor, the saintly Hernando de Talavera, had been made Archbishop of Granada; he was devoting his revenues and his tireless labors to missionary work, inculcating Christianity by example more potent than precept. He relieved suffering, he preached and he taught all who would listen to him; he required his assistants to learn Arabic and he acquired it himself. He won [320] many converts and there was a flattering prospect that his apostolic methods would bring the mass of the population into the fold. ⁽⁹⁾
 
The process however was too slow for the impatience that looked for immediate results. Ferdinand and Isabella were in Granada from July until November, 1499, and called in Ximenes to the aid of Talavera. His extraordinary energy and imperious temper soon made themselves felt; with liberal presents he gained the favor of the principal Moors; he held conferences with the alfaquíes, whom he induced to instruct their people and, it is said that, on December 18th, three thousand were baptized and the mosque of the Albaycin, or Moorish quarter, was consecrated as the church of San Salvador. The stricter Moslems became alarmed and endeavored to check the movement by persuasion, whereupon Ximenes had them imprisoned in chains; he summoned the alfaquíes to surrender all their religious books, of which five thousand--many of them priceless specimens of art--were publicly burnt. The situation was becoming strained; the Moors were restive under the disregard of their guarantees, and Ximenes grew more anymore impetuous. Rupture, under these conditions was inevitable and Ximenes soon brought it about. Christian renegades, known as elches, were protected under the capitulations, but he argued that this did not extend to their children who, if not baptized, ought to have been, and who thus were subject to the Inquisition. From Inquisitor-general Deza he procured a delegation of power to deal with them and used it for their arrest. It chanced that a young daughter of a renegade, thus arrested, while being dragged through the plaza of Bib-el-Bonut, cried out that she was to be forcibly baptized in violation of the capitulations. A crowd collected and from words soon came to blows; the alguazil was slain with a paving-stone, and his companion escaped only by a Moorish woman conveying him away and hiding him under a bed. The agitation increased; the Moors flew to arms, skirmished with the Christians and besieged Ximenes in his house. He had a guard of two hundred men who defended the place until the morning, when the Captain-general Tendilla came down from the Alhambra with troops and drove away the mob. For ten days Talavera, Ximenes and Tendilla parleyed with the Moors, who urged that they had not risen against the sovereigns but in defence of the royal faith; that the officials had [321] violated the capitulations, the observance of which would restore peace. Then Talavera, with his chaplain and a few unarmed servants, went to the plaza Bib-el-Bonut, where the Moors kissed the hem of his garments as of old. Tendilla followed and promised pardon if they should lay down their arms, as it should be understood that they were not in revolt, but had only sought to maintain the capitulations, which should be strictly observed in future. The city became quiet; those who had slain the alguazil were surrendered, and four of them were hanged; the Moors cast aside their arms and returned to work.
 
With such a population, kindness and fair-dealing alone were required to accomplish the desired result, but the inflexible temper of Ximenes had been aroused, and he was resolved on the forcible accomplishment of his purpose. The rumors of the disturbance had greatly alarmed the court at Seville, and Ximenes was bitterly reproached, but he hurried thither, gave his own version of the affair, and pointed out that the Moors had forfeited life and property by rebellion, so that pardon should be conditioned on accepting baptism or expatriation. With fatal facility his arguments were accepted; Tendilla's promises were ignored; the capitulations were cast aside; the Moors were to be taught how little reliance was to be placed on Christian faith; distrust and hatred were to be rendered ineradicable, and a religion was to be forced upon them which could not but be odious, as the visible sign of their subjection. From this false step sprang the incurable trouble which weakened Spain until statesmanship could devise no remedy, save the deplorable expulsion of the most useful and efficient portion of her population. It was not without reason that the admiring biographer of Ximenes admits that, so imperious was his temper that he sometimes acted through fury rather than through prudence, as was seen in the conversion of the Granadan Moors and in the attempt to conquer Africa. ⁽¹⁰⁾
 
He returned to Granada, armed with full powers, and offered to the people the alternative of baptism or punishment, while a royal judge, sent for the purpose, sharpened their apprehension by executing or imprisoning the more active of the rioters. The choice was readily made and they came forward in thousands for the saving waters of baptism. Instruction in the new faith [322] was impossible, nor was it wanted. When they asked for it in their own language, and Talavera had the offices and parts of the gospels printed in Arabic, Ximenes objected; it was, he said, casting pearls before swine; it was in the nature of the vulgar to despise what they could understand and to reverence that which was mysterious and beyond their comprehension. He cared little for heart-felt conversion so long as he could secure outward conformity. The number thus rudely inducted into the faith, in the city and the Vega, was estimated at from fifty to seventy thousand and the process which converted them could result only in undying hate for the religion thus forced upon them. ⁽¹¹⁾
 
Although no outbreak occurred during this forcible missionary work, the discontent which it excited was threatening, and Ferdinand returned to Granada where he made no secret of his displeasure at the imprudent zeal of Ximenes, especially as it interfered with his designs on Naples. These had to be postponed to meet the imminent danger at home for, although emigration had been large, many had taken refuge in the Alpujarras and were exciting the mountaineers to revolt. To meet this he wrote, January 27, 1500, to the leading Moors, assuring them that all reports that they were to be Christianized by force were false, and pledging the royal faith that not a single compulsory baptism would be made. To reconcile those who had been baptized and to attract others he issued, February 27th, a general pardon to all New Christians for crimes committed prior to baptism and renouncing his claims to confiscation. ⁽¹²⁾ Meanwhile he had been engaged in raising an army as large as though the conquest was to be repeated, and with this he was engaged, during the rest of the year, in quelling the revolts which broke out in one place after another, supplementing military operations with friars despatched through the mountains to instruct the converts. Massacre and baptism went hand in hand, until the Alpujarras were pacified and the army was disbanded, January 14, 1501. ⁽¹³⁾
 
[323] Then there came trouble in the Western districts of Ronda and the Sierra Bermeja, where the mountaineers rose, in dread of enforced conversion. Another army was raised, which suffered a severe defeat at Caladui. This brought a pause, during which the insurgents asked to be allowed to emigrate. Ferdinand drove a hard bargain with them, demanding ten doblas for the passage-money and requiring those who could not pay this to remain and submit to baptism. The baptized lowlanders, who had taken to the mountains, were allowed to return home, surrendering their arms and suffering confiscation. Large numbers escaped to Africa, but more remained to curse the faith thus imposed on them. To these New Christians, as we have seen, expatriation was forbidden. Baptism imposed an indelible character, and incorporation with the Church subjected them to a jurisdiction which could not be shaken off.
 
It was vitally important that these New Christians should be interfused with the rest of the population, with the same rights and privileges, so that in time they might form a contented whole, but this was not to be. One wrong always breeds another. The disregard of compacts and the violent methods of conversion inevitably rendered them objects of suspicion, and an edict of September 1, 1501 prohibited the new converts from bearing or possessing arms, publicly or secretly, under penalty, for a first offence, of confiscation and two months' imprisonment and of death for a second--an edict which was repeated in 1511 and again in 1515. ⁽¹⁴⁾ Not only was this a bitter humiliation but a serious infliction, at a time when weapons were a necessity for self-protection. There was however another distinction between the classes favorable to the New Christians, for it was provided that, for forty years, they should not be subjected to the Inquisition, in order that they might have full time to acquire knowledge of their new faith. ⁽¹⁵⁾ Yet, like all other promises, this was made only to be broken. It was thus, in less than ten years after the capitulation, that the Moors of Granada found themselves to be Christians in defiance of the pledges so solemnly given. Such a commencement could have but one result and we shall see its outcome. 
 
[324] Something might be urged in palliation of this forcible propaganda in that it was unpremeditated and brought about in the turbulence of a settlement between hostile races and religions, and that those who rejected conversion were allowed to depart. All this was lacking in the next step towards enforcing unity of faith. We have seen how the Mudéjares of Castile were loyal and contented subjects, living under compacts centuries old, which guaranteed them the full enjoyment of their religion and laws. To disturb this and convert them, by a flagrant breach of faith, into plotting domestic enemies, without even a colorable pretext, would appear to be an act of madness. Yet it was this that Isabella was led to do, under the influence of her ghostly counsellors, among whom Ximenes can probably be reckoned as the most influential. In bringing about the conversion of Granada, he had cared for little beyond outward conformity and this could be secured among the scattered and peaceful Mudéjares, without encountering the risk attending the attempt among the mountaineers of the Alpujarras, while subsequently the Inquisition could be depended upon for what might be lacking in religious conviction. God should no longer be insulted by infidel rites in Spain, and the land could not fail to be blessed when thus united in the true faith. Such we may assume to have been the reasoning which led Isabella to a measure so disastrous. That Ferdinand's practical sense disapproved of it may be inferred from the fact that, when he talked of similar action in Aragon, he readily yielded to the remonstrances of his nobles.
 
Persuasion, backed by threats, was first essayed. Instructions were sent to the royal officials that the Mudéjares must adopt Christianity and, when the corregidor of Córdova replied that force would be necessary, the sovereigns replied, September 27, 1501, that this was inadmissible, as it would scandalize them; they were to be told that it was for the good of their souls and the service of the king and queen and, if this proved insufficient, they could be informed that they would have to leave the kingdom, for it was resolved that no infidels should remain. ⁽¹⁶⁾ But four years had elapsed since the refugee Moors from Portugal had been invited to settle in Castile, and this sudden change of policy shows what influences had been brought to bear on Isabella during that brief interval.
 
[325] This tentative measure seems to have met with success so slender that more stringent methods were recognized as necessary and, on February 12, 1502, a pragmática was issued, shrewdly framed to give at least the appearance of voluntary action to the expected conversion. It alluded to the scandal of permitting infidels to remain after the conversion of Granada; to the gratitude due to God, which would fitly be shown by the expulsion of his enemies, and to the protection of the New Christians from contamination. All Moors were therefore ordered to leave the kingdoms of Leon and Castile by the end of April, abandoning their children, the males under fourteen and the females under twelve years of age, who were to be detained. The exiles were allowed to carry with them their property, except gold and silver and other prohibited articles. There was nothing said as to an alternative of baptism, but the conditions of departure rendered expatriation so difficult that it was self-evident that there was no intention of losing so valuable a portion of the population. Under pain of death and confiscation, the exiles were to sail only from ports of Biscay; they were not allowed to go to Navarre or the kingdoms of Aragon; as there was war with the Turks and with the Moors of Africa, they were not to seek refuge with either, but were told that they might go to Egypt or to any other land that they might select. They were never to return, nor were Moors ever to be admitted to the Castilian kingdoms, under penalty of death and confiscation, and any one harboring them after April was threatened with confiscation. One exception was made in favor of masters of Moorish slaves, who were not deprived of them, but they were to be distinguished by the perpetual wearing of fetters. ⁽¹⁷⁾
 
The voluntary character of the conversion which ensued is revealed in the fact that when zealous Moslems, in spite of almost insuperable obstacles, preferred to risk the perils of emigration they were not allowed to do so, but were forced to become Christians. ⁽¹⁸⁾ During the brief interval allowed, there was some pretence of preaching and instruction and, as it neared its end, the Mudéjares were baptized in masses. A report from Avila, April 24th, to the sovereigns, says that the whole aljama, consisting of two [326] thousand souls, will be converted and none will depart. ⁽¹⁹⁾ In Badajoz, we are told that the bishop, Alfonso de Manrique--the future inquisitor-general--won them over by kindness, so that they were all baptized and took his name of Manrique. ⁽²⁰⁾ Thus, externally at least, the kingdoms of the crown of Castile enjoyed unity of faith, but this was not accompanied with the desirable assimilation of the population. The new converts continued to form a class apart and came to be known by the distinctive name of Moriscos.
 
The nominal Christianity thus imposed upon those reared in the tenets of Islam was only the beginning of the task assumed by the state. The more difficult labor remained of rendering them true Christians, if the advantage was to be secured of moulding discordant races into a homogeneous community, which alone could justify the violent measures adopted. The unity of faith, which was the ideal at the time of both churchman and statesman, means more than mere outward conformity; it means that all should form a united nation, animated with the same aspirations and the same hopes, here and hereafter, and conscientiously sharing a common belief. In a land like Spain, populated by diverse races, this was an object worth many sacrifices; if it could not be attained, the enforced baptism of a powerful minority only exaggerated divergence and perpetuated discord.
 
To secure the desired result by the employment of force, through the Inquisition, could not fail to intensify abhorrence of a religion which, while professing universal love and charity, was known only as an excuse for oppression and cruelty. Yet the only alternative was the slow and laborious process of disarming the prejudices already aroused, and winning over the reluctant convert by gentleness and persuasion, by kindly instruction and demonstration that the truths of Christianity were not mere theological abstractions, of no vitality in practical life. We have seen the embodiment of the two methods in Ximenes and Talavera, and it was the fatal error of those who ruled the destinies of Spain that they had not patience and self-denial resolutely to follow the latter. Haltingly and spasmodically they tried to do so, with only persistence enough to put themselves in the wrong and deprive of [327] justification the concurrent employment of the easier process of coercion. From one cause or another, as we shall have occasion to see, the intermittent and ineffective attempts at persuasion failed miserably, while the perpetual irritation of persecution led inevitably to chronic exasperation.
 
Five years had elapsed since the coercive baptism which, under the precepts of the church, should have been preceded by competent understanding of the mysteries of the faith, when Ximenes attained, in 1507, the inquisitor-generalship. One of his earliest acts was a letter to all the churches prescribing the deportment, in religious matters, of the New Christians and their children, including regular attendance at the mass, instruction in the rudiments of the faith, and avoidance of Judaic and Mahometan rites. ⁽²¹⁾ Presumably this accomplished little and, in 1510, Ferdinand addressed all his prelates, pointing out the neglect of Christian observances by the Conversos, and ordering the bishops to enforce their presence at mass and to provide for their instruction, matters to which the parish priests must devote special attention. ⁽²²⁾ The council of Seville, in 1512, responded to this by calling attention to the number of new converts who greatly needed religious instruction. The prelates, who were responsible for the salvation of souls, were ordered to depute for that purpose learned men, who should specially investigate their manner of life and their commission of sins pertaining to their old faith. All parish priests were ordered to make out lists of the converts and see that they conformed to the mandates of the church, and special lists were to be compiled of those who had been reconciled by the Inquisition, with orders to attend mass on Sundays and feast-days, so that their fulfilment of their sentences could be enforced. ⁽²³⁾ From what we know of the failure of subsequent measures of this kind we may safely assume that these received little attention from those who would have been obliged to expend money and labor in their execution.
 
Simultaneously with his letters of 1510, Ferdinand had applied to Julius II, representing that, since 1492, there had been converted many Jews and Moors who, through insufficient instruction, had been led to commit many heretical crimes; he had ordered their [328] instruction, but it would be inhuman to visit them with the full rigor of the canons, and he therefore asked faculties to publish an Edict of Grace, under which those coming in could be reconciled without confiscation and public abjuration, so that, in case of relapse, they could escape relaxation. ⁽²⁴⁾ The conditions appended to Edicts of Grace so reduced their effectiveness that this has importance only as an indication that Ferdinand, as we shall see elsewhere, was rather disposed to check inquisitorial ardor in the prosecution of Moriscos, but he atoned for this on his death-bed, by a clause in his will commanding his grandson Charles to appoint inquisitors zealous for the destruction of the sect of Mahomet. ⁽²⁵⁾ This was superfluous for, as the stock of Judaizers became reduced, Moriscos supplied their place, and the Inquisition required curbing rather than stimulation. That Charles recognized this is seen in various Edicts of Grace issued in their favor, for certain districts, between 1518 and 1521, edicts which relieved them from confiscation and the sanbenito but did not protect from relapse or exempt from denunciation of accomplices. ⁽²⁶⁾
 
There was little practical relief to be expected from such measures, but at least they indicate the conviction of the rulers that it was both unjust and impolitic to visit with the rigor of the canons those who had been forced into the Church and had had no spiritual instruction. Still, the canon law was a positive fact; an elaborate machinery had been instituted for its enforcement, with no corresponding organization to render the new religion attractive instead of odious, and a situation had been created for which there was no radical cure. Alleviation was the only resource, and this was attempted, although the fluctuating policy adopted only intensified the evil for the future. In pursuance of this Cardinal Adrian, August 5, 1521, issued orders that no arrests should be made except on evidence directly conclusive of heresy, and even then it must first be submitted to the Suprema. This seems to have received so little obedience that Archbishop Manrique, April 28, 1524, repeated it in more decisive fashion. He recited the conversion of the Moriscos by Ferdinand and Isabella, who promised them graces and liberties, in pursuance of which [329] Cardinal Adrian had issued many provisions in their favor, ordering the tribunals not to prosecute them for trifling causes and, if any were so arrested, they were to be discharged and their property be returned to them. In spite of this, the inquisitors continued to arrest them on trivial charges, and on the evidence of single witnesses. As they were ignorant persons, who could not readily prove their innocence, these arrests had greatly scandalized them, and they had petitioned for relief, wherefore the Suprema ordered inquisitors not to arrest them without conclusive evidence of heresy, and when there was doubt it was to be consulted. All who were held for matters not plainly heretical were to have speedy justice, tempered with such clemency as conscience might permit. ⁽²⁷⁾
 
How completely these instructions were ignored is manifest in the trials of the Moriscos where, as in those of the Judaizers, any adherence to customs, which for generations had formed part of daily life, was sufficient for arrest and prosecution. It was not merely the fasting of the Ramadan, the practice of circumcision, the Guadoc or bath accompanied with a ritual, or the Taor, another kind of bath used prior to the Zala, or certain prayers uttered with the face turned to the East, at sunrise, noon, sunset and night. These were well-defined religious ceremonies admitting of no explanation, but there were numerous others, innocent in themselves, which implied suspicion of heresy, and suspicion was in itself a crime. Under skilful management, including the free use of torture, arrest for these simple observances might lead to further confessions, and the opportunity was not to be lost. Abstinence from pork and wine was amply sufficient to justify prosecution, and we hear of cases in which staining the nails with henna, refusal to eat of animals dying a natural death, killing fowls by decollation, the zambras and leilas, or songs and dances used at merry-makings and nuptials, and even cleanliness, were gravely adduced as evidences of apostasy. ⁽²⁸⁾
 
In pursuance of this policy, elaborate lists of all Moorish customs were made out for the guidance of inquisitors; abstracts of these were included in the Edicts of Faith, where every one who had [330] seen or heard of such things was required under pain of excommunication to denounce them; the Moriscos were subjected to perpetual espionage, and any unguarded utterance, which might be construed as inferring heretical leaning, was liable to be reported and to lead to arrest and probable punishment. It is true that from these slender indications the inquisitorial process frequently led up to full confession, but this did not render the position of the Morisco less intolerable, and constraint and anxiety contributed largely to intensify his detestation of the religion which he knew only as the cause of persecution. Bishop Pérez of Segorbe, in 1595, when enumerating fifteen impediments to the conversion of the Moriscos, included their fear of the Inquisition and its punishments which made them hate Christianity. ⁽²⁹⁾ At all events, it secured outward conformity, at least in Castile, where they were gradually assimilating themselves to the Old Christians; they had long since abandoned their national dress and language; they were assiduous in attendance at mass and vespers, the confessional and the sacrament of the altar; they participated in processions and interments and were commonly regarded as Christians, whatever might be the secrets of their hearts. ⁽³⁰⁾
 
Doubtless, as time wore on, many were won over and became sincerely attached to their new faith, but every now and then little communities of apostates were brought to light. Thus, in 1538, Juan Yañés, Inquisitor of Toledo, included Daimiel in a visitation. It had a Morisco population, which had been baptized in 1502, and had apparently been overlooked so long that it had grown somewhat careless. A woman reported to Yañés that she had lived with Moriscos for twelve years and had observed that they did not use pork or wine, on the plea that these things disagreed with them. This sufficed to start an investigation which so crowded the secret prison that we hear of nine women confined in a single cell, and of the hall of the Inquisition being used as a place of detention. Yet this vigorous work did not extirpate the evil for, in 1597, the Toledo tribunal was busy with heretics from Daimiel. ⁽³¹⁾ More shocking was a case in which María Páez, daughter of Diego Páez Limpati of Almagro, figured, for she accused all her kindred and friends. Her father was burnt in 1606, as [331] an impenitent negativo; her mother, who confessed, was reconciled and imprisoned, and in all twenty-five Moriscos of Almagro suffered, of whom four were relaxed. In the Toledo record, from 1575 to 1610, there are a hundred and ninety cases of Moriscos as against a hundred and seventy-four of Judaizers, and forty-seven of Protestants, showing that, notwithstanding the influx of Portuguese, the Moriscos were the most numerous heretics with which the tribunal had to deal. ⁽³²⁾ The old Mudéjares of Castile had fallen upon evil times, but worse were in store for them.
 
Granada presented a more difficult and dangerous problem, requiring the most sagacious statesmanship to reconcile political safety with the demand for unity of faith, yet this delicate situation was treated with a blundering disregard of common-sense characteristic of Philip II. The population was almost wholly Morisco, and the country was rugged and mountainous, offering abundant refuge for the despairing. The so-called conversion of 1501 had worked no change in their belief. They were hard-working, moral, honorable in their dealings, and charitable to their poor, but they were Moslems at heart; if they went to mass, it was to escape the fine; if they had their children baptized, they forthwith washed off the chrism and circumcised the males; if they confessed during Lent, it was merely to obtain the certificate; if they learned the prayers of the Church, it was in order to get married, after which they were forgotten with all convenient speed. They had been promised forty years' exemption from the Inquisition, but they were rendered disaffected by the abuses of judicial avarice and the insolent domination of the officials, secular and ecclesiastical. ⁽³³⁾
 
In 1526 Charles V was in Granada, where, in the name of the Moriscos, three descendants of the old Moorish kings, Fernando Vinegas, Miguel de Aragon and Diego López Benexara, appealed to him for protection against the ill-treatment by the priests, the judges, the alguaziles and other officials, whereupon he appointed a commission to investigate and report. Fray Antonio de Guevara, shortly to be Bishop of Guadix, was one of the commissioners and, in a letter to a friend, he describes the Moriscos as offering so much that required correction that it had better be done in [332] secret, rather than by public punishment; they had been so ill-taught, and the magistrates had so winked at their errors, that remedying it for the future would be enough without disturbing the past. ⁽³⁴⁾ This shows the spirit in which the commission performed its work; the incriminated priests and officials had turned the tables on their accusers, who were now defendants. The report of the commission confirmed the complaints of ill-usage, but stated that among the Moriscos there were not to be found more than seven true Christians. This was submitted to a junta, presided over by Inquisitor-general Manrique, and the result was an edict known as that of 1526. It granted no relief from oppression, but concerned itself with the apostasy of the Moriscos, which it sought to cure, not by instructing them, but by rendering their condition still more intolerable. In violation of promises, the Inquisition of Jaen was transferred to Granada. Amnesty for past offences was granted, and a term of grace was provided for those confessing voluntarily, after which the laws against heresy were to be rigorously enforced, although for some years fines were substituted for confiscation and time was allowed in which the penitents could earn them. ⁽³⁵⁾
 
This was supplemented with a series of most vexatious regulations, prohibiting the use of Arabic and of Moorish garments and of baths; Christian midwives were to be present at all births; disarmament was enforced by a rigid inspection of licences; the doors of Moriscos were to be kept open on feast-days, Fridays, Saturdays and during weddings, to prevent the use of Moorish ceremonies; schools to train children in Castilian were to be established at Granada, Guadix and Almería: no Moorish names were to be used and Moriscos were not to keep gacis or unbaptized Moors, whether free or slave. ⁽³⁶⁾ This naturally caused great agitation; the Moriscos held a general assembly and raised eighty thousand ducats to be offered to Charles for a withdrawal of the edict. His advisers were doubtless propitiated and, before leaving Granada, he suspended it during his pleasure and permitted the carrying of a sword and dagger in the towns and of a lance in the open [333] country. A special tax, known as farda, probably dates from about this period, under which the use of Moorish garments and language was permitted and, in 1563, we chance to learn that this amounted to twenty thousand ducats per annum. ⁽³⁷⁾
 
It would seem that, for awhile, the Inquisition troubled the Moriscos but little for, in its first general auto, held in 1529, out of eighty-nine culprits, while there were seventy-eight for Judaism there were but three for Mahometanism, and one of these was in effigy. ⁽³⁸⁾ Still it provoked disquiet and, in 1532, Captain-general Mondéjar suggested to Charles its suspension, since it had done nothing and could find nothing against the Moriscos. This was unfortunate, for it stimulated the tribunal to greater activity against them, leading to numerous offers on their part to Charles and, after his abdication, to Philip II, of liberal payments for relief. Charles's necessities prompted him to listen to these propositions, but the Inquisition managed to prevent their success, while Philip of course turned a deaf ear to them. Even Inquisitor-general Valdés, in 1558, during his disfavor at court, seems to have taken a hand in these negotiations, for we find him promising a subsidio of a hundred thousand ducats from the Moriscos of Granada. ⁽³⁹⁾

The condition of the Moriscos was steadily growing worse, and the situation in Granada was becoming dangerously explosive. The Inquisition was more active than ever; all the old oppressions by the priests and judicial officers continued unchecked, and a new source of intense irritation was the progressive spoliation of their lands by "judges of boundaries" who, in the name of the king, deprived them of properties inherited or purchased-- in short, they were gente sin lengua y sin fabor--friendless and defenceless. ⁽⁴⁰⁾ Then, in 1563, an old order to present to the captain-general all licences to bear arms was revived under a penalty of six years of galleys. ⁽⁴¹⁾ In 1565 a fresh source of trouble was created by extending the royal jurisdiction over the lands of the nobles, in which many Moriscos, who in years past had committed [334] crimes, had sought asylum. Eager for fees, the notaries and justices searched the records and made arrests, until there was scarce a Morisco who did not live in daily fear. Many took to the mountains, joining the bands of monfíes, or outlaws, and committing outrages, while the measures taken for their suppression only increased the disorder. ⁽⁴²⁾
 
The condition of Granada was one which required firmness and conciliation, but infatuation prevailed in Philip's court, and the occasion was seized to aggravate irritation beyond endurance. Guerrero, Archbishop of Granada, in returning from Trent in 1563, had tarried in Rome, where he lamented to Pius IV that his flock was Christian only in name. Pius sent by him an urgent message to Philip, reinforced by orders to his nuncio, the Bishop of Rossano, to the same purport. Guerrero, on reaching home, assembled a provincial council in 1565, in which he endeavored to restrain the oppression of the Moriscos by the ecclesiastics, but his chapter appealed from the conciliar decrees and the effort was nugatory. He had more success in inducing the bishops to join in urging upon the king the adoption of measures to prevent the Moriscos from concealing their apostasy, and he wrote to Philip, begging him to purify the land from this filthy sect; it could readily, he said, be found who were really Christians by prohibiting the things through which their rites were kept from view. ⁽⁴³⁾
 
Philip referred Guerrero's memorial to a junta presided over by Diego de Espinosa, recently made President of Castile and soon to be inquisitor-general. It reported that, presuming the Moriscos to be Christians by baptism, they must be compelled to be so in fact, to which end they must be required to abandon the language, garments and customs of Moors, by reviving the edict of 1526, and this was solemnly charged upon the royal conscience. Philip thereupon consulted privately Dr. Otadui, professor of theology at Salamanca, and shortly to be Bishop of Avila, who, in his reply, told the king that, if any of the lords of the Moriscos should cite the old Castilian proverb '' The more Moors the more profit" he should remember an older and truer one, "The fewer enemies the better" and combine the two into "The more dead [335] Moors the better, for there will be fewer enemies"--advice which, we are told, greatly pleased the monarch, in place of opening his eyes to the policy which was converting his subjects into his enemies. ⁽⁴⁴⁾
 
A pragmática was speedily framed, embodying the most irritating features of the edict of 1526, and Pedro de Deza, a member of the Suprema and of Espinosa's junta, was appointed president of the chancellery of Granada and sent there, May 4, 1566, under orders to publish and enforce it without listening to remonstrances. It illustrates Philip's method of government that Captain-general Mondéjar, although at the court, was not even apprised of the measure, until an order was conveyed to him through Espinosa to return to Granada and be present at the publication. He was captain-general by inheritance, being grandson to the Tendilla placed there at the conquest; he had lived in Granada from his boyhood, he had been captain-general for thirty years and was thoroughly familiar with the situation. He represented that Granada was destitute of troops and of munitions, and he begged either that the measure be suspended or that he be furnished with forces to suppress the revolt that he foresaw to be inevitable. It was in vain; Espinosa curtly told him to go to his post and mind his own business and, although the Council of War supported him, he was given only three hundred men to guard the coast, where he was ordered to reside during certain months and to visit frequently. ⁽⁴⁵⁾
 
Deza reached Granada, May 25, 1566, where he at once assembled his court and had the pragmática printed to be in readiness for publication on January 1, 1567, the anniversary of the surrender of the city, as though to create additional exasperation. Its provisions were sufficiently exasperating in themselves. After three years the use of Arabic was absolutely prohibited, in speech and writing; so were Moorish garments after one year for silken and two years for woollen; house doors were to be kept open on Friday afternoons, feast-days and marriage celebrations; zambras and leilas, though not contrary to religion, were forbidden on Fridays and feast-days; the use of henna for staining was to be abandoned; Moorish names were not to be used; all artificial [336] baths, public and private, were to be destroyed, and no one in future was to use them. ⁽⁴⁶⁾ Provisions for instructing the Moriscos in the faith were conspicuous by their absence.
 
All this could only seem to them a wanton interference with habits that had become a second nature and when, on January 1, 1567, the edict was published it created indescribable excitement. As an earnest of its enforcement, all baths were forthwith destroyed, commencing with those of the king. The aljamas throughout the kingdom consulted with the leaders of the Albaycin, or Morisco quarter of the city, and it was agreed that, if relief was not to be had by entreaty, resort must be had to rebellion, for life was insupportable under such tyranny. Even Deza recognized the threatening prospect and wrote to the court that precautions should be taken against a rising; during 1567, he mitigated, in some degree, the enforcement of the law and inflicted no punishment under it. The Moriscos appealed to Philip, but, when he referred the memorial to Espinosa, the latter replied that no suspension could be considered; religious men had charged the king's conscience, telling him that he was responsible for the souls of the apostates. In the Council of State, the Duke of Alva and the Commendador of Alcántara were in favor of suspension, and the Council suggested the gradual enforcement of one article a year, but Espinosa and Deza had more influence than soldiers and statesmen--it was a religious question with which the latter had nothing to do. ⁽⁴⁷⁾
 
On January 1, 1568, orders were issued to abandon all Moorish silken garments, and the priests were instructed to take all Morisco children, between the ages of three and fifteen, and place them in schools, where they should learn Castilian and Christian doctrine. This increased the agitation and a deputation was sent to remonstrate with Deza, who gave assurances that their children were not to be taken from them, but that the king was resolved to save [337] their souls and enforce the pragmática. ⁽⁴⁸⁾ The naked alternative was before them of submission or rebellion.
 
Desperate as rebellion might seem, it was not wholly hopeless. The Moriscos estimated that they could raise a hundred thousand fighting men, lamentably deficient in arms, it is true, but hardy and enured to privation. They counted largely on aid from Barbary, hoping that the rulers there would not miss the opportunity of striking a deadly blow at their traditional enemy. Their brethren, too, in Valencia, who were equally oppressed, might reasonably be expected to rise and throw off the Spanish yoke. They could not, moreover, be ignorant that the imposing Spanish monarchy was in reality exhausted--that its internal strength in no way corresponded with its external appearance. All the Venetian envoys of the period, in fact, describe the absence of military resources in Spain, the difficulty of raising troops and the unfamiliarity with arms of those who made such splendid soldiers when disciplined and trained. It was in this very year that Antonio Tiepolo, when commenting on the strange neglect which exposed the southern coast to the ravages of the Barbary corsairs, expresses apprehension that an invasion from Africa, supported by the Moriscos, might expose Spain to the fate which it experienced of old. ⁽⁴⁹⁾ It had been bled to exhaustion by Charles V and Philip was continuing the process. As with men, so was it with money. Charles had left such an accumulation of debt that Philip, on his accession, seriously contemplated repudiation, and he staggered under an ever-increasing burden, from which the treasures of the New World afforded no relief. His revenues were consumed in advance, and during the rebellion it was with the utmost difficulty that moderate sums could be furnished for the most pressing necessities. It was most fortunate for the monarchy that the hopes of the insurgents as to external aid were [338] disappointed, for a united effort of the Crescent against the Cross might have changed the destiny of the Peninsula. As it was, the Moriscos of Valencia were kept quiet; the Sultan held aloof; the Barbary princes only gave permission for adventurers to go as volunteers, and some five or six hundred straggled in small bands across the sea. Yet the resources of Spain were strained to the utmost in subduing the isolated rebellion thus heedlessly provoked.
 
Arrangements were made for a rising on Holy Thursday (April 18, 1568), but the secret was betrayed and the design was postponed. Even this failed to induce the precaution of placing Granada in a state of defence and, when the rebellion broke out, December 23d, it found the Christians wholly unprepared. Mondejar met the crisis with great vigor and ability. Raising a hurried force of a few thousand men, he marched out of the city on January 2, 1569 and, in a difficult winter campaign amid the mountain snows, by the middle of February he had virtually crushed resistance. Deza, however, backed by those who thirsted for rapine and plunder, poisoned the mind of the king; Mondéjar's agreements for the submission of the insurgents were set aside; Philip sent his half-brother, Don John of Austria, then an inexperienced youth, to take command, assisted by a council of war, each member of which had his own plan of campaign, while no action was to be taken without the approval of the king. This opéra bouffe method of making war had its natural result. The rebellion revived and grew stronger than ever, making raids on the Vega, almost to the gates of the city, in which Don John and his council were virtually beleaguered.
 
The details of the war that ensued do not concern us here except to say that it was carried on with ferocious greed and cruelty. Military expeditions were frequently mere slave-hunts, in which the men were massacred, while women and children were brought in thousands to the auction-block and were sold to the highest bidders. Nor were the Moriscos the only sufferers, for the Córtes of 1570 complained bitterly of the rapine and excesses of the troops on their way to the scene of action. ⁽⁵⁰⁾ Hostilities were prolonged until the opening months of 1571 and, when resistance was finally suppressed, Spain was well-nigh exhausted. The pacification [339]was as ruthless as the prosecution of the war. In advance, it had been proposed at the court to remove the whole population to the mountains of Northern Spain, and Deza, the evil genius of Granada, never lost sight of the suggestion. ⁽⁵¹⁾ At his earnest solicitation it was commenced with the Albaycin, as early as June, 1569. No distinction was made between loyalists and rebels. The men were shut up in the churches and then transferred to the great Hospital Real, a gunshot from the city, where they were divided into gangs, with their hands tied to ropes like galley-slaves, and were marched off to their destinations under guard. The women were left for a time in their houses, to sell their effects and follow. Some seven or eight thousand were thus disposed of, and even the chroniclers are moved to compassion in describing the misery and despair of those thus torn from their homes without warning and hurried off to the unknown. Many died on the road of weariness, of despair or of starvation, or were slain or robbed and sold as slaves by those set to protect them. It relieved the Christians of fear, we are told, but it was deplorable to see the destruction of prosperity and the vacancy left where had been so much life and industry. ⁽⁵²⁾
 
This policy was carried out everywhere, as one district after another was reduced. Final instructions from Philip to Don John, October 25, 1570, ordered the deportation of all and designated the provinces to which they were to be taken, some of them as far as Leon and Galicia. Families were not to be separated; they were to move in bands of fifteen hundred men, with their women and children, under escort of two hundred foot and twenty horse, with a commissioner who made lists of those under his charge, provided them with food and distributed them in their respective destinations. These orders were carried out. Don John writes, November 5th, from Guadix to Ruy Gómez, that the number removed from that district had been large; the last party had been sent off that day and it was the most unfortunate thing in the world, for there was such a tempest of wind, rain and snow that the mother would lose her daughter on the road, the wife her husband and the widow her infant. It cannot be denied, he added, that the depopulation of a kingdom is the most pitiful thing that can be imagined. It was more than pitiful in some [340] districts, where the undisciplined soldiery, entrusted with the task, converted it into pillage, massacre and the enslavement of the women and children. ⁽⁵³⁾ Such was the outcome of the pledges given, eighty years before, by Ferdinand and Isabella, but the object of clearing Granada of its Morisco population was measurably accomplished. In an auto de fe celebrated there, in 1593, there appeared eighty-one delinquents convicted of Judaism and only one charged with Mahometanism. ⁽⁵⁴⁾

The sufferings of the exiles did not end with deportation. Leonardo Donato, the Venetian envoy, who was an eye-witness, tells us that many perished through miseries and afflictions, which, in fact, was inevitable under the conditions. ⁽⁵⁵⁾ Their distribution was entrusted to a special Consejo de Poblaciones, and an elaborate edict, in twenty-three sections, issued October 6, 1572, specified the regulations under which they were permitted to exist. These scattered them among Christians, kept them under close and perpetual surveillance, and reduced them almost to the status of predial serfs, bound to the soil. No weapons were permitted, save a pointless knife, and savage punishments were provided for the enforcement of the prescriptions. Children were to be brought up, as far as possible, in Christian families, and were to be taught reading, writing and Christian doctrine. The pragmática of 1566 was declared to be in force, with added penalties for the use of Arabic; any one writing or speaking it, even in his own house, incurred, for a first offence, thirty days' prison in chains, fro a second double, for a third a hundred lashes and four years of galleys. ⁽⁵⁶⁾ The severity of this latter provision shocked even the town-council of Córdova, which had shown itself by no means favorable to the exiles. It represented to the alcalde that God alone could enable them to speak a language of which they were ignorant, especially as the alguaziles were constantly arresting and punishing them, and it begged that action should be suspended until schools could be organized for their instruction, but the alcalde replied that he had no choice and must execute the edict. ⁽⁵⁷⁾
 
In spite of these restrictions on exiles suddenly cast adrift, penniless in strange places, their indomitable industry and thrift [341] soon carved out careers which aroused the envious hostility of the indolent populations among whom they were thrown. Cervantes, in his Colloquio de los perros, stigmatizing them as a slow fever which slew as certainly as a violent one, gives expression to the feelings with which the Spaniard, whose only ambition was a position in the army, the Church or the service of the State, and who was a consumer, looked upon the producer and grudged him the product of his toil. ⁽⁵⁸⁾ Already, in 1573, the Córtes took the alarm and petitioned Philip that they should not be allowed to act as architects or builders, or to hold public office or judicial positions. ⁽⁵⁹⁾ In truth, only ten years after the exile, an official report complains that the numbers of the deported Moriscos are increasing, because none go to war or enter religion, and they are so hard-working that, after coming to Castile ten years before, without owning a handsbreadth of land, they are now well off and many are rich, so that, if it continues at the same rate for twenty years, the natives will be their servants. This grievance only increased with time. In 1587, Martin de Salvatierra, Bishop of Segorbe, in an enumeration of the evil deeds of the Moriscos, includes the fact that the exiles from Granada had already become farmers of the royal revenues in Castile, depositing cash as security in place of giving bondsmen; that there were individuals worth more than a hundred thousand ducats in Pastrana, Guadalajara, Salamanca and other places and that, if the king did not devise some remedy, they would soon greatly surpass the Old Christians in both numbers and wealth. ⁽⁶⁰⁾ This jealousy found official utterance in the Córtes of 1592, which represented to Philip that previous ones had asked him to remedy the evils of the Granadan exiles scattered through Castile. Those evils were constantly increasing; they had obtained possession of trade, and were becoming so rich and powerful that they controlled the secular and ecclesiastical tribunals and lived openly in disregard of religion. The response to this was an edict ordering all magistrates to enforce rigidly the restrictive legislation of 1572. ⁽⁶¹⁾ This effected nothing for, in 1595, the Venetian envoy describes them [342] as constantly increasing in numbers and wealth, as they never went to the wars and devoted themselves exclusively to trade. ⁽⁶²⁾ In 1602, Archbishop Ribera bears the same testimony; they were hard-working and thrifty, and as they spent little on food or drink or clothing, they worked for what would not support an Old Christian, so that they were preferred by employers and consumers; they monopolized the mechanic arts and commerce, as well as daily labor. ⁽⁶³⁾ The envious prejudices which thus found expression were a factor not unimportant among the causes leading to the expulsion.
 
All the exiles however were not thus peacefully laborious. About 1577, there arose complaints of seven or eight bands of Moriscos who lived by robbery and murder and terrorized the districts in which they operated. There was also a noted centre of lawlessness in Hornachos, near Badajos, populated by Moriscos. For thirty thousand ducats they bought from Philip the privilege of bearing arms; they had a regular organization and a treasury and a mint employing thirteen operatives for the coinage of counterfeit money, while, by judicious bribery of the courts, they protected their criminals when caught. In 1586 the Llerena tribunal made a raid on them with such success that it was obliged to hire houses to accommodate its prisoners, but the effect of this was temporary and, in October 1608, an alcalde of the court, Gregorio López Madera, was sent there to investigate and punish. Alcaldes of the court were noted for unsparing justice, and Madera did not belie this reputation. His inquest resulted in finding eighty-three dead bodies in the vicinity; he hanged ten members of the town-council and its executioner; he sent a hundred and seventy men to the galleys, scourged a large number, and left the place peaceful for the short interval before it was depopulated by the expulsion. ⁽⁶⁴⁾
 
 In the kingdoms of the crown of Aragon the position of the Moriscos was different from that in Castile. They were mostly vassals of the nobles, settled on lands of which they held the [343] dominium utile, while their lords owned the dominium directum. For these lands they paid tribute in money, in kind, or in service, and we are told that these imposts amounted to the double of what could be exacted from Christians. ⁽⁶⁵⁾ It is easy to appreciate the old proverb "The more Moors the more profits," and also that the nobles were vitally interested in protecting their vassals from external interference. Their ability to do this was largely owing to the sturdy independence with which the ancient fueros and privileges were maintained.
 
Alarm was taken early for, in 1495, the Córtes of Tortosa obtained from Ferdinand a fuero that he would never expel or consent to the expulsion of the Moors of Catalonia and, after the occurrences in Castile, the Córtes of Barcelona, in 1503, represented the destruction which it would cause and obtained a repetition of the pledge. ⁽⁶⁶⁾ At the Córtes of Monzon, in 1510, he renewed this, with the addition that he would make no attempt to convert them by force, nor throw any impediment in the way of their free intercourse with Christians and, to the observance of this, he took a solemn oath, a repetition of which was exacted of Charles V, on his accession in 1518. ⁽⁶⁷⁾ Under these guarantees, both the Moors and their lords might well imagine themselves secure.
 
As we have seen, the jurisdiction of the Inquisition did not extend to the unbaptized, so long as they committed no offences against religion. It had little scruple however in disregarding its limitations and, in Valencia as early as 1497, it undertook to prevent the wearing of Moorish costume and sent officials to Serra to arrest some women for disobedience. They were not recognized and were maltreated, while the women were conveyed away. We have seen how the tribunal arbitrarily avenged itself by arresting all residents of Serra who chanced to come to Valencia and that, when appeal was made to Ferdinand, he expressed his displeasure and ordered greater moderation in future--yet the leaders in the resistance at Serra were imprisoned for three years and suffered confiscation and banishment, leading to considerable correspondence in which Ferdinand sought to mitigate the harshness [344] of the tribunal. He showed the same disposition towards the Moorish aljama of Fraga, which was concerned in the confiscation of a certain Galceran de Abella, and also towards the Moors of Saragossa, when involved in trouble with that tribunal by reason of harboring a female slave who had escaped from Borja. ⁽⁶⁸⁾

After the enforced conversion of the Castilian Moors, the tribunal of Aragon overstepped its powers by endeavoring, indirectly if not directly, to compel submission to baptism. The Duke and Duchess of Cardona, the Count of Ribagorza and other magnates complained, in 1508, to Ferdinand, who reprimanded the inquisitors sharply for exceeding their jurisdiction, with much scandal to the Moors and damage to their lords. No one, he said, should be converted or baptized by force, for God is served only when confession is heartfelt, nor should any one be imprisoned for simply telling others not to turn Christian. In future, no Moor was to be baptized unless he applied for it; any who were imprisoned for counselling against conversion were to be released at once, and the papers were to be sent to Inquisitor-general Enguera for instructions, nor were arrests to be made without his orders. As it was reported that others had fled in fear of forcible conversion or imprisonment, steps must be taken to bring them home with full assurance against violence. ⁽⁶⁹⁾ In the same spirit, in 1510, when some Moors in Aragon had been converted, and had consequently been abandoned by their wives and children, Ferdinand ordered the inquisitors to permit them to return, and not to exert pressure on them or to baptize them forcibly. ⁽⁷⁰⁾ Ferdinand understood his Aragonese subjects and had learned when to respect their fueros.
 
These incidents indicate that there was a movement on foot which sometimes overstepped the limits of persuasion. There was, in fact, a process of voluntary conversion, affording hope that in time the wished-for unity of faith might be accomplished without coercion. A Catalan alfaquí, named Jacob Tellez, was baptized and brought several aljamas to embrace Christianity, when Ferdinand to aid him granted him licence to travel everywhere and to have entrance into all aljamas, whose members were required to assemble and listen to him. ⁽⁷¹⁾ The Moors of Caspe [345] sought baptism in 1499; in the district of Teruel and Albarracin, in 1493, a mosque was converted into the church of the Trinity and, in 1502, the whole population embraced Christianity. ⁽⁷²⁾ Wholesale conversions such as these were apt to furnish backsliders and, when the Inquisition undertook to punish those of Teruel and Albarracin, Charles V interposed, in 1519; he understood, he said, that many of the children of the Conversos, who had lapsed, desired to return to the faith, but were deterred through fear of punishment, wherefore he granted them a term of grace for a year, during which they could come forward and confess without incurring confiscation, and similar concessions were made in Tortosa and other cities. ⁽⁷³⁾
 
Valencia, which had the largest and densest Moorish population, was also the scene of considerable proselyting and of vigorous inquisitorial action. An influential alfaquí, named Abdallah, was converted, took orders as a priest, under the title of Maestro Mossen Andrés, and devoted himself to winning over his brethren. He wrote a work controverting the Koran chapter by chapter, which was printed and circulated. ⁽⁷⁴⁾ The little town of Manices must have been converted almost in mass, for we happen to have a sentence uttered in the church there, by the inquisitors of Valencia, April 8, 1519, on two hundred and thirty Moriscos, then present, who had come in under an Edict of Grace, confessing and abjuring the errors into which they had relapsed. They were received to reconciliation, apparently without confiscation, and the penances prescribed were purely spiritual, although in addition they were subjected to the customary severe disabilities. There must have been not a little cruel preliminary work for, in the list of these penitents, no less than thirty-two women are described as the wives or daughters of men who had been burnt. ⁽⁷⁵⁾ It is [346] easy for us now to recognize how powerful an impediment was this method of preserving the purity of the faith by obstructing the wished-for conversion, for the Mudéjares who refused baptism could congratulate themselves that they were not subject to a jurisdiction which visited with such severity the adherence to ancestral habits that had become a second nature.
 
The missionary work thus impeded received an unlocked for impulse from the insurrection known as the Germanía or Brotherhood, which suddenly broke out in 1520. This was a revolt of the people against the oppression of the nobles which, in its peaceful beginning, won the approval of Charles and of his representative, Cardinal Adrian. It speedily developed into civil war, in which the nobles had the aid of their Moorish vassals; these formed a large portion of the forces with which the Duke of Segorbe won the victories of Oropesa and Almenara, early in July, 1521, and they constituted a third of the infantry, under the Viceroy Mendoza, in the disastrous rout of Gandía, July 25. To cripple the nobles, the leaders of the Germanía conceived the idea of baptizing by force the Moors, thus giving them the status of Christians and releasing them from vassalage. ⁽⁷⁶⁾ Urgelles, the chief captain, mortally wounded at the siege of Játiva, which surrendered July 14th, was already busily engaged in compelling the baptism of the Moors in the places under his control; and his successor, Vicente Peris, who won the decisive victory of Gandía, adopted the same policy. Full particulars as to proceedings in the different towns and villages were obtained by a commission, formed in 1524 to ascertain whether the baptisms were voluntary or coerced, and the evidence in its report shows that bands of Agermanados traversed the territory between Valencia and Oliva, terrorizing the Moors and offering them the alternative of baptism or death. A few homicides punctuated their commands, and the helpless infidels flocked to the baptismal font for safety. Of course there was no pretence of instruction or of ascertaining what the neophytes knew of the religion thus imposed upon them; [347] they were baptized by sprinkling them in batches and squads and, when holy water was not at hand, that from running streams was employed. The only redeeming feature in the evidence is the frequent allusion to friendly relations between Christians and Moors and to the refuge and protection willingly given to the terrified victims, showing how the antagonism of race was gradually subsiding and how its extinction might have been hopefully anticipated if matters had been allowed to develop naturally. ⁽⁷⁷⁾
 
Attempts were also made to convert the mosques into churches. In a few places they were consecrated; in some others only a paper picture of Christ or the Virgin was hung up, or attached to the door. Occasionally divine service was performed, which the neophytes attended with more or less regularity, but their adhesion to their new faith lasted only while the impression of terror continued. In some places they felt safe to recur to their old religion in three weeks, in others they remained nominally Christian for a few months, but everywhere, as soon as they felt the danger to be passed, they resumed their Moslem rites and worshipped in their mosques as before. In this, for the most part, they were encouraged by their lords, who assured them that the coercive baptism was invalid, and that they were free to revert to their faith. Others more prudently seized the opportunity to escape to Africa, and it was estimated that no less than five thousand houses were left vacant, inferring an emigration of some twenty-five thousand souls. ⁽⁷⁸⁾
 
The suppression of the Germanía, in 1522, enabled the Inquisition to commence action against those who had been brought under its jurisdiction by baptism. Inquisitor Churrucca of Valencia entertained no scruple as to the validity of the sacrament, but there was difficulty in the fact that the hurried proceedings had precluded the making of records that would identify individuals. When the officiating priests had made lists he demanded their surrender and, towards the close of 1523, he was busy in obtaining evidence from eye-witnesses. Some fragmentary documents show that he was partially successful, and that he was prosecuting those whom he could prove to be apostates, but there was no disposition to treat them harshly. It would appear, indeed, [348] that Cardinal Adrian adopted a policy of toleration which, after his elevation to the papacy, enabled the advocates of the Moriscos to claim that they had the benefit of a dispensation. ⁽⁷⁹⁾
 
The situation, in fact, was perplexing. In Castile, enforced conversion had been universal, under threat of expulsion; all were constructively baptized and could legally be held to the consequences. In Valencia, however, the Germanía had occupied but a portion of the territory, and even there the work had been partial, and so irregularly executed that identification was impossible save in isolated cases. As soon as the pressure was removed all had reverted to their pristine belief, and the sovereign was under a solemn oath that no compulsion should be employed. The simplest solution that offered was to complete the work and to convert the whole Moorish population, after securing the assent of the nobles by conceding that their rights should not be affected, and that converts should not be permitted to change their domicile. ⁽⁸⁰⁾ Missionaries were therefore sent to try the effect of persuasion, prominent among whom was Fray Antonio de Guevara. In a letter of May 22, 1524, he says that for three years he had labored at the task, doing nothing but dispute in the aljamas, preach in the Morerías and baptize in the houses. ⁽⁸¹⁾ Well-meant as was this effort, its success was not commensurate with its merits; the question refused to be solved, and the claims of the Inquisition to exercise jurisdiction over the so-called apostates inevitably provoked discussion as to the validity of enforced baptism, the degree of coercion by the Agermanados, and the sufficiency of the rite so irregularly performed.
 
We have seen above (Vol. I, p. 41) that, when the Goths coerced their Jewish subjects to baptism, the fourth Council of Toledo enunciated the principle that, while the act was wrong, the baptism was indelible and the baptized must be forced to remain in the Church, a principle which became embodied in the canon law. Still there was a question as to the degree of coercion and Boniface VIII, while assuming to exempt those whose coercion was absolute, took care to define that the fear of death was not such [349] coercion. ⁽⁸²⁾ In the refinement of scholastic theology, two kinds of coercion were distinguished--conditional or interpretative and absolute; it was decided that coerced volition is still volition, and absolute coercion was reduced to the proposition that, if a man tied hand and foot were baptized while uttering protests, the rite would be invalid. ⁽⁸³⁾ Such was the received practice of the Church, although a few schoolmen of high repute denied the validity of the sacrament under coercion, rather as an academical question, for the Church assumes consent and compels the so-called convert to the observance of the faith imposed on him. ⁽⁸⁴⁾
 
It was inevitable that the converts of the Germanía were to be held to their responsibilities as Christians. Charles V had already resolved on his policy and had applied to Clement VII to be released from his oath not to impose Christianity on the Moors, but the proceedings of Inquisitor Churrucca were exciting murmurs, and a decent show of preliminary investigation was advisable. Charles at first ordered this to be done by the Governor of Valencia in conjunction with the inquisitors and some theologians and jurists, but this was not a sufficiently authoritative body to justify the far-reaching measures in contemplation and Manrique suggested, January 23, 1524, the formation of a junta under his presidency, in view of the opposition of the nobles and gentry, who dreaded the loss accruing to them from the Christianization of their vassals. ⁽⁸⁵⁾ That this was merely to save appearances is evident from the fact [350] that, when Charles, on February llth, gave orders for the assembling of the junta, he wrote on the same day to Germaine, Vice-queen of Valencia, instructing the inquisitors and vicar-general to take due action with the apostate Moriscos. ⁽⁸⁶⁾ Nine days later, Manrique issued a commission to Churrucca and his assessor Andrés Palacio to make a complete investigation into all the circumstances of the conversion and backsliding of the Moriscos-- a selection which indicates the foregone conclusion, as they had already committed themselves on all the questions involved. Two other commissioners--Martin Sánchez and Juan de Bas-- were added to them when, in November, they started on their work, and meanwhile the inquisitors had been taking testimony on their own account. ⁽⁸⁷⁾
 
The investigation lasted only from November 4th to the 24th, as the commission moved from place to place, in the little district between Alcira and Denia. A hundred and twenty-eight witnesses were interrogated on a series of questions drawn up by Manrique and their evidence established beyond doubt that submission to baptism was under the influence of mortal terror. The report of the commission consisted simply of the testimony, as taken down by the secretary, but it was supplemented by a learned argument in scholastic form by the fiscal of the tribunal, Fernando Loazes, the future Archbishop of Valencia. In this he made no pretence that the baptism was voluntary. The violence he admitted to be a crime, for which the actors should be punished, but the effect was good and should be maintained; it was the way in which God evokes good out of evil. The Moors had been saved from perdition and from slavery to the demon and, as this was a public benefit, the converts must be compelled to adhere to the Catholic faith, and those who upheld them in apostasy must be prosecuted as fautors and defenders of heresy. All doctors agree that, when there is danger of infecting the faith, the prince can compel uniformity or can expel the unbelievers. ⁽⁸⁸⁾
 
It was an imposing assemblage to which the report was submitted, consisting of a reunion of the Councils of Castile, of Aragon, of the Inquisition, of Military Orders and of Indies, together with eminent theologians, and it was under the presidency of Manrique.[351] There evidently was not unanimity, for the discussion occupied twenty-two days, and some of the theologians, with Jaime Benet, the most eminent canonist of Spain at their head, denied the validity of the baptisms. Still, the inevitable conclusion was that, as the neophytes had made no resistance or complaint, they must adhere to the faith, willingly or unwillingly. On March 23, 1525, the emperor attended a meeting, in which Manrique announced to him the decision, which he confirmed and ordered measures to be taken for its enforcement. In pursuance of this a royal cédula on April 4th, after reciting the care bestowed on the question, and the unanimous conclusion reached, declared the baptized Moors to be Christians, and ordered their children to be baptized, while churches in which mass had been celebrated were not to be used as mosques. ⁽⁸⁹⁾
 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this action on the fate of the Moriscos, for all that followed was its necessary consequence. Without loss of time an imposing inquisitorial commission was organized, with Gaspar de Avalos, Bishop of Guadix, at its head, and a retinue of counsellors and familiars. On May 10th they arrived at Valencia and, on Sunday the 14th, the bishop in a sermon ordered the publication of the royal cédula, with an edict granting thirty days within which apostates could return with security for life and property, after which they would forfeit both. ⁽⁹⁰⁾ It could scarce have been intended to execute this atrocious threat, and no attempt seems to have been made to do so. The apostates were not easily distinguishable among their unbaptized brethren, among whom they constituted perhaps ten per cent., but the commissioners endeavored to identify them, travelling through the land, making out lists, and confirming all whom they could discover, as a preliminary to prosecuting the backsliders. ⁽⁹¹⁾ Their numbers suggested moderation, for which papal authority was requisite. It was obtained, for a brief of Clement VII, June 16, 1525, recites that Charles had applied to him for a remedy; the multitude of delinquents called for gentleness and clemency, wherefore they were to be prosecuted with a [352] benignant asperity; those who should return to the light of truth, publicly abjure their errors and swear never to relapse, could be absolved without incurring the customary infamy and disabilities. ⁽⁹²⁾
 
Threats and promises availed little. The ten or fifteen thousand Moriscos, who had passed through the hands of the Agermanados, did not wait to experience the; benignant asperity of the commission, but took refuge in the Sierra de Bernia, and the nobles, so far from attempting to dislodge them, favored them, in hopes that their resistance might lead Charles to abandon his purpose. He had been moved to indignation on hearing that the magistrates of Valencia had begged the commission not to ill-treat the Alfaquíes, as the prosperity of the land depended on the Moors, and he now rebuked the nobles, ordering them to go to their estates and teach their vassals to be good Christians. Preparations at length were made to attack the refugees of Bernia, who had held out from April until August; they surrendered under promise of immunity and were taken to Murla where they were absolved and kindly treated. ⁽⁹³⁾
 
The commission, wearied with its fruitless labors, was about to abandon the field, when it received a letter from Charles, stating that, as God had granted him the victory of Pavia, he could evince his gratitude in no way more effective than by compelling all the infidels in his dominions to submit to baptism; they were therefore ordered to remain and to undertake this new conversion, in conjunction with a fresh colleague, Fray Calcena, afterwards Bishop of Tortosa. ⁽⁹⁴⁾ We have seen that, in preparation for this, he had, near the end of 1523 or in the early part of 1524, applied to Clement VII to absolve him from the oath taken in 1518 not to expel or make forced conversions, and Clement is said to have at first refused the request, declaring it to be scandalous. ⁽⁹⁵⁾ The persistence of the ambassador, the Duke of Sesa, however prevailed over Clement's scruples and the brief was issued, May 12, 1524, though for a time it was kept secret.
 
It commenced by reciting the papal grief on learning that, in [353] Valencia, Catalonia and Aragon, Charles had many Moorish subjects, with whom the faithful could not hold intercourse without danger, and who served as spies for their brethren in Africa. He was therefore exhorted to order the inquisitors to preach to them and, in case of obstinacy, he was to designate a term after which they should be expelled, under pain of perpetual slavery, to be rigorously enforced. The tithes, which they had never paid, should in future accrue to their lords, in recompense for the damage caused by the expulsion, under condition that the lords should supply the churches with what was requisite for divine service, while the revenues of the mosques should provide endowments for benefices. The fateful brief concluded by formally releasing Charles from his oath of 1518, absolving him from all penalties and censures for perjury, and granting him whatever dispensation was necessary for the due execution of the foregoing, and it further conferred on the inquisitors ample faculties to suppress opposition, notwithstanding all apostolical constitutions and all laws of the land. ⁽⁹⁶⁾
 
Charles was thus set free to work his will, in despite of oaths and of laws. Yet for eighteen months he held the brief without using it, waiting perhaps for the settlement of the question of baptism and for the agitation in Valencia to subside. At length, on September 13, 1525, he addressed letters to the nobles, informing them of his irrevocable resolve not to allow a Moor or an infidel to dwell in his dominions except as a slave; he recognized that expulsion would affect their interests, and consequently he urged them to go to their estates and co-operate with the commissioners in procuring the conversion and instruction of their vassals. Accompanying this was a brief letter to the Moors, informing them of the determination to which he had been inspired by Almighty God that His law should prevail throughout the land, and of his desire for their salvation, wherefore he exhorted and commanded them to submit to baptism; if they did so, they should have the liberties of Christians and good treatment; if they refused, he would find other means. The next day a proclamation was addressed to the Moors, emphatically repeating these threats and promises, and forbidding any interference with conversion or insults to converts, under penalty of five thousand [354] florins and the royal wrath. The same day a letter to Queen Germaine tacitly admitted the futility of depriving the Moriscos of their religion without providing a substitute. He had learned, he said, that in many villages of the converts there were no priests to give instruction or to celebrate mass, and he ordered her to see that they were instructed and ministered to, thriftily adding that, in lands of royal jurisdiction, care must be taken to reserve the patronage of the new churches to the crown. ⁽⁹⁷⁾

The commissioners, armed with full powers as inquisitors, lost no time in announcing to the Moors the irrevocable resolve of the emperor, with a term of grace of eight days, after which they would execute the decrees. The frightened aljamas deputed twelve alfaquíes to supplicate of Charles the revocation of the edict. Queen Germaine granted them a safe-conduct, and they were received at court, carrying with them fifty thousand ducats to propitiate persons of importance and, although at the moment they accomplished nothing, eventually, as we shall see, they secured a Concordia which, as usual, was granted only to be violated. ⁽⁹⁸⁾
 
Meanwhile, on November 3d, Charles enclosed the papal brief to the inquisitors, with instructions to enforce it without delay. At the same time he notified the authorities, secular and ecclesiastical, that it invalidated all the fueros, privileges and constitutions to which he had sworn; that he had instructed the Inquisition to enforce it, and that the local magistrates, under pain of ten thousand florins, must execute whatever the inquisitors might decree. ⁽⁹⁹⁾ Having thus made the Moors understand the fate in store for them, on November 25th he issued a general decree of expulsion. All those of Valencia were to be out of Spain by December 31st, and those of Catalonia and Aragon by January 31, 1526. As in 1502, there was no exemption promised for conversion, but similarly the obstacles thrown in the way of expatriation showed the real intent of the edict. The Valencians were ordered to register and obtain passports at Sieteaguas, on the Cuenca frontier, and then plod their weary way to Coruña, where they were to embark, under pain of confiscation and slavery, while [355] the nobles were threatened with a fine of five thousand ducats for each one whom they might retain. At the same time was published a papal brief ordering, under pain of excommunication, all Christians to aid in enforcing the imperial decrees, and all Moors to listen without replying to the teachings of the Gospel. Still another edict, which ordered that all Moors must be baptized by December 8th, or be prepared to leave the country, showed by implication that conversion would relieve from exile. Then the Inquisition gave notice that it was prepared to act, and it published tremendous censures, with a penalty of a thousand florins, against all failing to aid it against those who obstinately resisted the sweetness of the gospel and the benignant plans of the emperor. ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾
 
When the alfaquíes reported the failure of their mission, the great bulk of the Valencian Moors submitted to baptism. Fray Antonio de Guevara, who was foremost in the work, boasts that he baptized twenty thousand families, but the Moriscos subsequently asserted that this wholesale conversion was accomplished by corraling them in pens and scattering water over them, when some would seek to hide themselves and others would shout ''No water has touched me!" They endured it, they said, because their alfaquíes assured them that deceit was permissible, and that they need not believe the religion which they were compelled to profess. ⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Many hid themselves; some took refuge in Benaguacil [356] which surrendered, March 27th, after a five weeks' siege, but the Sierra de Espadan was the scene of a more formidable revolt, which was not subdued until September 19th, with considerable slaughter. Others again betook themselves to the Sierra de Bernia, to Guadalete and Confridas, but these mostly succeeded in escaping to Africa. Thus was Valencia converted and pacified; the Moriscos, we as may now call them, were disarmed, the pulpits of their alfaquíes were torn down, their Korans were burnt, and orders were given to instruct them competently in the faith-- orders, as we shall see, perpetually reissued and never executed. ⁽¹⁰²⁾
 
In Aragon, before the edicts, premonitions of the future had aroused much agitation. The Moors ceased to labor in the fields and shops, causing great anxiety as to impending famine. The Diputados were called upon to act and, while preparing to send envoys to Charles, they gave to the Count of Ribagorza, who chanced to be at the court, a memorial addressed to him. This appealed to the solemn oaths taken by him and Ferdinand; it represented that the whole industry and prosperity of the land rested upon the Moors, who raised the harvests and produced the manufactures, while the incomes of churches and convents, of benefices and the gentry, of widows and orphans, were derived from their censos or loans. They were practically the slaves of their feudal lords, to whom they were obedient, and they had never been known to pervert a Christian or cause scandal; they lived at a distance from the coast, so that they could hold no intercourse with Barbary, and the law punished by enslavement all attempts to leave the kingdom; their expulsion would cause ruin while, if converted, they would be enfranchised and enabled to go abroad. As they had ceased to sow their lands, immediate relief of their fears was necessary to avert a famine. Ribagorza's influence procured a brief delay, but Charles's practical reply was a proclamation, published in Saragossa December 22d, forbidding any Moor to leave the kingdom, prohibiting all purchases of property from them, closing their mosques and abolishing their public shambles. ⁽¹⁰³⁾ This increased the alarm, and risings occurred in some places, followed by others after the publication of the edict of expulsion, but they were not serious. The date of expulsion [357] was postponed until March 15, 1526, and, as it approached, there were other risings, but they were readily suppressed; the Moors were disarmed and, as a whole, they submitted to baptism. ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾
 
The whole Morisco population was now at the mercy of the Inquisition, but every consideration, both of policy and of charity, dictated a tolerant exercise of power, until they could be instructed and won over to their new faith. This the Suprema recognized by ordering that they should be treated with great moderation. ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ Possibly this may explain the absence of trials for heresy by the Valencia tribunal in 1525 and 1527, but, in the intermediate and subsequent years, there is no abatement in its activity, which was not only in disobedience of the commands of the Suprema, but a direct violation of the Concordia, agreed to January 6, 1526, although not published until 1528.
 
This Concordia was the result of the labors of the alfaquíes sent to the court in 1525. It was granted with the consent of Inquisitor-general Manrique; it was solemnly confirmed by Charles in the Córtes of Monzón, in 1528, when it was declared to comprehend all the kingdoms of the crown of Aragon, but when it was published by the Bayle-general of Valencia, under orders from Charles, Manrique rebuked him for so doing. Its main provisions are worth reciting if only to show the questions arising and as an instance of the faithlessness habitually shown to the Moriscos, for scarce one of the articles favorable to them was observed.
 
It set forth that the new converts could not at once abandon the Moorish ceremonies, which they observed rather through habit than with intention, and that prosecution by the Inquisition would be their total destruction, wherefore the Inquisition should not proceed against them for forty years, as had been granted to the Moors of Granada. As for their garments, they might wear out those existing, but new ones must be made in the Christian fashion. As most of the men and all the women could speak only Arabic, they could use it for ten years, during which time they must learn Castilian or Valencian. New cemeteries were to be consecrated for them, near the mosques now converted into churches. Dispensations were to be granted by the legate or the pope for all existing marriages and betrothals within the prohibited degrees, but future ones must conform to the canons. To the request that [358] their arms should be restored to them, the answer was that they should be treated like other Christians. To the argument that they could not pay the old tributes and imposts, if they were forbidden to work on feast-days, nor was it reasonable that they should be prevented from changing domicile, the equivocal reply was that they should be treated like other Christians, but without prejudice to third parties. There was also permission to continue as corporations the old Morerías in royal territory. All this Charles guaranteed for himself and for Prince Philip, and ordered its strict observance by all officials, from the highest to the lowest, under pain of the royal wrath and a fine of three thousand ducats. ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾
 
The Inquisition, however, was a law unto itself and was bound by no compacts. In a few months after the promulgation of the Concordia, the Suprema published everywhere a declaration that it referred only to trivial customs and did not condone the use of Moorish rites and ceremonies, and that those who performed them or lapsed from the faith were to be duly prosecuted, to all of which it stated that the emperor acceded. ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ When, therefore, the Aragonese nobles, in 1529, presented remonstrances to Charles and to Manrique, the latter replied that it was their salvation and not their injury that was sought, and that he hoped that God might lay his hands upon them, so that all would eventuate well. ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ The hand of God, as laid upon them through the Inquisition, was not merciful for, in 1531, the Valencia tribunal had fifty-eight trials for heresy, with some thirty-seven burnings in person, most of whom presumably were Moriscos. Saragossa was somewhat milder for, in 1530, it reported that in the last auto it had reconciled a number of Moriscos, commuting confiscation and prison into fines and, in some cases, to scourging; that the fines had been assigned to a cleric who should instruct the penitents, but the receiver had refused to surrender the money, whereupon the Suprema suggested a separate collection of fines and their payment to instructors. ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Thus the Inquisition went imperturbably on its way and, when the Córtes of the three kingdoms complained that it was notorious that there had been no attempt to instruct the Moriscos, or to provide churches for them, and that it was a great [359] abuse to prosecute them as heretics, Cardinal Manrique unctuously replied that they had been treated with all moderation and benignity and that, for the future, provision would be made, with the assent of the emperor, as best comported with the service of God and the salvation of their souls. ⁽¹¹⁰⁾
 
Even more defiantly self-willed was the conduct of the Inquisition with regard to confiscations. We have seen that these were the property of the crown and that, when the Inquisition was allowed to retain the proceeds, it was a concession dependent upon the will of the sovereign. Yet it sturdily set aside the laws of the land and the commands of the emperor, and persisted in confiscating the property of its penitents. The earliest fuero of Valencia, granted by Jaime I after the conquest, provided that, in capital cases of heresy and treason, allodial lands and personal property should accrue to the king, while feudal lands and those held under rent-charge or other service, should revert to the lord. The new Inquisition disregarded this and, in 1488, the Córtes of Orihuela demanded its observance, to which Ferdinand assented. Still the Inquisition persisted and he agreed to the demands of the Córtes of 1510, that he should compound for all lands thus illegally obtained. This was equally fruitless and, in 1533, the Córtes of Monzón repeated the complaint; it was the lords and churches that suffered by the confiscations inflicted on their vassals, and some compromise should be reached as to past infractions of the fuero. To this the answer was equivocal; there was no confiscation and, please God, with the efforts on foot for the instruction of the converts, there would be no necessity for it in the future but, if there should be, provision would be made to protect the lords, and meanwhile a commission could decide as to what would be just for the past. ⁽¹¹¹⁾
 
Charles, in fact, the next year, at Saragossa, issued a pragmática ordering that, when the new converts incurred confiscation, the property should be made over to the legal Catholic heirs, without prejudice to the lords of the delinquents. The Inquisition, however, was equal to the occasion; it obeyed the law in the letter but not in the spirit, for, in 1547, the Córtes complained to the inquisitor-general that, in lieu of confiscation, the Saragossa [360] tribunal imposed fines greater than the wealth of the penitents who, to meet them, were obliged to sell all their property and impoverish their kindred. To this the contemptuous answer was returned that if any one was aggrieved he could apply to the inquisitors or to the Suprema. ⁽¹¹²⁾
 
In Valencia the contest was more prolonged. The Córtes of 1537 reiterated the old complaints and asked Charles to order the tribunals to obey the law, which he promised to do. The Suprema rejoined, in a consulta, that confiscation was the most efficient penalty for the suppression of heresy; the culprit could escape burning by reconciliation and, without confiscation, heresy would be unpunished. The Inquisition accordingly went on confiscating and, in 1542, under urgent complaints by the Córtes, Charles assented to a law that the dominium utile of the culprit should revert to the dominium directum of the lord and that the royal officials, under pain of a thousand florins, should put the lord in possession. The pope seems to have been appealed to, to make the Inquisition obey, for in a brief of August 2, 1546, which virtually suspended it, he decreed that for ten years, and during the pleasure of the Holy See, there should be neither fines nor confiscation in the case of Moriscos. ⁽¹¹³⁾
 
Royal and papal utterances were alike in vain. In 1547, the Córtes renewed the complaint of the persistence of the Inquisition and introduced the new feature of asking that the inquisitor-general should join in signing the fuero, thus recognizing him as an independent power in the state. Prince Philip promised to obtain his signature, but it was not done. Again in 1552 and 1564 the same comedy was acted, but Philip's promise in the latter year was neutralized by specific instructions of the Suprema, to the Valencia tribunal, to confiscate Morisco property, without regarding what the people might say about having a privilege against confiscation. ⁽¹¹⁴⁾
 
At length a compromise was reached. In 1537 the Córtes had suggested a payment to the Inquisition of four hundred ducats [361] per annum in return for Morisco impunity from pecuniary penance, but the Suprema had refused the proposition as inadequate and as a disservice to God. ⁽¹¹⁵⁾ In 1571, negotiations were renewed, resulting in a royal cedula of October 12th, reciting that Inquisitor-general Espinosa had condescended to grant to the Moriscos of Valencia the articles presented by them. These provided that, in consideration of an annual payment of fifty thousand sueldos, or twenty-five hundred ducats, to the tribunal, the property of those contributing to it should be exempt from confiscation. Warning, moreover, was taken from the experience of Aragon, and fines were limited to ten ducats, but the aljamas of the culprits were responsible for their payment. It rested with the aljamas whether or not to come into the arrangement, but so many of them did so that thenceforth it was spoken of commonly as in force throughout Valencia. ⁽¹¹⁶⁾
 
This suited the Inquisition as assuring it a settled income; it relieved the Moriscos from the ever-present dread of pauperism and the miseries of sequestration, and it gratified the nobles and churches by securing them from the alienation of their lands and the impoverishment of their vassals. To the rigid churchman, however, it was a compact with evil and an encouragement of heresy. Archbishop Ribera of Valencia protested against it, and Bishop Pérez of Segorbe, in 1595, advocated its revocation, but Philip II resolved that it should continue during the period agreed upon for the instruction of the Moriscos. ⁽¹¹⁷⁾
 
The tribunal naturally took care to increase its assured income by exploiting to the fullest its remaining power of inflicting fines, and it did so with little regard to the limitation. In 1595, the aljamas complained of these infractions. ⁽¹¹⁸⁾ That such complaint continued to be justified would appear from the auto de fe of January 7, 1607, alluded to above (Vol. II, p. 395) where there were twenty fines of ten ducats each on Moriscos, of whom only eight were reconciled, besides other fines, one of twenty, one of thirty and one of fifty.
 

[362] The table in the Appendix shows that, while the activity of the Inquisition seemed to diminish somewhat after the Concordia, towards the close of the century it increased greatly, there being two hundred and ninety-one cases in 1591 and a hundred and seventeen in 1592. The record furnishing these figures ends with 1592 and we have no means of ascertaining the work in the years which immediately follow, but the rigor of persecution continued. In the auto of September 5, 1604, there were twenty-eight abjurations de levi, forty-nine de vehementi, eight reconciliations and two relaxations--all Moriscos, except a Frenchman penanced for blasphemy. In that of January 7, 1607, there appeared thirty-three Moriscos, of whom one was relaxed, besides six whose cases were suspended, and in the trials torture was employed fifteen times. ⁽¹¹⁹⁾ The fluctuations in the number of cases can be accounted for by evidence occasionally enabling the tribunal to make a raid on some Morisco village when, as they were all Moors at heart, the whole community would be gathered in. Thus, in 1589 and 1590 the little settlement of Mislata, near Valencia, furnished a hundred cases and we are told that in the town of Carlet there were two hundred and forty households that observed the fast of Ramadan. ⁽¹²⁰⁾
 
In fact, as the Moorish faith of the Moriscos was notorious, the whole population was at the mercy of the Inquisition, and the comparative moderation shown by the records may perhaps be explained by a system of secret bribery or compositions whereby immunity was purchased. The possibility of this is suggested by a case which throws considerable light upon the manner in which the inquisitorial power was exercised.
 
The family of Don Cosme, Don Juan and Don Hernando Abenamir of Benaguacil ranked among the first of the old Moors of Valencia; the brothers were rich and influential; they held licences to bear arms, and Inquisitor Miranda had appointed them familiars--a position which they resigned at the instance of the Duke of Segorbe, on whose lands they dwelt, for he said that they had no need of such protection, as they had only to appeal to him if aggrieved. In May, 1567, during the absence of Inquisitor Miranda, the fiscal presented to the other inquisitor, Geronimo [363] Manrique, a clamosa against the brothers. Their arrest was voted but, in view of the importance of the ease, the Suprema was consulted, which confirmed the vote and, on July 1st, the warrants were issued. The accused could not be found; edicts summoning them were published and, on January 12, 1568, Don Cosme presented himself. It is his trial that has been preserved, but presumably the others took the same course, except that Don Hernando's name disappears towards the end, probably in consequence of death.
 
At the first audience Don Cosme said that he presumed he had been baptized when a child, yet he did not consider himself a Christian but a Moor; he had through life performed Moorish rites and had gone to confession only to conform with the edicts, but in future he desired to be a Christian and to do whatever the inquisitors might require. He offered no defence in the various stages of his trial, but on July 15th, in consequence of the crowded condition of the secret prison, he was given the city as a prison on furnishing security in two thousand ducats.
 
Notwithstanding this he visited Madrid where, for seven thousand ducats, he purchased for himself and his brothers a pardon from the king, the inquisitor-general and the Suprema, and he also exercised important influence in securing the Concordia of 1571. His stay in the capital was prolonged when, after an interval of nearly three years, the tribunal suddenly revived his case, May 25, 1571 and, on June 6th, it summoned his bondsmen to produce him within nine days, a term extended to twelve days on their protesting that it was notorious that he was in Madrid, on business with the Suprema. This action brought from the Suprema a curt letter stating that Don Cosme complained that, after compounding his case, it had been revived, and ordering the tribunal to drop the matter and explain its motives. This it did and received from the Suprema a second order to do nothing, but to send the papers and await instructions. Subsequently Don Cosme returned to Valencia and exhibited certificates of the pardons for himself and his brothers to Juan de Rojas, then inquisitor, who told him to go enhorabuena, for they were pardoned and the Inquisition had nothing further to do with them.
 
Six years passed away when suddenly, without further evidence being sought for, on September 3, 1577, the Suprema returned to the tribunal the papers in the cases of Don Cosme and Don [364] Juan, and ordered it to summon them, examine them, vote on them and report to the Suprema for its decision. Don Cosme by that time seems to have been impoverished, and was supporting himself by farming the revenues at Genoves; after some delay he was brought to the prison, December 24th and his trial was resumed. At first he refused to be examined, alleging his pardon, but it was elaborately explained to him that it was not intended to interfere with it but to render it operative, for which it was necessary for him to abjure his errors and be reconciled, to which end he must make full confession as to himself and his accomplices; if he refused, it would show that he desired to remain in his old errors and under excommunication. After some fencing, he submitted and described how, about the age of twelve, his mother had taught him to perform the zala and fast the Ramadan and to believe in one God; that Santa María was a virgin and holy, but not the Mother of God; that the Lord Jesus Christ was a son of God and prophet of God, who had ever spoken truth, and it was a sin not to believe in what he had uttered, but that Mahomet was also a prophet of God, whose utterances were to be believed; he had also been taught to commit no murder, not to covet his neighbor's daughter and not to bear false witness--all of which would seem to indicate that there was developing among the Moriscos an intermediate faith which in time would have become Christian had opportunity been allowed. Don Cosme further declared that, since his first arrest, he had always been a Christian and desired to live and die in the faith of Christ; he repeated all the Christian prayers accurately, in both Latin and Romance, and wished that he had been born among Christians, as it would have been better for him, both in body and in soul. This went on, until February 21, 1578, when he was allowed the city as a prison, under bail, and on March 26th he was permitted to return home, keeping himself subject to summons.
 
Then fifteen months elapsed, until July 17, 1579, his case was voted upon in discordia, requiring its reference to the Suprema which, October 2d, ordered torture at discretion for Don Cosme and Don Juan. Preliminary audiences, however, were prescribed in order that they might discharge their consciences and satisfy the evidence, especially as to accomplices, giving them to understand that this was necessary to enable them to enjoy the pardon of 1571. Under this the trial was resumed, but the record [365] ends before the stage of torture was reached, and the archivist, Don Julio Melgares Marin, who copied it, assumes that the case remained suspended. Probably either the two brothers had succeeded in raising a sum sufficient to satisfy the Suprema, or they were recognized as too poor to be worth further prosecution. ⁽¹²¹⁾

From such a case as this, it can readily be conceived how efficient an instrument was the Inquisition in exciting and perpetuating among the Moriscos an abhorrence of the religion imposed on them by force, and scarce known to them save as an excuse for cruelty and exaction. To some extent this was recognized by the governing powers. After the wise toleration had been discarded, which had rendered the Mudéjares contented subjects, the apostasy of the neophytes was the source of grave concern in the spiritual field, and their known hostility was the cause of even greater disquiet in the sphere of statesmanship. For more than three-quarters of a century it was the subject of a constant series of efforts and experiments, alternating between moderation and severity. With an efficient and honest administration, something might have been accomplished by a consistent policy, but vacillation, incompetence and greed resulted only in increasing exasperation. The story is long and intricate and the barest summary must suffice here to indicate its leading features and the causes of the failure to assimilate the races, on which depended the ,peace and prosperity of Spain. We have seen the mistaken policy adopted in Granada; in Valencia it was less unreasonable in spirit, but failed miserably in execution.
 
After the Germanía and the edict of 1525, some futile attempts were made at missionary work among the so-called converts, but the situation, in 1526, is correctly described by Navigero, the Venetian envoy, who says that there was so little care about teaching them, priestly gains being the main object, that they either were as much Moors as before or had no religion of any kind. ⁽¹²²⁾ It was self-evident that to Christianize a large population, scattered over the land, for the most part in exclusive communities, would require a complete organization of parish churches with schools and all the necessary appliances. A basis for this existed in the property of the mosques, which Clement VII, in 1524, had ordered [366] to be converted into churches, and in the tithes, which were now imposed as a fresh burden upon the converts. These were spoils which all, who saw a chance for gain, hastened to grasp. To recompense the lords for the expected loss of tribute from their vassals, who were promised to be treated in all things like Christians, the tithes were made over to them, in return for which they were to provide the churches with what was requisite for divine service, while the revenues of the mosques were expected to furnish foundations for benefices, the patronage of which was given to the lords. For this, as we have seen, the requisite papal authority was procured, but the measure was attacked in innumerable suits, some of which were carried up to the Roman Rota, with the consequent interminable delays. ⁽¹²³⁾ In some fashion, two hundred and thirteen mosques were converted into churches in the archbishopric of Valencia, fourteen in the see of Tortosa, ten in Segorbe and fourteen in Orihuela, but the object kept in view was the revenues, and not the religious training of the Moriscos. ⁽¹²⁴⁾
 
Nearly ten years passed away with nothing accomplished. A thorough reorganization was seen to be necessary, and papal faculties were obtained empowering Cardinal Manrique to provide persons to instruct the converts, to erect and unite churches, to appoint and dismiss priests, to regulate tithes and to decide summarily all the suits that were expected from archbishops, bishops, chapters, abbeys, priests and secular lords, thus rendering him and his delegates independent of the bishops who thus far had done nothing. ⁽¹²⁵⁾ Under this, in 1534, Manrique despatched commissioners with detailed instructions, including provisions to be made for a college to be founded for the instruction of Morisco children, who should in turn instruct their parents. ⁽¹²⁶⁾ The scheme, however, though well intended, was wrecked on the money-question which, to the end, proved an obstacle frustrating all intelligent work in conversion. The revenues of the mosques, the tithes and first-fruits seem to disappear--swallowed up by noble and prelate and, although they derived their incomes in great part from the labor of the Moriscos, it seemed impossible to wring from them what was necessary to support the new establishment. In 1544, St. Thomas of Vilanova, then Archbishop of Valencia, urged the [367] emperor to place zealous and exemplary rectors in the Morisco villages, with ample salaries to enable them to distribute alms, but it does not seem to have occurred to him that this was part of his duty and that of the Church. ⁽¹²⁷⁾
 
Manrique's commissioners established a hundred and ninety rectories, endowed with the beggarly stipend of thirty crowns a year. It was impossible to find suitable priests for such livings, and the complaint was general that they were, for the most part, ignorant and depraved, creating repulsion rather than attraction to the religion which they assumed to teach. Many were nonresident and neglected their duties entirely, or found vicars at still lower salaries to replace them. There was no one to inspect them or keep them in order. A pension of two thousand ducats a year had been levied on the archbishopric of Valencia, to maintain the projected college for Morisco youths, but two-thirds of this was diverted to the support of the rectories and the rest was made up from various sources, not always adequate, for some holders of benefices refused to pay the moderate assessments made on them. ⁽¹²⁸⁾
 
It was in vain that one effort after another was made to remedy these deficiencies. The indifference of the ecclesiastical authorities, or their opposition when asked for funds, paralyzed every plan devised. In 1564, the Córtes of Monzon pointed out the failure of all attempts to instruct the converts, who were punished for their ignorance, and they made some remedial suggestions. Philip in response assembled a junta under the presidency of Valdes, the conclusions of which were embodied in a royal cédula. This confided the instruction of the Moriscos to the bishops in their several dioceses, who were to appoint proper persons and keep them under supervision, treating the neophytes with the utmost kindness, rewarding the good according to their deserts, and appointing the more prominent among them to familiarships. Archbishop Ayala, on his return from this junta, called a provincial council, but the bishops took no action to carry out the provisions of the cedula, contenting themselves with inflicting heavy fines on those who did not have their children baptized at birth in the best clothes that they could afford; on alfaquíes who visited the sick, and on secular officials who neglected to denounce Moorish observances. The pious hope was expressed that, by compelling [368] them to attend mass on Ash Wednesday, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday and All Saints, they might be attracted to Christian worship, and their salvation was cared for by ordering them on the death-bed to give something for the benefit of their souls, in default of which the heirs must at least have three masses sung for them. ⁽¹²⁹⁾
 
This was the spirit in which the prelates conceived their duties towards those whom clerical pressure had made their spiritual children, and to whom they owed great part of their revenues. Juan de Ribera who, in 1568, succeeded to the archbishopric of Valencia was a man of different stamp. He preferred the radical cure of expulsion but, so long as the Moriscos remained, he recognized the duty of laboring for their conversion. In 1575 he held a conference with the Bishops of Tortosa and Orihuela (Segorbe being vacant), when it was agreed that the rectorial stipends were inadequate, as there were no offerings at the altar, which led many to abandon their cures, while those who would accept the position were mostly unfitted, through ignorance and character. It was therefore resolved to increase the stipends to a hundred crowns. The king made a contribution, and a sum of seven thousand ducats per annum (or 7350 libras) was assessed on the bishops and those who enjoyed the tithes of the Moriscos. Ribera's share of this was thirty-six hundred ducats, levied on the income of his "table," which was forty thousand ducats, so that the assessment was 9 per cent. The rest fell upon ecclesiastics, except a negligible amount to be paid by five laymen. A brief of June 16, 1576, was obtained from Gregory XIII confirming this arrangement, and Ribera punctually paid his portion into the taula or bank of Valencia, but the other churchmen were recalcítrant. The share of his cathedral chapter was eight hundred libras a year, which it not only refused to pay but organized a league to contest the whole measure; the procrastinating resources of litigation were limitless and, in 1597, Philip sent to Valencia the Licentiate Covarrubias to settle the matter if possible. For three years he labored, and finally induced the chapter to obey the papal brief, but on some pretext it refused to abide by the agreement and the litigation continued. The chapter of Segorbe, although its portion was only seventy libras a year, threatened to raise a tumult if it was forced to pay, and sent its treasurer to Rome to work for [369] the revocation of the brief; in 1604 it procured an inhibition on the execution of the brief, but finally, in 1606, the matter was decided against the chapters. By this time their arrearages amounted to a hundred and fifty thousand crowns, which Philip III forgave them and, for the few remaining years they paid theif assessments. Meanwhile, Ribera's contribution had gone on accumulating with interest until it amounted to 157,482 libras 13 s., 11 d. Of this about thirty-two thousand libras had been expended on the rectories; in 1602, sixty thousand were devoted to the college for Morisco youths and, in 1606, thirty-one thousand were given to endow a girl's college; part went for expenses and, in 1607, a balance of over thirteen thousand was given to the Collegiate Seminary of Corpus Christi which he had founded. ⁽¹³⁰⁾ Thus this well-intended plan came to naught, like all other attempts, through the covetousness and indifference of those whose duty and interests alike demanded their earnest co-operation.
 
What might have been accomplished by zealous Christian prelates can be gathered from the experience of Feliciano de Figueroa, Bishop of Segorbe. He had long been Ribera's secretary and was thoroughly familiar with the question. Promoted to the see of Segorbe, in 1599, he writes, in 1601, that there were twenty Morisco villages in his diocese; at his own cost he put resident rectors in them, with doctrineros, or religious teachers, and twelve preachers, supervising the whole work himself. Already he reports a notable reformation in the adults, while the children manifested affection and readiness to embrace the faith; moreover, during the past forty years, many Moorish ceremonies had fallen into disuse. Again, in 1604, he describes his continued labors without discouragement, although he complains of the obstacles thrown in his way by the secular authorities, who aided the alfaquíes in opposing his efforts. ⁽¹³¹⁾
 
This alludes to a serious difficulty which aided in bringing about the catastrophe. The lords of Morisco vassals were actuated by the most purely selfish motives. Exploiting their dependents to the utmost, they feared that, if the latter became Christians in fact as well as in name, they would be unable to extort the imposts and tribute which they exacted almost at discretion, for the Moriscos were helpless and defenceless, and the pledges that they should [370] be treated as Christians were forgotten. The lords therefore discouraged all missionary work and, as far as they could, protected their vassals against the Inquisition. When the latter obtained evidence of this interference with conversion, it did not hesitate to prosecute the highest nobles. In 1570 it condemned Don Sancho de Cardona, Admiral of Aragon, to abjure de levi, to a fine of two thousand ducats and to reclusion in a convent at the pleasure of the Suprema--reclusion which proved perpetual, for he died in the convent of his confinement. He deserved much more if the testimony was true which asserted that he advised his vassals to appeal to the king, to the pope, and finally to the Grand Turk to induce him to threaten to persecute the Christians in his dominions if the Moriscos were not left in peace, and further that he advised them to rise and promised to arm them if they would do so. This was not the only case for, in 1571 the Master of Montesa and two other nobles appeared in an auto for the same offence and, in 1578, two others were the subjects of investigation. ⁽¹³²⁾The lords further made themselves obnoxious by seeking to protect their vassals from the ceaseless exactions of the alguaziles set over them to see that they attended mass regularly, and to fine those who did not, or who worked on feast-days. These gentry were paid by a half or a third of their collections; their position was not enviable, threatened as they were both by the lords and the Moriscos in the remoter districts, and it was impossible to fill the position with men of fitting character. ⁽¹³³⁾

These spasmodic and fruitless efforts to convert the so-called converts were accompanied with frequent relaxations of the rigid canons against heresy, interesting because they infer a dim conception that toleration, after all, might be a more practical method of winning human souls than oppression and persecution. Unfortunately, this fluctuating policy was the most irrational that could be devised. The Moriscos had been so sedulously taught to abhor Christianity and to distrust their conquerors that leniency could be regarded only as dictated by fear, and as affording licence to follow more undisguisedly the practices of their ancient faith, while the alternations of severity only increased their hatred of the religion of their oppressors.

[371] Edicts of Grace were the favorite resort when there was a disposition to show moderation, but these, as we have seen, were, for the most part, nugatory, because they were contingent on recorded confessions and the obligation to denounce accomplices. The recorded confession rendered the penitent liable to the terrible penalties of relapse and, as the latter was sure to occur, the Morisco naturally hesitated to incur the liability. To obviate this objection, the unprecedented concession was made of suspending the canons concerning relapse. This could be done only by papal authority and it was repeatedly tried. The earliest instance seems to be a brief of Clement VII, December 5, 1530, empowering Manrique to appoint confessors with faculties to absolve penitents, even if they had relapsed repeatedly, with secret absolution and penance, and to release them and their descendants from all penalties, disabilities and confiscation, the reason alleged for this liberal condonation of apostasy being the lack of priests in the Morisco districts to instruct the converts in the faith. It was not, however, until 1535 that Manrique transmitted this to the Valencia tribunal with orders to execute it, and even then it does not seem to have exercised much influence on the number of trials, though if honestly put into operation it would have superseded them. ⁽¹³⁴⁾ This policy continued to be followed spasmodically and grants exonerating from the penalties of relapse were repeatedly made during the rest of the century. ⁽¹³⁵⁾
 

There was also, in the Edicts of Grace, the necessity of denouncing accomplices, which the Moriscos, to their credit, could rarely persuade themselves to do. Bishop Figueroa of Segorbe pointed this out to Philip III as a matter of supreme importance, as it required them to accuse their parents, their wives and their children, which even the secular laws pretermitted as a matter so horrible to human nature. ⁽¹³⁶⁾ Still it was required by the canon law, and could not be omitted without special papal authority. Philip II was so convinced of its impolicy that, when a crucial effort was to be made to test whether the Moriscos could be converted, as an alternative to expulsion, by an Edict of Grace on the most [372] favorable terms, he endeavored to have this condition removed, but Clement VIII, as we have seen (Vol. II, p. 462) while granting, in 1597, an edict covering relapse and conceding that confession could be made to the episcopal Ordinaries, insisted that confession must include full denunciation of the apostasy of others. ⁽¹³⁷⁾
 
Various causes delayed the publication of the edict until 1599, after Philip III had succeeded to the throne. Great preparations were made for it as for a final experiment; rectors, preachers and commissioners were sent through the land, under detailed instructions from Ribera, who told them that the work was difficult but not impossible; Ribera's fund was drawn upon for the colleges; the barons were to found schools for the instruction of young children, and a hermandad was organized to place girls in convents or in the families of Old Christians. ⁽¹³⁸⁾ The edict was duly published in Valencia, August 22, 1599; its term was for only one year, but it was extended to eighteen months. Philip III eagerly awaited the result, which was conveyed to him in a report of August 22,1601, by the tribunal. During the eighteen months of the edict, the inquisitors said, only thirteen persons had come forward to take advantage of it and these had made such fictitious confessions, and had so protected their accomplices, that they deserved condemnation rather than absolution; some of them, indeed, had already been denounced to the Inquisition, so that they had evidently been impelled by fear rather than by the desire of conversion. The inquisitors went on to describe the Moriscos as Moors who would always be Moors and, if the Inquisition did not convert them, it at least compelled them to sin with less publicity and thus diminished their evil example. ⁽¹³⁹⁾ This failure may be regarded as virtually deciding the fate of the Moriscos. Archbishop Ribera emphasized it in two strong memorials addressed to Philip III, and expulsion came to be recognized as the only solution of the situation, although the vacillation and irresolution of the court postponed for some years the execution of the measure.
 
A glance at the tables in the Appendix will show how little influence the successive Edicts of Grace had on the operations of the Inquisition, which reaped its harvests irrespective of them. Yet [373] those tables reveal that, between 1540 and 1563, there were periods during which the tribunal was idle, at least as to cases of heresy. These intervals represent some remarkable efforts to try the effect of moderation, which, although neutralized by lack of cooperative work in winning over the converts, merit examination as measures without example in the career of the Spanish Holy Office.
 
The nobles of Valencia complained forcibly of the disquiet caused among their vassals by the operations of the Inquisition, and the Córtes petitioned that thirty or forty years might be allowed for their instruction during which they should be exempt from prosecution. Charles assembled a junta of prelates and theologians, which suggested various plans of moderation and conciliation, from among which he selected that of granting a term of grace for past offences, allowing them to confess sacramentally to confessors, and that a period should be provided for their instruction, during which the Inquisition should not prosecute them. This period was liberally fixed at twenty-six years, with the warning that, as they should use or abuse it, it would be extended or shortened. We have seen the failure to provide them with churches and instructors, and it is scarce surprising that they commenced to live openly as Moors, saying that, as they had thirty years in which to do as they pleased, they would take full advantage of it. ⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ This could not be permitted, and the effort to convert by toleration came to a speedy end. The tribunal which had no cases in 1541, 1542 and 1543 resumed operations and had 79, 37 and 49 in 1544,1545 and 1546--a portion of which, however were undoubtedly the Judaizers prosecuted for revoking confessions (Vol. II, p. 584).
 
Then, in 1547, came a reversion to a milder policy. A brief dated August 2, 1546, was obtained from Paul III, of so liberal a character that it virtually superseded the Inquisition, by granting faculties to appoint confessors with full power to absolve in utroque foro--both sacramentally and judicially--even those who had been condemned by the Inquisition, and to relieve them and their descendants from all disabilities. ⁽¹⁴¹⁾ Unfortunately the faculty to appoint confessors was conferred on Antonio Ramirez de Haro, who had for some years been acting as " apostolic [374] commissioner" in Valencia, with extensive powers over everything relating to the Moriscos, but he had, in 1545, left Valencia, on a summons, as Bishop of Segovia, to attend the Council of Trent-- from which summons he succeeded in getting himself excused-- and had not subdelegated his authority. According to the Archbishop St. Thomas of Vilanova, this made little difference, because the brief was ineffective, inasmuch as it required abjuration de vehementi, entailing relaxation for relapse, to which none of the converts would expose themselves. He, therefore, suggested that more extensive faculties should be obtained, to absolve and pardon without legal forms, seeing that these people had been forcibly converted, that they had never been instructed, and that their intercourse with Barbary indisposed them to Christianity. ⁽¹⁴²⁾
 
What followed is strikingly illustrative of the procrastination and neglect that rendered Spanish administration so ineffective. The commission of the Bishop of Segovia superseded both the inquisitorial and the episcopal jurisdiction, and his absence left everything in confusion. Archbishop Thomas wrote, April 12, 1547, to Prince Philip that, since the bishop had gone, the Moriscos had daily become bolder in performing their Moorish ceremonies, as there was no one to restrain them; the bishop had left no one to represent him, and no time should be lost in getting him to subdelegate some one who could come at once. Promises were made that a person should shortly be sent, but the habitual mañana postponed it indefinitely. On November 10th, the archbishop again represented the complete liberty enjoyed by the Converses, with no one empowered to correct them, but his representations were neglected and, in 1551 and 1552, he was still calling for some one authorized to keep the Moriscos in order. Even when, in 1551, the Bishop of Segovia, who still retained his commission, appointed the Inquisitor Gregorio de Miranda as a delegated commissioner, he granted him no inquisitorial power, and the Valencia Moriscos remained, for ten years longer, free from persecution. ⁽¹⁴³⁾
 This anomalous condition explains why the tables show only a few cases in 1547, 1548 and 1549, and then an entire cessation up to and including 1562, the former being probably the unfinished work of previous years. In 1561, Paul IV empowered [375] Valdés to grant faculties to the Archbishop of Valencia and his Ordinary to reconcile secretly the New Christians: in those cases which could be judicially proved, the confessions were to be made before a notary and delivered to the tribunal, where they remained of record against both the penitent and his accomplices, while in cases that could not be proved, the penances were to be purely spiritual. ⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ This fresh experiment indicates a revival of interest in the Morisco question, to be necessarily followed by a return to the old methods. In 1562, accordingly, the tribunal began to act in Teruel, where the town of Xea had the reputation of an asylum for malefactors; it was exclusively Morisco, no Old Christian being permitted to reside there. Finally, all restrictions were removed and, in 1563, the Inquisition was vigorously at work, with sixty-two cases, and held two autos, in which appeared nine cases from Xea. ⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ After that there was no further interference with its functions, and it continued to the end to contribute its share to rendering Christianity odious. What Archbishop Ayala thought of its influence in this direction is indicated by his offer, in 1564, to undertake the instruction of the Moriscos at his own expense, but only on condition that the Inquisition should have nothing to do with them, except in cases of open and defiant sin. ⁽¹⁴⁶⁾
 
Even without the aggravation of the Inquisition, the condition of the Moriscos was deplorable. They had been promised, in return for baptism, that they should have all the privileges of Christians, but this, like all other pledges, was made only to be broken. Enforced conversion had added to their burdens and had brought no compensatory relief--they were Christians as regards duties and responsibilities, but they remained Moors in respect to liabilities and inequality before the law. In 1525 the syndics of the aljamas pointed out that, in order to enjoy their religion, they had been subjected by their lords to many imposts and servitudes which they could not render as Christians, for they would not be allowed to work on Sundays and feast-days, wherefore they asked to be taxed only as Christians. To this it was replied, [376] in the Concordia of 1528, that they should be treated as Christians and that, to avoid injury to parties, investigation should be made to prevent injustice. Their lords, however, did not admit this and, in the same year, the Córtes of Valencia declared that they retained all their rights over their vassals, who were forbidden to change their domiciles. ⁽¹⁴⁷⁾The lords accepted the tithes and the first-fruits as a compensation, but merely added these fresh burdens on their vassals, who were powerless to resist.
 
Charles recognized this injustice and his responsibility for it, but he dared not raise a conflict with the nobles, and he sought to shield himself behind the awful authority of the Inquisition. He therefore procured from Clement VII, July 15,1531, a remarkable brief reciting that, when the Saracens were converted, the barons and knights, in compensation for the loss inflicted on them, were empowered to exact from their vassals the tithes and first-fruits, but they have not only enjoyed these new imposts but have continued to extort the personal services and açofras ⁽¹⁴⁸⁾and other demands of the ante-conversion period. Thus the converts, unable to endure these accumulated burdens, allege them as justifying their retaining their old customs and disregarding the Christian feasts and ceremonies. As Charles had asked him for a remedy, and as he knew nothing of the matter, he committed it to Manrique with power to hear complaints and render justice, enforcing his decisions with censures. ⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ The rôle of protector of the Moriscos was novel for the Inquisition and Manrique kept the brief until January, 1534, when, in sending Fray Antonio de Calcena and Antonio Ramírez de Haro as commissioners to organize the Morisco churches, he informed them that the king ordered the Concordia to be enforced; the New Christians were in all things to be treated like the Old; they were to investigate secretly and report whether this was the case. ⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Apparently the Inquisition shrank from the unaccustomed task; there is no trace of its intervention in behalf of the oppressed Moriscos, and its only prosecutions of the nobles were for favoring their vassals against its persecution. As for [377] the Córtes, their sole efforts were directed to increase the burdens of the vassals and, in case of their condemnation, to profit by the confiscations.
 
 Thus they were mercilessly pillaged. Besides the division of the crops, of which one-third or one-half went to the lord, and besides the tithes and first-fruits, there were innumerable imposts of all kinds and forced loans or benevolences. In 1561, one of the numerous consultas on the Morisco question alludes to the hardship of forcing them to live like Christians and pay like Moors. The king, it added, ought to relieve them from these unjust impositions, but it would throw the whole kingdom into confusion and impede the work of conversion, so the commissioners ought to see how it could be brought about that they should pay no more than the Christians. This continued to the end. In 1608, Padre Antonio Sobrino, S. J., argued that one of the chief obstacles to conversion was the tyranny of the lords and, in addition to the exactions in money and kind, he alludes to the forced labors imposed on them, on meagre wages and still more meagre food, or frequently with no wages. ⁽¹⁵¹⁾ In fact, they were virtually taillables et corvéables à miséricorde, and their oppression was tempered only by the ever-present apprehension of rebellion and, in the coast districts, by the facilities of escape to Africa. Even their ecclesiastical persecutors were almost moved to pity by the hopeless misery of their lot, but we are told that there was no compassion felt for this, as it was generally deemed advisable to keep them impoverished and in subjection. ⁽¹⁵²⁾
 
The control of the lords over their vassals was further safeguarded by a pragmática of Charles V, in 1541, forbidding the Moriscos of Valencia, under pain of death and confiscation, from changing either domicile or lord, and any one accepting them as vassals, without special royal licence, was fined five hundred florins, or was scourged in default of the money. Granadan and Castilian Moriscos were threatened with death for entering Valencia and this, in 1545, was extended to those of Aragon. This ferocious legislation was repeated in 1563 and 1586. ⁽¹⁵³⁾
 
[378] Akin to this was the suicidal policy of forbidding the emigration of those who were recognized as dangerous domestic enemies. This, as we have seen, was begun by Ferdinand and Isabella and was rigidly persisted in--partly, no doubt, from a pious scruple of allowing the baptized to apostatize in Barbary, and partly to protect the lords from the loss of their vassals. In time this was enforced in Aragon by the Inquisition, which published edicts to that effect, including the guidance over the mountains of emigrants by Christians. In the auto of June 6, 1585, the tribunal punished two who were seeking to leave the country and two who served as guides, with scourging and the galleys for three men and scourging and imprisonment for a woman. ⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ Not only was this a grievous hardship, by depriving the oppressed of all hope of relief, but it was a fatal error for, if the discontented had been allowed to expatriate themselves, the remainder could have commanded better treatment, and the Morisco question which, for half a century, distracted Spanish statesmanship, might have settled itself without the desperate expedient of expulsion.
 
Disarmament was another precaution entailing a grievance which was keenly felt. We have seen it in Granada, and that in Valencia it was a prudent preliminary to enforced baptism in 1525. In the Concordia of 1528, the Moriscos asked that their arms be restored to them, and were told that they would be treated as Old Christians. This promise, like the rest, was broken. The pragmática of 1541, among its other restrictions, included that of bearing arms. This was not enforced and, in 1545, orders were sent to carry it into effect, but the methods suggested show that it was regarded as a dangerous business, and the purpose was abandoned. In 1552, St. Thomas of Vilanova urged that it should be done, and so did Inquisitor Miranda in 1561. Finally, in 1563, the work was done by a sudden simultaneous action of the lords, when the inventories compiled show that, in 16,377 Morisco houses, there were seized 14,930 swords, 3,454 cross-bows and a long list of other weapons, indicating how industriously the Moriscos had provided themselves. ⁽¹⁵⁵⁾
 
[379] In Aragon, the matter was confided to the Inquisition. The tribunal of Saragossa issued a decree, November 4,1559, forbidding the Moriscos from carrying arms, but the nobles appealed to the Suprema and procured its indefinite suspension. ⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ The question was revived, in 1590, but a quarrel with the archbishop on a point of precedence delayed its consideration, and then the troubles of Antonio Perez distracted attention. Finally, in 1593, Philip II ordered the disarmament, the execution of which was entrusted to the tribunal. Two inquisitors traversed the land and collected 7,076 swords, 3,783 arquebuses, 489 cross-bows, 1,356 pikes, lances and halberds and large numbers of other weapons. Knives were permitted, but these increased in size until they became formidable; after two or three officials of the Inquisition had been killed with them when making arrests, a royal edict of 1603 limited them to a third of an ell in length and required them to be pointless. ⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ The result of these precautions was seen when the edict of expulsion was enforced and the desperate wretches who essayed a hopeless resistance were slaughtered.
 
The growth of the absurd cult of limpieza brought another hardship of no little moment. At first there was a disposition to exempt Moriscos from its exclusiveness. When, in 1565, Philip II was trying conciliation he ordered that leading and influential Moriscos should be appointed as familiars, and we have seen that Inquisitor Miranda gave commissions to the brothers Abenamir. Paul IV forbade admission to holy orders to the descendants of Jews to the fourth generation and, in 1573, Gregory XIII extended this to the Moriscos, but the Córtes of Monzon, in 1564, had decreed that those trained in the Morisco college of Valencia should be allowed to hold benefices and the cure of souls among their people, and we are told that it graduated some good priests and preachers and doctors of theology. ⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ Yet in time the exclusion became general, and throughout Spain no distinction was made between descendants of Jews and Mudéjares. In a land where a career in office, secular or ecclesiastical, was the ambition of every man who had a smattering of education, this barrier condemned to obscurity [380] able men who naturally devoted their energies to stimulating disaffection and provoking revolt. Navarrete, as we have seen, even thinks that the necessity of the expulsion would have been averted but for this; that the Moriscos could have been Christianized, if they had had the opportunity to identify themselves with the nation and to share in its public life, in place of being driven to desperation and to hatred of religion by the indelible stigma imposed upon them. ⁽¹⁵⁹⁾
 
The baptism of Morisco children furnished a perpetual source of irritation. Rigid regulations were prescribed to ensure the administration of the sacrament, as it was essential to their salvation and to rendering them subject to inquisitorial jurisdiction. No Morisco woman was allowed to act as midwife, but in every village there was a Christian midwife, carefully selected and instructed. She kept watch on all pregnant women, under a fine of a hundred reales for every case she missed. After putting the infant to the breast, her first duty was to notify the priest and alguazil, after which she was not to leave the bed-side save for indispensable household duties. The baptism was performed the same day or the next, and careful registers were kept, so that identification could be secured. There is doubtless truth in the universal assertion that, on returning home, the father scraped and washed the spots touched by the chrism, in the belief that he thereby effaced the sacrament. ⁽¹⁶⁰⁾
 
Marriage was the source of infinite trouble. The Church had prohibited unions within the fourth degree of kinship and, by inventing spiritual affinity, it had complicated and enlarged the incestuous area while, by assuming for the pope the profitable power of selling dispensations, it admitted that the restriction was purely artificial. Among the Moors, marriage between first cousins was permitted and, as the Moriscos dwelt confined in their Morerías, or in small, isolated villages, without power to change domicile, intermarriage throughout generations had created such complexity of relationship that unions lawful under the canon law must have been exceptional. We have seen the question raised in the Concordia of 1528, with the result that existing marriages and betrothals were dispensed for, but that future ones [381] must conform to the canons. This was a virtual impossibility; the rectors sought to make their subjects purchase dispensations, but we are told that they rarely did so; that, in some places, they merely told the lord that the parties were of kin and that, if he made no objection, the marriage would take place--an indifference for which more than one noble was prosecuted and publicly penanced. ⁽¹⁶¹⁾ Under such circumstances, there could have been no Christian marriage-rites, and the union was legally pure concubinage, or at best clandestine marriage, which the Council of Trent, in 1563, pronounced invalid. ⁽¹⁶²⁾ It was probably the conciliar definitions that induced the Córtes of Monzon, in 1564, to petition that facilities should be afforded for obtaining dispensations from the Commissioner of the Santa Cruzada, who possessed the requisite faculties, and further that the offspring of such unions should be legally legitimate. To this not unreasonable request the bishops of the Council of Valencia, in 1565, replied by threatening excommunication and other penalties on all marrying within the prohibited degrees, and on all concerned in evasions of the canons. ⁽¹⁶³⁾
 
The matter was universally admitted to be of supreme importance, but it was treated with the customary negligence and procrastination. At length, in 1587, Philip II represented it to Sixtus V, but he only obtained a brief, January 25, 1588, granting to the Valencia bishops, for six months only, faculties to validate such marriages, legitimate the children and absolve the parents in utroque foro, with salutary penance, for all of which no fees were to be exacted. It is not likely that the officials took much interest in performing this gratuitous labor, or that the Moriscos, even if they chanced to hear of the brief, exposed themselves to the annoyances which it entailed. The last recorded action in the matter is that Philip, in 1595, resolved to apply for another brief of the same nature. He doubtless obtained it with the same nugatory result. ⁽¹⁶⁴⁾
 
The Moorish rule, to eat no meat slaughtered by the uncircumcised, was made the pretext for some troublesome intermeddling. In the Granada decree of 1526, Charles V forbade all slaughtering by Moriscos, in places where there was an Old Christian; where [382] there was none, the priest was to designate a person to perform the office. ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ Little attention appears to have been paid to the matter, until Archbishop Ribera issued an edict prohibiting Moriscos from eating meat that had not been slaughtered by an Old Christian. This was trespassing on the jurisdiction of the Inquisition and, in 1579, the Suprema called upon the Valencia tribunal for a report, including what Bishop Gallo of Orihuela had done with regard to the same matter. The tribunal replied that the edict was obeyed, but that the Moriscos would eat no meat slaughtered by Old Christians, except in a few places, under compulsion by their lords. The edict ought to be perpetuated, for the refusal to eat the meat of a Christian butcher was proof of suspicion, requiring prosecution by the Inquisition. In Orihuela there was doubt whether a cow killed at Aspe had been properly slaughtered; the Moriscos refused to eat of it, for which the Murcia tribunal punished a number of them, leading Bishop Gallo to order that, at Aspe and Nobelda, the butchering should be done by Old Christians. It was probably this which led to general legislation forbidding Moriscos to follow the trade of butchers, or even to kill a fowl for a sick man, a law repeated as late as 1595. ⁽¹⁶⁶⁾
 
Subjected to the perpetual exasperation of interference with their habits and customs, to the oppression of their lords and the persecution of the Inquisition, denied all opportunity to rise in the social scale, forbidden to enjoy the faith of their ancestors, while sedulously trained to hate the religion imposed on them, and despairing of relief in the future, it is no wonder that the Moriscos were discontented subjects, eager to throw off the insupportable yoke and to rise against their oppressors. They were, however, but little more than half a million of souls, weaponless and untrained, in a population of eight or ten millions--a negligible quantity in the vigorous days of Ferdinand and even in the earlier years of Charles V. The Spanish monarchy, however, had squandered its strength on distant enterprises; even before the fearful drain in the Netherlands, the exhaustive effort required to crush the Moriscos of Granada showed that it was already [383] bankrupt in resources. That episode was a warning which Spanish statesmanship might well take to heart, and, year by year, the fear grew greater of what might be the fate of Spain if internal enemies should unite with external.
 
There had long been a source of humiliation and annoyance, though not in itself of danger, in the ravages of Moorish corsairs along the southern coast, for which the Moriscos were held responsible. Undoubtedly they aided by conveying information, maintaining relations with Barbary, and availing themselves of the razzias to escape thither when they could, but the primary fault lay in the incredible fatuity of a policy, so preoccupied with foreign ambitions and the fatal Burgundian inheritance, that it neglected the protection of the Spanish shores, until it became a proverb that these were the Indies of the Turkish and Moorish sea-rovers.
 
Complaints of these ravages commence with the Christianization of Granada and continue uninterruptedly for more than a century, while the measures to guard against these attacks were spasmodic and miserably insufficient. Boronat gives a list of thirty-three descents, between 1528 and 1584, but this cannot include the innumerable landings from small vessels to carry away bands of Moriscos and such pillage as could hastily be gathered--little raids such as that picturesquely described by Cervantes, with its characteristic feature of the fortified church, in which the Christians of the sea-coast village defended themselves, while the Moriscos eagerly hurried to embark. ⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ In the larger expeditions, the Moriscos sometimes escaped in considerable numbers. In 1559, Dragut carried off twenty-five hundred; in 1570, all those of Palmera were taken; in 1584, an Algerine fleet removed twenty-three hundred, and the next year another fleet took away the whole population of Callosa, all of which was exceedingly damaging to the lords who lost their vassals. ⁽¹⁶⁸⁾
 
These raids were practically unresisted and unavenged, for the coasts were unguarded by land or sea. Occasionally, as in 1519, we hear of a few hundred troops sent, when news was received of an expected hostile fleet: sometimes there were negotiations between the central government and the exposed provinces to maintain [384] a force on the water, but the inadequacy of these precautions is illustrated by the bargaining in 1547, when the Catalan Córtes complained of the irreparable damage inflicted by the Moorish corsairs and asked that six of the Castilian galleys be sent to winter there. Prince Philip would only promise that he would do what was suitable, which brought an offer that Catalonia would equip and man one galley while Valencia promised one or two, and Philip acceded to the request that the Castilian galleys should cooperate with them. ⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ Another expedient was based on the assumed collusion of the Moriscos with the corsairs, and it seemed easier to exclude them wholly from the coast than to guard it effectually. As early as 1507 Ferdinand undertook to depopulate it from Gibraltar to Almería, but the experiment proved a failure. ⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ It was tried again repeatedly, in various savage laws to prevent Moriscos from travelling within prescribed distances from the sea, and from holding communication with the corsairs, but this naturally effected nothing. ⁽¹⁷¹⁾ In 1604, the Córtes of Valencia even proposed to enlist the cooperation of the Moriscos, by suggesting that they should redeem all Christians captured and enslaved on the Valencian coast, in return for which the rigor of the Inquisition should be relaxed and their evidence against each other should not be required, but it is needless to say that the plan was rejected. ⁽¹⁷²⁾
 
While this matter of the corsairs was comparatively trivial in itself, it bore a disproportionately large share in the discussions on the Morisco question, and undoubtedly had its influence on the final decision. The result, indeed, showed that there was a connection between the Moriscos and the corsairs, for one of the benefits derived from the expulsion was relief to the coasts. ⁽¹⁷³⁾Vastly greater, however, in the eyes of statesmen, was the impending danger of rebellion, coincident with attack from Barbary or from the Turk or, in later years, from France.

Even as early as 1512, Peter Martyr, in describing the disturbed [385] condition of Granada, declared that if some daring pirate leader should march into the interior, the population would rise and, as Ferdinand was occupied with the conquest of Navarre, all would go to ruin. ⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ In 1519, there was a scare in Valencia over a report that the Moors of Algiers were coming to seize the kingdom, in concert with the Moriscos. ⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ It is somewhat remarkable that, when a conspiracy was discovered in 1528, the eagerness of the Valencia tribunal to defend its jurisdiction actually led it to protect the conspirators. The authorities had arrested Pere de Alba and his mother-in-law Isabel, as the leaders of the plot. The tribunal claimed them as apostates and, when they were sent to it for examination, it threw them into its prison and refused to surrender them, although the viceroy demanded them as essential to unravelling the details of the conspiracy. Cardinal Manrique was obliged to despatch a special courier with a letter expressing his surprise, as the safety of the state was the first consideration, but even then the tribunal only gave them up with a warning that they must not be made to suffer in life or limb. ⁽¹⁷⁶⁾
 
When Philip II returned to Spain, in 1559, he called for a report on the Moriscos, and the information submitted to him comprised an account of a plot with the Turks for an invasion. ⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ In 1565, a number of arrests were made on charges of treasonable correspondence with the Turk, and it was public rumor that thirty thousand Moriscos were enrolled, awaiting only the capture of Malta to rise in aid of an invasion. The French ambassador, who reported this, subsequently added that the story of the conspiracy was contradicted, but the Moriscos were so badly treated by the Inquisition that despair might readily lead them to rise in arms to aid the Turk. ⁽¹⁷⁸⁾ In 1567, the trial of Gerónimo Roldan, by the Valencia tribunal, revealed evidence of envoys from the ruler of Algiers with a letter urging the Moriscos to rise, together with plans to organize and arm them. ⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ It is true that the rebellion of Granada showed that there was no such eagerness to invade Spain as was apprehended, but, on the other hand if, with the aid of five or six hundred Moors and Turks, the insurgents [386] had taxed to the utmost the power of the kingdom, what was the prospect if a powerful fleet, holding command of the sea, should land a heavy force of trained and well-armed fighting men? During the rebellion, the Venetian envoy, Sigismondo Cavalli, pointed out that assistance from Barbary would involve the kingdom in the greatest straits, for there were about six hundred thousand Moriscos to help an invader. So, in 1575, Lorenzo Priuli, estimating them at four hundred thousand, described them as the source of perpetual danger. ⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ The peril constantly increased with time. It was universally recognized that, through the drain to the colonies, the external wars, and the growth of the celibate clergy, the Old Christians were constantly diminishing in numbers, while the Moriscos were rapidly increasing; the material and especially the military resources of Spain were becoming gradually exhausted, and Spanish statesmen looked forward anxiously to the time when, as Fray Bleda tells us, the Moriscos hoped eventually, to reconquer the land with the aid of the Moors and Turks. ⁽¹⁸¹⁾
 
Nor was this all for, with the pacification of France under the able control of Henry IV, there loomed before them a new and more dangerous enemy. Henry had a long debt of vengeance to pay, and was but awaiting his opportunity. He was in alliance with the Turk and had no conscientious scruple as to Moslem aid. Even as early as 1583, while as yet he was only King of Navarre, there was a scare over an asserted combination between him and the Turk, for an invasion in combination with the Moriscos, which led the Suprema, in January, 1584, to order from the Saragossa tribunal a report on all the evidence in the records as to plots for rebellion. ⁽¹⁸²⁾ This was furnished in detail and shows the incessant vigilance and constant anxieties, since 1565, to which the disaffection of the Moriscos had given rise, and their correspondence not only with the Barbary States and the Turk, but with the French Huguenots. A portion of the evidence was undoubtedly manufactured by the spies in the pay of the Inquisition, but there was enough of genuine to show that plots and intrigues were constantly on foot among the Moriscos. Henry [387] IV was quite ready to utilize their disaffection in furtherance of his plans for the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy and, in 1602, he entered into negotiations with them, through the Marshal Duke de la Force, his governor in Béarn and Navarre. They promised to raise eighty thousand men and to deliver three cities, one of them a seaport and, as an earnest of their resolve, they paid to la Force, at Pau, in 1604 or 1605, a hundred and twenty thousand ducats, but Henry decided that the moment was not favorable and the plan was postponed. ⁽¹⁸³⁾

Then, in 1608, there came a fresh alarm through negotiations of the Valencian Moriscos with Muley Cidan, a pretender to the throne of Morocco, to whom they promised two hundred thousand men, if he would bring twenty thousand and seize a seaport, while certain Hollanders agreed to furnish transportation. Philip III was so impressed with this that, in sending the report to the Royal Council, he ordered it to consider the matter to the exclusion of everything else. He admitted the defenceless condition of Spain; Muley Cidan was its declared enemy; Sultan Ahmed I had his hands free from the war with Persia and had suppressed his own rebels; Spain's Italian possessions were exhausted and ripe for revolt, while at home the Moriscos were impatient for liberation. The Council was therefore ordered to consider the means of preserving peace, short of butchering them all. ⁽¹⁸⁴⁾
 
This scare passed away; Muley Cidan rejected the Morisco overtures, and Ahmed sent his fleet against the coasts of Italy. The impression remained, however; the final impulsion had been given, and thenceforth the expulsion of the Moriscos was only a question of means and opportunity. Its execution can scarce be said to have been premature for, although those of Valencia were deported in the autumn of 1609 and those of Aragon in the spring of 1610, Henry IV still relied on those who were left to aid him in his plans for the destruction of Spain. A part of his design was an invasion by la Force with ten thousand men, trusting to the cooperation of the Moriscos, with whom negotiations had been resumed. La Force was in consultation with him, and was in his carriage on May 14, 1610, when, in the Rue de la Ferronerie, the knife of Ravaillac gave Spain a respite. ⁽¹⁸⁵⁾It was evidently [388] supposed that the expulsion had been imperfect and that Spain was still an easy prey. The Baron de Salignac, French Ambassador at Constantinople, wrote to Henry, May 2, 1610, that no matter how many Moriscos had been banished, enough remained to give the Spaniards trouble; war that elsewhere could cost a crown would not there cost a maravedí, and when it should begin Spain would find it more difficult to raise a maravedí than it would be to raise a doubloon elsewhere. ⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ As events turned out, these were vain speculations, but they have interest as showing how, in the estimation of her enemies, Spain had fatally crippled herself by the mismanagement of her Morisco subjects. To the Spanish statesmen of the time the situation had become one from which extrication was imperative at whatever cost.
 
It can readily be believed that the matter had long before awakened the earnest solicitude of Philip II and his counsellors. As early as 1581, when in Lisbon consolidating his rule over Portugal, he formed a junta of his chief advisers to formulate a definite conclusion. That which they reached was the merciful one of sending to sea all the Moriscos who would not be catechised or did not desire to remain, embarking them on worthless ships which were to be scuttled, for it was deemed unwise to add to the population of Africa; it was resolved that, when the fleet returned from the Azores, the plan should be executed by Antonio de Leyva but, when the fleet arrived, it was wanted in Flanders, and the project was abandoned. When, in 1602, Philip III was informed of this, he expressed his pleasure because it justified what was then in contemplation. ⁽¹⁸⁷⁾
 
As Fray Diego de Chaves, confessor of Philip II, was a member of the junta, there could have been no conscientious scruples concerning this wholesale murder. The Church for centuries had taught that death was the penalty for heresy; this was past discussion and was accepted as a matter of course, so that anything short of it was a grace undeserved--slavery, the galleys, the mines, castration, were mercies for which the culprits should feel grateful. So all theologians taught and so Fray Bleda learnedly set forth in his hideous book, the Defensio Fidei, which was approved in Rome after careful examination, and was printed at the [389] expense of Philip III. ⁽¹⁸⁸⁾ Yet, for the honor of humanity, it must be said that there were a few rare souls who held that religion should be spread by love and charity--at least we may so assume from a memorial presented to the Lisbon junta, setting forth that the proper means of conversion had never yet been tried; that the cure had failed through the use of violence, for the disease was not incurable and the fault lay in the methods adopted; Christ had sent forth the apostles to convert the world by preaching the gospel, and the effort should be to find teachers of exemplary life, who would preach with love and gentleness. The memorial recited calmly and temperately the mistakes that had been made in the use of coercion and the absence of instruction and persuasion, and it proposed a series of measures which show that the writer was familiar with the difficultes of the task, the essential condition of which was that those entrusted with it should persuade themselves that it was not impossible. The junta contented itself with proposing that, if the king so desired, the memorial could be sent to the prelates of Valencia, Aragon and Granada, for examination and report. It seems to have been so sent, but only two answers are on record. Archbishop Ribera replied with the alternative of immediate expulsion or, what would be better, thinning out the Moriscos by appointing a body of special inquisitors, who should execute speedy justice, until there should be so few left that they could be expelled without trouble, thus calmly proposing to burn men and women by the hundred thousand. A shade less ferocious was the suggestion of the Inquisitor of Valencia, Ximenez de Reynoso, who favored expulsion to Newfoundland, under the guard of soldiers, who should receive allotments of land and vassals, similar to those of the conquistadores in the New World. ⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ Such an expulsion averted the danger of increasing the African population and was recommended, with a characteristically savage addition, by Martin de Salvatierra, Bishop of Segorbe, when, in 1587, his advice was sought by Philip. He responded by a long and brutal attack on the Moriscos, and suggested deportation to Newfoundland, where they would speedily [390] perish, especially if the precaution were taken of castrating all the males, old and young. ⁽¹⁹⁰⁾
 
It is to the credit of Philip II and his counsellors that, after the failure of the Lisbon project of 1581, they refused to entertain the inhuman suggestions of their ecclesiastical advisers. The matter continued to be threshed out, over and over again, in repeated juntas and councils, in innumerable consultas, and in the system, which Philip had reduced to perfection, of endless talking and writing, which served as an excuse for inaction. One device after another was discussed, such as reducing all the Moriscos to slavery, or sending the able-bodied to the galleys, but the idea of expulsion gradually forged to the front. In this confused tangle of prejudice, passion and fanaticism, it is refreshing to meet with a more statesmanlike view, expressed in a letter of the royal secretary, Francisco de Idiaquez, October 3, 1594, concerning a paper, submitted to him by the king, from some zealous but unpractical person, who argued that the existing scarcity arose from overpopulation, which would be relieved by the expulsion of the Moriscos. So far from this being the case, said Idiaquez, Spain had less inhabitants than for the last two or three centuries. If the presence of this vile race were as safe as it was profitable, there was not a corner of land that should not be placed in their hands, for they alone would bring fertility and plenty by their skill and thrift, which would reduce the price of provisions and with them that of other products. Cheapness was not caused by scanty population but by dense, if the people would work; the high prices were the result of the vice, the idleness, the luxury and the excessive superfluities indulged in by all classes. ⁽¹⁹¹⁾

The panic fear entertained of the Moriscos is reflected in an elaborate memorial presented to Philip III, on his accession in 1598, by the Marquis of Velada, who had been his tutor and was his mayordomo mayor, seriously urging Sicilian Vespers to prevent them from adopting the same expedient. ⁽¹⁹²⁾ Yet the simpler solution of allowing the irreconcilables to depart was not without its advocates, and at one time came near to adoption. In 1598, Don Martin González de Cellorigo submitted to Secretary Idiaquez [391] the suggestion that they should be permitted or required to leave Spain, scattering the rest throughout Castile, on their abjuring their heresies, and subjecting them to the restrictions imposed on the exiles from Granada. ⁽¹⁹³⁾ Even as late as 1607, the Junta de Tres, to which the whole affair of the Moriscos had been entrusted, in a consulta of January 1st, favored the plan of allowing all, who would not accept Christianity, to betake themselves to Barbary, pointing out the futility of the objection that this would increase the power of the Moors, and this it repeated, October 29th, adding the suggestion that the Moriscos of Castile should be scattered and confined to agricultural labor, in all of which Philip signified his concurrence. ⁽¹⁹⁴⁾
 
This was too sensible and humane to suit the ecclesiastics, who were bent on getting rid of the obnoxious apostates by expulsion or extermination, and Spain was not to be allowed so easy a solution of the difficulties created by a century of fanaticism and wrong-doing. In the irresolute and vacillating policy of the court, a final effort was made, as we have seen, to conciliate and instruct, in the Edict of Grace of 1599, under conditions that rendered it nugatory. Its failure, in 1601, was followed by the memorials of Archbishop Ribera urging expulsion, and any subsequent efforts to convert, such as a junta of bishops held in 1608 and 1609, were merely to keep the Moriscos amused and in ignorance of the more drastic measures proposed, during the years in which Philip III and his advisers discussed and rediscussed the question, pondered over details and avoided an irrevocable decision.
 
When, under pressure of the alarm about Muley Cidan, Philip called upon his Council of State for an immediate decision, it admitted that there had been too much delay and that the matter must not be left for the next generation, for the Christians, through wars and religion and dissolute lives, were constantly diminishing in numbers, while the Moriscos, through peace and frugality, were multiplying until in time they would be the majority. The alternatives of massacre or slavery, or the galleys, or allowing the discontented to emigrate were barely alluded to, and expulsion was in the minds of all. The external relations of Spain rendered the opportunity propitious and it ought not to be wasted. The work should commence with Valencia, which was the most dangerous [392] centre, and the other kingdoms could be kept quiet with assurances that the expulsion was not to go further. The opposition of the nobles could be bought off by granting them the real and personal property of their vassals, and preparations should be made to have a powerful fleet off the coast by the end of Spring, and sufficient forces on land to crush resistance. As the Inquisition was in the habit of making many arrests, it could readily seize the influential Moriscos, so as to deprive the rest of their leadership. This sketched out the plan eventually followed, and the only partially dissentient voice was that of the royal confessor, Cardinal Fray Gerónimo Xavierr, who pleaded the forcible baptism and the futile endeavors to instruct by ministers, many of whom were of lives so depraved that they wrought harm by their evil example; he asked that efforts to convert should continue and if, by the time set for expulsion, there was no prospect of improvement, the proposed rigor would be justified. A process could then be formed by the Inquisition as to their apostasy, when they could be condemned for treason against God, or, if rebellion were proved, for treason against the king. ⁽¹⁹⁵⁾
 
This last suggestion refers to a characteristic scruple. Ribera had alluded to it in his second memorial, to the effect that expulsion would be an invasion of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, depriving it of inflicting the canonical punishments, but this, he suggested, could be removed by application to the pope. ⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ It was doubtless in view of this scruple, and to avoid interference by the Inquisition, which was interested in maintaining the existing situation, that the edict of expulsion represented the measure as purely secular, caused by the treasonable correspondence of the Moriscos with the enemies of Spain, and by the necessity of placating God for their heresies. ⁽¹⁹⁷⁾
 
Still there were irresolution and delay, and the die was not cast until, in April, 1609, the Council of State presented a consulta unanimously agreeing on expulsion and virtually determining that the work should commence in autumn, the interval being employed in organizing the militia, bringing troops from Italy, and assembling squadrons to command the coast. Early in May orders were sent to the viceroys of Sicily, Naples and Milan to [393] have the galleys in readiness and, at the end of June, the squadrons were instructed to rendezvous at Majorca on August 15th. Even after this there were evidences of hesitation and vacillation, but the plan was adhered to. ⁽¹⁹⁸⁾
 
Early in August, Don Agustín de Mexia, an officer of high rank, who had distinguished himself at the siege of Ostend, was sent to Valencia, ostensibly to inspect the fortifications, but armed with full powers to carry out the expulsion. He bore a letter from the king to Ribera, expatiating on the influence which the latter had had in leading him to a decision. Ribera had obtained more than he had bargained for. His somewhat selfish theory had been that, by expelling the Moriscos from the rest of Spain, those of Valencia and Aragon could be controlled, and he shrank from the loss and misery to be inflicted on his immediate surroundings. As late as December 19, 1608, he had urged this view in a letter to the royal secretary, arguing that they were an injury to Castile and Andalusia, while their removal would be ruin to Valencia and Aragon, now the most flourishing kingdoms of Spain. The larger cities, he said, lived on the provisions brought by the Moriscos; the churches, hospitals, monasteries, brotherhoods, pious bequests, nobles, gentry and citizens depended on their services and were supported by the censos charged on their communities; he often wished to die rather than to witness such destruction. ⁽¹⁹⁹⁾So, when Mexia reached Valencia, August 20th, and, after conference with the Viceroy Caracena, Ribera was sent for and read the royal letter, he repeated these arguments and proposed that all three should join in appeal to the king to commence with Andalusia. When the conference ended at 4 p.m., he was still firm and was told that a courier for Madrid would start at midnight when he could write what he saw fit. On reflection he concluded that the king wanted obedience, not advice, and he sent to the palace, in time for the courier, a letter to the king, and word to Mexia and Caracena, setting forth that the royal resolution came from heaven and he would further it with all his power. Still, he could not reconcile himself to the prospect of poverty. On August 23d he wrote to Secretary de Prada repeating his urgency that commencement be made with Castile and Andalusia and, on September 3d, he said to Fray Bleda and the Dominican [394] Prior Alcocer "Padres, we may well in the future have to eat bread and herbs and to mend our own shoes." ⁽²⁰⁰⁾
 
The secret had been admirably kept, but the mission of Mexia on a duty so incompatible with his rank caused suspicions which grew from day to day. The Moriscos commenced to fortify their houses, to cease laboring and bringing provisions to the city, which suffered in consequence; the nobles brought their families to town to be prepared for the worst, and Ribera's action in increasing his guard and laying in stores of victuals increased the excitement. The Estamento Militar, or House of Nobles, held two or three stormy meetings, in which it was resolved to send a deputation to the king to represent the ruin which expulsion would bring upon every class in the kingdom, where eleven millions of ducats were invested in the censos charged on the Morisco communities. The envoys went but, when they reached Madrid, they were told by the king that it was too late, for the edict had been already published in Valencia. ⁽²⁰¹⁾
 
Everything, in fact, had worked with precision. By September 17th the fleet, consisting of sixty-two galleys and fourteen galleons, conveying about eight thousand disciplined troops, had reached their stations at Alicante, Denia and the Alfaques de Tortosa, and had commenced landing the men. Possession was taken of the Sierra de Espadan, while Castilian cavalry guarded the frontiers. When all was in readiness, royal letters to the Jurados, Diputados and Estamento Militar were read and, on the 22d, the edict was published.
 
The comparative liberality of the terms and the short notice allowed manifest the sense of weakened power. Under irremissible pain of death, within three days after publication in the several towns and villages, all Moriscos were to depart for the port of embarkation designated by a commissioner. They could take such portable property as they could carry on their backs; they would find vessels ready to carry them to Barbary and would be fed on the voyage. During the three days all must remain at home awaiting the orders of the commissioners and, after that, any one absent from his domicile could be robbed by the first comer and carried to a magistrate or be slain if offering resistance. As the king gave to the lords all real and personal property not [395] carried off, any firing of houses or harvests or hiding of portable things would be punished by putting to death all the inhabitants of the place. In order to preserve the houses, the sugar mills, the rice crop and the irrigating canals, six per cent, of the Moriscos were allowed to remain. The same permission was given to those who, for two years, had lived among Christians without attending the meetings of the aljamas, as well as those admitted to communion by their priests. Children under four years of age desiring to stay could do so, with consent of parents or guardians. Children under six, whose fathers were Old Christians, were to stay, together with their Morisco mothers: if the father was a Morisco and the mother an Old Christian, he was to go and children under six were to stay with their mother. Sheltering fugitives was forbidden, under pain of six years of galleys, and all soldiers and Old Christians were strictly forbidden to insult or injure Moriscos by word or deed. As an evidence of good faith, after every instalment had been carried to Barbary, ten were allowed to return and report to their fellows what their treatment had been. ⁽²⁰²⁾
 
The publication was followed by days of anxious suspense. The people, we are told, rejoiced, for they hated both the Moriscos and the nobles, and there were symptoms of a rising against the latter. The lords grieved over the ruin of their lands and the religious communities over the loss of their enormous investments in censos. The Moriscos at first were inclined to resist and, after vainly offering large sums to the viceroy, they sought to arm themselves by forging ploughshares and reaping-hooks into pikes, which with slings were their only weapons. ⁽²⁰³⁾ Then suddenly their purpose changed. They were awed by the large bodies of disciplined troops and by the cavalry on the border. A meeting was held of their alfaquíes and leaders, in which it was agreed that resistance was hopeless and that, in case of defeat, their children would be brought up as Christians, while prophecies were talked of which promised an unexpected blessing. Consequently it was resolved that all should go, including the six per cent, allowed to remain, and that any one who stayed should be regarded as an apostate. This had such an effect that those who had been offering large sums to be included in the six per cent, now refused to stay, although asked to name their own terms. The Duke of [396] Gandía, who had an enormous sugar crop and who could get no other skilled labor to work his mills, vainly offered whatever they might ask. The only condition they would accept was the free exercise of their religion; the Duke applied to the viceroy, but Ribera declared it to be a concession beyond the power of king or pope to grant, for they were baptized. ⁽²⁰⁴⁾
 
The nobles, for the most part, loyally accepted the situation and aided in the execution of the decree. The Duke of Gandía who, next to the Duke of Segorbe, had the largest number of vassals, wrote to. the king, October 9th, that on September 28th the Marquis of Santa Cruz had embarked for him five thousand of them, whom he desired to be the first, in order to quiet the apprehensions of the rest as to the safety of the voyage. To protect and reassure their vassals, a number of the nobles--the Duke of Gandía, the Marquis of Albaida and others--accompanied them and saw them safely on shipboard, and the Duke of Maqueda even sailed with them to Oran, the point of debarkation. ⁽²⁰⁵⁾ All, however, were not thus self-sacrificing. Bishop Balaguer of Orihuela reported, October 31st, that some were retaining their vassals by threats or by force, and that, unless energetic commissioners were sent, many would be kept. ⁽²⁰⁶⁾
 
The Moriscos objected to abandoning their personal effects to their lords and sought to convert what they possessed into money. Gandía and some others permitted this, but many insisted on their rights and, on October 1st, the viceroy issued a proclamation forbidding all sales, but this led to imminent danger of rebellion and was wisely abandoned. The land became a universal fair in which stock, produce and household gear were sold at a fraction of their value, and finally were given away. The Grao or port of Valencia, while the exiles were awaiting fair winds, became a bazaar, in which exquisite Moorish garments, rare embroideries, rich gold and silver laces and the like were bought for a song. ⁽²⁰⁷⁾
 
As soon as the first shock was over, of abandoning home and possessions, the prospect of reaching a land, where they could openly [397] profess their faith and escape paralyzing oppression, stimulated them to intense eagerness to leave Spain. They contended for places in the first embarkation, and the commissioners had no trouble in assembling and leading them to the designated ports. Troops escorted them to protect them from the savage greed of the Old Christians, who gathered in bands, robbing and often murdering those whom they encountered. Royal edicts commanding swift justice were issued, gallows were erected along the roadsides and executions were numerous, but it was impossible to prevent outrages. In spite of this the Moriscos pressed forward to the shores. At Alicante they came with music and song, thanking Allah for the happiness of returning to the land of their fathers, which suggests how simple a solution of the question it would have been to permit the emigration of the discontented. Many, indeed, distrusting the royal faith, preferred to charter ships and pay for transportation, which was encouraged by providing elaborate regulations to ensure, as far as possible, their safe passage and fair treatment. All the Spanish ports were ordered to send their ships to the Valencia coast, even discharging those which were loaded, and all arrivals were pressed into service. Seeing this eagerness, the promise of free passage was broken after the first embarkation, and the royal galleys charged the same fare as the private vessels--seventy-five reales per head for all over sixteen and thirty-five for those younger. In all there were three embarkations, occupying about three months and including, according to lists kept at the ports, over a hundred and fifty thousand souls. ⁽²⁰⁸⁾
 
This eagerness to go was, however, not universal. There were many who, not unreasonably, felt little confidence in the royal faith and preferred the chances of resistance. Gathering into bands they sought refuge in two easily defensible positions, one on a peak in the Val del Aguar, where their numbers were reckoned at from fifteen to twenty-five thousand, and the other in the Muela de Córtes, where there were said to be nine thousand. Mexia paid no attention to them, until the business of embarkation [398] was nearly concluded, when they were readily reduced. In the Val del Aguar it was a massacre of the weaponless wretches, rather than a battle; three thousand Moriscos were slain and only one Spaniard, Bautista Crespo, who was killed by his own firelock. The survivors, starved, frozen and dying with thirst, surrendered at discretion, November 28th, and were conducted to the port of embarkation, but many perished of exhaustion on the road and many women and children were stolen by the soldiers and sold as slaves, while of those who embarked but few reached Africa. At the Muela de Córtes they surrendered on promise of safety to life and property, provided they embarked within three days, but the soldiery, disappointed at the loss of expected booty, fell upon them. Only three thousand were brought to the sea-ports, and more than two thousand scattered among the mountains, where for a year or two they gave much trouble. They had elected as king Vicente Turixi, who was tracked to a cave and brought to Valencia, where he was put to a cruel death, December 18th. He died as a good Christian and made a most edifying end, for we are told that he had been a most liberal almsgiver and was devoted to the Virgin and to the religious Orders. ⁽²⁰⁹⁾ This ended the only open resistance to the expulsion throughout Spain.
 
The unexpected ease of the affair in Valencia, regarded as the most dangerous district, quickened the preparations for the other kingdoms. Thus far it had been represented as confined exclusively to Valencia, but the rest felt that their turn was to come, and remonstrances were showered upon the government, which met them with equivocating denials and assurances. The mask was gradually thrown off. Towards the end of October the Marquis of San German was sent to Seville to prepare for the expulsion from Murcia, Granada and Andalusia. Murcia succeeded in obtaining a suspension of the decree, which was published for the other provinces on January 12, 1610, after the galleys and troops had been brought from Valencia. It gave the exiles thirty days--subsequently reduced to twenty--after which they were threatened with death and confiscation without trial or sentence. Their lands were confiscated to the king, for the service of God and the public, but they were allowed to sell movable property and carry away the proceeds in merchandise bought of Spanish subjects, but were forbidden to take bills of exchange, jewels, bullion [399] or money, beyond what was needed for transportation. They could take their children with them, provided they went to Christian lands, which led many to charter vessels, ostensibly for France, but in reality for Africa. In spite of the reports of the cruelties perpetrated in Algiers on the Valencia exiles, they are said to have gone with cheerfulness, and many of them sought Morocco. By April, Andalusia was reported clear of Moriscos and that a few remained on the coast of Granada, waiting for vessels. The whole number was estimated at from eighty to a hundred thousand, besides twenty thousand who had voluntarily gone in advance. They were reported to have carried much wealth with them, which is not improbable, as many, especially those of Seville, were rich and prosperous and held positions of honor. A significant incident was the desire of Córdova to retain six per cent, of them and, when this was refused, it petitioned for the retention of two Morisco saddlers, for the encouragement of horsemanship, especially as they were old and childless. Apparently there were no Spaniards capable of making harness. ⁽²¹⁰⁾
 
Yet, at first, there were some exceptions made. It had been represented to the king that there were many descendants of Mudéjares, voluntarily converted prior to the enforced baptism, who were Spaniards in dress, language and religion, including many beatas and persons vowed to chastity. Accordingly an order was issued, February 7, 1610, to the bishops to examine all such cases and report to San German those whom they found worthy to be retained. This, however, amounted only to a brief reprieve. Their cases were referred to the Royal Council and those who did not, within the impossibly brief term of thirty or sixty days, obtain favorable decisions were hunted like wild beasts and forcibly carried off. ⁽²¹¹⁾
 
Expulsion from Castile had been resolved upon by the Council of State, September 15, 1609, but was deferred to await the result in Valencia. In preparation, an attempt was made in October to organize the militia, by enrolling one in five of the able-bodied men--a measure twice attempted in vain by Philip II--but it [400] met with resistance which forced its abandonment, for there was no military ardor in Spain, even for local service. Then an enumeration of the Moriscos was ordered which, in conjunction with events in Valencia, aroused much excitement. Appeals to the court were unanswered, while orders to the magistrates intended to quiet alarm, only increased it. Many commenced to sell their lands, and this diminution of prospective confiscations was met, towards the end of October, by prohibiting sales, but they were continued under various devices. ⁽²¹²⁾
 
On November 3d, the Count of Salazar was appointed to superintend the expulsion from Old and New Castile, La Mancha and Extremadura. From their anxiety to sell their lands he assumed that they mostly would go voluntarily, and he suggested the granting of permission to emigrate. This was adopted, and a royal cédula of December 28th allowed them to leave Spain within thirty days, under the same conditions as those of Andalusia. Such multitudes arranged to pass through Biscay into France that the term was extended for thirty days and, on January 19, 1610, Salazar was sent to Burgos to register them and issue certificates. Under this arrangement 16,713 persons, of 3,972 families were registered up to May 1st, when intimations that further admissions to France would be refused, turned the stream to Cartagena, where 10,642 embarked, nominally for Christian lands, in order to retain their children. ⁽²¹³⁾
 
The prohibition to carry money or jewels was naturally evaded as far as possible and, for infractions of it, more than thirty were hanged at Burgos. There were also at hand obliging Portuguese brokers, who undertook the transmission of the forbidden valuables and who were detected and prosecuted. A safer conduit was found through the French ambassador at Madrid, who received very large sums, to be repaid in various French cities. His steward was despatched with the documents, but the Spanish authorities were on the alert; he was arrested at Buitrago and brought back to Madrid, whereupon the ambassador threatened that, if the letters were opened, thereafter no Spanish courier should pass through France without seizure of his papers. After an angry [401] correspondence, the Spaniards yielded, and the steward was allowed to resume his journey. ⁽²¹⁴⁾
 
Aragon and Catalonia were next taken in hand. There had been much disquiet there, which the glozing assurances from the court failed to allay. The Old Christians began to maltreat the Moriscos, who ceased their labors and commenced to sell their movables, while their creditors and holders of censos became alarmed and proceeded to collect their claims with rigor. Envoys were sent to the king from Aragon with an elaborate memorial detailing the enormous damage to result from expulsion, and the impolicy of reducing the diminishing population of Spain. Philip made fruitless efforts to prevent the mission from coming, and when it came it was put off with reassuring generalities. ⁽²¹⁵⁾
 
The edicts for Aragon and Catalonia were the same as that for Valencia, except in two points. The Catalan one retained children under seven years of age, whose parents were going to infidel lands, which led them to make their way through France to Barbary. The other exception, induced by the expense of the Valencia expulsion, the cost of which had been swelled to eight hundred thousand ducats, threw upon the exiles all the charges, not only of the journeys and voyage, but the wages of the superintending officials and half a real per head as export duty on what they carried with them, all of which amounted to twenty-four reales at the Alfaques de Tortosa. The rich were required to pay for the poor, and the commissioners were unmerciful in their exactions, making them pay for the water in the brooks and the shade of the trees in their long summer journeys, besides exacting from them as wages much more than was due. ⁽²¹⁶⁾
 
The edicts were published simultaneously, in Saragossa and Barcelona, on May 29, 1610. No resistance was attempted, but there went up a cry of despair which moved even their persecutors to compassion; they protested that they were Christians and would die as such, even though torn to pieces, but it was too late for [402] this, and they were led submissively in bands of from one to four thousand souls, without guards, although they suffered severely from the brigandage of the Old Christians. This apathy of despair was most fortunate for Spain, as resistance would have been overcome with difficulty. The troops, debarked at the Alfaques de Tortosa, had not been paid since they left Italy; after vainly clamoring for their money, they disbanded, leaving none but the officers, who were fain to gather together such raw recruits as they could find. From Aragon the number of exiles was estimated at seventy-five thousand and from Catalonia at fifty thousand. ⁽²¹⁷⁾
 
France was inundated by the emigration. Henry IV had anticipated it and, in February, had issued an ordonnance permitting those who would profess the Catholic faith to settle in the lands beyond the Garonne and Dordogne, while shipping should be provided for those desiring to sail for Barbary. ⁽²¹⁸⁾ Under this the immigration from Castile had been taken care of, but his assassination in May threw everything into confusion, and there was no preparation for the twenty or twenty-five thousand from Aragon, who passed through Navarre, or sought to make their way over the mountains. La Force, after some delay, arranged to admit them in bands of a thousand each, so as not to oppress the population of the sterile district through which they had to pass, and thus they struggled on towards Marseilles and other ports where they hoped to find shipping. ⁽²¹⁹⁾
 
There was one body, of some fourteen thousand souls, that was refused admission to France, after they had reached Canfranc, the last Spanish town on the mountain road over the Pyrenees. They had paid forty thousand ducats for permission to go to France, besides the export duties on what they carried, and the expense of the commissioners in charge of them. Forced to turn back on the long road to the Alfaques, so many of them sickened and died in the summer heat that it was feared that they would bring pestilence to the ships. ⁽²²⁰⁾ In short the story of the exodus from Aragon is one of heartless greed and reckless inhumanity.
 
The dangers which had weighed so heavily on Spanish statesmanship [403] were thus removed, but fanaticism and race hatred were not yet satisfied, and it was resolved to root out all traces of the old Moorish population. An edict of July 10, 1610, banished all Moriscos of Granada, Valencia and Aragon, who were settled in the Castilian kingdoms, and this was followed, August 2d, by a similar provision for the kingdoms of Aragon. These edicts exempted those who had lived as good Christians, but this was a point difficult to establish, and the claims under it were multitudinous and embarrassing. To save the trouble of deciding them an end was put to the matter by banishing all who had thus far been exempted, including even the Moriscos antiguos, descendants of the old Mudéjares. This was effected by orders of March 22d and May 3, 1611, to the corregidores, stating that it was for the service of God and the kingdom that the matter be perfected, wherefore all who had previously been exempted and all who, after expulsion, had returned, were given two months to leave the kingdom, under the irrevocable penalty of death and confiscation, the only exceptions being priests, nuns and the wives of Old Christians with their children. ⁽²²¹⁾
 
This final rooting-out gave infinite trouble. There was often nothing to distinguish these Moriscos from Old Christians, in language, dress or mode of life, and there was no lack of persons to harbor them, whether from compassion or to have the benefit of their services. Commissioners were sent to the different provinces with instructions that no privileges or antiquity should avail them, while the courts were expressly prohibited from interference; it was added, indeed, that those who bore the reputation of Old Christians could appeal to the king, but his representatives soon grew tired of the multitude of perplexing cases thus thrust upon them. The number thus expelled was computed at about six thousand, exclusive of young children, who were given to Old Christians to bring up. The difficulty of effecting this final clearance was increased by the number of exiles who persisted in returning, in spite of an edict of September 12, 1612, which consigned them all to the galleys. The work seemed endless and finally it was confided to the Count of Salazar. In this he labored long and strenuously. At Almagro he found more than eight hundred returned exiles, of whom he consigned some to the galleys, others to the quicksilver mines of Almadén, and the rest he sent [404] abroad at the expense of the magistrates, who had been remiss in detecting and punishing them. His greatest trouble, we are told, lay in deciding the numerous suits of those who claimed that they were not comprised in the edicts and, to cut matters short, on October 26, 1613, he issued, in the name of the king, an edict commanding all Moriscos to leave the kingdom within fifteen days; any person receiving or harboring them was threatened with confiscation and, as he included in this fiefs, castles, vassals and royal grants, it shows that nobles were sheltering them. Finally a reward of ten ducats was offered for information leading to the capture of a Morisco. ⁽²²²⁾ In this insane determination to purify the land of all trace of Moorish blood, and in the confusion of the process, many Catholics as sincere as their persecutors must have been consigned to infidel lands.
 
The time came at last for the Moriscos of Murcia and the Val de Ricote to share the fate of their brethren. Influence had been exercised to procure the suspension of the edict of December 9, 1609, and of a subsequent one of October 8, 1611, but, after the work was completed elsewhere, the Duke of Lerma and the royal confessor, Fray Aliaga, sent investigators who of course reported them to be Christians only in name. Lerma insisted, Philip yielded, and a cédula of October 6,1613, ordered Salazar to enforce the edicts. He was hurried from Madrid, November 20th, with instructions to lose no time and, in January 1614, some fifteen thousand were deported, although many old people and invalids were allowed to remain. Many women married Old Christians in order to obtain exemption, and numerous husbands and wives of honorable birth entered religion, to the great enrichment of the monasteries, for which the bishops and the superiors of the Orders cheerfully granted licence. Early in February, Salazar returned to Madrid with his work accomplished, although some had escaped to Valencia and had returned on being driven out from there. In 1615 Salazar reported that he had sent his assistant Manrique to Murcia to complete the expulsion, but there were still some Moriscos in Tarragona and the Balearic Isles, and he knew of others in Sardinia and the Canaries. ⁽²²³⁾
 
[405] For some years yet the effort was continued to discover and eject those who were concealed among the Old Christians--an effort complicated by the numbers who persisted in returning after experiencing the inhospitable reception accorded to them in Africa. They offered themselves as slaves to those who would receive them, and in this manner many succeeded in remaining. To prevent this, royal orders were repeatedly issued, but they were ineffective, and the Royal Council at length grew tired of reiterating them, so that Bleda, writing in 1618, deplores the fact that he would die without seeing his land purified of this evil seed. Total purification, in fact, was impossible. We are told that, in Valencia, La Mancha, and Granada, there are still communities which in dress, customs and tendencies may be regarded as Moriscos with scarce any trace of Christianity, and Padre Boronat ascribes to this element the growth of modern scepticism and the mingled fanaticism and superstition which afflict certain portions of Spain. ⁽²²⁴⁾
 

However this may be, in so far as the Inquisition was concerned, the expulsion was a success. In such of its records as I have been able to examine, the cosas de Moros virtually disappeared, the exceptions being scarce more than enough to show that vigilance was unrelaxed. For awhile, it is true, there were Morisco slaves to be looked after. A letter of March 14, 1616, from the commissioner at Denia, asks for instructions concerning some baptized Morisco slaves, who had plotted to escape to Barbary, which shows how carefully they were watched. ⁽²²⁵⁾ Then the exiles who chanced to be captured in Moorish corsairs, or who were brought to Spain as slaves, or who were in the royal galleys, were subject to prosecution as apostates because they had been baptized, until, in 1629, the Suprema mercifully decreed that they should not be molested unless they gave occasion for scandal. ⁽²²⁶⁾ The scattering cases of Mahometanism, which figure in the autos de fe subsequent to the expulsion, are mostly of Christian renegades, captured at sea, or of Moorish slaves taken in the perpetual warfare of the Mediterranean, who were baptized under legislation of 1626, repeated in 1638 and 1712. ⁽²²⁷⁾ Occasionally, however, we hear of a Morisco, such as Gerónimo Buenaventura--probably one of the children [406] detained in 1609 or 1610--condemned to relaxation by the tribunal of Valencia, transferred in 1635 to Valladolid and, in 1638 to Saragossa, to be burnt for pertinacity. ⁽²²⁸⁾
 
Yet, in spite of the sleepless vigilance of the Inquisition, there were descendants of the Old Moriscos who managed to preserve an organization for the perpetuation of their faith. In 1727 such a one was discovered in Granada, so numerous that it furnished forty-five reconciled in an auto of May 9,1728, followed by twenty-eight more in that of October 10. They must have been wealthy, for the confiscations proved so profitable that the Inquisition granted to the chief informer and his heirs a perpetual pension of a hundred ducats. ⁽²²⁹⁾ Probably one of these Granadans, escaped to Jaén, was the Ana del Castillo, condemned in the Córdova auto of March 4, 1731, as a herege Mahometana, to reconciliation, confiscation and irremissible prison. ⁽²³⁰⁾ The latest allusions to these persistent Moriscos occurs in a report, in 1769, by the Inquisition to Carlos III, that it had verified the existence, in Cartagena, of a mosque maintained by New Christians. ⁽²³¹⁾ Details are lacking but, if there were prosecutions and convictions, they may safely be assumed to be the last endured by Moriscos. In the complete record of the operations of all the tribunals from 1780 to 1820, there is not a single case of a Morisco and the only Mahometans are renegades. ⁽²³²⁾
 
Contemporary estimates of the number of exiles vary from three hundred thousand to three millions, and the statistics furnished are too fragmentary to admit of accurate computation. ⁽²³³⁾ In modern times Llórente assumes a total of a million, while Janer estimates at the same figure the total Morisco population, of whom a hundred thousand perished or were enslaved, leaving nine hundred [407] thousand exiles. Vicente de la Fuente reduces the number to a hundred and twenty thousand, while Danvila y Collado, after a careful comparison of all official statistics,reaches an estimate of something under five hundred thousand souls, which Padre Boro-nat accepts. ⁽²³⁴⁾ This is probably somewhat under the mark. The nearest approach to a contemporary official statement is that of Sebastiano Gigli, the Lucchese envoy, August 12, 1610, placing the number at six hundred thousand. This he doubtless procured at head-quarters, for he adds that the ministers assured him that it was much greater than they had foreseen. ⁽²³⁵⁾ Considering how large had been the Mudejar population and its notorious fecundity, these figures indicate how many had been Christianized and had merged into the general mass. One cannot help concluding that with time and reasonable treatment, there would have been no Morisco question to perplex the statesmen of Spain.
 
The fate of the exiles parallelled that of the Jews in 1492, and indeed was even worse, for they were banished more precipitately, and were absolutely forbidden to return even as Christians. They were thrust into the new and strange life before them under most unpromising conditions, intensified by the inhumanity of their reception in the homes which they sought. The transit to Africa in the royal ships was doubtless safe enough, but the masters of the vessels chartered by them had no scruple in robbing and murdering them, despite the regulations adopted for their safety. Many who sailed were never accounted for as arriving. It was not that the Spanish authorities were indifferent. Fonseca relates that in Barcelona, on December 12, 1609, he witnessed the execution of the captain and crew of a barque which had sailed with seventy Moriscos. Falling in with a Neapolitan felucca, the united crews conspired to kill the passengers and divide the booty, amounting to three thousand ducats. Under promise of pardon a dissatisfied sailor revealed the crime, when not only were the Spaniards punished but the Viceroy wrote to Naples with details that enabled the authorities there to seize and execute the crew of the felucca. ⁽²³⁶⁾
 
In France, la Force no doubt did what he could to minimize the sufferings of the outcasts, but their hardships were such as to [408] call forth energetic remonstrances from Ambassador Salignac and from Ahmed I himself. Cardinal Richelieu tells us that some of the officials commissioned to superintend their passage were guilty of much thievery and even permitted murder, but they were punished with such severity that the outrages ceased. ⁽²³⁷⁾ France, however, was only a place of transit. Some who passed through sought refuge in Italy, where their reception was not hospitable. In 1610 and 1611 the Holy See refused to allow those arriving at Civita Vecchia to remain but, in 1612, some seventy, who reached Recanati and asked to be allowed to live as Christians, were permitted to settle at a distance from the coast, broken up into small parties and under close surveillance. ⁽²³⁸⁾
 
Barbary, however, was the destination of the vast majority of the exiles, whether direct from Spain or by way of France, and their reception by their fellow religionists was terrible. They were landed at Oran, whence they had to make their way to the Moorish states; they had the reputation of bringing money with them and, after the first embarkation had been safely convoyed by paying heavily for a guard, they were plundered and slain without mercy, and their women were taken from them. Even before the year 1609 was out, the Count of Aguilar, Governor-general of Oran, wrote that, through fear of the Arabs, many were remaining and were starving; twenty of their principal men had come to him, professing to be Christians, for they had not known what to believe until they had seen the abominations of the Moors, and now they desired to remain and die as Christians. In his perplexity, Aguilar threw them into prison and applied for instructions. What were given to him we know not, but there is doubtless truth in the statement of the Comendador de Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes of Oran that, what between disease and the atrocities of the Arabs, two-thirds of the exiles had perished. Indeed, the general estimate was that the proportion was at least three-quarters. ⁽²³⁹⁾
 
These horrors are heightened by the fact that, in the vigorous determination to eradicate every vestige of Islam, and in the cruel haste of the process, many who were really Christians were cast [409] upon the tender mercies of the infidel. Discrimination was difficult and doubt was settled adversely. A typical case is furnished in a petition, November 26, 1609, of Gaspar Galip, a priest and vicar of the general hospital of Valencia, in favor of his two brothers-in-law, Francisco Castillo and Vicente de Alcázar. Galip himself was the son of a Morisco father and Old Christian mother; his sisters were Christians and so were their husbands and children, two in each family, the latter being even ignorant that they had Morisco blood. Yet Ribera was pitiless and both families were deported, doubtless to perish among unbelievers. ⁽²⁴⁰⁾ Escolano tells us that in Tunis some of the Castilians continued to hear mass and to live as Christians, and he prints a letter from a Valencian in Algiers expressing his determination to persevere in the faith. ⁽²⁴¹⁾If remorse were possible to those who believed that they were rendering a service to God, it might have been felt by the prime movers of the expulsion when they learned that in Tetuan, exiled Moriscos, firm in the faith, were lapidated or otherwise put to death, because they resolutely refused to enter the mosques. ⁽²⁴²⁾These were true martyrs, and the Church might well have canonized them, in place of beatifying their persecutor Ribera. ⁽²⁴³⁾
 
Among the arguments advanced in favor of expulsion was that the confiscation of Morisco property would bring permanent relief to the treasury and enable it to discharge the enormous and constantly increasing indebtedness. Undoubtedly the amounts realized from the rapacious seizure of the property of the exiles were large. Already, in October, 1610, the Council of Finance reported that, in Ocana and Madrid, it had mostly been sold, and that two hundred thousand ducats had been paid in. ⁽²⁴⁴⁾ Whatever was the magnitude of the receipts, they were quickly dissipated to the greedy courtiers who profited by Philip's reckless prodigality. Sir Francis Cottingham, the English Ambassador, in letters of March 4th and May 16, 1610, reports that commissioners [410] had been sent to the provinces to sell the houses and farms of the exiles, but the king did not propose to lighten the burdens of the state, for he was dividing the proceeds among his favorites in advance with scandalous liberality. To Lerma were assigned two hundred and fifty thousand ducats, to his son, the Duke of Uceda, a hundred thousand, to his daughter, the Countess of Lemos, fifty thousand and to her husband a hundred thousand. ⁽²⁴⁵⁾We need not be surprised, therefore, to find Philip, in 1611, when appealing to the Córtes for relief, enumerating, among the reasons for his poverty, the expulsion of the Moriscos, in which he had postponed the interest of the treasury to the service of God and of the state. ⁽²⁴⁶⁾
 
Thus, nine hundred years after the overthrow of the Gothic monarchy, Spain purified her land of the invader by a stroke which Cardinal Richelieu qualified as the boldest and most barbarous in human annals. ⁽²⁴⁷⁾ The yearning for unity of faith was gratified, and the anxiety as to attack from without was allayed. That the price paid was heavy is seen in the premature decrepitude which overtook the monarchy during the rest of the century. The causes of decadence were many, but not least among them must be reckoned the fierce intolerance which led to the expatriation of the most economically valuable classes of the population. 

1. The long-drawn tragedy of the Moriscos can only be outlined within the compass of a chapter and I must refer the reader, who desires greater detail, to my "Moriscos of Spain, their Conversion and Expulsion" (Philadelphia 1901). Since that volume was issued Padre Pascual Boronat y Barrachina has published two octavo volumes on the subject--" Los Moriscos españoles y su Expulsion" (Valencia, 1901) in which his industry has accumulated a very copious mass of original documents; of these I have here freely availed myself.

2. Yanguas y Miranda, Diccionario de Antigüedades del Reino de Navarra II, 433 (Pamplona, 1840).

3. Fray Jayme Bleda, Corónica de los Moros, p. 877 (Valencia, 1618).

4. Pulgar, Crónica de los Reyes Católicas, II, lxxvii.--Archivo gén. de la C. de Aragon, Regist. 3684, fol. 96.--Padre Fidel Fita (Boletin, XV, 323-5, 327, 328, 330; XXIII, 431).

5. Fernández y González, p. 421.--Colección de Documentos, VIII, 411.-- Marmol Carvajal, Rebelion y Castigo de los Moriscos de Granada, pp. 146-50 (Biblioteca de Autores españoles, Tom. XXI).

6. Colección de Documentos, XI, 569; XIV, 496.--Janer, Condicion social de los Moriscos, p. 127.

7. Printed in Appendix to the author's " Moriscos," p. 403.

8. Marmol Carvajal, p. 153.--Salazar de Mendoza, Crónica del gran Cardenal de España, p. 251 (Toledo, 1625).

9. Marmol Carvajal, p. 152.--Pedraza, Hist. eccles. de Granada, fol. 174, 186-7.

10. Gomesii de Rebus gestis a Francisco Ximenio, Lib. IV, fol. 65; Lib. V, fol. 128; Lib. VII, fol. 219.

11. The principal authority for all this is Marmol Carvajal (Rebelion y Castigo, pp. 153-6), but there are also accounts by Gomez (De Rebus gestis, Lib. II, fol. 30-33); Zurita (Hist. del Rey Hernando, Lib. III, cap. xliv); Galindez de Carvajal (Coleccion de Docum. XVIII, 296); Bernaldez (Hist. de los Reyes Catholicos, p. 145); Pedraza (Hist. ecles. de Granada, fol. 193, 196).

12. Clemencin, Elogio de la Reina Isabel, pp. 291-3 (Madrid, 1821).--Archivo de Simancas, Patronato Real, Inq., Leg. único, fol. 26.

13. Zurita, Galindez de Carvajal, Marmol Carvajal, Bernaldez, ubi sup.

14. Nueva Recop. Lib. VIII, Tit. ii, ley 8.

15. When, or on what terms, this exemption was granted to the Moriscos of Granada I have been unable to ascertain, but it is referred to repeatedly in subsequent documents as a matter of common knowledge.

16. Boronat, Los Moriscos españoles, I, 113.

17. Nueva Recop., Lib. VIII, Tit. ii, ley 4.--Cf. Fernández y González, p. 219.

18. Galíndez de Carvajal (Col. de Documentos, XVIII, 301-4). Zurita, while quoting Carvajal, disputes this, but admits that the conversion was not voluntary.--Hist. del Rey Hernando, Lib. IV, cap. 54.

19. Col. de Documentos, XXXVI, 447.

20. Bravo, Catálogo de los Obispos de Córdova, I, 411 (Córdova, 1788).

21. Gomesii de Rebus gestis Lib. III, fol. 77.

22. Danvila y Collado, Expulsion, p. 74.

23. Concìl. Hispalens., ann. 1512, Cap. 2 (Aguirre, V, 363).

24. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 3, fol. 72.

25. Mariana, Hist. de España, Ed. 1796, Tom. IX, Append, p. lvi.

26. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 4, fol. 97; Lib. 9, fol. 2, 13,29; Lib. 940 fol. 69, 131, 185.

27. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 939, fol. 89.--Danvila y Collado, p. 98.

28. MSS. of Library of Univ. of Halle, Yc, 20, T. I.--Bibl. nacional, MSS., D, 111, fol. 127; PV, 3, n. 20.--Procesos contra Mari Serrana, Mari Naranja, Mari Gómez la Sazeda (MSS. penes me).

29. Archivo de Simancas, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 205, fol. 3.

30. Bleda, Corónica, p. 905.

31. MSS. penes me.--MSS. of Library of Univ. of Halle, Yc, 20, T. I.

32. MSS. of Library of Univ. of Halle, Yc, 20, T. I.

33. Pedraza, Hist. ecles. de Granada, fol. 236-8.

34. Sandoval, Hist. de Carlos V, Lib. XIV, cap. 18.--Guevara, Epístolas familiares p. 543.

35. Sandoval, ubi sup.--Dormer, Añales de Aragon, Lib. II, cap. vii.--Archivo de Simancas, Lib. 926, fol. 80.

36. Dormer, ubi sup.--Bleda, Corónica, p. 566.--Marmol Carvajal, p. 158.-- Nueva Recop., Lib. VIII, Tit. ii, leyes 13, 15, 17.

37. Dormer, Bleda, Marmol Carvajal, loc. cit.--Relazioni Venete, Serie I, Tom. V, p. 37.

38. Rule, History of the Inquisition, I, 172 (London, 1874).

39. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 926, fol. 80-2, 86-7.--Gachard, Retraite et Mort de Charles-quint, II, 356.

40. Mendoza, Guerra de Granada, p. 71 (Bibl. de Autores españoles, T. XXI).

41. Danvila y Collado, Expulsion, p. 172.

42. Marmol Carvajal, p. 160.--Cabrera, Felipe Segundo, pp. 293, 429 (Madrid, 1619).--Memoria de Mondéjar, pp. 14-16 (Morel-Fatio, L'Espagne au xvi^e et xvii^e Siècle).--Mendoza, p. 71.--Pedraza, fol. 239.

43. Cabrera, p. 393.--Pedraza, fol. 238.

44. Cabrera, pp. 394, 466.--Pedraza, fol. 238-9.

45. Memoria de Mondéjar (Morel-Fatio, p. 17).--Marmol Carvajal, p. 167.-- Cabrera, p. 465.--Pedraza, fol. 239.

46. Marmol Carvajal, pp. 161-2.--Pedraza, fol. 239.

This prohibition of bathing, even by Christians, is a curious illustration of the civilization of the period. It had degenerated since the Fuero of Teruel, granted in 1176, by Alfonso II of Aragon, which prescribed that the public bath should be used by men on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays, by women on Mondays and Wednesdays, and by Jews and Moors on Fridays. On Sundays the bath was closed and no water was heated.--Forum Turolii: Transcripcion de Francisco Aznar y Navarro, p. 142 (Zaragoza, 1905).

47. Marmol Carvajal, pp. 166, 168.--Cabrera, p. 465.--Pedraza, fol. 240.

48. Marmol Carvajal, p. 167.--Pedraza, fol. 241.

49. Relazioni Venete, Serie I, T. V, p. 145.

The Córtes of 1570 petitioned Philip to repeal the prohibition of using arquebuses in the chase, pointing out that the war in Granada had shown the scarcity of the weapon in Spain and the lack of men that could use it. They also referred to the difficulty experienced in arming the levies and suggested that the cities and towns should be permitted to provide armories at their own cost under such restrictions as the king might prescribe. To these petitions the royal replies were equivocal. It is all highly significant of the suspicions entertained by the monarch as to the loyalty of his subjects.--Córtes de Córdova del año de setenta, fol. 6, 12 (Alcalá, 1575).

50. Córtes de Córdova del año de setenta, fol. 13 (Alcalá, 1575).

51. Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux, I, 354 (Paris, 1896).

52. Marmol Carvajal, p. 277.--Mendoza, p. 92.

53. Marmol Carvajal, pp. 341, 364.--Col. de Documentos, XXVIII, 156.

54. Bibl. nacional, MSS., G. 50, fol. 240.

55. Relazioni Venete, Serie I, T. VI, p. 407.

56. Nueva Recop., Lib. VIII, Tit. ii, ley 22.

57. Janer, p. 256.

58. Obras de Cervantes, p. 242 (Ed. Ribadeneyra).

59. Córtes de Madrid del año de setenta y tres, Peticion 96 (Alcalá, 1575).

60.Janer, p. 272.--Boronat, I, 626.

61. Janer, p. 270.--Bleda, Corónica, p. 905.--Nueva Recop., Lib. VIII, Tit. ii, ley 24.

62. Relazioni Venete, Serie I, T. V, p. 451.

63. Ximenez, Vida de Ribera, p. 379.

64. Janer, p. 272.--Boronat, I, 318.--Bleda, Corónica, p. 921.--Guadalajara y Xavierr, Expulsion de los Moriscos, fol. 122-3 (Pamplona, 1613).--Cabrera, Relaciones, p. 355.

65. Sandoval, Lib. XII, § xxviii.

66. Danvila y Collado, pp. 75, 76.--Constitutions y altres Drets de Cathalunya, p. 34 (Barcelona, 1688).

67. Fernández y González, p. 441.--Bleda, Corónica, p. 641; Ejusd. Defensio Fidei, p. 156.

68. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 1.

69. Ibidem, Lib. 926, fol. 76.

70. Ibidem, Lib. 3, fol. 132. 

71. Ibidem, Lib. 3, fol. 245.

72. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 1.--Múñoz, Diario Turolense, ann. 1502 (Boletín, 1895, p. 10).

73. Ibidem, Lib. 14, fol. 80; Lib. 940, fol. 69, 131, 185.

74. This work was subsequently prohibited. Nevertheless Salvatierra, Bishop of Segorbe, in 1587 asked Philip II to permit its reprinting for the benefit of priests laboring among the Moriscos.--Boronat, I, 614.

75. Archivo hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 98.

In the Appendix will be found a table of all the cases of heresy tried by the Valencia tribunal from 1455 to 1592. In the fifteenth century the culprits must have been almost exclusively Judaizers. Then in time Moriscos were mingled with them, but the blanks in the fifth, sixth and seventh decades, during which the Moriscos, as we shall see, were exempted from the Inquisition, show that Judaizers had virtually disappeared, except those punished in 1544, 1545 and 1546, for retraction of confession (See Vol. II, p. 584).

There is also an imperfect table of the cases of relaxation. An examination of these tables will show the varying activity of the Inquisition of the period.

76. Danvila y Collado, La Germanía de Valencia, pp. 146, 471.--Pet. Mart. Angler. Lib. XXXIII, Epp. 659-61.

77. MS. Informacio super Conversione Sarracenorum.--I possess the original document.

78. MS. Informacio.--Danvila y Collado, Germanía, p. 184.

79. MS. Informacio.--Danvila, Germanía, pp. 473, 474.--Archivo hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 299, fol. 400.--Loazes, Tractatus super nova paganorum Regni Valentiae Conversione, col. 12 (Valentiae, 1525)

80. Danvila y Collado, Germanía, p. 489.

81. Guevara, Epistolas familiares, pp, 639-42.

82. Cap. 13 in Sexto, Lib. V, Tit. ii.

83. Hostiensis Aureae Summae Lib. iii, de Baptismo § 11; Lib. v, de Judaeis § 5.-- S. Th. Aquinat. Summae P. III, Q. lxviii, Art, 8 ad 4; Q. lxix, Art. 9 ad 1.--S. Bonaventura in IV Sentt. Dist. IV, P. 1, art. 2, Q. 1.--S. Antoninae Summae P. II, Tit. xii, Cap. 2, § 1.--Summa Sylvestrina s. v. Baptismus IV, § 10

84. Albertus Magnus in IV Sentt., Dist. VI, Art. 10.--Duns Scotus in IV Sentt. Dist. IV, Q. 4, 5.--Summa Angelica s. v. Baptismus VI, §§6, 12.

The facility with which, in this matter, the Church adapted its theories to accomplished facts is well exhibited by Cardinal Toletus (Summae Casuum Conscientiae Lib. n, cap. xxi). After explaining that, in adult baptism, three prerequisites are necessary--intention, faith and sorrow for sins committed--he proceeds "Haec autem non eodem modo sunt necessaria. Intentio namque ita est necessaria ut si desit actualis vel virtualis, non sit baptismus. Unde fit ut qui renuens invitus baptizatur, non sit veré baptizatus; si tamen interius consensit, quamvis metu et vi, tune baptizatus est et recepit characterem, sed non gratiam; cogendusque est ut maneat in fide Christiana." Thus the coerced convert was burdened with the responsibilities of baptism while denied its spiritual benefits.

85. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Sala 40, Lib. 4, fol. 97.

86. Danvila y Collado, Expulsion, p. 88.

87. MS. Informacio.

88. Loazes, Tractatus, col. 1, 17, 45, 60-1, 62.

89. Sandoval, Lib. XIII, § xxviii.--Sayas, Añales de Aragon, cap. cxxvii.-- Danvila y Collado, Expulsion, pp. 90-1.

90. Sandoval, Sayas, loc. cit.--Bleda, Corónica, p. 647.

91. Fonseca, Giusto Scacciamento, p. 11 (Roma, 1611).--Bleda, loc. cit.--Ejusd. Defensio Fidei, p. 123.

92. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 926, fol. 47.--Bulario de la Orden de Santiago, Lib. II, fol. 58.

93. Sandoval, loc. cit.--Sayas, loc. cit. --Danvila y Collado, pp. 92-3.--Boronat, I, 141.

94. Sayas, loc. cit.

95. Llorente, Añales, II, 287.

96. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 927, fol. 285.--Bledae Defensio Fidei, pp. 463-66.

97. Danvila y Collado, pp. 94-8.--Fernández y González, p. 443.--Sayas, cap. cxxvii.

98. Sayas, loc. cit.--Danvila, pp. 97-8.

99. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 927, fol. 285.--Boronat, I, 403.

100. Sayas, cap. cxxvii.--Llorente, Añales, II, 296.--Danvila, p. 99.

Boronat asserts (I, 157) that the greater part of the Valencian Moors embarked at Coruña, while large numbers, from the rest of Spain, went to France by way of Biscay, but he cites no authority and the documents and contemporary writers are silent as to any such exodus, while statistics and the course of events show that, except those who escaped to Barbary, practically the whole Moorish population was retained.

101. Guevara, Epistolas familiares, p. 543.--Archivo de Simancas, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 205, fol. 3.

Bleda (Defensio Fidei, p. 125) says that Guevara exaggerates and that in 1573 there were in Valencia only 19,801 Morisco families.

It is not easy to determine the Morisco population of Valencia. A detailed list of the whole kingdom, dated 1520 (but which Padre Boronat thinks was corrected up to 1550) gives a total of 52,689 hearths of Old Christians and 31,815 of New Christians. In 1582 Ximenez de Reinosso, Valencian Inquisitor, estimated the Morisco population at from 19,000 to 20,000 families. About 1601, Feliciano de Figueroa, Bishop of Segorbe, assumed that there were 460 Morisco settlements, comprising 28,000 hearths and 120,000 souls in all.--Boronat, I, 428-42, 596; II, 431.

102. Sandoval, Lib. XIII, § xxix.--Dormer, Lib. II, cap. viii, ix.--Bleda, Corónica, p. 649.

103. Sayas, cap. cxxx.--Dormer, Lib. II, cap. i.

104. Sandoval, Lib. XIII, § xxviii.--Dormer, loc. cit.

105. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 939, fol. 108.

106. Boronat, I, 423-8.

107. Ibidem, I, 162-5.

108. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 76, fol. 183.

109. Ibidem, fol. 312

110. Archivo de Simancas, Patronato Real, Inq., Leg. único, fol. 38. 39.

111. Col. de Documentos, XVIII, 106-13.--Archivo de Simancas, loc. cit., fol. 37,

112. Archive de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 939, fol. 9; Lib. 922, fol. 15.

113. Ibidem, Inquisicion, Lib, 78, fol. 192; Patronato Real, Inq., Leg. único, fol. 37, 38.--Col. de Documentos, XVIII, 114,116.--Bulario de la Orden de Santiago, Lib. iii, fol. 33.

114. Col. de Documentos, XVIII, 119-24.---Bledae Defensio Fidei, pp. 333-6.--- Archivo hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 2, n. 16, fol, 187,

115. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 922, fol. 15.

116. Danvila y Collado, pp. 183-88.--Cf. Archive hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Cartas del Consejo, Leg. 5, n. 1, fol. 107.

117. Archive de Simancas, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 205, fol. 3.--Danvila y Collado, p. 228.

118. Archive hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 5, n. 2, fol. 14, 15.

119. Archive hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 2, n. 10, fol. 79.--Danvila y Collado, p. 263.

120. Ibidem, Leg. 98, 99,

121. Boronat, I, 540-69.

122. Gachard, Voyages des Souverains des Pays-Bas, I, 208.

123. Sayas, cap. ex.--Dormer, Lib. II, cap. i.

124. Danvila y Collado, p. 116.--Bledae Defensio Fidei, p. 190.

125. Bulario de la Orden de Santiago, Lib. II, fol. 94, 96, 105.

126. Archive de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 77, fol. 227.

127. Col. de Documentos, T. V, p. 81.

128. Ibidem, T. V, pp. 92, 93, 102-7.

129. Danvila y Collado, pp. 167-71.--Boronat, I, 238.--Bledae Defensio Fidei, p. 192.--Aguirre, Concil. Hispan. V, 415, 419, 432.

130. Boronat, II, 45-6, 69-71, 169, 435, 438, 478, 683.

131. Ibidem, II, 436, 440-3.

132. Danvila y Collado, pp. 126, 129, 181, 183, 194.--Boronat, I, 443-69, 569.

133. Archive de Simancas, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 205, fol. 3.

134. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 926, fol. 57, 80--Bulario de la Orden de Santiago, Lib. II, fol. 79.

135. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 926, fol. 49, 53, 59, 63, 67.--Bulario, Lib. III, fol. 51, 85, 88, 109; Lib. IV, fol. 24, 103.--Archivo de Alcalá, Hacienda, Leg. 1049.--Boronat, I, 495.

136. Boronat, II, 439.

137. Bulario de la Orden de Santiago, Lib, iv, fol. 128.--Archive de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 926, fol. 71.

138. Boronat, I, 669; II, 8.--Escolano, Decada primera de la Historia de Valencia, II, 1783-97 (Valencia, 1610-11).

139. Archive hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 5, fol. 185,186, 220, 295, 297-99.

140. Danvila y Collado, p. 130.

141. Bulario de la Orden de Santiago, Lib. III, fol. 33.

142. Col. de Documentos, T. V, p. 104.

143. Ibidem, pp. 100,101,107,108,122.

144. Archive de Simancas, Sala 40, Lib. IV, fol. 262.

145. Danvila y Collado, pp. 164, 167.--Archivo hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 98.

146. Discorso de la Vida de D. Martin de Ayala (Revista crítica de Historia y Literatura, 1902, p. 375),

147. Dormer, Lib. II, cap. i.--Danvila y Collado, pp. 101, 105.

148. The zofres or zofras were imposts or excise paid by the Mudéjares in addition to the division of crops. It remained a grievance to the last.--Ximenez, Vida de Ribera, pp. 362, 444.

149. Bulario de la Orden de Santiago, Lib. I de copias, fol. 118.

150. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 77, fol. 227.

151. Boronat, I, 531; II, 147.

152. Bleda, Corónica, p. 1030; Defensio Fidei, pp. 47, 51.--Fonseca, Giusto Scacciamento, p. 65.

153. Danvila y Collado, pp, 128, 133, 211.--Boletin, Abril 1887, p. 288.--Boronat, I, 469.

154. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Sala 40, Lib. IV, fol. 263.--Bibl. nacional, MSS., PV, 3, n. 20.

155. Danvila y Collado, p. 127.--Col. de Documentos, V, 88, 102, 123.--Janer, Condicion social de los Moriscos, p. 342.--Boronat, I, 233.--Danvila, in Boletin, Abril, 1877, pp. 276-306.

156. Guadalajara y Xavierr, Expulsion de los Moriscos, fol. 62.--Archive de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 13, fol. 372.--Relazioni Venete, Serie I, T. VI, p. 407.

157. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 940, fol. 296.--Guadalajara y Xavierr, fol 64--Lanuza, Historias de Aragon, II, 417 (Zaragoza, 1622).

158. Bledae Defensio Fidei, p. 372.--Fonseca, p, 377.

159. Navarrete, Conservation de Monarquías, pp. 51-3 (Madrid, 1626).

160. Bleda, Corónica, pp. 951-2.

161. Fonseca, p. 72.--Cf. Bleda, op. cit., p. 905.

162. C. Trident. Sess. XXIV, de Reform. Matrim. C. 1.

163. Danvila y Collado, p. 169.--Aguirre, Concil. Hispan. V, 418.

164. Bulario de la Orden de Santiago, Lib. IV, fol. 101, 102.--Boronat, I, 661.

165. Nueva Recop., Lib. VIII, Tit. ii, ley 13, cap. ix.

166. Boronat, I, 589.--Bledae Defensio Fidei, pp. 57, 42a1.--Dnvila, p. 230.

167. Boronat, I, 208-12.--Escolano, II, 1746-68, 1798-1810.--Persiles y Sigismunda, Lib. II, cap. xi.

168. Danvila y Collado, pp. 161, 182, 205, 207.

169. Boronat, I, 207.--Constitutions en la Cort de Barcelona en lany 1520; en lany 1547 (Barcelona, 1520, 1548).

170. Pet. Mart. Angler. Epist. 499,--Mariana, Hist. de España, IX, 217 (Ed. 1796).

171. Danvila y Collado, pp. 109-12, 118, 129, 132, 210.--Nueva Recop., Lib. VIII, Tit. ii, ley 20.--Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 940, fol. 69, 184.--Boronat, I, 471, 499.

172. Fonseca, pp. 341, 343.

173. Guadalajara y Xavierr, fol. 160-3

174. Pet. Mart. Angler., Epist. 499.

175. Escolano, II, 1448.

176. Boronat, I, 179.

177. Danvila y Collado, p. 158.

178. Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux, I, 8, 13.

179. Archivo hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 30.

180. Relazioni Venete, Serie I, T. VI, pp. 165, 241.

181. Bledae Defensio Fidei, pp. 272, 276, 285.

182. Archivo hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Cartas del Consejo, Leg. 5, fol. 192.

183. Mémoires du Duc de la Force, I, 217-20, 339-45 (Paris, 1843).--Escolano, II, 1811-18.

184. Janer, p. 274.

185. Mémoires de la Force, I, 217, 221-2.

186. Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron, Baron de Salignac, II, 353 (Paris, 1889).

187. Danvila y Collado, pp. 250-4

188. Bleda, Corónica, p. 928; Defensio Fidei, pp. 13-14, 502.

189. Boronat, I, 291-4, 596, 603-4.--Danvila y Collado, pp. 196-200.

The memorial, in a somewhat more elaborate form, was presented to the conference of bishops in Valencia, November 22, 1608, when Ribera pronounced it to be a hallucination, founded on ignorance--Boronat, II, 132, 493 sqq.

190. Boronat, I, 610-34.

191. Danvila y Collado, p. 227.

192. Boronat, II, 64.

193. Boronat, I, 366.

194. Ibidem, II, 75, 98-111.

195. Boronat, II, 464-74.

196. Ximenez, Vida de Juan de Ribera, p. 381.

197. Janer, p. 299.

198. Danvila y Collado, pp. 274-86.--Boronat, II, 506.--Janer, pp. 282-91.

199. Ximenez, p. 397.--Boronat, II, 501.

200. Boronat, II, 501, 167.--Bleda, Corónica, p. 988.

201. Guadalajara y Xavierr, fol. 109.--Fonseca, pp. 148-58.

202. Janer, p. 299.

203. Fonseca, pp. 165, 198.

204. Fonseca, pp. 199 sqq.--Archivo de Simancas, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 205, fol. 2.--Bleda, Corónica, p. 1000.

205. Danvila y Collado, p. 301,--Fonseca, p. 219.

206. Boronat, II, 240.

207. Fonseca, pp. 202 sqq., 219.--Janer, p. 203.--Bleda, Corónica, p. 1004.-- Boronat, II, 210.

208. Fonseca, pp, 212-22,--Escolano, II, 1988.--Bleda, Corónica, pp. 999, 1001-3, 1005-7, 1020.--Boronat, II, 234.

A report, apparently drawn up by the Valencia tribunal, puts the number at the more moderate figure of 100,656, viz., at Valencia, 17,766; at Alicante, 32,000; at Denia, 30,000; at Vinaros, 15,200; and at Moncofar, 5,690,--Archivo de Simancas, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 205, fol. 2.

209. Fonseca, pp. 234-49.--Bleda, Corónica, pp. 1009-20.--Escolano, II, 1972.

210. Cabrera, Relaciones, pp. 386, 390, 396, 402.--Nueva Recop., Lib. VIII, Tit. ii, ley 25.--Bleda, Corónica, pp. 1038-42.--Janer, pp. 295, 296.--Cf. Bravo, Catálogo de los Obispos de Córdova, p. 582.

211. Guadalajara, fol. 144.--Aguilar y Caro, Memorial Ostipense, I, 164-66. (Estepa, 1886).

212. Danvila y Collado, p. 292.--Cabrera, Relaciones, pp. 386, 389, 390.--Bleda, Corónica, pp. 1036-7.

213. Danvila y Collado, p. 310.--Boronat, II, 288-91.--Bleda, Corónica, p. 1051. --Cabrera, Relaciones, pp. 393, 396.

214. Tapía, Historia de la Civilizacion española, III, 272.--Cabrera, Relaciones, p. 402.--Bofarull y Broca, Historia de Cataluña, VII, 292 (Barcelona, 1878).-- Watson's Philip III, Appendix B.

215. Lanuza, II, 49.--Bleda, Corónica, p. 1045.--Danvila y Collado, p. 311.-- Guadalajara y Xavierr, fol. 124-8.

216. Janer, p. 280.--Boronat, II, 298, 301, 596.--Bledae Defensio Fidei, pp. 602-6, 612-18.--Watson's Philip III, Appendix B.--Guadalajara y Xavierr, fol. 135-41.

217. Bleda, Corónica, pp. 1046-50.--Guadalajara y Xavierr, fol. 142.--Janer, p. 90.--Lanuza, II, 249.

218. Mémoires de Richelieu, I, 88 (Paris, 1823).

219. Mémoires de la Force, II, 8-12, 288-311.

220. Cabrera, Relaciones, pp. 410, 413, 415, 418.

221. Janer, pp. 344, 345, 350.--Boronat, II, 293-4.--Bleda Corónica, pp. 1051-2; Defensio Fidei, pp. 524-5, 607-12.--Cabrera, Relaciones, p. 415.

222. Cabrera, Relaciones, pp. 434, 437, 440, 522.--Bleda, Corónica, pp. 1044, 1057-8, 1060.--Janer, pp. 351, 355, 356, 357, 360--Danvila y Collado, pp. 212, 213.

223. Bleda, Corónica, pp. 1058-60.--Janer, pp. 361-66.--Cabrera, Relaciones, pp. 531, 546.--Danvila y Collado, pp. 314, 317.--Boronat, II, 285-7, 593.

224. Bleda, Corónica, pp. 1021-3.--V. de la Fuente, Hist. eccles. de España, III, 228.--Boronat, I, 197; II, 307.

225. Archivo hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 372.

226. MSS. of Royal Library of Copenhagen, 218^b, p. 224.

227. Autos acordados, Lib. VIII, Tit. ii, Autos 4, 6.

228. Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Lib. 552, fol. 22, 23.

229. E. N. Adler, in Jewish Quarterly Review, XIII, 417.--Archivo de Simancas, Inq., Leg. 1479, fol. 2.

In Mr. Adler's paper, by a printer's error, the auto of Oct. 10th is attributed to Córdova May 15th.

230. Matute y Luquin, p. 268.

231. Danvila y Collado, p. 318.

232. Archivo hist. nacional, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 100.

233. Guadalajara y Xavierr, Expulsión, fol. 163; Historia Pontifical, V, 161.-- Escolano, II, 1990.--Navarrete, Conservación de Monarquías, p. 50.--Dávila, Vida y Hechos del Rey Felipe III, p. 151.--Von der Hammer y León, Felipe el Prudente, fol. 33.--Alfonsi Sanctii de Rebus Hispan. Anacephaleosis, p. 390.

234. Llorente, Hist. crít., cap. XII, art. 1, n. 20.--Janer, p. 143.--V. de la Fuente III, 229.--Danvila y Collado, pp. 337-40.--Boronat, II, 307.

235. Pellegrini, Relazioni di Ambasciatori Lucchesi, p. 32 (Lucca, 1903).

236. Fonseca, pp. 222-6.

237. Ambassade de Salignac, II, 389, 434.--Mémoires de Richelieu, I, 89.

238. Decret. Sac. Congr. S. Officii, p. 435 (Bibl. del R. Archivio di Stato in Roma, Fondo Camerale, Congr. del S. Officio, Vol. 3).

239. Cabrera, Relaciones, pp. 391, 396.--Archivo de Simancas, Inq. de Valencia, Leg. 205, fol. 2.--Juan Ripol, Diálogo de Consuelo, fol. 20 (Pamplona, 1613)-- Bleda, Corónica, p. 1021.--Escolano, II, 1988.

240. Boronat, II, 243-5.

241. Escolano, II, 1992.

242. Cabrera, Relaciones, p. 404.

243. Escolano (II, 2001) attributes the slow fever which ended Ribera's life, in January 1611, to the execration aroused by the misery of the kingdom resulting from the expulsion, for which he was held responsible, and to the vexations endured in his unsparing endeavors to root out the remnants,

244. Janer, p. 343.

245. Watson's Philip III, Appendix B.

246. Cabrera, Relaciones, p. 458.

247. Mémoires de Richelieu, I, 86.