[87] The figure remembered in Catalan history as the Great Seneschal was not a Montcada by birth, but the husband of Beatriu de Montcada.⁽¹⁾ His ancestry was overshadowed by that of his wife, from whom his descendants took their name, and his exploits increased the fame of the Montcada lineage. Guillem Ramon was lord of Montcada for more than sixty years, and in this role he led a life worthy of a twelfth-century baron -- a life marked by both armed resistance to the count of Barcelona and loyal and devoted service to the same count, by military contributions to the conquest of new Catalonia, and by a sensational divorce.

The career of Guillem Ramon Seneschal coincided with a period of increasing Catalonian power and influence. Under Counts Ramon Berenguer III and IV, Catalan forces regained the initiative against the Muslims. As a result, the role of the counts as political leaders of Catalonia grew stronger. In 1137 Ramon Berenguer IV obtained the Aragonese succession and the right to marry the heiress Peronella, which made Catalonia a new political entity and a significant power in the western Mediterranean, equal to the other Christian states of Spain. Guillem Ramon was an active participant in these developments, first as an obstacle to the exercise of comital supremacy, later as a leading member of the count's retinue. Once the issue of feudal obligation had been forced and then resolved, Guillem Ramon Seneschal contributed to the historic advances of Catalonian influence that characterized his era. [88]

The discord that caused a momentary deterioration in relations between Guillem Ramon [II] Seneschal and Ramon Berenguer IV in the mid-1130s arose from tensions that had originated as far back as the second half of Ramon Berenguer III's countship. At that time, Guillem Ramon had only recently assumed control of both the Montcada patrimony and the extensive fiefs granted to his father, Guillem Ramon [I] Seneschal, by counts of Barcelona and bishops of Vic (see Map 2). Guillem Ramon was also heir to a tradition of service as seneschal to the counts of Barcelona. But could the count ever fully rely upon a baron whose lordship was subject in name alone to comital control? Would Guillem Ramon find the promotion of his own interests compatible with the office of seneschal? There are indications that Guillem Ramon's loyalties were divided, and that his participation in the count's affairs was balanced by an aggressive exercise of his territorial lordship.

Upon his father's death in 1120, Guillem Ramon [II] did not assume a central role in the entourage of Count Ramon Berenguer III. He was at once a newcomer and a relatively important territorial lord in a comital retinue composed of more seasoned -- and less prominent -- vassals. Nor was he the only baron in the count's entourage with the title of seneschal: since 1112 another figure, Berenguer Bernat, a modest vassal of uncertain origins and few, if any castle lordships, had also held this title.⁽²⁾ For nearly a decade Guillem Ramon appeared only occasionally in comital acts, and even then he was not always given a prominent place in the order of subscribers.⁽³⁾

No evidence from this period suggests that Guillem Ramon was estranged from the count, however. In 1125 he was among the "nobiles of the court of Barcelona" who heard a case brought before Count Ramon Berenguer and his wife Dolça in the palace [90] of Barcelona.⁽⁴⁾ And one year later Ramon Berenguer strengthened his ties to Guillem Ramon by confirming his guardianship of the heir to the viscounty of Bas.

In making this grant of baiulia for the next fifteen years, the count was not only fulfilling the wishes of the late Viscount Udalard, who had willed that his son Pere and his inheritance be confided to "almighty God, his men [Pere's vassals], and his uncle Guillem Ramon Seneschal."⁽⁵⁾ More significant than that, the count's action modified the legal status of wardship by basing it not on testamentary dispositions but on comital prerogative. A payment by Guillem Ramon of 10,000 sols, a church at Boada, and rights at Osor, made the seneschal's dependency on comital approval clear. Moreover, the count's charter stipulated that the seneschal, as the count's faithful vassal, should grant him power over the castles and other elements of Pere's honor whenever he wished. The pact concluded with an oath of fidelity by Guillem Ramon to the count and his son.⁽⁶⁾ The convention thus continued a process begun by Ramon Berenguer I of subjecting the territorial lordships held by magnates to the rule of fiefs.

Guillem Ramon Seneschal's honor in Girona and his control over castles belonging to the viscounty of Bas may soon have acquired strategic importance for Ramon Berenguer III. In 1128 the count responded with force to the aggressions of Count Ponç Hug of Empúries.⁽⁷⁾ Comital forces moved into the heart of the Empordà and captured the rebellious count at his castle of Quermançó. Whether the seneschal joined Count Ramon Berenguer's men is not known because the documentation mentions mostly participants on the side of Ponç Hug. But an exchange of property in 1129 brought to Guillem Ramon compensation for two knight's fees in the county of Girona and 100 morabetins that Guillem Ramon had given the count, perhaps during the campaign.⁽⁸⁾ Nonetheless, Guillem Ramon's appearances in comital documents declined in the last years of Ramon Berenguer III's countship. He was attested only in July 1131 at a donation of land in Roussillon to Ramon Berenguer's daughter Mahalta and as testamentary executor in the [91] count's will.⁽⁹⁾ This turn of events may have foreshadowed the discord that occurred later.

At first glance, the primary cause of the blow up between Ramon Berenguer IV and his seneschal in 1136 appears to have been the Count's interference with the marriage of Guillem Ramon and Beatriu de Montcada. This marriage became a focus of Barcelona court politics in 1135, when Ramon Berenguer promoted Beatriu's abandonment of Guillem Ramon Seneschal for the count's vassal, Guillem de Sant Martí. Ignoring the provisions of the wedding contract drawn up between Berenguer Ramon de Montcada and the seneschal, Ramon Berenguer promised Beatriu in marriage to Guillem de Sant Martí, and with her the honor of Montcada, just as Guillem Ramon Seneschal had held it.⁽¹⁰⁾ Guillem Ramon retaliated against the count by disrupting the supply of water to Barcelona -- an act of defiance that capped a series of deeds displeasing to the count.⁽¹¹⁾

Guillem Ramon's open resistance to Ramon Berenguer ended by 7 July 1136 when the parties concerned subscribed negotiated settlements. Key elements in the agreements were a decision for divorce obtained in the court of the archbishop of Tarragona,⁽¹²⁾ a division of property mediated by friends of both spouses,⁽¹³⁾ and a redefinition of the relationship of Guillem Ramon and Ramon Berenguer. Central to their agreement was Guillem Ramon's acceptance [92] of the castles of his patrimony as comital fiefs. The seneschal agreed to hold these in "service and fidelity" to the count and to be the count's faithful liege vassal.⁽¹⁴⁾

Although the dispute of 1136 may have been touched off by the count's meddling with the seneschal's marriage, the underlying cause of the quarrel was probably Ramon Berenguer IV's desire to bring to submission a baron whom he perceived as far too powerful. Thus, when Guillem Ramon defied the count for intruding into his personal affairs, Ramon Berenguer responded by indicting the seneschal for excessive use of force and for infringement of comital prerogatives. The water supply incident was the most prominent breach of comital right.⁽¹⁵⁾ Just as important were matters dating back to the last years of the countship of Ramon Berenguer III. To repair these, Ramon Berenguer IV demanded that Guillem Ramon return property alienated by the count's father, submit his choice of castlà for the castle of Montcada to Ramon Berenguer for approval, and renounce his encroachment upon jurisdiction of the monastery of Sant Llorenç del Munt.⁽¹⁶⁾ Ramon Berenguer further insisted that Guillem Ramon submit to his will in certain agreements made with other nobles, that he compensate Ramon Bernat de Ripollet for injuries he had inflicted,⁽¹⁷⁾ and that he respect the newly defined Usatge entitled "Exorquie" in the [93] case of one of his vassals.⁽¹⁸⁾ These demands help define what was in fact Ramon Berenguer's first condition for settlement: Guillem Ramon's complete feudal submission in matters of the castles of his patrimony, and his recognition of Ramon Berenguer's ultimate lordship. This was consistent with the terms of 1126 that had made Guillem Ramon's wardship of the viscounty of Bas dependent upon comital commendation. It also reflected the strongly authoritarian views of Ramon Berenguer IV, whose legislative efforts bolstered comital power more than any of his predecessors had since Ramon Berenguer I.

Recent scholarship has exploded many of the myths surrounding the formulation and compilation of the Usatges of Barcelona.⁽¹⁹⁾ They are now recognized as mostly the twelfth-century product of Ramon Berenguer III and Ramon Berenguer IV, retaining few traces of Ramon Berenguer I's attempts at legislation. The compiler or compilers saw the opportunity to give the work greater authority by attributing it to an earlier count, thus constructing what Bonnassie has described as a model of falsification. A critical element in the deception was the historical description of the Usatges: [94] according to their preamble (Usatge 4, "Hec sunt usualia"), they were produced in the court of Ramon Berenguer I and his third wife, Countess Almodis, with the accord and counsel of the magnates of the land -- among them Ramon de Montcada and Guillem [Ramon] Dapifer.⁽²⁰⁾ This device was apparently designed to still the objections of men like Guillem Ramon [II] Seneschal, who were asked to believe that their ancestors in the eleventh century had personally approved Barcelona's legal code -- its customs -- that now limited their independence and prerogatives. The subterfuge remained undetected for eight hundred years.

Another legend that acquired historical credibility grew out of attempts to relate Guillem Ramon's and Ramon Berenguer IV's discord of the 1130s to important events of the period.⁽²¹⁾ This legend, passed down in elements of chansons de geste, served as an introduction to the thirteenth-century chronicle of Bernat Desclot.⁽²²⁾ In Desclot's account, Guillem Ramon "de Montcada"⁽²³⁾ had been exiled from court in Barcelona before the siege and taking of Lleida "for a reason that I do not want to relate."⁽²⁴⁾ Seeking refuge at the court of Alfonso el Batallador of Aragon, Guillem Ramon fought valiantly alongside King Alfonso at Fraga and was one of a few combatants to escape unhurt from the battle, which took his patron's life. As the Aragonese chose Alfonso's monk-brother [95] Ramiro to be king and pondered the choice of a prince to receive the hand of Ramiro's young daughter, Peronella, the designated heiress of the realm, the seneschal's influence became crucial. Guillem Ramon offered the name of the count of Barcelona, and the approving Aragonese sent him to Ramon Berenguer, then at Lleida, with their proposal. The count's acceptance won a reconciliation with him for Guillem Ramon, whose exile to Aragon then came to an end. This story, invented by Desclot and followed by most Renaissance historians, has been echoed in scholarship down to the twentieth century.⁽²⁵⁾

Although Bernat Desclot's tale may transmit some recollections based on fact, the supposed exile of Guillem Ramon Seneschal and his reconciliation with Count Ramon Berenguer IV are probably without foundation. It appears from documentary evidence that all disputes had ended and that the seneschal's possession of all his castles had been confirmed by July 1136, fully a year before Peronella's betrothal to the count of Barcelona. This would not preclude a role for the seneschal in negotiations with the Aragonese, however. Guillem Ramon is absent from documents issued in Catalonia during 1137; he may well have accompanied Ramon Berenguer, the count's scribe Ponç, and other members of the comital retinue to Aragon for six months in 1137.⁽²⁶⁾ He reappears in Catalonian documents early in 1138, at about the same time as does Ramon Berenguer, a coincidence that supports the idea of their absence together.⁽²⁷⁾ Guillem Ramon witnessed a document [96] of Ramon Berenguer in October 1139, and he accompanied the count to his February 1140 meeting with Alfonso VII of Castile at Carrión.⁽²⁸⁾ The resolution of problems raised by Alfonso el Batallador's will enabled Ramon Berenguer and his court to turn their attention from affairs of the union to those of reconquest of the south.

Guillem Ramon Seneschal was committed to Ramon Berenguer IV's reconquest plans even by 1134. In that year the seneschal and his brother Ot, following the count's lead, pledged personal service to the Knights Templar at the frontier castle of Granyena and material support to the order from their property there.⁽²⁹⁾ Two dozen other members of the comital suite followed their action, though to a lesser degree.⁽³⁰⁾ This happened at the conclusion of an assembly approving a truce charter, granted by Archbishop Olleguer and Count Ramon Berenguer, that placed under ecclesiastical and comital protection the rights and possessions of the Templars in Catalonia.⁽³¹⁾ The legislation anticipated a military role for the Templars that was supported by Guillem Ramon and other leading members of Ramon Berenguer's entourage. Mobilization of the frontier convents awaited only the settlement with Ramon Berenguer in 1143 of the Templars' claims to rights of succession in the kingdom of Aragon.⁽³²⁾ From that time on, a Templar order [96] would share the fruits of the reconquest with magnates of New Catalonia.⁽³³⁾

Catalan forces did not have long to wait for the taste of victory. The troops of Ramon Berenguer, in cooperation with Alfonso VII of Castile, tested their mettle against the Saracens in a two-month siege in autumn 1146 at Almería.⁽³⁴⁾ Returning from this success, Ramon Berenguer prepared for his next advance by enlisting the Genoese in a joint assault on the Ebro port city of Tortosa.⁽³⁵⁾ The allied forces, aided by a Templar contingent, attacked first the city and then the citadel in July 1148, with their Muslim foes ensconced behind the walls of the Suda. This castle was besieged by Catalan machinery in October, and the Saracens negotiated first for delay, then for surrender, capitulating on the final day of December.⁽³⁶⁾ The taking of the city was a victory for Ramon Berenguer, but it also resulted in rewards for two of the parties most responsible: the Genoese and Guillem Ramon Seneschal.⁽³⁷⁾

Guillem Ramon Seneschal was merely the most recent Catalan noble to have been promised a share of the city of Tortosa. The vision of its capture had tantalized the counts of Barcelona for decades, and repeatedly they had anticipated the partition of spoils there. Beginning in 1097, Ramon Berenguer III had promised the city to his ally Count Artau of Pallars⁽³⁸⁾ -- a pledge that faded when Catalan forces failed to take even Tarragona, a major center north of the Ebro capital. Even the Aragonese king Alfonso el Batallador had envisaged taking Tortosa, and he had provided in his will that the city be granted to the Hospitallers.⁽³⁹⁾ Later, Ramon Berenguer IV offered Tortosa to Guillem de Montpellier, but he was also unable to capture the prize, though he tried to leave the rights to it to his son.⁽⁴⁰⁾ By the time the city had been won for the Christians, [98] Guillem Ramon Seneschal was the only living recipient of such a promise. The count honored his claim (which dated from 1146) in 1149, along with that of the Genoese, to whom one-third of the city had been pledged for their assistance in the campaign.

Guillem Ramon may well have likened Ramon Berenguer's donation of 1146 to a grant made to the Norman baron Robert Bordet in Olleguer's time that established him as "prince" or "count" of Tarragona and its territory.⁽⁴¹⁾ According to the charter, Guillem Ramon would receive "the city of Tortosa, so that [he] might hold the Suda, have lordship of the city, its rural settlements (villa), and district, and have a one-third share in the right and possession of all revenues from the city and villa and from all its lands and appurtenances."⁽⁴²⁾ But by the time of the reconquest in 1148 it had become apparent that the count of Barcelona had further political plans for the city than were spelled out in Guillem Ramon's charter. These plans substantially modified the statute under which the seneschal would ultimately exercise lordship in Tortosa and set a precedent that seems to have been followed in Lleida as well.

As the two major centers on the frontier with Islam fell to Ramon Berenguer in 1148 and 1149, he began to experiment with new forms of political administration that complemented his aspirations for princely power. No doubt he adopted the major principle behind his organization, division of authority, as a way of ensuring that his personal prerogatives would not be usurped by grasping vassals. His ideals were first applied at Tortosa, where the Genoese, the Templars, and Guillem Ramon Seneschal held rights that sometimes overlapped. A further counterbalance was provided by resettlement charters, which granted liberties to citizens and enshrined the authority of the count as head over all.

A similar plan was followed at Lleida. There Ramon Berenguer, who retained more than half the city, provided for the Templars and for his ally the count of Urgell, to whom he accorded a third of the [99] city and its titular lordship.⁽⁴³⁾ But he reserved for himself the right to select Lleida's first castlà. A century earlier, when Catalan feudalism began, this post typically was occupied by distinctly non-aristocratic rural garrison chiefs; but now the castlà was called upon to exercise effective lordship in the city in fidelity and service to the count of Urgell. The lesson was clear to all. Princes, not barons, were the locus of public authority during Ramon Berenguer IV's reign, and those whom the count chose to exercise local authority did so in his name.

The count's application of his new ideas was visible first at Tortosa, where Guillem Ramon -- in spite of Ramon Berenguer's promise of lordship in 1146 -- found in the years following the city's reconquest that his role there was overshadowed by the count. From the moment of the first donation of the city to its Christian inhabitants -- an act endorsed by Guillem Ramon Seneschal -- it was Ramon Berenguer who guided the installation of authority in the city.⁽⁴⁴⁾ By order of the count, Guillem Ramon and the Genoese consul Cafaro divided Tortosa.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The count was allocated the suburb of Remolins except for the teuizola⁽⁴⁶⁾ and the villa olliaris⁽⁴⁷⁾ [100] which were assigned to the Genoese. The Suda was divided into parts for the count, for the Genoese, and for common usage. Within the city walls, the Genoese were given all the villa sicca to the Suda, and the count retained the rest of the city with its darazana.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Further, a city charter was promulgated in Ramon Berenguer's name that established customs for the Muslim inhabitants of Tortosa. There was also a deed that ceded a section of the city to the Jews for constructing houses and that extended to them the customs enjoyed by the Jews of Barcelona.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Ramon Berenguer granted to the new bishop of Tortosa the right to local tithes and first fruits and established other endowments for the benefit of the church.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Guillem Ramon was simply a subscriber in nearly all of these acts, and not, as Count Ermengol would be later on in Lleida, a co-actor with the count of Barcelona. In short, Guillem Ramon appears to have become little more than Ramon Berenguer's castlà at the Suda.

The long summer offensive against Lleida and Fraga in 1149⁽⁵¹⁾ interrupted the flow of charters pertaining to the repopulation and administration of Tortosa.⁽⁵²⁾ Guillem Ramon Dapifer and his knights, fighting beside the counts of Barcelona and Urgell, contributed [101] to the victory won on 24 October 1149.⁽⁵³⁾ Though an earlier convention had given the count of Urgell a one-third share of lordship in the conquered city,⁽⁵⁴⁾ Guillem Ramon was also destined to play an administrative role there and to obtain grants that made him one of the principal landholders in and around Lleida. As in Tortosa, the capture of Lleida prompted a flurry of donations by the count of Barcelona to his followers. Three of them, made in 1149 and 1150, were subscribed by his seneschal, as was the city charter granted by the two counts to the citizens in January 1150.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Though the identity of the first castlá or castlans at Tortosa and Lleida is not documented, Ramon Berenguer's choice may well have been Guillem Ramon Seneschal. He alone may have been given the post at Tortosa, and he may have received the one at Lleida with Ramon de Pujalt, a frequent member of Ramon Berenguer's inner council.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Although the seneschal had been unquestionably loyal to the count for a decade or more, his bases of power in Old Catalonia were both considerable and central, and Ramon Berenguer may well have considered it advantageous for him to spend significant amounts of time attending to matters on the frontier.⁽⁵⁷⁾ Guillem Ramon was clearly of sufficient stature to command respect. In the role of castlà at Tortosa and Lleida, he would be regarded by all as a loyal and responsive vassal or "man" of the count, just as the count himself wished. By awarding to Guillem Ramon only limited lordship in the reconquered cities and by shackling his office with a title denoting subservience, Ramon Berenguer hoped to reinforce the image of a hierarchic pattern of public authority with the count at its summit.

The details of this picture are obscure at Lleida during the career [102] of the Great Seneschal, but they became clearer during the lifetime of his son, Ramon de Montcada [I]. Heir to his father's rights there, Ramon succeeded to a lordship held under Ermengol of Urgell. He thus became one of the "major castlans" in an administration divided into shares, as at Tortosa.⁽⁵⁸⁾ As "lord" of Lleida for the count of Urgell, Ramon was joined by Guillem de Cervera, who in 1179 received lordship of the count's part of the city⁽⁵⁹⁾ This arrangement continued during the lifetime of Ramon de Montcada [II], who with Guillem de Cervera in 1213 presided over a pact reached between the maiores cives and the populus of Lleida in which the citizens approved institutions relative to the consuls, whose duties were "to govern, preserve, and protect [the city] save fidelity to the king of Aragon and other lords of Lleida." The lords were without doubt Ramon de Montcada and Guillem de Cervera, who promised to preserve and protect the goods of the inhabitants and to aid them in maintaining their civic institutions.⁽⁶⁰⁾

In Tortosa, Guillem Ramon may have found that the role accorded him by Ramon Berenguer was less prestigious than he had expected. But even the material benefits fell short of those promised in the charter of 1146. He received from Ramon Berenguer one-third of the comital portion of the city, once one-third had been allocated to the Genoese and a fifth to the Templars. This left Guillem Ramon not with a 33-percent share, but with 16 percent.⁽⁶¹⁾ The situation quickly led to new conflict between Ramon Berenguer and his seneschal.

The second major quarrel between the two came to a head sometime after the Genoese, ending their disputes with Ramon Berenguer over Tortosa, sold him their share of the city for 16,640 morabetins in November 1153.⁽⁶²⁾ Their action directly affected relations [102] between Ramon Berenguer and Guillem Ramon: the seneschal later complained that he had understood the count would give him the Genoese third if he were to acquire it by purchase or exchange. Arguing his case before barons assembled in comital curia possibly sometime during 1155, Guillem Ramon listed point by point how he felt Ramon Berenguer had reneged on former promises, curtailed his fiscal rights, and interfered with his administration of lordship in the city⁽⁶³⁾ Ramon Berenguer responded by accusing Guillem of not personally commanding the knights assigned to the Suda as stipulated in his charter of donation, a failing that the count claimed had cost him 60,000 morabetins, and by charging that the seneschal had worked to diminish the count's rights in Tortosa.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Eventually a settlement was reached that produced mixed results for Guillem Ramon. But the case was resolved peacefully. In seeking a judicial resolution from a court of his peers, the seneschal demonstrated his respect for the count and his political institutions.

Apart from his contributions to the conquests of Tortosa and Lleida, Guillem Ramon frequently traveled with Count Ramon Berenguer IV as he dealt with the king of Castile and with unruly barons in Provence. Guillem Ramon accompanied the count when [104] he met with Alfonso of Castile to carve up the map of Spain, at Carrión in 1140 and again at Tudellén in 1151, and he was present five years later when the two leaders confirmed their design at Lleida.⁽⁶⁵⁾ Guillem Ramon was also at Narbonne in January 1157 when the bishop of Pamplona surrendered as hostage to the count for the misdeeds of Sanç of Navarre, and he joined Ramon Berenguer on a journey to Haxama in 1158 to treat with the count's nephew Sanç of Castile.⁽⁶⁶⁾

Ramon Berenguer's expedition to Provence in 1150 involved not only the seneschal, who subscribed settlements at Arles with members of the Baux family of Provence and at Narbonne with the viscount of Béziers, but also two of his sons.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The eldest, Guillem de Montcada [II], witnessed the Arles agreement, and the younger Berenguer de Montcada gave the count two galleys he had had constructed in Barcelona.⁽⁶⁸⁾ Guillem Ramon was also frequently present when Ramon Berenguer concluded political arrangements with Catalan magnates. Typically, the count would commend a castle to a noble in return for his pledge of fidelity and acknowledgment of the count's right to use the castle at any time.⁽⁶⁹⁾ But castles provided a prime source of contention, between the count and various nobles and among neighboring nobles. Such cases were often judged by members of the count's court, which regularly included Guillem Ramon Seneschal.⁽⁷⁰⁾

As Guillem Ramon supported the count of Barcelona politically and militarily, so too he backed Ramon Berenguer financially. He witnessed the count's pledge of an allod in Vacarisses in 1144 as security for a loan of 130 morabetins.⁽⁷¹⁾ He was also a signatory [105] to the loan of fifty pounds of silver to the count from the church of Barcelona for expenses caused by the siege of Tortosa.⁽⁷²⁾ But this sum was inadequate, and the count turned for assistance to the citizens of Barcelona. In return for a pledge of repayment from comital revenues that was made in a document subscribed by Guillem Ramon and his son Guillem de Montcada, eleven townsmen advanced 7,600 sols in December 1148. As further security, six members of the comital suite, headed by Guillem de Montcada, pledged to hold the count to the terms of his agreement.⁽⁷³⁾ Five years later, the Genoese asked that one of the seneschal's sons be named a potential "hostage" as security for the count's fulfillment of his financial obligations in purchasing the Genoese third of Tortosa.⁽⁷⁴⁾

And in 1157, the seneschal pledged his own liberty to Ramon Berenguer's creditor Guillem Leteric of Montpellier in a loan of 4,700 morabetins. If the count defaulted, Guillem Ramon and five other members of the entourage would go to Guillem Leteric when requested, and not try to avoid his summons. Similar arrangements involving other hostages were confirmed by the seneschal in 1160 and 1162, by which time the amount owed to Guillem Leteric was reckoned at 6,000 morabetins.⁽⁷⁵⁾

When Ramon Berenguer sought to settle a dispute between the Hospitallers of Amposta and the bishop of Tortosa over rights to a field of the church of Sant Joan in Tortosa, Guillem Ramon's lordship in Tortosa and his closeness to the count made him a logical choice as mediator. The count's intervention began with a letter to Prior P. Humbert, in which he told of the appointment of Archbishop Bernat of Tarragona and Guihlem Ramon Dapifer as arbiters.⁽⁷⁶⁾ The count then wrote a letter to the archbishop and Guillem Ramon Seneschal, placing the matter in their hands and declaring that he would accept their decision as binding upon the two parties.⁽⁷⁷⁾ Their compromise settlement was reached in the presence of Cafaro, consul of the Genoese, and Baldovino, "who [106] in that time commanded the Genoese party in Tortosa."⁽⁷⁸⁾ But it apparently did not end all claims concerning the field, for several years later the principal mediators issued new charters confirming the division.⁽⁷⁹⁾ Sometime thereafter, Ramon Berenguer wrote to Pope Hadrian IV, to inform him that the archbishop and Guillem Ramon, "delegated by us," had settled the dispute and to ask the pontiff's approval.⁽⁸⁰⁾ Hadrian replied on 20 March 1157 from Benevento in adulatory terms, noting that "you and your dapifer G. Ramon truly had taken the initiative" in reaching the accord.⁽⁸¹⁾ The favorable outcome of this mediation may have encouraged Ramon Berenguer to intervene again in a dispute among clerics, this time between the master of the Temple of Miravet and the bishop of Tortosa, who wanted to treat the clergy of the church of Miravet as his own men. The count discussed the matter with his optimes, Guillem Ramon Dapifer, Guillem de Castellvell and his brother Arbert, and Bernat de Bell-lloc, and arranged a compromise whereby the Templars' secular priests would be subject to the bishop. A further question between the two parties concerning the division of tithes and the first fruits was also settled by compromise.⁽⁸²⁾ Once again, Ramon Berenguer acted either through the office of leading magnates or according to their counsel, a practice that strengthened the count's ability to intercede and enhanced the prestige of the members of his court, among them Guillem Ramon Seneschal.

As companion and adviser to Ramon Berenguer, Guillem Ramon was with the count on a journey to meet Frederick Barbarossa at Turin in August 1162. How to maintain the emperor's favor without making political concessions in Provence, an imperial fief, and what stand to take on the matter of papal schism were two topics that must have preoccupied the entourage as it made its way toward the Alps. But whatever policy was formulated remained untested. [107] Ramon Berenguer IV, stricken ill in the Piedmont, died three days after dictating his last will to Guillem Ramon Seneschal, Arbert de Castellvell, and master Guillem, the count's chaplain.⁽⁸³⁾ Nevertheless, the charter issued by Frederick when he heard of the count's death -- perhaps to a party including the count of Provence and Guillem Ramon -- included confirmation of the Barcelona dynasty's claims to Provence, which had been a key element of Ramon Berenguer's policy.⁽⁸⁴⁾ Guillem Ramon and his two companions returned from the empire after arranging for Ramon Berenguer's body to be transported back to Catalonia for burial at Ripoll.⁽⁸⁵⁾ After the trip, they prepared to make public the count's will at an assembly of bishops and magnates in Huesca two months later and also to oversee its implementation.⁽⁸⁶⁾

Through his prominence in court in the last years of Ramon Berenguer's countship, Guillem Ramon increased his influence over the affairs of Catalonia during the minority of the count's eldest son, Alfons I. Apparently by common accord, and notwithstanding Ramon Berenguer's wish that his sons enjoy the "wardship, protection, and defense" of the English King Henry II, Guillem Ramon and Bishop Guillem of Barcelona emerged as Alfons's co-regents. The regency was to last "until such time as Alfons... should become a knight and emerge from tutelage."⁽⁸⁷⁾ The arrangement maintained for the seneschal, by now a septuagenarian, the leadership position he had held under Ramon Berenguer.

In the decade after 1162, the experienced hand of Guillem Ramon Seneschal helped guide Alfons I's actions in Catalonia. During the first year of the regency, Guillem Ramon and Bishop Guillem made a provisional grant to the See of Tortosa of the church of Ascó with its revenues.⁽⁸⁸⁾ Later that year, the seneschal subscribed a donation by Alfons of the villa of La Coma as the site of an Augustinian priory.⁽⁸⁹⁾ In 1164 Guillem Ramon, Bishop Guillem, [108] and several other Catalan magnates witnessed the donation by Ramon Berenguer's wife, Peronella, of the kingdom of Aragon to her son, further justifying the practice, now nearly two years old, of titling Alfons "King of Aragon" as well as "Count of Barcelona."⁽⁹⁰⁾ The queen acknowledged making this donation "with the advice and consent" of Catalan and Aragonese bishops and nobles.⁽⁹¹⁾ Other royal acts of ensuing years, carried out with the counsel of Alfons's principal magnates "and all my court"⁽⁹²⁾ and subscribed by many of the same barons, concerned donations of property, acts of fiscal administration, commendations of castles and honors, and arbitrations of disputes.⁽⁹³⁾ Issued at Barcelona, Tarragona, Tortosa, Ascó, Lleida, Perpignan, Villefranche de Conflent, and Arles, the documents of the young count-king regularly bore the subscription of Guillem Ramon Seneschal and often those of his sons Guillem and Ramon de Montcada.⁽⁹⁴⁾ But the seneschal's influence did not end with Catalan political and administrative affairs. Guillem Ramon also counseled the count-king on matters concerning Castile and Navarre, promoting a policy that took into account interests in the viscounty of Béarn on the part of both the counts of Barcelona and the seneschal's family.

[109] Though the viscounts of Béarn had fought alongside the kings and magnates of Aragon against the Muslims for nearly a century,⁽⁹⁵⁾ not until the countship of Ramon Berenguer IV did Béarn become an important factor in the politics of the ruling house of Barcelona. This occurred around 1150 when Viscount Pere died leaving two children, Gastó V and Maria, as heirs. After the subsequent death of Viscountess Ataresa four years later, the Béarnese turned to Ramon Berenguer for protection.⁽⁹⁶⁾ At an assembly at Canfranc in 1154 he received the homage of the Béarnese and welcomed the heirs to his court in Barcelona.⁽⁹⁷⁾ Ramon Berenguer, as regent for the young viscount, presumably helped arrange Gastó's two marriages, the first with the daughter of the king of Navarre and a subsequent with an illegitimate daughter of the king of Castile. Neither bore fruit, however, and the matter of succession to the viscounty arose anew when Gastó died in 1170. The new viscountess would be Maria de Béarn, Gasto's sister and the wife -- no doubt through the intervention of Guillem Ramon Seneschal, by then acting as regent -- of Guillem de Montcada.⁽⁹⁸⁾

The accession of Guillem de Montcada's wife, Maria, as visountess of Béarn was important because it implanted Montcadas in the lordship of Béarn and it ensured the continuation of close ties between this strategic Pyrenean principality and the ruling house of Barcelona. These ties were reaffirmed at an assembly of leading Béarnese at Jaca in April 1170, on the occasion of Alfons's grant of royal protection to the viscounty and his confirmation of [110] Maria's inheritances in Béarn in return for a declaration of homage.⁽⁹⁹⁾ In this treaty, Maria agreed not to accept any husband without Alfons's consent, a clause that has been interpreted to mean that she was not yet married to Guillem de Montcada⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ but that in fact applied to potential remarriages.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Alfons's approval of his seneschal's eldest son as Maria's husband was confirmed by March 1171, when the count-king made a donation to Guillem and his sons of all the Aragonese inheritances of the former viscountess, Ataresa, just as they had been held by Gastó.⁽¹⁰²⁾ In return, Guillem rendered homage to Alfons for all the lordship of Béarn, "which I will be able to achieve for myself or for my sons," and accepted the king's promise of protection and assistance in matters concerning the viscounty of Béarn.⁽¹⁰³⁾

Alfons's posture toward Béarn, which was almost certainly influenced by Guillem Ramon Seneschal, was but one element of an external policy concerning Pyrenean and peninsular affairs that occupied the court of the young count-king throughout his minority. Another was the maintenance of balanced relations with the kings of Castile and Navarre. The traditional policy of alliance with the king of Castile against the king of Navarre, continued until 1166, had to be reconsidered when Castilian nobles swept into western Aragon, killing men and destroying livestock in the regions of Calatayud and Daroca. From his encampment at Soria, Alfons and his men moved to end the incursion capturing many of the aggressors.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ A break with Castile was indicated; and Alfons [111] and his court turned their attention to the king of Navarre, with whom a tentative peace was worked out by December 1168.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ In this pact, which covered twenty years, mutual attacks against the Muslim lands of King Lupus and others were envisaged, and equal division of conquests was agreed upon except in lands already occupied by the Aragonese. Men from one kingdom were to be secure in the other, and castle holders in both kingdoms were to offer pledges of homage to guarantee the treaty's fulfillment.

But the convention was never implemented, perhaps because of two articles added to the margins of the principal text that stipulated a delay of twenty days after the feast of St. Thomas (21 December) in the settlement of a placitum involving both kings and the castle of Pau. The castle was claimed by Sanç of Navarre, who insisted that Guillem de Montcada -- who held the fortification -- probably through his marriage to Maria de Béarn -- defend his claims before judges. Sanç asked Alfons to help him obtain the castle from Guillem; failing that, he asked that Alfons dispossess Guillem of it in favor of the king. This demand, no doubt unacceptable to the Catalan members of Alfons's court, helped doom the agreement and also speeded a rapprochement between the count-king and Alfonso of Castile.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ The return to an alliance with Castile was supported in its initial stages by Guillem Ramon Seneschal, who with other leading Catalan and Aragonese barons confirmed a treaty of friendship and mutual aid between the two Alfonses in Saragossa in July 1170.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

A third side to the triangular exterior policy of the court of Alfons I concerned his interests in Languedoc and Provence. Alfons [112] and his entourage intervened there after the assassination of Ramon Berenguer III of Provence at Nice in 1166, rallying the support of most local magnates, who confirmed their loyalty to the house of Barcelona and their opposition to the adherents of Count Ramon V of Toulouse.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ But this campaign was costly, further aggravating the court's financial straits and ensuring that conditions of debt repayment would remain a major item on the agenda for years to come. Though apparently contracted through the offices of the magnate Guillem de Montpellier, "curator and procurator of the king of Aragon [for Languedoc and Provence?],"⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ money advanced by the Montpellier lender Guillem Leteric required other guarantors from Alfons's entourage. Those chosen included Guillem Ramon Seneschal, who guaranteed repayment in December 1167 of 2,500 morabetins to Guillem Leteric, renewed that guarantee three months later, and subscribed in July 1168 a new promise of payment from the proceeds of a baiulia of 1,000 remaining morabetins.⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Another document from the expedition, dated at Arles in October 1167, acknowledged debts to the Genoese left over from the countship of Ramon Berenguer IV and pledged their timely repayment; it also contained the promise of Guillem de Montcada and three Aragonese barons to see the obligations acquitted or to deliver themselves to Montpellier as hostages until the amounts were paid.⁽¹¹¹⁾ Other important advances of cash notwithstanding, a shortage of funds continued to plague Alfons before he came of age.⁽¹¹²⁾ He was still in debt to Guillem Ramon when the seneschal died in 1173; still outstanding then was an advance to Alfons of 2,000 morabetins,another 2,000 morabetins for expenses incurred in Provence, and unpaid expenses in Montpellier amounting to 1,200 sols of Melgueil.⁽¹¹³⁾

Guillem Ramon Seneschal did not live to witness the marriage of Alfons I to Sança of Castile in 1174. This event brought to a formal end the approximately twelve-year regency shared by Guillem Ramon and Bishop Guillem of Barcelona.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ Guillem [113] Ramon was in his eighties when he died shortly after the redaction of his will on 20 April 1173.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ He had been instrumental in helping Alfons's rule as a minor to unfold without dissension or any great difficulty Because of this the Great Seneschal was warmly remembered long after his contributions to the momentous events of the mid-twelfth century had come to an end.

1. A portrait by Ramon Tusquets that hangs in the Galeria de Catalans Illustres in the Reial Academia de Bones Lletres de Barcelona (see frontispiece) reflects the nineteenth century's image of the Great Seneschal. In 1886 Guillem Ramon was included in this group of important figures in Catalonia's national history.

2. Pladevall, in "Senescals," pp. 124-26, correctly dismissed Miret y Sans' suggestion ("Casa," p. 131) that this Berenguer Bernat was a member of the Montcada family and hypothesized that he might have been Berenguer Bernat de Queralt, whose father, Bernat Guillem, had played an important role in comital affairs during the infancy and wardship of Ramon Berenguer III. Berenguer Bernat is attested as dapifer from 1112 to 1134.

3. ACA RB III:238; ACA S. Benet:403; LFM 2:33-34:520.

4. ACB Lib. ant. 2:125v:371 (Mas 10:301:1340).

5. ACA RB III:256.

6. ACA RB III:281, 282.

7. See Sobrequés, Grans comtes, pp. 196-98.

8. ACA Sentmenat: Dominio y jurisdicción de Sentmenat, A2.

9. LFM 2:246:738; 1:527-32:493.

10. LFM 1:330:305.

11. Some historians feel that the quarrel began with the disruption of the water supply (see Rubió y Lluch, D. Guillermo Ramón, p. 22, following Pujades). It seems more likely, given the timing of Ramon Berenguer's convention with Guillem de Sant Martí, that Guillem Ramon was responding to provocation by the count. See LFM 1:483:459.

12. Historians of the Montcada family have long thought that Guillem Ramon and Beatriu were first cousins once removed, and that the divorce was pronounced because of consanguinity. But my revision of the Montcada genealogy makes any prohibited degree of relationship highly unlikely. Other canonical impediments, like lack of consent to the marriage by one of the parties or spiritual affinity may have been found, though it seems improbable that the church would press for divorce on such grounds in the face of canon law tradition favoring the indissolubility of marriage.

13. LFM 1:331-32:307. This agreement preserved the Montcada inheritance for the sons of Guillem Ramon and Beatriu while leaving half of the honor to Guillem Ramon and half to Beatriu for at least as long as she remained unmarried.

14. LFM 1:480-81:457; 1:481-82:458.

15. LFM 1:483:459. Ramon Berenguer forced Guillem Ramon both to acknowledge his right to take water for his mills wherever and whenever he wanted and to promise that Montcada mills would not encroach upon their supply or cause their flooding. This clear expression of the concept of eminent domain was echoed in the Usatges of Barcelona, compiled around mid-century from a variety of legislative and judicial sources (see Catalogne, pp. 713-14); Usatge 74 ("Caequiam aquae") specifically prohibits interfering with the canal that supplied the mills of Barcelona. The fact that this Usatge is one of only five written in the first person suggests that it may have been a comital order issued during the conflict with Guillem Ramon.

16. Guillem Ramon [II] had quarreled earlier with the abbot of Sant Llorenç over property that both he and the monastery claimed. See ACA S. Llorenç: 261 (15 Sept. 1126).

17. The text does not state when these injuries took place. The complaint may have been as much as ten years old, and it may relate to a dispute between canons of Barcelona and Ramon Bernat that was settled before the count in 1125 (ACB Lib. ant. 2: 125v:371 [Mas 10:301:1340]). Perhaps some action by GuiIlem Ramon after the hearing undermined the count's decision in the case.

18. The will of Pere de Palau, a knight, was probated in Vic on 9 June 1135 (ACA RB IV: 46). Pere had asked that all his allod be given to the Knights Templar if he died in captivity, "if Guillem Ramon Dapifer should wish it." Guillem Ramon chose to keep the allods for himself, as Pere died without descendants and the seneschal was his lord. Ramon Berenguer's challenge of this action shows that the count already claimed the rights enunciated in Usatge 69 ("Item statuerunt"). It is interesting to note that "the most noble Roger, legislator and judge of Barcelona," was present at the probate proceeding in Vic.

19. Two recent studies of the Usatges have devastated the historical fabric woven earlier in the century by José Balan y Jovany and Fernando Valls Taberner. They are Bonnassie's treatment in Catalogne (pp. 711-28) and the study by Joan Bastardas i Parera, Sobre la problemàtica dels usatges de Barcelona, Discurs llegit...a la Reial Academia de Bones Lletres de Barcelona (Barcelona, 1977). Both historians acknowledge the inspiration of Ramon d'Abadal i de Vinyals, whose conclusions on the subject remained unpublished, though not unknown, at his death (cf. Catalogne, p. 713 n. 83).

20. The use of the term dapifer is anachronistic for the eleventh century. Its first known use as a synonym for seneschal dates from 1104. This element of internal criticism of the preamble was overlooked by Balan, who did recognize the anachronism of the term vetus for vetulus in respect to Ramon Berenguer I (Orígenes,pp. 453:54).

21. See Miquel Coll i Alentorn, La llegenda de Guillem Ramon de Montcada (Barcelona, 1958; first published as vol. 12 of the series Guió d'or, Barcelona, 1957).

22. Coll i Alentorn, Llegenda, p. 69; and Ferran Soldevila, ed., Les quatre grans cròniques (Barcelona, 1971), nn. to chs. 1-3 of "Llibre del rei en Pere," pp. 589-93.

23. This error of appellation by Desclot, which occurs only once in his story, indicates his fusion of Guillem Ramon [III Seneschal and his grandson Guillem Ramon de Montcada [I].

24. This cryptic remark was taken by subsequent historians to refer to the murder of the archbishop of Tarragona, which was committed by the Great Seneschal's grandson in 1194. See Coll i Alentorn, Llegenda, pp. 61-69. Desclot compressed the chronology of events between 1134 (the death of Alfonso el Batallador) and the capture of Lleida in 1149 for reasons explained by Soldevila, Cròniques, p. 592 n. 2.

25. At a minimum, modern scholars have accepted the plausibility of an exile for Guillem Ramon and a reconciliation between him and the count. See Miret y Sans, "Casa," p. 130, and Rubió y Lluch, D. Guillermo Ramón, pp. 22-24, who both placed the exile during the countship of Ramon Berenguer III. More recently, Sobrequés attributed the cause of the dispute to differences between the seneschal and Ramon Berenguer IV over water rights. But he then followed Desclot in suggesting an exile to Aragon, during which the seneschal would have facilitated Peronella's marriage to Ramon Berenguer. The seneschal would later have returned to the good graces of the count and been reinvested with the Montcada castle and others (Barons, pp. 59-60).

26. Three documents relative to the union of Aragon and Catalonia that are preserved in Barcelona were written by the count's scribe, Ponç (LFM 1:12-13:7, 1: 13-14:8; DI 4:63-64:27). Though they do not mention Ramon's entourage, it can be assumed that he was accompanied by a number of counselors.

27. Ramon Berenguer returned to Catalonia at the latest by 5 Mar. 1138, the date of a convention between him and Ponç Hug of Empúries (LFM 2:40-41:526). Guillem Ramon appeared on 16 Mar. in a convention betweem the brothers Pere and Berenguer de Sentmenat (ACA RB IV:82).

28. LFM I:366-67:341; DI 4:64-65:28.

29. DI 4:29-33:11.

30. Guillem Ramon and Ot promised both to remain in the service of God in the caballaria of Granyena for one year and to furnish the equipment (garnimentum) of one knight, i.e., a horse and arms and as much from their honor as would be necessary to support a knight there. The other barons pledged less, by omitting either donations of mounts and arms or grants of land -- manses or portions of an honor (DI 4:29-33:11).

31. DI 4:29-33:11. The two documents are recorded on one parchment.

32. DI 4:93-99:43. Described by A. J. Forey, The Templars in the Crown of Aragon (London, 1973), pp. 21-24.

33. The Templars were promised one-fifth of all lands conquered from the Moors; see Forey, Templars, p. 22.

34. See Joseph F. O'Callaghan, A History of Medieval Spain (Ithaca, N.Y, 1975), p. 231.

35. Ibid. What may be the rough draft of the convention reached between Ramon Berenguer and the Genoese is published in DI 4:332-34:141.

36. Anales, 2:8:31-33.

37. Anales, 2:8:33.

38. ACA RB III:51.

39. Forey, Templars, p. 25.

40. DI 4:53-54:22; Forey, Templars, p. 25.

41. Sobrequés, Grans comtes, p. 192.

42. LFM 1:485:462. This donation, made in the early days of the campaign against Almería, also awarded to Guillem Ramon the yet unconquered castle of Peníscola, the city of Mallorca with its lands and lordship, and the islands of Menorca and Ibiza.

43. LFM 1:168-69:161. It is worth emphasizing that this division preceded the conquest and was not the result of glorious deeds performed during it, which is the impression given by Zurita in Anales (2:9:35-36). The decision was a premeditated political one, and participants were rewarded only selectively. This explains the predominance of Catalan magnates in the city's lordship despite the important contribution of Aragonese knights in taking the city (Anales, 2:9:35-36).

44. CPFC 1:121-24:75.

45. ACT Cart. 3, 31v-32v. Another copy is in ACT Cart. 2, 27r-28r:9. The document preserved in these two early thirteenth-century cartularies provides a historical account of the division of Tortosa, the sale of the Genoese part to the count, the Templar purchase of an additional one-fifth share from Alfons I, and dissensions between the Templars and the bishop of Tortosa over distribution of clerical tenths. The text consists of excerpts from documents the originals of which appear to have been lost. To my knowledge this document remains unpublished, though a summary is given in Enrique Bayerni i Bertomeu, Historia de Tortosa y su Comarca, vol. 7 (Tortosa, 1956), p. 9.

46. It is tempting to associate this word with the Catalan teulís (tile). Could the building referred to here "teuizolam sicuti antiquitus edificata fuit" have been a tile factory? In 1977 the local parish priest, Father Francisco Also, recalled a tile industry that in the days of his grandfathers took advantage of the clay-rich banks and hills of the Ebro River valley in the suburb of Remolins.

47. This location is not identified. The name may refer to a pottery industry (cf. Catalan olleria, a pottery factory or boutique).

48. This seems to imply that the higher parts of the city (within the walls behind the cathedral, which huddles in an arc around the base of the Suda) were given to the Genoese, whereas the count kept parts outside the walls and down to the river bank (the darazana, Catalan drasssana, refers to a boat launching, building, or maintenance facility).

49. DI 4:130-35:56; CPFCI:126-28:76.

50. DI 4:193-96:70.

51. Approximate dates of the siege are known from charters granted there; the earliest is from 11 June (Marquis d'Albon, Cartulaire general de l'ordre du Temple, 1119?-1150 [Paris, 1913], 345-46:557), the next from September (DI 4:142-44:60), and the last from 15 Oct. (ACV Lib. dot. 8r-v). All three acts attest the presence of Guillem Ramon Dapifer, and the last attests that of his brother Ot and son Guillem de Montcada as well.

52. In addition to the comital donations cited above, Guillem Ramon was also a signatory to donations to the church of Tortosa (ACT Cart. 8, 9v-10r:9) and donations of property to vassals (LIB 50:42; ACT Cart. 2, 70v-71r:17), as well as to the concession of the castle of La Ràpita (which flanked Tortosa's southern borders) to the monastery of Sant Cugat (ACA S. Cugat: 516).

53. The date is supplied by annals of Tortosa (ACT Cart. 8, 157v-59v: 100) and is repeated by Zurita (Anales, 2:9:35).

54. LFM 1:168-69:161.

55. ACT Cart. 6, 25v-26r:39; LIB 52:44; ACA Cart. Gardeny 88r:217; CPFC 1:129-32:79.

56. In 1156 all four -- Ramon Berenguer, Ermengol, Guillem Ramon, and Ramon de Pujalt -- made a donation of a square in Lleida (ACA Arm. 11:2121).

57. This supposition is supported by Ramon Berenguer's complaint of the mid-1150s that Guillem Ramon had failed in his obligations at Tortosa by not personally commanding the Suda's military garrison.

58. The term "major castlans" can be found in the document by which Alfons commended lordship to Guillem de Cervera: he was to receive one-sixth of all the revenues in the city and district of Lleida "and in all in which the major castlans accept their part" (LFM 1:198-200:188).

59. LFM 1:198-200:188.

60. ACA Cartas reales, Jaime I:caja I, n. 124.

61. See Forey (Templars, p. 25), who considered the evidence with the aim of determining the actual share granted to the order, and ch. 7 below.

62. LFM 1:485-87:463. This is published with an accompanying convention in DI 4:212-16:78.

63. The charges are recorded with rebuttals and judgments by a comital curia in undated documents published in LFM I:487-92:464-65. The documents, which are subsequent to the Genoese sale in Nov. 1153 and prior to Ramon Berenguer's death in 1162, offer few internal clues for precise dating. The dispute followed a period when Guillem Ramon was habitually absent from the Suda, however, and this absence may be related to the abrupt end after Nov. 1154 of his appearances in charters relating to Tortosa (these averaged 2.4 per year from 1149 to 1154, dropped to zero in 1155, and resumed in 1156-1159 at an average of 2 per year).

64. The count's insistence that the charter of 1146 obligated Guillem Ramon to man the Suda corroborates the hypothesis that from the outset he thought of his seneschal as a castlà. The curia upheld the count's view over Guillem Ramon's objections. The charter is discussed at length in ch. 7, below.

65. DI 4:168-74:62; 4:239-41:91.

66. DI 4:230-32:87; 4:245-47:95.

67. LFM 2:351-53:887; 2:328-29:852; 2:329:853.

68. The ships were built at docks at the foot of the present Baixada de Viladecols. On 13 Aug. 1150 Berenguer named Ramon Durfort as their captain and gave them to Ramon Berenguer for use during his campaign in Provence. See Andres Arelino Pi y Aramon, Barcelona antigua y moderna... (Barcelona, 1854), 1:258; the source of the document he cites is not identified (I am indebted to Philip Banks for this reference).

69. LFM 2:64-65:549; 2:82-83:570; 1:366-67:341; 1:318-19:293; 1:367-68:342; 1:391-92:370.

70. DI 4:87-90:40; LFM 1:269-73:253.

71. DI 4:92-93:42.

72. Mas 11:121-22:1642.

73. The document is published with commentary by Miret y Sans, "Los ciutadans de Barcelona en 1148," BRABLB (1917), 10:137-40.

74. DI 4:214-16:782.

75. DI 4:228-30:86; 4:357-60:149; 4:300-04:121; 4:305-08:122.

76. ACT Cart. 6, 42v: 112.

77. ACT Cart. 6, 43r: 113.

78. ACT Cart. 6, 43r-v: 115. This phrase suggests that the conflict arose before the Genoese sold their third of the city in 1153.

79. The archbishop's undated letter to the Hospitallers (ACT Cart. 6, 43r:114) was written "lest any questions over these things arise between you and the church of Tortosa." A memorial issued by Guillem Ramon on 28 June 1156 (ACT Cart. 6, 43r-v: 115) recalled the settlement in similar terms.

80. ACT Cart. 6, 42r: 110. Published in Kehr, "Papat," 15:19-20.

81. ACT Cart. 6, 42r-v:111. Noted also in Kehr, "Papat," 15:19.

82. ACT Cart. 6, 12r-v:18 (an undated document from 1150-1162).

83. LFM 1:532-34:494.

84. LFM 2:368-71:902.

85. Gesta comitum Barcinonensium, ed. L. Barrau Dihigo and J. Massó Torrents (Barcelona, 1925), p. 41.

86. LFM 1:532-34:494.

87. VL 19:290-92:30.

88. VL 19:290-92:30. The donation was subject to later confirmation by Alfons.

89. ACA Alfons I:9.

90. Rulers of Catalonia-Aragon after Ramon Berenguer IV are usually called "count-kings" by Catalan historians, though this term is not found in documents of the period. The adjective "royal" applies to count-kings generally, though occasionally as well to distinguish Aragonese from Catalonian contexts. In Catalan style, adopted here, rulers are numbered sequentially beginning with Ramon Berenguer's son Alfons.

91. LFM 1:23-24:17.

92. For example, ACA Alfons I:25.

93. Donations: ACA Alfons I:32, 59, 123; ACA Cart. Tortosa, 73v:238; ACT Cart. 6, 6r-v: 8; CP 53:96, 205 -06: 335; fiscal acts: ACA Alfons I:25; commendations: ACA Alfons I:30, 107, 110; LFM 2:191-92:681, 2:94:589; ADP-O B. 15 ("Liber feudorum A"), f° 53r; arbitrations: ACA tart. Gardeny, 68r: 170.

94. Despite the assertion of the Gesta comitum (p. 46) that Alfons's uncle Ramon Berenguer [III] of Provence directed his minority, it is plain from the documentation that this task was performed by nobles in Catalonia and Aragon, led in Catalonia by Guillem Ramon Seneschal and Bishop Guillem of Barcelona (see also Ferran Soldevila, Historia de Catalunya, 2^nd ed., 3 vols. [Barcelona, 1962], 1:200-01). The only evidence I have found that suggests an intervention in the curia by Ramon Berenguer is of doubtful validity: in the body of subscriptions in a cartulary copy of a donation by Alfons in 1164, the name "R.B. comitis Provincie" appears, written in a later hand than the rest of the document (ACT Cart 6, 6r-v:8).

95. See "Casa," pp. 187-90.

96. Ibid., p. 192.

97. DI 4:220-22:81.

98. The date of the marriage is unknown, but a donation of l0 June 1164 bears the subscription of Maria as "uxoris Guillelmi de Monte Catano" (CSC 3:214-15 : 1049; the date of this document is known from the family's copy, which bears the subscriptions of the abbot and a number of monks and is preserved in the original [ACA Alfons I:14]). A parchment from 21 May 1166 (ACA Alfons I:33) also contains Maria's subscription as Guillem's wife and attests a son, Guillem Ramon. Miret y Sans, who studied these records, believed that the subscriptions of Maria de Béarn were later additions because of a phrase in a document of 1170 that he took to mean that Maria was then unmarried. But he conceded the implausibility of the idea that Maria wed Guillem and bore three children between the date of that document (30 Apr. 1170) and Guillem's death in 1172 (?). The correct assumption, I believe, is that the evidence of 1164 and 1166 is correct.

99. LFM 1:26-28:19.

100. "Casa," p. 194.

101. Guillem de Montcada, who was born before 1134, was probably forty-five or fifty in 1170. Because a remarriage by the younger Maria after his death was a real possibility, Alfons and his counselors may well have seen the wisdom of retaining the veto over a candidate inimical to the house of Barcelona-Aragon.

102. ACA Alfons I: 102. This document further supports the theory that Guillem and Maria were married before 1170 in its reference to the sons of Guillem. Only if they were twins could they have been born within a year, but this possibility is eliminated by evidence in a document of 1166 (cited above, n. 98), which mentions "a son."

103. ACA Alfons I:103. This document -- probably issued on the same day as the preceding one -- lends some substance to the view of Leon Cadier (cited in "Casa," p. 193) that "the Béarnese people resisted sacrificing their independence and associating themselves with the abdication of their sovereignty into the hands of the king of Aragon."

104. Cesta comitum, p. 47. This incident, though undated, almost certainly occured before 1170 (see Soldevila, Història, 1:205-06) and may have been an impetus for Alfons's projected alliance with King Sanç of Navarre, which had occurred by December 1168.

105. ACA Alfons I:64. This document appears to be an unexecuted draft of an agreement between the two sovereigns because it bears no validating subscriptions in the space left for that purpose at the bottom of the parchment. Moreover, it records in its right and left margins the text of an additional agreement and the names of Navarrese and Aragonese magnates swearing to uphold the pact.

106. Better relations led to the marriage in 1174 of Alfons to Sança of Castile -- and eventually, according to Soldevila, to the abandonment of the Catalano-Aragonese right to reconquer Murcia in exchange for recognition of Alfons's independence from Castile (see Soldevila, Història, 1:211-12).

107. LFM 1:45-47:32.

108. Soldevila, Història, 1:201-02.

109. ACA Alfons I:48.

110. ACA Alfons I:48, 55, 58.

111. ACA Alfons I:47.

112. ACA Alfons I:13, 6o, 67; ACA Arm. 11:648.

113. "Casa," p. 138.

114. In fact, this co-regency appears to have shifted during the last years of Guillem Ramon's life to a co-rule by Alfons and his immediate entourage -- a natural evolution that no doubt prepared the count-king for fuller independence later.

115. Published in "Casa," pp. 137-39.