[66] Improvements in naval technology, rather than a change in penological methods, led to the abolition of the galleys in 1748. Compared with the sailing warships then in use, the galleys were no longer redoubtable. But the galleys were more than fighting ships, for they served the Spanish monarchy as an important penal institution -- a place where large numbers of offenders could be confined to work for the benefit of the state. With their disappearance, some alternative had to be devised, since neither the mines of Almadén nor the North African presidios could take their place. The naval arsenals of the Peninsula eventually provided a replacement for the galleys, but this solution was not adopted immediately, even though a precedent had already been set at the end of the seventeenth century with the use ashore of forzados and slaves from the galleys. It was not until after 1765 that serious offenders began to be sentenced to the arsenals in substantial numbers, and their formal organization as presidios did not come until 1771.

The years immediately following the dissolution of the galleys were characterized by experimentation. Several expedients were tried, and a definite policy did not emerge until much later. To begin with, provision had to be made for the forzados and slaves still remaining aboard the now unserviceable galleys. A decree of January [67] 1749 provided for a distribution of the forzados. Lifers were to be sent to the mines of Almadén, while those with term sentences of more than one year, or with the note of "retention" in their sentences, were assigned to the North African presidios. Finally, all prisoners with less than one year to serve were to be set free with the stipulation that they be banished for two years from the regions where they had committed their crimes. Despite this legislation, the courts continued to sentence men to the galleys, and in June 1749 (repeated the following October) the king ordered all offenders meriting the penalty of the galleys sentenced to the mines of Almadén while the rest were to be sent to the North African presidios. ⁽¹⁾
 

As for the slaves, the abolition of the galleys brought little change to their daily existence. The fact that they no longer had to pull the oars was meaningless, because in the eighteenth century the galleys went out on campaign infrequently. During this period the galleys remained in port almost all the time, and the slaves and forzados labored ashore in the navy yards and port areas. With the suppression of the galleys in 1748, the slaves continued to perform the same tasks as before, and in Cartagena were housed aboard the galleys now permanently moored as hulks in the harbor. ⁽²⁾ Their labor, supplemented by that of free contract workers, was considered sufficient to meet the normal needs of the navy.

The decision of the government in 1750 to begin construction on the naval arsenals of El Ferrol (Galicia) and Cartagena, as well as to expand the facilities at La Carraca (Cádiz), altered these plans. The new projects required the mobilization of large numbers of unskilled workers at the lowest possible cost, conditions ideally suited to penal labor.. Because of security problems, the government was reluctant to send hard-core offenders into the arsenals. For that reason, it was not until after 1765, when problems in the North African presidios (overcrowding and desertion) came to a head, that a policy change was made.

In the 1750s and 1760s the government attempted to satisfy the labor needs of the arsenals with vagrants, gypsies, and other "undesirables" impressed into service in the forced levies (see table 5. 1). ⁽³⁾ In September, 1749, an order was issued to send 600 gypsies, imprisoned in the castle of Alicante under the decree of 1749 providing for their arrest and application to forced labor, to work in the [68] arsenal of Cartagena with the slaves already employed there. ⁽⁴⁾ The following year they were joined by the first contingents of vagabonds to arrive in Cartagena. During the initial two years of construction, the gypsies and vagrants worked as manual laborers, but after 1751 they began to be utilized in a variety of skilled and semiskilled tasks in the arsenal and navy yard, especially in the fabrication of materials necessary for sailing ships. To facilitate their use in a wide range of occupations in the arsenal, they were made to wear ankle fetters only. This was in contrast to the slaves and other prisoners who, in addition to their fetters, where chained together in pairs. The use only of ankle fetters encouraged escape, since the fetters could easily be removed and prisoners were able to slip out of the arsenal unnoticed among the free laborers, who served as foremen and master craftsmen, when they left their work at nightfall. Efforts to restrain the vagrants and gypsies through the application of chains in addition to the fetters proved unsuccessful. In the first place, it made them unserviceable for many of the jobs they were doing. Secondly, the legality of the practice was questionable, because customarily only serious offenders were chained in this manner. A flood of complaints led to the abolition of the practice in 1769. ⁽⁵⁾
 

Year	Number of  Prisoners	Deaths (per year)
1755	1,356	88
1756	1,300	36
1757	1,227	28
1758	1,496	70
1759	1,919	150
1760	1,814	86
1761	1,920	51
1762	1,814	32
Total	12,846	514

The failure to resolve the security problems involved in the use of vagrants and idlers led to their eventual withdrawal from the arsenals. Other factors that influenced royal policymakers to revise their plans concerning these elements included the poor quality of their work and the growing conviction that the program to convert them [69] into useful workers was not succeeding. ⁽⁶⁾ Evidence showed that when they left the arsenals after serving their four to five-year terms, they returned to their old ways. In the 1760s they still represented the majority of workers, but in the early 1770s their numbers declined sharply.

Coincidentally with the removal of the vagrants, the number of slaves also registered a decline. The total number of slaves on the galleys at the time of their (the galleys') abolition is unknown, but in 1751 there were 465 laboring at Cartagena. By 1761 their numbers had nearly doubled (871), and in 1763 they peaked at 1,260 (see table 5.2), after which there was a rapid decrease. In the 1770s there usually were 400 to 500 of them at the arsenal in Cartagena, but frequent treaty exchanges after 1766 between Spain and the North African states gradually reduced their numbers. In 1766, for example, as part of the treaty with Morocco, 800 Moroccan slaves were freed. The following year, in an exchange negotiated with the Algerians, 1,248 slaves were repatriated. By the 1780s, only a small contingent (mainly Turks and Algerians) still labored alongside the Christian convicts. ⁽⁷⁾

The decline of slavery on the Iberian Peninsula gave impetus to the further extension of penal servitude. When slaves became scarce, their places in the arsenals were taken by penal laborers. Large contingents of serious offenders began to arrive in the arsenals after 1765 as a result of a decree of that year which directed the courts to sentence all those meriting the penalty of presidio to the arsenals instead. ⁽⁸⁾ Prisoners of this kind were needed particularly for the operation of the chain pumps that prevented the drydocks from [70] flooding. In the 1760s and 1770s this was the principal occupation of the slaves, and the royal order of 1765 specifically stated that the strongest prisoners were to be assigned to the pumps. The labor of the pumps was so strenuous that eventually it became the maximum penalty in the category of hard labor and was reserved for slaves and for those found guilty of the most heinous crimes. Finally, in 1771 a decree formally established presidios in the naval arsenals and recognized them as being the replacement for the galleys. ⁽⁹⁾
 

Galley	1762	1763
Capitana	262	285
Santa Teresa	220	248
San Felipe	213	242
San Genaro	217	245
San José	209	240
Total	1,121	1,260

The law of 1771 not only had the immediate practical effect of creating presidios in the arsenals, but proved to be one of the most significant events in the history of Spanish penal legislation, because it incorporated key reform ideas current at the time. Most important among them was the separation of offenders into classes according to their crimes. Eighteenth-century penal reformers placed great emphasis on the need to separate prisoners so as to remove the lesser offenders from the hardened criminals. This was the message of Lardizábal's Discurso de las penas, which originally was prepared on royal orders in 1770, and served as the basis for the law of 1771. In the legislation of 1771, the principle of the separation of offenders was adopted mainly because it was considered to be the best means to deal with the problem of continued desertion of prisoners from the North African presidios to the Moslems. By dividing prisoners into classes according to the gravity of their crimes, and by assigning those of the first category (minor and first offenders) to North Africa and those of the second category (serious offenders and recidivists) to the arsenals, it was hoped that those thought capable of deserting to the Moslems and becoming renegades (second category) would be prevented from doing so.

The concept that the penalty must be commensurate with the crime also was incorporated into the legislation of 1771. Prisoners in the first category were to be applied to the labor of the fortifications and other similar tasks in the presidios. On the other hand, the most difficult and fatiguing work, such as the operation of the chain pumps, was reserved for prisoners in the second category, who were to perform it chained together in pairs. ⁽¹⁰⁾ As for the problem of indeterminate sentences, before 1771 they often were imposed, but desperation caused by fear of interminable imprisonment led to frequent escapes. In order to prevent prisoners from resorting to [71] desperate measures, it was decided to restrict sentences to a ten-year maximum and to require judicial authorities to indicate fixed terms in their sentences. Finally, the legislation of 1771 established a system of distribution of prisoners among the three naval arsenals. Accordingly, offenders sentenced by the Chancillería of Valladolid, the Audiencias of Galicia and Asturias, and the Royal Council of Navarre, in addition to all other magistrates within those jurisdictions, were to be sent to the arsenal of El Ferrol. Prisoners from Andalusia, Extremadura, and the Canary Islands were destined for La Carraca, while Cartagena was to receive those originating from New Castile, Murcia, and the Kingdom of Aragon. ⁽¹¹⁾

With the law of 1771 the naval arsenals became the principal Peninsular penal establishments, and they remained so until their suppression in the early years of the nineteenth century. The number of prisoners who served in these arsenals can never be determined, but it is known that in the first seven years of operation a total of 12,846 men labored at Cartagena. ⁽¹²⁾ As for the prisoner population at any given time, only scattered statistics are available, and they are difficult to use because the categories employed to describe the prisoners are not clear; The terms desterrados and presidiarios, although clearly defined by the first half of the eighteenth century in the North African presidios, were still used interchangeably in the naval arsenals until the end of the century. In the beginning, vagrants and idlers impressed into forced labor in the arsenals by the levies were called desterrados. This term was the same used for those sentenced to serve at arms in the North African presidios in the eighteenth century. It was applied to the vagrants sent into the arsenals because originally they, too, were destined for military service, but were disqualified for reasons of age, poor health, or other factors. In the 1760s with the arrival of the serious offenders, the expression desterrados por crímenes was adopted to distinguish them from the desterrados por la leva -- the vagrants and idlers. Finally, in the late 1770s the term presidiarios began to be applied to all prisoners with the exception of the remaining vagrants, who continued to be called desterrados. Nevertheless, in common practice, arsenal officials continued to use the two terms synonymously until the end of the century. ⁽¹³⁾

[72] In addition to confusing terminology, careless errors in calculation as well as purposeful distortion of the figures should be considered when analyzing prison statistics. Presidio administration changed the figures to suit their purposes. A good example of this occurred in 1761, when administrators were anxious to disprove the complaints by the North African states that Moslem slaves in the arsenal of Cartagena were being abused. By juggling the number for slaves and presidiarios, they could effectively lower the mortality rates for slaves, and then argue on the basis of the "figures" that the Moslem slaves were being treated well (compare the statistics in tables 5.3 and 5.4).

Despite the fragmentary nature of the quantitative data and the problems involved in its use, the figures in table 5.7 are useful for obtaining an approximate estimate of the prisoner population in the arsenal of Cartagena in the period of 1761-1818. According to these figures the number of presidiarios reached its highest point in 1786, when there were 2,530 after which there was a slow decline into the early years of the nineteenth century. Although the completion of the major construction work in 1782 and the abolition of the penalty of the chain pumps after 1787 reduced the need for penal laborers at Cartegena, this was not reflected in the figures, which remained at high levels. In the period 1786-1800, the courts continued to sentence convicts to the arsenals, because they [73] could not be accommodated in the North Africa presidios (especially after the loss of Oran in 1792), nor could they be sent to the public works presidios, reserved for minor offenders. This situation came to an end in1807, when the king ordered that in the future no more offenders should be sent to the arsenals, because their labor was no longer necessary there. ⁽¹⁴⁾ Eleven years later, the naval presidios were abolished.
 

Month	Presidiarios (N= 841)*	Slaves (N= 982)*
January	7	4
February	7	2
March	4	4
April	7	6
May	4	1
June	5	2
July	4	1
August	3	3
Total	41	23

Year	Presidiarios	Slaves	Total
1761	933	871	1,924*
1767	1,461	--	1,461
1771	1,568	491	2,059
1779	1,621	223	1,844
1786	2,423	107	2,530
1800	2,114	--	2,114
1802	2,201	--	2,201
1807	1,000	--	1,000
1818	10	--	10

As for La Carraca and El Ferrol, the extant statistics are too few to permit analysis other than to state that  the average presidiario population in both arsenals ranged from 500 to 800, and may have reached 1,000 at La Carraca (including prisoners in the depósito) by the end of the eighteenth century. ⁽¹⁵⁾ Both arsenals had depósitos that were centers of distribution for the New World presidios. The depósito at La Carraca was particularly important, usually holding 100 or more prisoners who were awaiting transportation from Cádiz to Spanish America. There also was a depósito at Cartagena which held prisoners destined for the presidios of North Africa and the New World; it served, too, as a "holding pen" for prisoners rejected from other prisidios, or those not admitted to military or naval service for lack of qualifications. ⁽¹⁶⁾

In the naval arsenals, as on the galleys, the main concerns continued to be security and utility. In the beginning, the same officials [74] (alguaciles) who guarded the forzados and slaves on the galleys were transferred to the arsenals. As the prisoner population increased, the alguaciles proved insufficient in numbers to deal with the situation, while their notorious greed and corruption provoked criticism that led to an attempt to replace them. In 1754 a contingent of marine guards composed of veterans was established in the arsenal of Cartagena, and eventually similar units were formed in the other arsenals. While the purpose of this measure was to eliminate the alguaciles, it proved impossible to do so, and they continued to exist alongside the marine guards. ⁽¹⁷⁾ The new system provided some extra protection, but real security was impossible because of the disproportion in numbers between guards and prisoners. In 1761, for example, there were 154 guards for 1,942 prisoners at Cartagena, that is, one guard for every twelve prisoners, and at that time the arsenal was not completely enclosed. By 1773 a wall had been [75] built around the whole arsenal complex, but the marine unit had been reduced to sixty men. If in the 1770s and 1780s there was a decline in the number of escapes, this was a reflection of the change in the kind of prisoners and the heavy application of chains rather than any increase in the effectiveness, or number, of the security force. ⁽¹⁸⁾

In addition to security, another important concern on the galleys was utility. On oar-driven vessels, the physical condition of the prisoners was important precisely because they were needed to work the oars, that is, their utility depended on it. This was one of the most significant aspects of the galleys and distinguished them from other prisons in the period. No matter how debased it might have been in practice, this tradition was continued in the arsenals. Arsenal rules, like the galley ordinances, protected prisoners from arbitrary punishments and afforded equal treatment to all, regardless of status. Nevertheless, in the arsenals as on the galleys, there was more concern for the Moslem slaves than for the convicts. Although the motives were economic (convicts were expendable and slaves were not), in the 1760s they became political as well. The North African states made it clear that they would not honor their treaty commitments with Spain and would retaliate in kind against Spanish captives in North Africa in return for mistreatment of Moslems enslaved in Spain. As a result, conditions of Moslem slaves in the arsenals gradually improved. Bodily mutilations (cutting off of ears and noses) that were inflicted on slaves as punishments on the galleys and continued in the arsenals in the l750s were eliminated, and the same penalties (mainly flogging) applied to slaves as the presidiarios. Slaves were allowed to correspond with families and friends in North Africa, and presidio officials were prohibited from interfering with the free flow of correspondence. ⁽¹⁹⁾ There also existed in Cartagena a cemetery for Moslem slaves. In addition, they were given the use of a building where they conducted the rites related to interment. Despite opposition from the town and ecclesiastical authorities, who claimed that it was really a mosque, it operated freely for thirty-seven years. In 1770 the Inquisition succeeded in having it torn down, but four years later, under pressure from the North African states who retaliated against Christian churches in their territories, it was rebuilt. ⁽²⁰⁾ Given the circumstances, the [76] remaining slaves in the arsenal in the 1780s were treated with far less rigor than were the presidiarios.

Although the arsenals continued the methods of administration used on the galleys, there were some changes. Among the most important was a reorganization of the "system of chains." Under the new system, troops accompanied the chains, and the conductors were always army officers in active service or veterans. The conductors were better paid. They received a salary of twenty reales per day for the round trip, and before leaving they were allotted an advance from the royal treasury calculated to cover all the expenses of the trip. Upon their return, an accounting was made, but with few exceptions the sums advanced were either adequate or only slightly less than the actual cost (see table 5.5). When there was a large disparity, padding of accounts can be assumed. This was not difficult to do, since mules and carts had to be rented and food purchased along the way, and prices varied in different regions. As for the food, the daily ration prescribed for the convicts was equivalent to sixteen cuartos (sixty-four maravedís) per man, but the actual amount of food they received depended more on its cost. When prices were high, they were given less than their standard allotment.

In addition to food and transportation costs, another large item in the total budget was salaries for the officers and troops accompany-[77] ing the chain. The troops were divided into cavalry and infantry units. Their numbers depended on the size of the chain, but on the average there was one soldier for every three convicts. In the case of larger chains, additional troops drawn from veteran units were added for increased security. The soldiers received sixteen cuartos and their officers four reales a day per man, respectively. Salaries also were paid to a cook (four reales a day) and to a functionary in charge of the chains and irons worn by the prisoners. The latter received six reales a day for forty days, since he was required to return the equipment to its place of origin. ⁽²¹⁾
 
 

Item	July, 1793**	July, 1797**
Food*	7,873	2,528
Carts and mules	4,704	3,484
Salaries	5,999	6,085
Other expenses	2,956	5,438
Total	21,532	17,535
Sum advance	24,000	16,000
Difference	2,468	1,535

The chains were dispatched in the spring and fall of each year. May and October eventually were fixed as regular months of departure for the annual general chains, but smaller ones were sent out at other times whenever it was necessary to reduce the number of prisoners in the depósitos. ⁽²²⁾ Lack of continuous records makes it difficult to determine mortality rates for the chains, but it seems likely that the average ranged between 1 and 3 percent. Instances of sickness and high mortality usually were related to poor health among prisoners as a result of long periods of incarceration in jails, or severe weather encountered along the route, rather than conditions on the chains themselves. For example, on the chain from Madrid to Cartagena in October 1797, out of a total of 242 prisoners, fifteen died en route and two remained hospitalized in one of the towns along the way. In this case, 158 convicts who were added to the Madrid chain in Toledo had arrived there only recently from Valladolid. Apparently they had contracted some infectious disease in the Valladolid jail. Two days after leaving Toledo, one of the prisoners from Valladolid died, and from that point forward every day brought another death. ⁽²³⁾ Weather was another factor of great importance. Chains that were dispatched from Madrid to Cartagena during the summer months often met such extreme heat en route that prisoners had to be supplied with water jars so as to prevent them from fainting from heat prostration and lack of water. Such conditions forced a reduction of pace, and sometimes the trip lasted twenty-eight days. ⁽²⁴⁾

Despite reorganization and more careful supervision of the chains, it was difficult to eliminate the long-established abuses. Complaints by prisoners about bad treatment on the road, particularly about the [78] malpractices of the conductors, were frequent. Conductors were accused of accepting bribes for better treatment, cheating on food rations, inflicting arbitrary punishments, and misappropriating funds. When investigations of complaints were conducted, they almost always resulted in the vindication of the conductors. ⁽²⁵⁾ Hence, while conditions undoubtedly were better in the second half of the eighteenth century than before, prisoners still were at the mercy of the conductors.

The itineraries followed by the chains were the same as those used in previous centuries. Toledo remained the main depósito and distributing center for Castile, although most chains for Cartagena now originated in Madrid and contained a large number of prisoners from the jails of that city. Prisoners condemned to the arsenal of Cartagena from the north and northwest (Galicia, Asturias, Old Castile) were sent first to Valladolid, and from there, in company with those sentenced in Valladolid, they were dispatched to Toledo. ⁽²⁶⁾ There they were placed in the depósito where they awaited the formation of a chain for Cartagena. Most often they were added to a chain from Madrid, and together, under the command of the Madrid conductor and his troops, they proceeded to Cartagena. From Toledo the chain moved southeastward through the bleak uplands of La Mancha to the town of Albacete -- a trip of thirteen days. From there they traveled southward to Murcia (six days) along a road that dropped at one point some 2,000 feet within a distance of ninety miles. They covered the last part of the journey, from Murcia to Cartagena, in one day.

The trip from Madrid to Cartagena in the eighteenth century took twenty-four days, and given the distance between the two points (according to their route), it is possible to estimate an average daily march of twelve miles, weather and other conditions permitting. When crossing the dry rough plateau country between Toledo and Albacete the chain moved at a slower pace, however. By the time they reached Murcia, most prisoners experienced general physical exhaustion. The gradual deterioration in the health and strength of the men is reflected in the steady increase in the number of carts utilized for the trip from Toledo to Murcia, especially after Albacete (see table 5.6). From Albacete to Murcia the speed was increased to seventeen miles a day, with the prisoners riding most of the time. [79] Finally, all prisoners rode in carts in order to cover the last thirty one miles between Murcia and Cartagena in one day.

For men who survived the rigors of imprisonment and the long trek to Cartagena, conditions in the arsenals were harsh, but supportable. At Cartagena, before 1773 they were housed aboard the decaying galley hulks; in 1773 a barracks was built for them. ⁽²⁷⁾ At El Ferrol and La Carraca they were lodged in barracks from the beginning. Later on, an edifice called
 
 

Leg of Journey	Leagues	Carts	Mules	Cost (reales)
Madrid-Getafe	2	4	16	60
Getafe-Torrejón	2	3	20	75
Torrejón-Yuncos	3	5	20	112.5
Yuncos-Cabañas	2	7	28	105
Cabañas-Toledo	3	7	28	157.5
Toledo-Almonacid	3	8	32	180
Almonacid-Manzaneque	3	10	40	225
Manzaneque-Madridejos	5	10	20	225
Madridejos-Villafranca	3	10	20	135
Villafranca-Campo de Criptana	3	10	20	135
Campo de Criptana- Pedro Múñoz	3	10	20	90
Pedro Múñoz- Socuéllamos	3	10	20	90
Socuéllamos- Villarribledo	3	10	20	135
Villarribledo-Minaya	3	10	20	135
Minaya-La Roda	3	12	24	162
La Roda- La Jineta	3	11	22	148.5
La Jineta- Albacete	3	12	24	162
Albacete-Chincilla	3	12	24	108
Chinchilla-Tobarra	5	12	24	270
Tobarra-Jumilla	5	12	24	270
Jumilla-Cieza	5	12	24	270
Cieza-Molina	5	14	28	315
Molina-Murcia	2	23	46	207
Murcia-Cartagena	9	23	46	931.5
Total, Madrid-Cartagena				4704

[80] the Casa de Cuatro Torres (because of its characteristic four corner towers) was built at La Carraca to serve as their jail. This building, large enough to house 2,000 prisoners, was divided into two sections. The main part served as living quarters for the presidiarios, while the towers contained offices and rooms for the foremen and guards. Most of the area designed for the prisoners was taken up with lines of wooden bunks where they slept with their shackles fastened to chains attached to iron rings on the wall. ⁽²⁸⁾ Some of the more fortunate had straw bedding, but because of the danger of fire the authorities were reluctant to allow straw beds. Only at El Ferrol, where climatic conditions kept their clothes permanently dampened, were the presidiarios given blankets. This was done so that they could remove their clothes at night to permit drying. As for sanitary conditions, at La Carraca, for example, the presidiarios shared their living space with six pigs that belonged to one of the guards. ⁽²⁹⁾ Yet squalid circumstances of this kind were not unusual among the poor in the eighteenth century, and this was the class from which almost all of these men were drawn.

In the 1750s the diet of the presidiarios and slaves in the arsenals remained basically the same as on the galleys. Their daily fare still consisted of vegetable stews and bread in the form of biscuit, but there were two important differences. Rising bread prices by the mid-eighteenth century had caused a reduction in the daily ration from twenty-six to twenty-four ounces per man, while lower prices for wine led to its introduction (one pint a day per man) in place of water, the standard beverage on the galleys. Wine in the eighteenth century became a cheap foodstuff and an excellent source of calories when bread was expensive or unavailable. ⁽³⁰⁾

There was a slight improvement in the food ration in the last quarter of the century due to changes in the methods of distribution (see table 5.7). Originally, following the practice of the galleys, only two meals a day were provided, worth a total of twenty-two maravedís. The remaining twelve maravedís of the one real that the king had designated for the daily maintenance of the presidiarios was given to them in cash. It was expected that they would use it to purchase additional food, but most bought tobacco or gambled the money away. In order to provide them with a more balanced diet, [81] the officials at Cartagena began to assign the whole sum of one real for food. In 1765 they introduced this practice for those working at the pumps, and by the early 1770s it was extended to the rest of the presidiarios. ⁽³¹⁾ In this way, they created a third meal (breakfast) out of the surplus twelve maravedís, but the sum total of food per day remained the same. The new system secured a better distribution of the same amount of edibles rather than providing better nutrition.

In contrast to Cartagena, the system of three meals a day was not introduced at La Carraca even though a commission investigating conditions there in 1777 urged its adoption. ⁽³²⁾ The same committee reported that the midday meal at that arsenal consisted of a plate of beans that was full of worms and vermin. At night the prisoners received a stew of rice and chickpeas (reportedly "as hard as bullets"). There were many presidiarios who did not eat their daily ration, and instead purchased food with the twelve maravedís that they received in cash. In the opinion of the investigators, this was the cause of their chronic malnutrition and illness, because twelve maravedís could not provide sufficient sustenance. Despite the recommendations of this commission, the system of two meals a day was continued at La Carraca. At El Ferrol only one meal a day was [82] provided, and prisoners were expected to purchase additional food with the rest of the sum allowed them. ⁽³³⁾
 
 

year	Item	Daily Ration (per man)	Cost of Daily Ration
1752	Biscuit	24ounces	22 maravedís*
	Beans	7 ounces
	(or Chickpeas)	6 ounces
	Wine	1 pint
1777**	Biscuit	24 ounces	1 real
	Beans	11 ounces
	Rice	3 ounces
	Wine	1 pint

Although the presidio ration was based on bread and beans and was totally lacking in meat, this did not make it inadequate from a dietary point of view in the eighteenth century. In this period there were marked differences in meat consumption according to social classes, as well as variations among regions and between towns and countryside. Urban meat consumption totals tended to be higher than rural ones, but here, too, there was considerable variety. Vincente Vizcaíno Pérez, an eighteenth-century economic thinker, claimed that the unskilled working class as a whole lived permanently on a diet of bread and vegetables and rarely or never consumed meat. ⁽³⁴⁾

Some idea of how the presidio ration compared with the daily fare of free workers can be derived from a survey of conditions among the bakers of Madrid in the year l767-1768. ⁽³⁵⁾ Since the objectives of this investigation were fiscal, that is, to fix bread prices, a certain amount of exaggeration on the plus rather than minus side must be allowed. It was reported that all workers in the bakeries were given three meals a day in the form of identical stews. The average stew contained, per man, two ounces of meat, two ounces of chickpeas, one third of an ounce of bacon, and a sprinkling of olive oil plus seasonings. The stews of the workers, while slightly more varied and flavorful, were not much better nutritionally than those of the presidiarios.

As on the galleys, fraud and corruption reduced both the quality and quantity of the rations. In 1752 the prisoners at Cartagena claimed that they only received twenty-two ounces of bread, and that it was so hard and stale that they had to crush it with a stone or soak it before it could be eaten. They described their main meal as a watery stew with a handful of spoiled beans. Twenty years later the same complaints were being made. In 1772 the presidiarios at Cartagena asserted that their bread ration was short and that the stews contained fewer beans than required. They estimated that the individual stew rations were not worth more than two maravedís each -- at least that was the price for which they were sold by those not able or willing to eat them. ⁽³⁶⁾ In 1783 circumstances were still the same. In a petition of that year, prisoners complained that the food that [83] they actually received was less than the official ration and that it was of inferior quality. ⁽³⁷⁾

While the presidio ration was supportable by eighteenth-century standards, it was nutritionally deficient, especially for the amount of labor being performed. Prisoners worked from dawn to dusk with a brief respite for lunch at midday. Frequently they were required to work on holidays, particularly in the early days of major construction at the arsenals and, later on, at such tasks as picking oakum in their barracks. ⁽³⁸⁾ They performed their labor while wearing chains, that is, chained together in pairs and with fetters on their feet. These chains, weighing several pounds, hindered their movements and limited their output. In 1772 the intendant of Cartagena reported to the king that the labor of two presidiarios was scarcely equivalent to that of one free worker. ⁽³⁹⁾ Any kind of work performed while wearing chains required extra food whereas the presidio ration only provided for the bare needs of existence.

The presidiarios and slaves who worked the chain pumps were an exception. In consideration of the severity of their work, they received a larger gratuity of twelve cuartos or forty-eight reales from the beginning, but only eight cuartos of this sum was invested in their food. In 1765, officials at Cartagena, convinced that this food allowance was inadequate, began to allot all twelve cuartos for rations. In that year there were 390 prisoners assigned to the thirteen chain pumps at that arsenal. Ten men worked each pump in three daily shifts of four hours. Every man labored a total of eight hours a day. ⁽⁴⁰⁾

The pumps had to be worked constantly. At Cartagena there was a leakage of some 3,690 cubic feet of water, and if it had not been for the steady movement of the pumps, the drydocks never would have been free of water. Prisoners and slaves were forced to work day and night, and when there were shortages of men due to illness or death, they were kept at this labor twelve to fourteen hours a day. ⁽⁴¹⁾ Like their working conditions, the circumstances under which they lived were harsh. To begin with, they were separated from the rest of the prisoners and housed aboard one of the galley hulks that had been set aside for them and anchored near the pumps. To achieve more security and convenience in 1771 they were moved into a subterranean chamber located under the pumps. There they [85] were confined to a small damp space without proper ventilation and subjected to the constant noise of the machinery. The pump room remained their quarters until 1773, when, in response to their numerous petitions, the king ordered them transferred to a nearby storehouse that was converted into a barracks for them. ⁽⁴²⁾

Despite the improved housing, conditions at the pumps continued to be the same. When the English traveler Henry Swinburne visited the arsenal of Cartagena in 1775, he observed that there were 800 presidiarios and 500 slaves assigned to the pumps, and that most labored there for a total of fifteen hours a day. He also reported that scarcely a day passed without some of them dropping dead at their work, and that suicides were frequent. ⁽⁴³⁾ Twelve years after Swinburne's visit, the labor at the pumps ceased. In 1787 steam pumps were installed at Cartagena to replace the chain pumps, and in that same year the penalty of hard labor at the chain pumps was abolished. ⁽⁴⁴⁾

Two factors combined to bring an end to the presidios in the naval arsenals: the rising cost of maintaining them as penal institutions, and the decline of the Spanish navy after its defeat at Trafalgar in 1805. Originally, penal laborers were introduced into the arsensals to fill the immediate demand for cheap unskilled workers, but their continued use there depended on a combination of favorable economic factors. These circumstances existed in the period between 1749 and the 1770s, when it was financially advantageous for the state to utilize presidiarios to perform heavy labor in the arsenals because they were cheaper than free laborers. During those years their total upkeep, including food, clothing, and security, cost less than three reales a day per man as compared with the three and one-half reales (winter) and four reales (summer) in daily wages required by free workers. ⁽⁴⁵⁾ In addition to the saving in wages, recruitment of free workers for unskilled jobs in the arsenals was difficult. In the planting and harvesting seasons contract labor was not available, and, regardless of the time of the year, free laborers could not be hired to work the chain pumps or to do any other disagreeable work. Even when slightly higher wages were paid as an inducement, as occurred at El Ferrol during the early years of construction, free workers still refused to labor there because of unfavorable working conditions. ⁽⁴⁶⁾

[86] In the late l770s the economic situation began to change. Sharply rising prices, particularly during the war period, 1778-83, increased the cost of maintaining the presidiarios and thereby reduced the economic benefits to be gained from their labor. From 1785 through the early years of the nineteenth century, a growing inflationary trend with a corresponding decline in wages (both real and nominal) completely reversed the economic balance. Maintaining the presidiarios in the arsenals became more costly than hiring free labor. In 1775 Swinburne observed that it cost the Spanish government five reales a day per man to support the presidiarios, while their work was estimated to be worth less than one tenth of what they ate. In 1800 the expenses of their maintenance had risen to eight reales a day per man, and the quality of their work when compared with that of free workers was calculated at the ratio of one to three, that is, three convicts did the work of one free laborer. ⁽⁴⁷⁾

As it became more expensive to feed and clothe the presidiarios, there was less need for their labor. The completion of major construction work in the arsenals and the installation of the steam pumps eliminated many of the difficult and distasteful jobs. Labor in the arsenals became more attractive to free workers. But despite these circumstances, there was no substantial decline in the arsenal prisoner population. There were 2,201 presidiarios in the arsenal of Cartagena in 1802, that is, some 491 more than in 1771, with "little or no work to do and idle most of the time." ⁽⁴⁸⁾ In 1804 the king ordered the courts to refrain from sentencing criminals to the arsenals, especially Cartagena, but this decree, like previous ones in 1801 and 1802, had little effect. Aside from the crowded North African presidios, there was no other place where serious offenders could be sent. These circumstances, in conjunction with the penal reform ideas popular at the end of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, led to an attempt to preserve the naval presidios by transforming them into experimental correctional presidios.

In 1804 a new system of penal practice that combined the utilitarian needs of the state with the correction of offenders was established in the arsenals. ⁽⁴⁹⁾ Inmate rehabilitation was to be effective through compulsory work in (and learning of) a special craft, with the end of making inmates useful to society and themselves. Prisoners had to pass through three progressive stages, each with its [87] own system of rewards and punishments. In the first stage (corresponding to the first third of their sentences) they were assigned to hard manual labor in the arsenal, which they performed wearing heavy fetters and chained together in pairs. During the remainder of their terms, they were trained in seamanship and related crafts (second stage) and labored in these occupations (third stage). During this period their chains were lighter and fewer (those in the third category wore light fetters only), and they received a gratuity from one to three reales a day for their work. Although most of the money they earned was not given them until they completed their sentences, they could use 25 percent of it each month to improve their food and clothing. Under this system their labor was compulsory but at the same time educative and rehabilitative. It prepared them for re-entry into society by giving them a trade and some financial means to start a new life. In the opinion of the Spanish penologist Rafael Salillas, the legislation of 1804 for the arsenals laid the foundations for the progressive penal system adopted in Spanish correctional prisons in the nineteenth century. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

The naval disaster at Trafalgar in 1805 completed the ruin of the Spanish navy and brought a rapid end to the experimental presidios. In 1807 there still were a thousand prisoners in each of the three arsenals, but as a result of a decree of that year prohibiting further admissions, their numbers were reduced to a handful. In 1818 the presidios at Cartagena and El Ferrol were terminated when their remaining prisoners (ten and seven men, respectively) were transferred to other presidios. As for La Carraca, it continued to function as a military presidio for naval offenders, and continues to serve in that capacity today. ⁽⁵¹⁾

1. AGS, Marina, leg. 699, Oct. 11, 1749; Sevilla y Solanas, Historia penitenciaria, p. 35.

2. AGS, Marina, leg. 699, Oct. 11, 1748-Nov. 16, 1749; Sevilla y Solanas, Historia penitenciaria, p. 35.

3. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1787, vol. 2, if. 681-82, June 5, 1751.

4. For a discussion of Bourbon policies toward the gypsies, see Sánchez Ortega, Los gitanos españoles. According to the author, their real objective was to exterminate the gypsies.

5. AGS, Marina, leg. 700, Jan. 9, 1769; leg. 695, July 13, 1766, and Oct. 12, 1765; Pérez Estévez, El problema de los vagos, pp. 248-88.

6. Pérez Estévez, El problema de los vagos, p. 249. The experiment with the gypsies was an acknowledged failure by 1760. A decree in 1763 ordered their release from the arsenals, with the exception of those sentenced for crimes.

7. Sevilla y Solanas, Historia penitenciaria, p. 204; Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, La sociedad espanola en el siglo XVIII (Madrid: C.S.I.C., 1955), pp. 227-28. It is not clear how many actually served at Cádiz and El Ferrol in the 1750s and 1760s, but Cartagena was always their principal center.

8. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1765, f. 671, Feb. 25, 1765.

9. Novisíma Recopilación, book 12, title 100, law 7, Mat 12, 1771.

10. The chain pumps, worked by the prisoners and slaves twenty-four hours a day, were used to remove water from the diydocks where ships were being constructed or repaired. AGS, Marina, leg. 699, Dec. 17, 1765; Feb. 1, 1769.

11. Novísima Recapilación, book 12, title 100, law 7, Mat 12, 1771; Lardizábal, Discurso de las penas, pp. 603-6, 710.

12. AGS, Marina, leg. 708, Oct. 10, 1773.

13. Ibid., leg. 700, year 1772; leg. 694, July 13, 1762.

14. Lasala Navarro, Galeotes y presidiarios, p. 115. In 1802 and 1804 the courts were prohibited from sentencing prisoners to Cartagena, but this legislation proved ineffective. Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:14.

15. In 1771 there were 721 presidiarios at La Carraca and 588 at El Ferrol. In 1808 there were approximately 1,000 prisoners at each of the three arsenals. AGS, Marina, leg. 700, Dec. 30, 1771; Lasala Navarro, Galeotes y presidiarios, p. 114.

16. Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:118.

17. Sevilla y Solanas, Historia penitenciaria española, pp. 224-27; MN, Vargas Ponce, tomo 35, doc. 61, Mar 12, 1754.

18. Pérez Estévez, El problema de los vagos, pp. 263-66; AGS, Marina, leg. 693, Oct. 10, 1773; leg. 699, June 3, 1761.

19. AGS, Marina, leg. 706, Aug. 22, 1761; leg. 708, Sept. 30, 1767.

20. Ibid., leg. 708, July 12, 1774; Apr. 5, 1770; July 6, 1757.

21. AGS, Secretaría de Hacienda, leg. 978, years 1792-97.

22. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4975, Feb. 4, 1785; leg. 4923, Mar 9,1775; AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1788, f. 877; year 1797,f. 757.

23. AGS, Secretaría de Hacienda, leg. 978, Oct. 9, 1797.

24. Ibid., leg. 978, July 26, 1793.

25. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4885, Sept. 21, 1764.

26. Ibid., leg. 4950, Feb. 8, 1779.

27. Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:126. This building became known as the "Cuartel de Presidiarios." AGS, Marina, leg. 700, Jan. 8, 1772.

28. The date of its construction is not clear. Salillas believed that it probably was built in the 1760s. See Salillas, La vida penal en España (Madrid: Imprenta de la Revista de Legislación, 1888), p. 238.

29. AGS, Marina, leg. 700, Sept. 18, 1778; Nov. 6, 1773.

30. Bread prices oscillated between eight and sixteen reales a pound (excluding years of severe scarcity), while wine prices remained fixed around three reales per azumbre (equivalent to four pints). Domínguez Ortiz, La sociedad española en el siglo XVIII, p 212.

31. AGS, Marina, leg. 699, Feb. 19, 1765; leg. 700, 1774.

32. Ibid., leg. 697, Sept. 20, 1777.

33. Perez Estévez, El problema de los vagos, p. 256. The vegetable stew in this one meal contained salt pork, however. The northern region of Spain had a higher consumption of meat than any other area. For example, individual consumption of meat in the city of Bilbao in the mid-eighteenth century was four times that of the average for the rest of the country. Vicente Palacio Atard, "Notas acerca de la historia de Ia alimentación," in his Los españoles de la Ilustración (Madrid: Ediciones Guadarrama, 1964), p. 298.

34. Vicente Vizcaíno Pérez, Discursos politícos sobre los estragos que causan los censos, felicidades y medios de su extinción, comercio fomentado y general abundancia de comestibles en España (Madrid, 1766), as quoted in Palacio Atard, "Notes," p. 295. For the diet of the poor of Madrid, see Soubeyroux, Pauperisme, 1:148-61.

35. AHN, Consejos, leg. 6774, as quoted in Palacio Atard, "Notas acerca de la alimentación," pp. 301-6.

36. AGS, Marina, leg. 696, May 1772. For the petition of 1752, see ibid., leg. 694, Aug. 2, 1752.

37. Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:160. For the petition of 1783, see AGS, Marina, leg. 698, Aug. 8, 1783.

38. AGS, Marina, leg. 698, Aug. 8, 1783.

39. Ibid., leg. 700, Jan. 8, 1772.

40. Ibid., leg. 699, Feb. 2, 1765. For the change in their ration, see ibid., Feb. 19, 1765.

41. Ibid., leg. 699, Feb. 19, 1765.

42. Ibid., leg. 694, May 16, 1772; leg. 696, Oct. 10, 1773.

43. Henry Swinburne, Travels through Spain in the Years 1775 and 1776 (London: P. Elmsly, 1779), p. 124.

44. AGS, Guerra Modema, leg. 4962, July 26, 1787.

45. AGS, Marina, leg. 700, Jan. 8, 1772.

46. Ibid., leg. 708, Oct. 12, 1763; leg. 700, Jan. 8, 1772; Antonio Meijide Pardo, Contribución a la historia de la industria naval de Galicia: Los arsenales del Ferrol en el siglo XVIII (Lisbon: Congreso Internacional de historia dos descubrimientos, 1961), p. 26.

47. Sevilla y Solanas, Historia penitenciaria, p. 230; Swinburne, Travels, p. 125. For the price rise in the second half of the eighteenth century, see Jaime Vicens Vives, ed., Historia social y económica de España y América (Madrid: Editorial Vicens-Vives, 1972), 4:183-85.

48. Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:14.

49. This new system was created in the Ordenanza de los Presidios Arsenales in 1804, and its text has been published in Lasala Navarro, Galeotes y presidiarios, ch. 16.

50. Rafael Salillas, La vida penal en España, (Madrid: Imprenta de la Revista de Legislación, 1888), p. 238.

51. Lasala Navarro, Galeotes y presidiarios, pp. 114-15.