[88] In Spain the public works presidios were created in the second half of the eighteenth century to meet the needs of the Bourbon monarchs. During the reign of Charles III (1759-88), an extensive public works program was inaugurated with the objective of improving transportation and communications within the country. The most important innovations undertaken were the construction of paved roads and canals. In 1761, construction was begun on a highway system designed to connect Madrid with the periphery. The pattern that was adopted reflected the prevailing concepts of political centralization. Madrid was to be the center of a radial system that formed the circulation of the country. The new royal highways or caminos reales followed the most direct routes from Madrid to their peripheral destinations: Irún, Barcelona, Cádiz, Cartagena, Badajoz, and La Coruña. They were designed for efficient communications, and had little impact on the vast areas between them. Since they were constructed in a straight line, some of the most important interior towns, notably Toledo and Valladolid, were left out. ⁽¹⁾

These royal roads were planned on a grandiose scale, in terms of cost and conception. The enterprise was so ambitious and it moved so slowly that some thirty years later most of the work was still only half finished. ⁽²⁾ In the last decade of the eighteenth century and the [89] first years of the nineteenth century, efforts also were made to build highways connecting the provincial and port cities. Some of the best roads were constructed in the Basque country and along the Mediterranean coast from Valencia to the French border. During those years, around 2,000 kilometers of new roads were added. By 1812, there were 12,700 kilometers of roads in Spain, a gain of 4,300 kilometers since 1758. Of this total, almost 4,000 kilometers could be found in Old Castile and León, with the rest distributed throughout the other northern and northwestern provinces. ⁽³⁾

Like paved roads and highways, canals also were deemed necessary to stimulate economic development. A canal system was seen as the best means to lower the costs of transportation between the interior regions and the sea. By the 1780s, several canals were under construction, but the most impressive were the canals of Aragon and Castile. The canal of Aragon, based on a plan devised in the sixteenth century but abandoned because of engineering problems, was to run beside the Ebro River from Tudela to the Mediterranean Sea. A concession was given to a French company in 1768, but the enterprise soon failed, and the project was not revived until 1779, when the government invested large subsidies in it. By the end of the l780s the canal of Aragon was completed as far as Zaragoza. Subsidiary irrigation canals for this region, for example, the canal of Tauste, also were part of the plan. ⁽⁴⁾

The canal of Castile was to begin at Segovia, run northward past Valladolid and Reinosa, and enter the sea at Santander. Another branch of this system was to extend westward from Valladolid to Zamora. Construction began in the 1750s and continued intermittently until 1779, when the work was suspended pending further advancement on the canal of Aragon. When Townsend visited it in 1787, only a small portion of the canal, from Reinosa to Medina del Ríoseco, had been completed. ⁽⁵⁾ A third canal (the canal of Guadarrama) was to be build from Madrid southward through New Castile and La Mancha into Andalusia, entering the Guadalquivir River at Seville or Córdoba. It was hoped that this southern canal and the others would eventually form a national canal network comparable to the projected road system. ⁽⁶⁾

Road and canal building, like the construction of naval arsenals and military fortifications, required the mobilization of a large labor [90] force at minimum cost. Once again, the campaign to derive utility from marginal elements coincided with the public works program. As had occurred in the arsenals of Cartagena and El Ferrol, an attempt was made to supplement free contract laborers with forced workers. In the beginning, this was done with the use of slaves and gypsies. In 1763, three hundred Moslem slaves from the arsenal of Cartagena were sent to labor on the road being built from Madrid to Barcelona. Several gypsies who were confined to that same arsenal under the forced labor legislation of 1749 went along as foremen. The following year another contingent of slaves and gypsy foremen was transferred from Cartagena to construction work on the road from Madrid to Segovia. ⁽⁷⁾

The experiment with slaves and gypsies was short-lived. In 1765, a royal decree repealed all previous legislation conscripting the gypsies for forced labor and ordered them freed from the arsenals and sent to their places of origin. ⁽⁸⁾ One year later a representative of the Moroccan government arrived in Madrid to negotiate a peace treaty and arrange for a mutual exchange of prisoners. He visited the Moslem slaves who were laboring on the Segovia road and secured the release of the Moroccans. From there he went to Cartagena, where be obtained freedom for the rest of the Moroccan slaves in the arsenal. ⁽⁹⁾ After the removal of the Moroccans, the remaining slaves working on the Segovia road (Algerians, Tunisians, and Turks) were returned to Cartagena. By that time the heavy work of excavation had been completed, and it was difficult to use the slaves in other tasks because of security problems. Moreover, frequent prisoner exchanges with the North African states from this time forward steadily reduced the number of slaves in Spain, and those still available were needed to operate the chain pumps at Cartagena. ⁽¹⁰⁾

Simultaneously with the employment of slaves and gypsies, the government decided to conscript vagrants for public works. There existed a plan (originally conceived in the 1750s) to establish permanent brigades of vagrants assigned to public labor. These brigades, under the command of the military, were to be composed of one hundred men each. Their members were to be dressed in uniforms, housed in military barracks, and guarded by troops. In times of peace, they would be employed in constructing and repairing [91] roads, building canals, and other kinds of hard labor. In wartime, they would be useful to the army as minelayers and sappers. But the companies were not formed, and because of the steady manpower demands of the armed forces, the majority of vagrants were destined for military service. Public works were reserved for vagrants who were too old for service at arms or whose physical condition was not satisfactory for work in the arsenals. According to Pérez Estévez, those destined for public works represented a mere 6 percent of her sample for the years 1730-82. ⁽¹¹⁾

In Madrid there was a special situation. As the center of the court and administrative capital, it had a larger number of vagrants than any other city in the country. Here the levies of vagrants were constant, especially after the riots of 1766. These conditions gave rise to a surplus difficult to accommodate in the jails. ⁽¹²⁾ In order to relieve the overcrowding, it was decided to use the vagrants destined for the armed services in public works while they were awaiting transportation to their units. ⁽¹³⁾ This decision also coincided with the initiation of a beautification program for Madrid. In its initial stages it involved the opening of new streets, the completion of the work of paving begun earlier, and the bettering of old promenades and the opening of new ones. In 1770, an order was issued transferring vagrants from the Madrid jails to a building specifically designated to serve as a depósito for them. This edifice, a former cavalry barracks, was located behind the Royal Granary near the Prado de San Jerónimo. For several years prior to this date, vagrants destined for the navy had been housed there and used occasionally in public works. This move marked the beginning of the first public works presidio of Madrid, known as the Presidio del Prado. ⁽¹⁴⁾

The penal population of the Prado presidio in the early 1770s consisted primarily of vagrants, either those serving temporarily or those sentenced to public works because of ineligibility for military service. In general, the courts tried to take into consideration the age and physical condition of the vagrants, but since the objective was to secure the maximum number for the armed forces, many concessions were made. Consequently, the contingents of vagrants sentenced to public works were always minimal, even in a city like Madrid. For example, in the first six months of 1771, of the 192 [92] vagrants imprisoned in the Cárcel de Corte, only thirty-nine were sentenced to public works. ⁽¹⁵⁾

In addition to vagrants, the Madrid courts began to sentence petty offenders to the Prado presidio. During these years public works began to be championed as the best means of punishment for those convicted of minor crimes. ⁽¹⁶⁾ Traditionally, fines, banishment, and/ or flogging had been applied to minor offenders, but the effectiveness of these penalties had long been questioned. The fines that were levied usually remained uncollected because the defendants, being poor men, could not pay them. As a result they remained in jails, causing overcrowding in those institutions and increasing the risks of disorder and disease. If applied to public works, indigent offenders could work off the fines and court fees that they owed. As for the municipality, it could utilize the prisoners in its building projects and in the regular tasks of street-cleaning and repairing, as well as in the of upkeep of parks and promenades. ⁽¹⁷⁾ The convicts could be maintained at half the cost of wage laborers. From the early 1770s until 1805, two reales a day was the daily compensation per prisoner, whereas the rate for free contract laborers was at least four reales a day. ⁽¹⁸⁾

Regardless of the advantages of sentencing minor offenders to public works, the number actually assigned there remained small. This was particularly true in the initial years. For example, in the six-month period from January to June, 1771, 147 prisoners were sentenced to the Prado presidio from all the jurisdictions of Madrid. Fewer prisoners completed their sentences. Of those sentenced in 1771, eleven were transferred from the Prado to other destinations (the hospicios or the navy), while nineteen were freed before the termination of their sentences. Discounting the five who died and the one who escaped, a total of thirty-seven completed their terms. At the end of June, 1771, the population of the Prado was seventy-four presidiarios. ⁽¹⁹⁾

The year 1774 marked a turning point in the history of the public works presidio. The changes introduced in that year were related to the inauguration of one of the most important projects for the beautification of Madrid. It was decided to remodel the Prado Promenade, a favorite recreation spot for madrileños for centuries because of its rustic setting. The plans called for the transformation of this [93] area into a vast public walk lined with trees and benches and adorned with statues, vases, and fountains. Although the project for the reconstruction of the Prado was devised in 1767 by the Count of Aranda, actual work did not begin until 1774. ⁽²⁰⁾ In that year, prisoners from the nearby Prado presidio were used to perform the costly and heavy labor of clearing and leveling the land in preparation for construction. At the same time, the presidio was placed under the financial control of the municipality of Madrid. In the beginning, a part of the expenses of the establishment was paid from release fees extracted from the inmates, but with the abolition of these payments for presidio prisoners in 1776, funds had to be drawn entirely from city taxes. ⁽²¹⁾

While the presidio was the financial responsibility of the municipality, it was run by the military. It was located in a converted military barracks, and its commander was an army officer attached to the garrison of Madrid. He was assisted by two other officers, a sergeant and a foreman. The sergeant was in charge of the custody and guard of the prisoners, while the foreman went out with them and directed their work. Troops stationed in Madrid were sent on a rotating basis to guard the presidiarios both when they were at work and when they were confined to the presidio barracks. ⁽²²⁾

In 1775, major offenders sentenced to the overseas presidios and naval arsenals (rematados) from the Cárcel de Corte who were awaiting the departure of the chain were sent to the Prado presidio. ⁽²³⁾ This move was made because the relatively few prisoners regularly sentenced to the presidio could not meet the growing demand for workers. The rematados were to work on the Promenade and other public works during the interim period. When the chain was ready, they were to be returned to the jail where they would be subjected to the usual physical examinations and certifications prior to their departure. Although the use of rematados in public works was an innovation, a precedent had been set already in the temporary application of vagrants destined for the armed services. The transferral of the rematados to the Prado in 1775 converted it into a depósito as well as a public works presidio. In contrast to what occurred in other parts of Spain, the public works presidio of Madrid originated independently of the depósito rather than developing out of it. When John Howard visited it in 1783, he noted its mixed character. He [94] saw three kinds of prisoners: those sentenced originally to pub1ic works, those destined for the navy, and rematados. There were around one hundred prisoners at that time. ⁽²⁴⁾

During the late 1770s there was an attempt to utilize rematados in public works projects on a more permanent basis. In 1777 the king authorized the tribunals of the kingdom to sentence offenders normally sent to the overseas presidios and arsenals to work on the Canal of Murcia. ⁽²⁵⁾ The king took this action on the request of the company undertaking the construction of the canal. Its directors complained that the work was being delayed because of the difficulty of hiring laborers, especially during the planting and harvesting seasons. According to the terms of this concession, prisoners sent to labor on the canal were to be supported by the king, that is, given the usual presidio ration, and utilized principally in excavation work. There was a provision which permitted the distribution of gratuities in the form of cash to prisoners in reward for extra labor. It was hoped that this would stimulate them to work harder so that the project would advance more rapidly. At the same time, the extra money they gained could be used to improve their conditions. ⁽²⁶⁾ This system proved too costly and was abandoned, but the idea of offering incentives to prisoners was retained. In future projects involving penal labor, reductions in sentences replaced money compensation.

In 1784 the government began construction of a new highway (the Camino Imperial) from Madrid north to the French frontier. This led to a new use of presidiarios from the Prado presidio. In September, 1784, the tribunals of Madrid were ordered to sentence as many prisoners as possible to forced labor on the new road. The only stipulation was that their sentences had to exceed fifteen days, because anything less was considered too short to be serviceable. Reductions in sentences were to be allowed as rewards for extra work, and the directors of the project were specifically enjoined to uphold this policy. ⁽²⁷⁾ In the following years reductions were awarded periodically, and, on the average (depending on the gravity of the offense), ranged from three months for a six-month term and four months for a two-year sentence to eight months for a three-year term. ⁽²⁸⁾

In order to facilitate work on the Camino Imperial, the location of the presidio was changed. Presidiarios sentenced to this road [95] were sent to new lodgings closer to the construction work. A few large decrepit barracks on the right side of the Toledo Bridge were outfitted for them. This establishment became known as the Presidio del CaminoImperial or del Puente de Toledo. ⁽²⁹⁾ In 1785 the remaining prisoners in the Prado presidio (only twenty were left) were moved to the new location, and the old building was abandoned. A former washhouse located on the left side of the Toledo Bridge was appropriated for their use. This site came to be known as the Presidio nuevo or del Prado because it was considered the successor of the original Prado presidio. ⁽³⁰⁾ From 1785 to 1798, the public works presidio of Madrid consisted of two establishments located on both sides of the Toledo Bridge. Their penal population labored on the Camino Imperial and other roads leading in and out of the city and performed municipal services such as street- and drain-cleaning, paving work, and the maintenance of parks and promenades. ⁽³¹⁾

The use of prisoners from the Prado presidio in Camino Imperial work also brought about a change in the administration of the presidio. Since the presidiarios were to be used on a royal road, control over the presidio was transferred from the municipality of Madrid to the Dirección General de Correos y Caminos, a royal agency that supervised the construction and repair of roads and highways. ⁽³²⁾ From 1784 to 1804 this agency directed the public works presidio of Madrid, but it did not finance it until after 1798. During the years 1784-98, the city government of Madrid supported the Prado establishment while the Dirección General maintained the Puente de Toledo. In 1798, the two presidios were merged and the Prado site abandoned. At the same time, the Dirección General assumed complete financial control over the new entity. ⁽³³⁾

While it is likely that the original Prado presidio in Madrid was the oldest of its kind on the Peninsula, similar establishments sprang up elsewhere in the 1780s. One of the most important, and probably the first created outside of Madrid, was located in Málaga. Similar factors contributed to its formation, that is, a surplus of prisoners and the inauguration of a public works program in the region. Málaga was the principal distributing center for the North African presidios, and its depósito was the largest in the country. Prisoners were brought to Málaga from all parts of Spain, and they often waited there for years before being transferred to their final destina- [ 96] tions. Unserviceable presidiarios from the North African presidios also were returned to the depósito in Málaga, where they remained until they either were reassigned or died. In addition, prisoners from the North African presidios who were being transferred to the New World presidios and vice-versa were sent through Málaga. The volume of traffic, and the difficulties of transportation due to lack of money, and ships and interruptions because of wars, all combined to produce an excess of prisoners in the depósito at Málaga. ⁽³⁴⁾ In the last two decades of the eighteenth century a rise in the level of criminal activity (especially property crime), reflective of the growth in population, along with more effective law enforcement and a decline in the death penalty, further increased the number of prisoners in the depósito and resulted in serious crowding. ⁽³⁵⁾

The glut of prisoners in the depósito of Málaga occurred precisely at a time when the government was beginning its road-building program in that region. Two new roads were projected, one from Málaga to Granada, and the other from Málaga to Antequera. In order to secure enough cheap laborers, the companies undertaking the two projects applied to the king for a grant of convicts. In 1780, a royal decree ordered the assignment of a part of the prisoners in the depósito of Málaga (the less serious offenders) to work on the two roads. The original contingent consisted of 100 men, but in December 1782 this number was increased to 200. ⁽³⁶⁾ At the same time, the king approved a Reglamento for the governance of prisoners laboring on the Málaga roads. This code, a first of its kind, served as a model for other ordinances, notably that of the Camino Imperial. It incorporated the principle of reducing sentences in return for extra work, and in contrast to later ordinances it established a definite scale for them. A reduction in sentence of three months was to be given for every 1,000 varas of road completed. ⁽³⁷⁾

Although originally intended to labor on the royal roads, prisoners from the depósito were soon being utilized in public works projects sponsored by the municipality of Málaga. One of the most impressive was begun in 1786 when the city undertook to dam the Guadalmedina River, which frequently overflowed its banks and flooded the town. The labor on this project was performed by prisoners from the depósito. By that date almost all the prisoners received in the depósito, regardless of their sentences, were being [97] applied to public works in Málaga. ⁽³⁸⁾ Only the most serious offenders, that is, murderers, infamous thieves, and bandits, were sent on to their destinations in the North African presidios. While remaining a distribution center for the overseas presidios, the depósito at Málaga became a public works presidio as well.

The use of major criminals in public works created serious security problems. Escapes were frequent, and some escapees succeeded in joining the bands of smugglers who were particularly numerous in the mountains around Málaga. Others committed additional crimes -- assaults, murders, and thefts. This situation influenced the king in 1787 to order the depósito officials to refrain from detaining prisoners destined for North Africa in Málaga and to ship there immediately all thieves, bandits, and habitual criminals. Only those who had been convicted of minor crimes or those whose sentences lacked a specific destination could be retained and applied to public works. ⁽³⁹⁾

Conditions in the depósito of Málaga were particularly bad in the 1780s. In 1781 there was a widespread outbreak of jail fever, with great loss of life. Jail fever (now believed to be a form of typhus) resulted from dirt, overcrowding, and lack of sanitary conditions, and was endemic to the jails. During the 1780s the presidiarios complained frequently about poor and insufficient food rations, as well as corrupt guards and overseers. Other complaints included accusations that some prisoners were employed illegally as assistants to the jailers and guards, and that they meted out arbitrary punishments to the others. ⁽⁴⁰⁾

Reports of abuses and mismanagement at the depósito of Málaga eventually reached the king, who ordered an official investigation. In 1795, new regulations were issued for the governance of the presidiarios at Málaga. The new rules once again forbade the retention in Málaga of prisoners sentenced to the overseas presidios, because this practice had continued despite the prohibition against it in 1787. Only those whose sentences bore the designation of public works could be used. According to the official explanation, the prisoners customarily sentenced to public works were minor offenders. This sentencing was done by the courts with the knowledge that minor offenders could be restrained by the limited security in the public works presidios. Other prisoners, the major offenders,[98] needed the extra protection available only in the North African presidios, and (according to the new directives) should be dispatched as soon as possible to them. If by chance the transcripts of any sentences were missing, presidio officials were to direct the sentencing tribunals to replace them. Previously, transcripts had been purposely destroyed so as to justify illegal retention. Finally, presidio administrators were required to provide monthly accounts of deaths and desertions, so as to prevent cover-ups to hide faulty security and mistreatment. ⁽⁴¹⁾

Another one of the abuses associated with the presidio at Málaga was the concession of inmates to private individuals, who used them as servants and employees. While this system was permitted in the North African presidios because of a lack of manpower, it was not allowed in the Peninsular presidios. The Reglamento of 1795 repeated the prohibition against the employment of convicts by private persons resident in Málaga or elsewhere. In addition, the directors of the private companies engaged in the public works projects lost their privilege to grant reductions in sentences. ⁽⁴²⁾ It was felt that this authority in the hands of private individuals interfered with the government's sovereign power to grant pardons. The principal of distributing these rewards was not abandoned, but the power to do so was delegated to government officials.

Coincidentally with the emergence of the public works presidio at Málaga, the same transformation occurred at several other depósitos, namely Cádiz, Cartagena, and Barcelona. Like Málaga, all three were peripheral depósitos that served as main distribution centers. In addition, they were located in areas where there were extensive public works projects in the last decades of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth century. Prisoners were used to build the new Barcelona-Valencia highway in the 1780s and to improve port facilities in Cádiz, Barcelona, and Cartagena. They also were used in all three cities for repair and maintenance of the streets and public thoroughfares. ⁽⁴³⁾

In 1788 the Spanish government approved plans to build the Canal of Guadarrama, and construction was begun. The Bank of San Carlos agreed to advance money for the project and to supervise the work in return for a 10 percent commission and 4 percent per annum for all the money expended. After having difficulties recruit- [99] ing free laborers, the directors of the Bank of San Carlos petitioned the king to grant them a contingent of prisoners. Following the precedent of the Canal of Murcia, the king ordered the assignment of offenders already sentenced and those about to be sentenced to the presidios or military service to the Canal of Guadarrama. Thieves, murderers, smugglers, and counterfeiters were excluded. In accord with this order it was decided to transfer prisoners from the public works presidio of Madrid to the canal. The directors of the project requested the use of 200 convicts immediately, but there were only seventy prisoners in the presidio of Madrid -- twenty-one in the Prado and the rest in the Puente de Toledo. Furthermore, there were quite a few among them who had committed crimes that would prevent them from being used ⁽⁴⁴⁾

Little is known about how the presidio of Madrid functioned during the years 1784-1804 while it was under the supervision of the Dirección General de Caminos. In that period the problem of security was foremost. Escapes were common, despite the guards and chains. Even the introduction of the penalty of 200 lashes for those caught had little effect. One of the most serious incidents occurred in 1788, when a group of presidiarios who were being taken out to work attempted to overpower their guards. In the resulting struggle several prisoners escaped, and there were deaths and injuries on both sides. This event was blamed on the presence in the presidio of army deserters who had been sent to work on the Camino Imperial, but their subsequent removal did not improve the situation. ⁽⁴⁵⁾ One year later there was a full-scale revolt in which the prisoners almost succeeded in seizing the presidio. An investigation of this uprising resulted in accusations of laxity and favoritism against the presidio officials. It was claimed, for example, that some prisoners were allowed to remain without chains, while others left the presidio daily to go into Madrid on errands for themselves or presidio administrators. ⁽⁴⁶⁾ In the 1790s, special efforts were made to enforce discipline and curb corruption, including several changes in command at all ranks. But conditions did not improve substantially. ⁽⁴⁷⁾ In the early 1800s, while the total inmate population was about the same as in previous years, the escape rate had doubled. Similarly, charges of maladministration continued to be directed against the presidio officials. ⁽⁴⁸⁾

[100] Extant data in the municipal archives of Madrid allow a quantitative analysis of prisoners in the public works presidio for selected years. The collection of documents in the Archivo de Villa consists of a series of prisoner lists for the years 1794-1802, when the presidio was under the direction of the Dirección General de Caminos. ⁽⁴⁹⁾ Some of these records contain crimes and sentences. Others give an account of the number of deaths, completed sentences, and releases. A substantial number of transcripts of sentences also have been preserved for the years 1796-1800, yielding additional sociodemographic data. They represent a scattered and fragmentary collection for the most part, with the exception of the years 1799 and 1800, which seem to be complete. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

Table 6.1 shows that in the period 1794-1802, 81 percent of the presidio population was being confined there for one year or less: 52 percent were sentenced to terms of less than one year, while 29 percent were serving one-year sentences. Some 14 percent had been condemned for two years. Convicts serving terms of three years or more, transients, and others made up the remaining 5 percent. ⁽⁵¹⁾ Among the prisoners serving less than one year, 92 percent were sentenced to terms lasting from one to six months. Sentences of two, four and six months were the most common penalties, while terms of less than one month were rare (see table 6.2).

Statistics for releases and completion of sentences can be deduced from these same sources, but the sample is smaller. There is an uninterrupted series of figures for the years 1797-1802. During that period, 37 percent of the men confined to the presidio completed their terms (see table 6.3). A somewhat higher ratio (41 percent) were released before the termination of their sentences. The rest (22 percent) either died, deserted, or were transferred. In the less than [101] one-year group, slightly more men completed their terms than were released (47 percent vs. 38 percent; see table 6.4). For those serving one-year terms the situation was reversed; 27 percent completed their sentences, while 48 percent were released before the end of their terms. When dealing with convicts sentenced for one year or more, mortality and desertion rates must be considered. There was a 6 percent mortality rate among one-year prisoners in the period 1797-1800. Although figures are missing for the number of men who escaped, other sources indicate higher desertion rates among inmates serving one year or longer. ⁽⁵²⁾ Among those in the two-year category, the percentage of prisoners who completed their terms was sharply reduced (only 15 percent). There was an 8 percent death rate as well.
 
 

Length of Sentence	Number of prisoners	Percentage
Less than one year	341	52
One year	190	29
Two years	94	14
Three years or more and other	33	5
Total	658	100

 
 
 
 
 
 

Length of Sentence	Number of Prisoners	Percentage
Less than one month	4	1
One month	43	12
Two months	100	27
Three months	22	6
Four months	72	20
Five months	0	0
six months	100	27
Not stated	24	7
Total	365	100

 
 
 
 
 

	Number of Prisoners	Percentage
Completed sentences	220	37
Released before termination	242	41
Died	20	3
Other	115	19
Total	597	100

The release of a substantial proportion of prisoners before the termination of their sentences was not unusual in a public works [102] presidio in this period. Since many of the men (in particular, those serving one year or less) were convicted of very minor offenses, especially those related to disturbing the domestic or public peace, they were considered candidates for early release. One-year sentences of these offenders usually bore mandatory terms of six months, but they also contained a proviso allowing for parole upon completion of the minimum mandatory term. At the appropriate time, wives or parents petitioned the sentencing tribunals to parole prisoners in consideration of the lightness of their offenses and the urgent need for them at home. The majority of those released early belonged to this group. Severe illness or total physical incapacity was another cause for early release, but these cases were rare. Indisposed and sick presidiarios were treated in the presidio and, if necessary, were transferred to a military hospital where special quarters were reserved for them. ⁽⁵³⁾
 
 

Length of Sentence	Completed Sentences No. (%)	Released No. (%)	Died No. (%)	Other No. (%)
Less than one year	161 (47)	130 (37)	3 (1)	51 (15)
One year	48 (27)	86 (48)	11 (6)	35 (19)
Two years	11 (15)	26 (52)	6 (8)	28 (39)

The public works presidios were established primarily as places of confinement for two kinds of offenders: disturbers of the domestic and public peace and petty thieves. In the period 1799-1800, 63 percent of the men sentenced to the presidio of Madrid belonged to these two categories (see table 6.5). The largest number (34 percent) were convicted of offenses against good customs and morals and disturbing the peace. These delicts included vagrancy, drunkenness, and licentious behavior. Vagrants made up 21 percent of those sentenced for disturbing the peace, while chronic alcoholics accounted for 10 percent. Libertinism, i.e., concubinage and sexual misconduct, represented 19 percent of this category. More numerous (30 percent) were the men sentenced for mistreatment of their wives and failure to support their families. Often these same individuals [103] were convicted of drunkenness and libertinism as well. They served sentences ranging from two months to one year, with an average of four months. They also were the group most likely to be paroled after completing their mandatory sentences. The courts were anxious to return these offenders to their homes as soon as possible so as to prevent destitution and degradation of their wives and families.

The second largest contingent of convicts in the presidio (29 percent) was made up of men convicted of crimes against property. Almost all were sentenced for petty larceny, that is, small thefts involving objects of limited value. Objects stolen were mainly food products and pieces of clothing, usually the most accessible kinds, such as hats, shoes and handkerchiefs. A considerable number of these prisoners were convicted of pilfering from their places of employment -- for example, masons who removed building materials and tools from construction sites, or workers in a meat-salting plant who stole pieces of bacon and lard.
 
 

Nature of Offense	Number of prisoners	Percentage
Crimes against persons	35	13
Crimes against property	80	29
Crimes against good customs and morals, disturbing the domestic peace	63	23
disturbing the public peace	31	11
Swindling, fraud, and counterfeiting	17	6
Offenses related to forests	30	11
Not stated and other	21	7
Total	277	100

Only 13 percent of the men were confined to the presidio for crimes against persons. Punishment for offenses of this kind depended on many factors, in particular, the severity of the injury and the status of the individuals involved. Serious injuries and injuries inflicted on persons of high social position brought sentences to North African presidios. Those serving in the public works presidio for violent behavior were men of low social status (as were their victims), and the injuries inflicted were slight or insignificant. Some were there because they could not pay the damages and fines [104] assessed in these cases. There also were a considerable group who were convicted of attacks against their wives or other members of their families.

The remainder of the population of the Madrid presidio consisted of a small percentage of prisoners sentenced for swindling, fraud, and forgery, as well as offenses related to the forests. In this period the courts were indulgent toward the more intelligent kinds of crimes (except counterfeiting) if they involved men of status and wealth. Few of these offenders were ever prosecuted, as can be seen in their low representation in the North African presidios. The prisoners in the public works presidio of Madrid were all poor men, and their offenses were minor. For example, there were frauds connected with the exercise of their trades: a shopkeeper who sold several people small amounts of adulterated olive oil, or a carpenter who used inferior materials in a commissioned work. There also were a few men condemned for offenses related to the forests. The forests traditionally were sources of food supply during times of shortage. Gleaning and the collection of firewood were still popular and collective acts, as witnessed by the fact that thirteen men were serving six-month sentences each for collecting firewood and acorns from royal and municipal lands. Poaching was a more serious offense that usually resulted in a longer overseas presidio sentence. There were four men in the presidio convicted of poaching. One was sentenced to Puerto Rico, and was at the presidio temporarily until the departure of the chain, while the others were first-time offenders whose crimes were so minor that they did not merit a more severe sentence. They were serving one-year terms each at public works, but their sentences carried the warning that in case of recidivism they would be condemned to eight years in a North African presidio.

Table 6.6 reveals an apparently older convict population. While men under thirty were numerous (31 percent of the sample), they did not predominate. The largest percentage (41 percent) was made up of mature men aged thirty to forty-five years. In addition, there was a substantial proportion of men between the ages of forty-five and fifty-five. After fifty-five, the pyramid declines rapidly. Similarly, there were few young prisoners (under twenty years), since youthful offenders normally were sent to either the hospicios or the houses of correction.

[105] With their population of mature prisoners, the public works presidios stand in sharp contrast to the North African presidios. There were several reasons for this. The North African presidios had a large number of military prisoners, and soldiers were in the youngest age groups. Moreover, the very nature of the public works presidios as places of punishment for minor offenders tended to exclude younger men. In the eighteenth century, as today, each age group was associated with a specific type of crime. Violent crime seemed to have been more closely associated with younger men, and these offenders were normally confined to the North African presidios. Crime among middle-aged and mature men was somewhat different. Among the prisoners in the Madrid presidio, those in their thirties and forties seem to have been involved more often in sexual misconduct, while those in the forty to fifty-five year old category mistreated their wives and engaged in public drunkenness. The oldest criminals were vagrants, who often were convicted of small thefts as well. Younger men (the twenty to thirty-year-old group) committed most of the crimes against persons, while theft was common among all groups.
 
 

Age Group	Number of Prisoners	Percentage
Under 15	1	1
15-19	5	4
20-24	19	14
25-29	23	17
30-34	19	14
35-39	14	11
40-44	21	16
45-49	12	9
50-54	10	7
55-59	5	4
60-64	3	2
65-69	2	1
Total	134	100

Marriage and celibacy rates among the prisoners correspond to their age groups and types of offenses. The majority of convicts were married (65 percent, as compared with 28 percent unmarried [106] and 7 percent widowed), but most of the younger men (under twenty-five years) were single (see table 6.7). Between ages twenty-five and thirty, the ratios of married to unmarried are close (about two to one). Beyond age thirty, the incidence of celibacy drops sharply. Eighty-four percent of the men between thirty and forty-five were married. The number of celibates among those aged forty-five and older was negligible. These figures are consistent with what is known about eighteenth-century marriage patterns. In this period, the average male age at marriage fluctuated between twenty-five and forty years. ⁽⁵⁴⁾ Given the character of the public works presidios, a married older penal population was typical.
 
 

	age group 15-19	age group 20-24	age group 25-29	age group 30-34	age group 35-39	age group 40-44	age group 45-49	age group 50-54	age group 55-59	age group  60-65
Single	100.0	53.0	43.0	9.0	17.0	5.0	29.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Married	0.0	47.0	52.0	91.0	83.0	80.0	57.0	60.0	80.0	100.0
Widowed	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	15.0	14.0	40.0	20.0	0.0

From 1798 to 1803, the presidio of Madrid known as the Puente de Toledo was located in a converted barracks on the right side of the Toledo Bridge. Because of their restricted numbers (usually fifty or sixty), most presidiarios labored in road-building and repair. Few were available to the city for use in street-cleaning and the maintenance of parks and promenades, as had been done in the past. In April, 1803, in order to obtain more penal workers for municipal duties, the city decided to reestablish the Prado presidio. Its former site on the left side of the Toledo Bridge was rehabilitated and by the summer of 1803 it was in full operation. In the following year, control over the Puente de Toledo presidio was transferred from the Dirección General de Caminos to the city of Madrid. The municipal corporation henceforth assumed responsibility for both presidios. ⁽⁵⁵⁾

At the time of the transfer, there were 136 prisoners in both presidios: sixty-three in the Prado and seventy-three in the Puente de Toledo. ⁽⁵⁶⁾ Most men in the Prado (46 percent) were convicted of offenses against good customs and morals and disturbing the domes- [107] tic and public peace. Crimes against persons in which the attack was incidental or the injury superficial made up 21 percent of the total, while crimes against property represented 14 percent. In contrast, 59 percent of the prisoners in the Puente de Toledo had been sentenced for property crimes. Offenses against morality and disturbing the public and domestic peace totaled 21 percent, while personal crime made up 10 percent. The majority of men in both presidios were sentenced to terms of one year or less, but in the Puente de Toledo, a larger percentage of prisoners were serving sentences of two years or more.

The Puente de Toledo was above all a presidio for thieves, while the Prado contained vagrants, drunks, wife-beaters, and sexual misbehavers. The difference between the two presidios was manifest in the kind of work the prisoners did. Contingents from the Prado regularly cleaned the streets and performed other tasks within the city limits. Men from the Puente de Toledo, being property offenders, were considered too dangerous to be used in the city proper. They worked on surrounding roads and other projects on the outskirts of town. ⁽⁵⁷⁾

A considerable number of men in the Puente de Toledo presidio were convicted of serious thefts. In the past they would have been sentenced to a North African presidio, but during these years the government was attempting to reduce the population of the North African presidios. Consequently, the Madrid courts were asked to assign these offenders to public works presidios, and this practice was continued in subsequent years. ⁽⁵⁸⁾ In this way the public works presidios began to take on the form that was fully developed in the nineteenth century, that is, as places of punishment for more substantial property offenders as well as petty thieves.

One year after the city assumed responsibility for the public works presidios of Madrid, there occurred a decisive change in their administration. In 1805, control over them was transferred from the city to the state even though the municipality of Madrid was still required to finance them. ⁽⁵⁹⁾ With the change in status came new rules and regulations for their governance. The Reglamento of 1807 (originally approved in 1805) provided for the creation of the post of director of presidios, a royal appointee directly under the Ministry of Justice. ⁽⁶⁰⁾ The director was responsible for the administration of [108] the two presidios. He was assisted by the presidio commandants, who supervised the day-to-day operations of their establishments. The powers of the commandants, who were to be retired army officers, were limited. They could no longer exempt prisoners from any labor or remove their chains. Nor could they select their subordinates, because all the presidio officials were appointed by the director. Finally, only the director had the authority to reduce sentences in return for extraordinary work, in accord with standard practice in the public works presidios.

The daily routine of the presidiarios was carefully defined. They were required to labor on all public works financed by the municipality, and specifically on highways, public thoroughfares, and crossroads in Madrid and its vicinity. They were to be used in construction work in the cemeteries and in the preservation of the Prado and other promenades and parks. Finally, they were to do street-cleaning, paving, and other tasks related to municipal repair and sanitation. All work was to be performed in chain-gangs and under heavy guard, but with the proviso that those condemned for theft or like crimes could not be used in street-cleaning or other labor within the city proper. In the winter, when bad weather prevented them from laboring outside, they were to be employed indoors making brooms, baskets, and similar items.

For their maintenance, each man received nineteen cuartos (four reales) a day, which was divided into six cuartos for lunch, three cuartos for dinner, and ten cuartos for bread. For the first time, prisoners were required to wear uniforms. Uniforms were not used previously because they were considered too expensive for men serving short sentences, but the poor security record of the presidio while it was under the Dirección General de Caminos influenced the municipality to adopt a uniform. ⁽⁶¹⁾ In addition, the hair of prisoners serving sentences over six months was shaved in a further attempt to reduce escapes. Finally, deserters were to be punished with additional sentences of six months.

The Reglamento of 1807 established the basic rules and regulations for the use of penal labor in public works in the nineteenth century. It incorporated the fundamental methods used in the eighteenth century, but also adopted new ideas reflecting changing concepts of penal organization in the early years of the nineteenth [109] century. The public works presidios originally were military establishments at the service of the city and state. They were directed by military officers and guarded by troops. The Reglamento of 1807 changed their character. Their director became a civilian government employee with wide powers of supervision, while the authority of their commandants, previously unlimited, was sharply reduced. Even though the participation of the military was not completely eliminated, since troops were still used to guard the prisoners, for all practical purposes the public works presidios were transformed into civilian institutions. ⁽⁶²⁾

When they became civilian institutions, the objectives of the public works presidios changed. In the eighteenth century penal labor had two main purposes: utilitarian, that is, the exploitation of convict labor for the state; and vindictive -- the expiation of crimes through suffering. Under the Reglamento of 1807, the public works presidios became correctional presidios, a change reflected even in their titles (presidios de corrección). The name-change implies that the vindictive purpose was no longer to be stressed. Despite the intent, the idea of rehabilitation did not become fully operative until much later; but at least in a theoretical way, the new aim was to reform the inmates through productive labor.

The Reglamento also provided for changes in the kind of work that the prisoners did. In the eighteenth century, presidiarios performed unskilled labor only, and this was considered particularly appropriate for the punitive objectives of their sentences. Because of their chains and the security problems involved in their use, they were held to be unserviceable for other jobs. Moreover, they were always utilized as auxiliary workers (at times when free laborers were not available or too expensive), or else in combination with contractual workers. In contrast to eighteenth-century practice, the aim of the Reglamento of 1807 was to convert the presidiarios into a permanent force of unsalaried city workers. They were to be employed in a variety of municipal jobs, a few of which required a little skill, such as pruning of trees and plants, gardening, and irrigation works in the parks and promenades. The utilitarian aspects of this plan were obvious. By utilizing the convicts, the city did not have to pay salaries to workers to perform necessary municipal tasks, and could effect large savings. In addition, under the Regla- [110] mento the presidios became industrial workshops with the presidiarios producing various items during the off-seasons. The sale of these products could help defray the cost of their upkeep, but aside from economic reasons, there was a rehabilitative element also. By turning the prisoners into gardeners, pruners, irrigation workers, and industrial producers, their work ceased to be, as in the past, simply hard labor, forced and punitive. The work was compulsory, but at the same time useful and remunerative, for when prisoners worked on special assignments they received a gratuity. It also was to be educative, in accord with the modern concept that rehabilitation was the ultimate aim of the penal system.

One of the most important aspects of the Reglamento of 1807 was that it was supposed to serve as a model for other municipalities. But its extension elsewhere in the country was prevented by the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the subsequent war and occupation (1808-14). Political problems afterwards caused additional delays, and it was not until 1822 that further steps were taken to reform the presidios. In that year a new Spanish penal code included, for the first time, the punishment of forced labor on public works, but this was really a redefinition of the old penalty. It further called for the establishment of a network of public works presidios. ⁽⁶³⁾ Once again, changes in the political situation prevented further action. Finally, in 1834, the Ordenanza General de Presidios reorganized the entire penal system, and the public works presidios were incorporated into the new organization as correctional presidios and designated as places of punishment for offenders sentenced to terms of two years or less.

1. David Ringrose, Transportation and Economic Stagnation in Spain,1750-1800 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), p. 14; Richard Ford, A Handbook for Travellers in Spain (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1966), 1:21.

2. Gonzalo Menéndez Pidal, Los caminos en la historia de España (Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1951), p. 123; Ringrose, Transportation, pp14-15.

3. Menéndez Pidal, Los caminos, pp. 128-33.

4. Joseph Townsend, A Journey through Spain in the Years 1786 and 1787 (London: C. Dilly, 1791), 1:210-15; Ringrose, Transportation, p. 16.

5. Townsend, A Journey, 1:366-69; Ringrose, Transportation, p. 16.

6. Townsend, A Journey, p. 206; AGS, Marina, leg. 705, Oct. 1, 1763; Nov. 7, 1763.

7. AGS, Marina, leg. 705, Mat 2, 1764; Mat 10, 1764.

8. Ibid., leg. 706, Mat 11, 1767; Sanchez Ortega, Los gitanos españoles, p. 232.

9. Domínguez Ortiz, La sociedad española en el siglo XVIII, p. 228.

10. AGS, Marina, leg. 706, Feb. 8-14, 1767.

11. Perez Estévez, El problema de los vagos, pp. 234-36. For the brigades of vagrants, see ibid., p. 270.

12. Ibid., p. 227. In 1766, as a result of the popular riots of that year, the government decreed the expulsion of all vagrants from the city. They were given the choice of either entering an hospicio or voluntarily joining the road workers. All those still around four days after the publication of this decree were to be arrested and sent to the army.

13. This was in accord with a practice introduced throughout Spain in the late 1760s. See Perez Estévez, El problema de los vagos, p. 222; Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:17-18.

14. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1775, f. 867. Documents for the initial years of the Prado presidio have disappeared from the collection in the Archivo de Villa of Madrid (section: Secretanía). The earliest legajos date from 1784.

15. AGS, Gracia y Justicia, leg. 807.

16. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1776, f. 129.

17. Ibid., ff. 124-42. See also Tomás y Valiente, El derecho penal, pp 366-67

18. AVM, Secretaría, sec. 2, leg. 324, no. 13, year 1805

19. AGS, Gracia y Justicia, leg. 807.

20. Carlos Cambronero, "El Prado de Madrid," Revista Contempóranea 129 (1904): 9-21.

21. AVM, Secretaría, sec. 2, leg. 234, no. 16, year 1806; sec. 2, leg. 323, no. 13, year 1784.

22. Ibid., sec. 3, leg. 324, no. 16, year 1784; AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1776, f. 129.

23. AHN, Alcades de Casa Y Corte, year 1775, f. 868.

24. Howard, The State of Prisons, p. 156

25. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1777, ff. 399-407.

26. Ibid., f. 407

27. Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:23; AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1784, no folio, Sept. 28, 1784.

28. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1788, vol. 2, no folio, May 3, 1788.

29. AVM, Secretaría, sec. 2, leg. 322, no. 13, year 1784.

30. Ibid., year 1785.

31. Ibid., sec. 2, leg. 234, no. 16, year 1806; Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:28-30.

32. AVM, Secretaría, sec. 2, leg. 324, no. 16, year 1784; year 1806.

33. Ibid., sec. 2, leg. 324, no. 8, year 1803.

34. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4958, Jan. 31, 1781.

35. Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:80-84; Tomás y Valiente, El derecho penal, pp. 366-68

36. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4962, Jan. 7, 1783; leg. 4954, July 24,1780.

37. Ibid., leg. 4971, Feb. 15, 1784; Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:30.

38. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4984, Jan. 30 1787. For the Guadalmedina River project, see ibid., leg 4980, June 27, 1786.

39. Novísima Recopilacíon, book 12, title 40, law 12, Jan. 27, 1787; AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4984, Jan. 30, 1787; leg 4980, Mar. 7, 1786.

40. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4975, Nov. 4, 1785; leg. 4980, Oct 11, 1788; leg. 4958, Oct.-Mar. 1781.

41. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1795, ff. 552-56; Novísima Recopilación, book 12, title 40, law 21.

42. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1795, ff. 552-56; Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:83-84.

43. Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:94; AGS, Secretaría de Hacienda, leg. 719, Oct. 30, 1788, and Apr.20, 1789; AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4971, Dec. 24, 1784.

44. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1788, vol. 1, ff. 862-862v, 842-847; Townsend, A Journey, 2:206.

45. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1788, vol. 1, f. 847.

46. AVM, Secretaría, sec. 2, leg. 322, no. 17, year 1789.

47. Ibid., sec. 2. leg. 323, no. 19, year 1796; year 1797; year 1799.

48. Ibid., sec. 2. leg. 324, nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, years 1801-4.

49. Ibid., sec. 2. leg. 323, nos. 15, 19.

50. Ibid., sec. 2. leg. 323, nos 9-11, 19.

51. The transients were rematados destined for the overseas presidios who were serving temporarily while awaiting the departure of the chain. Others included black slaves whose owners had placed them in the presidio for insubordination or other misdemeanors. They served at the pleasure of their owners and were released whenever their masters wanted them.

52. Conclusions based on official reports of escapes in the presidio collection of the AVM (Secretaría) for these years.

53. Data in this paragraph and the following pages derived from the collection of the transcripts of sentences of the years 1796-1800 in the AVM (Secretaría). For presidiarios who spent their terms in the hospital, see AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1776, ff. 124-42.

54. Massimo Livi Bacci, "Fertility and Nuptiality Changes in Spain from the Late 18th to the Early 20th century," Population Studies 22:2 (July 1968): 216-25; Soubeyroux, Pauperisme, 1:24-29.

55. AVM, Secretaría, sec. 3, leg. 324, no. 8, year 1803; Sept. 3, 1803; sec.1, leg. 88, no. 67, year 1801; Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:46-51.

56. Statisitics derived from AHN, Consejos, year 1804, leg. 9475.

57. Ibid.; AVM, Secretaría, sec. 2, leg. 324, no. 7, year 1803.

58. Ibid., sec. 2, leg. 324, no. 8, year 1803.

59.  Ibid., sec. 2, leg. 324, no. 16, year 1806.

60. The discussion of the Reglamento of 1807 in the following pages is based on AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1807, ff. 1205-12; AVM, Secretaría, sec. 2, leg. 324, no. 16, year 1806 (includes two copies of the Reglamento -- the original one, dated Dec. 13, 1805, and the amended doument, dated May 26, 1807.

61. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1788, f. 842.

62. See note 60, above.

63. Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:43, 392-93.