[111] At the opening of the eighteenth century, Spain still retained five presidios along the coast of North Africa. The two main presidios were Ceuta and Oran. The latter was lost to the Moslems in 1708, recaptured in 1732, then held until 1792, when it was retaken permanently by the Algerians. There also were three minor presidios: Melilla, Alhucemas, and El Peñón de Vélez. As in previous centuries, the history of the North African presidios in the eighteenth century can best be described as a chronicle of incessant warfare. Since they were almost constantly under attack, their defenders were permanently occupied with the defense of their positions and the repair and extension of their fortifications. ⁽¹⁾

Manpower shortages were particularly acute in the last years of the seventeenth century and the first decades of the eighteenth century. This period saw a revival of Moslem power in Morocco. Under the leadership of the Moroccan ruler Mulay Ismail (1673-1727), the Moslems intensified their attacks against the Spanish presidios. To meet this critical situation, magistrates and judicial tribunals throughout Spain were ordered in the 1670s to sentence convicted vagrants to the presidios instead of the galleys. ⁽²⁾ After 1700 the new Bourbon government adopted this policy, and the shipment of vagabonds to the presidios became a part of its campaign to eliminate [112] idlers and delinquents and to derive utility from them. The vagrants were sentenced to terms ranging from two to four years, but, as on the galleys, retention was common. In 1706, it was reported that more than 200 men in Oran had already served two to three years more than their original sentences, and that they could not be released because of the lack of replacements. ⁽³⁾ Following the practice of the galleys, the retainees automatically were converted into volunteers, and in that status they were applied to fortification work at a salary of two reales a day per man. ⁽⁴⁾

In addition to the vagrants, there was a gradual increase in the number of serious offenders sent to the North African presidios in the 1720s and 1730s, but the transformation of these presidios into general penal establishments was a slow process, not completed until after the abolition of the galleys in 1748. In the first half of the eighteenth century the galleys continued to absorb the majority of felons convicted in Spanish courts, and sentences to the presidios for commoners still represented commutations of galley sentences. ⁽⁵⁾ For this reason, the presidios continued to be viewed as places of confinement for the privileged, and this attitude was reflected in the way in which they were administered. They were not governed by any formal code of rules, but rather by customs and observances developed over the course of the centuries. Their governors had wide and almost unlimited powers, and they used them to punish and reward prisoners at will. ⁽⁶⁾ They often freed men before the termination of their sentences, or allowed them to return home on temporary passes. When crimes were committed by prisoners in the presidios, the governors frequently permitted them to be transferred to other presidios instead of sending them to the galleys, as was required for commoners. In effect, they had complete freedom of action, despite repeated royal decrees prohibiting such practices. ⁽⁷⁾ Given the circumstances, prisoner escapes were common, and many escapees succeeded in reaching Spain. In the first decade of the eighteenth century, the judges on the Sala de Alcaldes de Casa y Corte often complained to the king about the number of criminals that they had condemned to the presidios who had escaped and returned to Madrid. They blamed these conditions on the laxity and indifference of the presidio administrators and, in particular, on their ineffective security measures. ⁽⁸⁾

[113] In 1716 the Spanish Government attempted to improve discipline by introducing into the North African presidios the military reform measures being adopted in Spain at that time. Special legislation (a Reglamento) was drafted for the presidios applying for the first time the brigade structure for the organization of prisoners. The brigades were to be composed of fifty men each commanded by officers called reformados. In addition, the Reglamento of 1716 made a clear distinction between the two kinds of prisoners: desterrados, men sentenced to the service of arms, and presidiarios, those condemned to hard labor on the fortifications. There were to be separate brigades for desterrados and presidiarios . ⁽⁹⁾

While there was some improvement in conditions in the presidios after the Reglamento of 1716, the situation did not change substantially until the 1740s. In conjunction with the creation of penal contingents in the Peninsular military presidios, it was decided to reorganize the North African presidios as well. The Reglamento of 1743 represented the first formal code of rules and regulations for the governance of the penal establishments in the North African presidios. ⁽¹⁰⁾ It became a model upon which all subsequent legislation for those institutions was based. The first part of this ordinance provided for the assignment of duties and the delineation of authority among the several officers of the presidio. Under its provisions, the powers of the governors were reduced and divided among the members of a governing junta composed of a comptroller and a chief military engineer, in addition to the governor. The brigade structure introduced in the Reglamento of 1716 was retained, and the individual brigades were enlarged to consist of eighty to one hundred men. The brigade commanders, now called brigadiers, still had complete authority over their men, but their actions were made subject to review by a new group of officers known as inspectors. All these officials were appointed by the governing junta and were under its supervision. ⁽¹¹⁾

The second part of the Reglamento of 1743 dealt with the daily regime of the prisoners. The administration and distribution of their food rations was reorganized. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, prisoners in the North African presidios were not given any food rations except their daily allotment of bread. Instead, each received a daily cash allowance of three cuartos (twelve maravedís) [114] to purchase food. By the opening years of the eighteenth century this sum was grossly inadequate. ⁽¹²⁾ The Reglamento of 1716 called for the distribution of food to prisoners in addition to their bread rations, but it did not specify how this was to be accomplished. In 1738 a system was introduced by which the food allotments were combined (in quantities for eleven men) and prepared in the form of stews by camp cooks, usually prisoners. ⁽¹³⁾ This practice received official sanction in the legislation of 1743, and the daily menus were described in detail. The food in the two daily stews cost seven cuartos (twenty-eight maravedís) per man -- five cuartos (twenty maravedís) for lunch and two cuartos (eight maravedís) for supper. The remaining one cuarto (four maravedís) of the eight cuartos (32 maravedís) of the prisoners' allowance was retained to cover the cost of washing their clothes, providing oil for the lamps in their quarters, shaving, etc. ⁽¹⁴⁾

The food distribution system adopted in the Reglamento of 1743 was introduced to effect economies. This was necessary because the provisioning of the North African presidios was very difficult. All food supplies and munitions had to be brought from Spain. Only Oran could obtain its basic provisions through tribal allies in the neighborhood. Food was scarce, and the garrisons usually were demoralized by the irregularity with which supplies reached them. Under the system established in 1743, savings could be had by preparing food in large quantities, while at the same time the quality of the meals was improved. In addition, the legislation of 1743 stipulated that presidiarios who were employed as servants of presidio officials and town residents could not receive presidio rations. They had to be supported by their employers. ⁽¹⁵⁾ This reduced the number of men to be fed and clothed with presidio funds. Despite the reorganization, however, the food allotments in the North African presidios continued to be meager. Not surprisingly, the lack of food was one of the principal factors behind the high desertion rate in the North African presidios for both soldiers and presidiarios throughout the centuries.

Dependence on supply ships from Spain was only one part of the problem. As on the galleys and in the Peninsular presidios, there were constant complaints concerning the quality of food as well as the way in which it was actually distributed. The Reglamento of [115] 1743 gave the brigadiers control over the distribution of food and clothing to the prisoners. On the first day of each month, the brigadiers received the monthly allotments (in cash) due the men under their command. These payments had to be exchanged immediately for their equivalents in food, including the bread ration. ⁽¹⁶⁾ From the beginning, this system engendered fraud and corruption, and most of the abuses originated with the brigadiers. They developed the practice of illegally advancing the prisoners their monthly allowances in consideration of retaining eight to ten reales for themselves. Since the presidiarios usually spent most of this money on alcohol, tobacco, or gambling, they often suffered hunger and malnutrition. Many resorted to theft to obtain food, or ended up in the hospital suffering from illnesses caused by lack of proper nourishment. In Ceuta and Oran there also was the long-standing custom by which the presidiarios turned over their monthly allowances to the brigadiers in return for permission to work in town at their trades, or as Street vendors and porters, instead of laboring on the fortifications. ⁽¹⁷⁾

In the years after 1743, attempts were made to reduce the powers of the brigadiers and to deprive them of their control over the monthly cash allowances. On several occasions, a paymaster was appointed and charged with the receipt and distribution of the payments. And, it was decided to make these payments every fifteen days (on a bi-monthly basis) so as to reduce the sums available for malversation. ⁽¹⁸⁾ Nevertheless, pressure from the brigadiers doomed all efforts to failure, and the abuses continued unabated throughout the period. They were, after all, inherent in the system.

Regardless of the Reglamento of 1743 and all subsequent legislation (most notably the Reglamento of 1791, which included tighter controls and more restrictions), the North African presidios were never as effectively governed and administered as the Peninsular naval arsenals. ⁽¹⁹⁾ One of the main reasons for this was their distance from Spain and their precarious position as Christian outposts in a Moslem world. This situation was perfect for the growth of indiscipline, fraud, and corruption. An official investigation of the Alhucemas presidio in 1778 found that bribes and special favors were rampant at all levels of the administration. Similar inquiries at other times showed that the same circumstances existed in other presi- [116] dios. ⁽²⁰⁾ Moreover, criminals were quite aware of the more "flexible" conditions in the North African presidios, and despite the obvious inconveniences, many preferred to be sent there rather than to the naval arsenals. In 1767, when prisoners at the arsenal of Cartagena were given the choice of remaining at that presidio or being transferred to North Africa to complete unfilled quotas there, 923 out of 1,464 asked to be sent to North Africa. ⁽²¹⁾

With the abolition of the galleys in 1748, the penal population of the North African presidios underwent a sudden rise. The remaining forzados on the galleys were distributed between the mines of Almadén and the North African presidios. Prisoners with term sentences of more than one year, or with the note of retention, were destined for the North African presidios. In order to accommodate the increased numbers, new brigades were created and the old ones enlarged, but these measures were temporary because circumstances changed rapidly. ⁽²²⁾ As more convicted criminals were sentenced to the arsenals in the late 1750s and early 1760s, serious manpower shortages developed in the North African presidios. After 1765 the situation deteriorated further, largely as a result of legislation in that year which ordered that all those guilty of crimes meriting presidio punishment be sent to the naval arsenals. ⁽²³⁾ Also, in the late 1760s and early 1770s the North African presidios had to compete with the presidios of the New World for convict laborers. In 1766, the Spanish government decided to strengthen the defenses of the Spanish Empire in America by rebuilding the fortifications of Havana and San Juan. Part of the plan was to sentence military deserters and civilian smugglers, who normally would have been sent to the North African presidios, to the Caribbean presidios. ⁽²⁴⁾ In 1766 and 1767, the lack of manpower in the North African presidios became so severe that 1,214 prisoners serving at Cartagena were removed from the arsenal and distributed between the presidios of Ceuta and Oran ⁽²⁵⁾

A new era for the North African presidios began in 1771 when, as a result of the legislation of that year, prisoners were divided into categories according to the severity of their crimes. Minor and first offenders were assigned to the North African presidios, while recidivists and major offenders were sent to the naval arsenals. Although available statistics are few and incomplete, some general trends can [117] be ascertained. ⁽²⁶⁾ The 1770s and early 1780s were a period of accelerated growth for the North African presidios, due to the resumption of hostilities with the Moslems (see table 7.1). The peace treaty of 1767 with Morocco was short-lived, and in 1773, Ceuta, Melilla, and El Peñón were attacked. The elevated population figures reached during the late 1770s and early 1780s coincided with the period of war. High levels continued to be maintained throughout the 1780s in the larger presidios of Oran and Ceuta, while El Peñón and Alhucemas registered a decline. Melilla, after reaching a peak in the late 1770s, declined somewhat in the early 1780s, but recovered by the end of the century. When Oran was captured by the Algerians in 1792, its prisoners were distributed among the remaining presidios, mainly Melilla and Ceuta. ⁽²⁷⁾

In the eighteenth century the Spanish government made strenuous efforts to restrict the population of the North African presidios to soldiers and presidiarios. This policy was based on military and financial considerations -- the high cost of defense and provisioning. Legislation throughout the century prohibited the wives and children of soldiers and presidiarios from residing in the presidios. ⁽²⁸⁾ On the other hand, their governors had the authority to grant special permits for temporary residence, on condition that family members could be supported. ⁽²⁹⁾ Table 7.2 shows that in 1774 women and children made up 16 percent of the total population at Melilla and 22 percent at Alhucemas. Among the presidiarios, dependents of those serving in the fixed regiments (fijos) were among those favored for these permits. In 1774, at Melilla, for example, thirty-three out of ninety men in the fixed regiment had their wives with them. Occasionally, permission was given to the wives of presidiarios working in the presidio shops or offices or plying their trades in the town. Some of these women worked as servants in the homes of presidio officials, and their permits for temporary residence were based on this arrangement. ⁽³⁰⁾

The same financial and military considerations that influenced the Spanish government to limit the population growth of the presidios also motivated it to try to prevent them from becoming penal colonies. To that end, presidiarios were prohibited from remaining after the completion of their sentences. But there always were exceptions. Many former prisoners who performed work in necessary or special- [118] ized trades or professions received permission to remain temporarily and even permanently. By the end of the eighteenth century, there existed the nucleus of a permanent resident Spanish population made up of former presidiarios and their families. ⁽³¹⁾ In this way, the foundations were laid for the eventual transformation of the North African presidios into penal colonies in the nineteenth century.
 
 

Year	Oran**	Melilla	El Peñón
1772	2,180	730	--
1773	--	--	--
1774	--	808	249
1775	--	725	--
1776	2,055	998	266
1777	--	1,330	260
1778	2,941	--	276
1779	--	1,023	296
1780	3,024	--	285
1781	2,888	--	282
1782	2,629	726	164
1783	1,598	850	209
1784	2,582	--	--
1785	--	--	--
1786	2,616	--	205
1787	2,379	--	--
1788	2,532	--	--

As for the convict population of the presidios, it was not determined by changes in the Spanish penal code or by need alone. Two key factors influencing prisoner statistics were death and desertion rates (see table 7.3). Desertion, in particular, was a constant problem. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, men frequently deserted because of scarcity of food and other provisions, and these same miserable conditions continued to motivate desertion in the [119] eighteenth century. ⁽³²⁾ The conversion of the North African presidios into general penal establishments in the eighteenth century further aggravated the situation, but it is not correct to assume that desertion was a problem mainly involving presidiarios. On the contrary, soldiers (those belonging to the rotating regiments that were stationed temporarily in the presidios) as well as the presidiarios deserted throughout the eighteenth century. At times, the desertion rate of the soldiers was much higher than that of the presidiarios (see table 7.4). ⁽³³⁾ The prisoners serving at arms (desterrados) were especially inclined to desert. Most of these men had committed offenses, usually desertion, while stationed in Peninsular Spain. After being tried by courts martial, they were condemned to serve in the fixed regiments in the North African presidios. The military courts customarily meted out long-term sentences (eight years or more) or life sentences to deserters. In addition, before 1771, indefinite sentences in such cases were frequent. A high rate of desertion is not suprising among men who already had a high recorded rate of [120] desertion and who, besides, were made desperate by the fear of indeterminate punishment. ⁽³⁴⁾
 
 

Status	Melilla Men	Melilla Women	Melilla Children	Alhucemas Men	Alhucemas Women	Alhucemas Children
Military Staff	19	6	21	5	3	2
Accounting dept. staff	3	2	2	2	2	3
Ecclesiastics	3	--	--	3	1	3
Regular garrison (fijos)	90	33	59	67	13	12
Arsenal personnel	20	14	28	8	6	9
Navy personnel	45	7	13	25	10	19
Hospital staff	6	5	8	3	5	9
Widows, orphans	--	4	8	--	3	2
Private individuals	5	12	16	--	--	--
Rotating battalions	539	9	8	122	3	2
Supply dept.	--	--	--	1	4	3
Presidiarios	808	14	20	174	2	2
Total	1,539	106	183	410	52	66

Both the location of the presidios and conditions in them favored desertion. These fortresses were enclaves in a hostile countryside, and once prisoners were outside the walls, desertion and capture by the Moslems was easy. Since the fixed regiments customarily served as guards in advance posts and strongholds extramuros, there were ample opportunities for desertion. These regiments also helped to guard the cattle and flocks of sheep belonging to the presidio that were pastured in the surrounding countryside. ⁽³⁵⁾ As for the presidiarios assigned to the labor brigades, traditionally a greater part of them were left unchained. Only those condemned for heinous crimes wore chains and fetters. In the 1780s, the practice of chaining those sentenced for theft was introduced as a means of reducing the high [121] rate of crimes against property in the presidios. Although it did accomplish its purpose (theft declined somewhat), presidio officials considered such punishment excessive and, in the long run, unwise. They believed that it made prisoners more inclined to desert and more willing to take any risks. Chained prisoners were used in fortification work exclusively, and could not be removed from it. ⁽³⁶⁾ As for the rest of the presidiarios, some were employed in presidio offices and shops. Others labored at their trades and other occupations in the town. The relative freedom of movement enjoyed by many presidiarios made desertion an ever-present possibility.
 
 

	Died-  Soldiers	Died- Presidiarios	Deserted- Soldiers	Deserted- Presidiarios	Total- Soldiers	Total- Presidiarios
January	21	13	2	1	23	14
April	5	11	10	12	15	23
June	3	4	12	11	15	15
July	13	6	18	16	31	22
August	8	4	4	3	12	7
September	7	2	4	4	11	6
October	3	1	3	6	6	7
November	7	3	6	4	13	7
Total	67	44	59	57	126	101

	Soldiers	Presidiarios	Total
1742-44	149	40	189
1745-47	262	123	385
1748-50*	90	72	162
Total	501	235	736

Although statistics are fragmentary, available data suggest that desertion rates began to rise sharply in the 1750s, coinciding with the abolition of the galleys. Desertion reached its highest levels in the last years of the 1760s and in the decade of the 1770s. In the 1780s there was a tendency toward stabilization, with a gradual decline in the late 1780s and into the 1790s (see table 7.5).

Alarmed by the increase in desertion in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Spanish government restudied the problem [122] and developed new approaches to it. Several methods were devised and utilized to combat desertion. To begin with, there was a modification of the penalties previously inflicted on deserters. Traditionally, all those who deserted from the presidios and were apprehended were subject to the death penalty. ⁽³⁷⁾ In 1765 (and again in 1769) it was decreed that the death penalty would be commuted for deserters who returned voluntarily before surrendering to the Moslems or being captured by them. Instead, they would be sentenced to serve at the chain pumps in the arsenal of Cartagena for five years. After that, they would be returned to a North African presidio to complete their original sentences, but with the proviso that the total time served could not exceed ten years. In the 1780s, after the abolition of the penalty of hard labor at the pumps, many deserters, in particular recidivists, were sent to the presidios of the New World. ⁽³⁸⁾
 
 

	Percentage of Presidiarios Deserting
1760	3.6
1766	5.1
1767	2.1
1768	7.1
1772	7.6
1773	6.7
1776	6.8
1780	3.8
1781	4.0
1782	4.1
1783	3.3
1784	3.7
1785	5.4
1786	3.4
1787	2.5
1788	3.1

Most of the men who were penalized for desertion either had been captured in the act or had returned voluntarily. Most had deserted in the hope of somehow finding their way back to Spain. After successfully eluding capture by the presidio forces and the Moslems, they hid in the surrounding countryside for a short time. When they finally realized the hopelessness of their situation, they returned voluntarily to the presidio. In general, the period of desertion was short, usually a few hours or days. Extant data also suggest that drunkenness and the perpetration of crimes in the presidios by the desterrados and presidiarios were frequent causes for desertion. ⁽³⁹⁾

The deserters who returned to the presidios from Moslem captivity made up a special category. To encourage these men to return, it was established that, in such cases, the penalty of five years at the pumps would be commuted to the same length of time in a North African presidio. This was done in consideration of their sufferings in captivity. It also was assumed that their devotion to the Christian faith had motivated their flight, a claim which they all made, even though most had converted to Islam. Despite the modification of punishment, such cases do not seem to have been numerous. The few examples that have been recorded involve men who had been in captivity for a long time -- on the average, from ten to twenty years --and who were renegades. In such instances, the procedure called for a period of interrogation and quarantine in the presidio, after which the returnees were sent to Spain to be reconciled by the Inquisition. [123] Once absolved by the Holy Office, they were returned to a North African presidio to complete their sentences. In certain cases of old age or physical incapacity, they were freed. ⁽⁴⁰⁾

Another method of combating desertion was the deployment of troops from the presidio to patrol the immediate area surrounding it. In Ceuta, a presidio with one of the highest desertion rates, for years there was a special cavalry unit for the sole purpose of seeking out and capturing deserters. When in the 1760s it became impossible, for fiscal reasons, to maintain it, a small number of presidiarios ("trusties") were assigned to lookout posts in the area for the same purpose. In return for their services they were offered a partial or full pardon, depending on their crimes and the amount of time remaining in their sentences. ⁽⁴¹⁾

The payment of bribes and rewards to Moslem chieftains and others in the frontier zones surrounding the presidios was another approach to the problem. This system was utilized in Ceuta and Melilla in the 1760s, but was not introduced into Oran until the 1780s. It was particularly effective in the years following the treaty of 1767 with Morocco, which ushered in an era of greater cooperation between Spain and Morocco. This treaty provided for mutual restitution of deserters, and a considerable number of men were returned under this provision. Nevertheless, the Moroccans eventually adopted the practice of allowing deserters who converted to Islam to remain. The rest were forcibly turned over to the presidio officials. In the 1770s, in order to encourage the frontier Moors to return even those deserters who had been willing to convert, the Spanish government offered them payments at thirty to forty pesos a head for each deserter that they returned. ⁽⁴²⁾ Frequent references to these payments in the records indicates that the system was somewhat effective.

The reform legislation of 1771 represented the most comprehensive and far-reaching plan to combat desertion in the eighteenth century. Here the emphasis was on prevention rather than control. Major offenders and recidivists, the group thought to be most capable of deserting and becoming renegades, were not to be sent to North Africa. Only minor offenders were to be assigned to the North African presidios. In addition, the elimination of indefinite terms and the establishment of a ten-year maximum for all sentences were [124] conceived as a means to prevent desperation, which was considered to be one of the main causes of desertion. Finally, the legislation of 1771 called for a softening of treatment, since it was believed that the cruelty to which prisoners often were subjected influenced them to desert. ⁽⁴³⁾

The gradual decline in desertion rates in the late 1770s and in the 1780s seems to have been closely related to the legislation of 1771. Perhaps just as important was the cooperation of the Moroccans and Algerians (the treaty of 1785 with Algiers included a restitution provision) in returning deserters. But in the last analysis, desertion could be reduced but not prevented. As one presidio official stated in 1780, "once a soldier or presidiario decides to desert, nothing can stop him. He is not deterred by fear of captivity, punishment or anything else." ⁽⁴⁴⁾

An extensive quantitative analysis of prisoners in the North African presidios is not possible because of lack of data. With the exception of selected years and a few presidios, the registers of prisoners in the North African presidios are no longer in existence. ⁽⁴⁵⁾ Although the complete series seems to have disappeared, the data that remain facilitate at least a partial statistical analysis. Some of the most useful extant material relates to the presidio of Oran in the 1780s. This collection consists of lists of prisoners received in Oran during the years 1781-86, together with their crimes and sentences. In addition, there are five separate lists for the years 1785-89 with the names of 1,579 men and their social and occupational status. ⁽⁴⁶⁾

As can be seen in table 7.6, the majority of prisoners in Oran in the years 1781-86 were property offenders, smugglers, and soldiers. These three groups represented 71 percent of the sample of 3,477 men. Soldiers made up 26 percent of the total. The North African presidios, like those of the New World, served as military prisons in the second half of the eighteenth century. For 28 percent of these soldiers, a presidio sentence resulted from such common-law offenses as homicide, theft, or robbery, while 60 percent were condemned for infractions against military discipline. Property crimes alone made up 24 percent of the total number of military delicts.

There were several categories of military offenses. Two of the most usual were abandonment of guard duty and sale of military property (clothes, munitions, and provisions). Violence against fel- [125] low soldiers and officers also was a frequent offense, and carried with it a ten-year presidio sentence. Of all the military infractions, desertion was the most common. Some 39 percent of the soldiers condemned to Oran were deserters. Of this total, less than one quarter were repeat offenders, since it was customary during these years to send recidivist deserters to the presidios of Spanish America. ⁽⁴⁷⁾ As for the others, with the abolition of the chain pumps in the arsenal of Cartagena, most first-time offenders were sentenced to North Africa.
 
 

Name of Offense	Percentage
Crimes against persons	10
Crimes against property	32
Crimes against good customs and morals; disturbing the domestic peace	3
Disturbing the public peace	10
Smuggling	13
Swindling, fraud, and counterfeiting	2
Military offenses (all kinds)	26
Others	4
Total	100

Despite their large representation, soldiers were not the most numerous group in the Oran presidio. The largest category of prisoners was civilian property offenders, who accounted for 32 percent of the total inmate population. On the basis of this sample, without additional data, it is not possible to say whether or not property crime increased during this period, but the evidence seems to indicate that it may have become more violent. Significantly, men convicted of robbery, banditry, burglary, and housebreaking (crimes that involved violence or the threat of it) represented the majority of prisoners sentenced for crimes against property (a total of 52 percent). These statistics agree with what is known about property crime in town and countryside in this period. Banditry, for example, endemic to many parts of Spain in the seventeenth century, became particularly intense in Andalusia and Extremadura during these years. Within the urban centers -- in Madrid, for example -- robbery [126] cases represented a large proportion of the property delicts coming before the Sala de Alcaldes de Casa y Corte in the 1780s. ⁽⁴⁸⁾ The rest of the property offenders in the Oran presidio sample included an assortment of thieves, particularly horse and cattle thieves, and those who specialized in stealing from churches. All were men who had committed serious thefts (in number and value) or were notorious recidivists. There were few petty thieves in the North African presidios at this time, since they were being absorbed almost entirely by the Peninsular public works presidios. When they did appear, their sentences included other crimes in addition to theft, most often resistance to arrest.

Among those sentenced for property crimes there was a small percentage of cases of swindling and fraud. Most involved officeholders who had been convicted of malversation in the performance of their duties. While peculation and fraud were common occurrences among government officials in the early modern era, few of these officials, protected as they were by their privileged status, were ever prosecuted. This explains the small representation of these offenses. Similarly, only 3 percent of the men sentenced to Oran in this sample had committed crimes against good customs and morals. In the 1780s, most sexual offenses were punished by fines and short sentences in the public works presidios.

Offenses against the public order constituted a somewhat larger percentage of the sample (10 percent). Most common was the use of prohibited arms, which was the charge against 32 percent of the offenders in this category. Men who disregarded the laws against the possession of various kinds of knives and firearms were sentenced to four to six years in an overseas presidio. In 1771, the North African presidios were specifically designated as their place of reclusion . ⁽⁴⁹⁾

The third largest group in the Oran presidio were the smugglers. They represented 13 percent of the total inmate population. Among the smugglers, 87 percent were defrauders of the government tobacco monopoly, who were serving terms that averaged between four and six years. Tobacco fraud was one of the most frequent offenses in eighteenth-century Spain, and it involved individuals from all socioeconomic groups. The most common form of fraud was the sequestration of tobacco from factories and warehouses by [127] employees. Although tobacco workers were carefully searched when leaving their work, it was impossible to prevent small amounts of tobacco from being removed. Workers convicted of these offenses were subject to presidio sentences, and they were among the prisoners at Oran. Nor was it unusual for officials of the government monopoly to be involved in the theft of tobacco from warehouses and engaged in its illegal sale. Some of these men ended up serving long sentences in the presidios. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

While the amount of tobacco pilfered from factories and storage facilities was large, it was insignificant when compared with the quantity of foreign tobacco brought into Spain clandestinely. Most of this tobacco originated in France, and was smuggled across the Pyrenees into Spain. Spanish tobacco in the form of powder or snuff (its most solicited variety in the eighteenth century) was finer than the French type, but popular opinion, dominated by French styles in this period, preferred the French powder, known as rapé. Because of the incessant demand for rapé, all laws against its illegal importation proved ineffective. Finally, in 1786, the Spanish government authorized the manufacture of the French-style powder in Spanish factories; but by that time tastes had changed, and smoking tobacco had become more popular than snuff. ⁽⁵¹⁾ The conversion of Spanish factories from the manufacture of snuff to that of smoking tobacco took a long time. The process required a large number of specialized laborers who did the work by hand, and for many years production was limited. At the same time, demand rose sharply in the last years of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth century. During that period of restricted Spanish output, contraband tobacco helped to satisfy the expanding market. ⁽⁵²⁾

The most numerous group of tobacco defrauders in the presidios were the smugglers who specialized in bringing foreign tobacco into Spain. Predominant among them were the smugglers of Aragon, Catalonia, and Navarre who operated in the Pyrenean region along the Franco-Spanish frontier. These men worked in groups and spent most of their lives in desolate and mountainous areas living in caves and huts. They brought their merchandise to isolated roadside inns whose owners served as intermediaries between them and prospective purchasers. These bands were equipped with all kinds of weapons, including harquebuses, and they fought standing battles with [128] frontier guards and army troops that were occasionally sent out to capture them. ⁽⁵³⁾

In Andalusia and Extremadura the smugglers operated in a similar manner. The Extremaduran smugglers brought Brazil-tobacco into Spain from Portugal, while the Andalusians obtained their contraband from Gibraltar and North Africa. In certain Spanish towns around Gibraltar, smuggling was organized in an almost capitalistic manner. Individuals came together and formed companies with the objective of making a profit. Some invested capital and others their labor. Those who did the actual smuggling were considered employees of the company and were paid salaries. Spanish popular opinion was favorable toward the tobacco smugglers, especially in Andalusia and Extremadura, where poverty and unemployment forced many into this activity. Regional folklore bears eloquent testimony to the popular exaltation of the smugglers and the legends that were created about them. ⁽⁵⁴⁾

Only 10 percent of all presidiarios in Oran in the 1780s had been sentenced for crimes against persons, most of them for murder and [129] manslaughter. Since the trend in the second half of the eighteenth century was toward the substitution of presidio sentences for capital punishment, and homicide is one of the better-reported crimes, the number of sentences for it bears a close relationship to its actual incidence. ⁽⁵⁵⁾ In the 1780s a good number of these offenders were being sentenced to the North African presidios rather than the naval arsenals. On the other hand, whether the low percentage is indicative of a real decline in personal crime in Spain in the last quarter of the eighteenth century (as seemingly occurred in other western European countries) is questionable. The re-establishment of the galleys in the years 1784-1803 may be a determining factor. In 1784, the king directed the courts to sentence all serious offenders to the galleys, as had been done in the past. ⁽⁵⁶⁾ This would include most of those convicted of crimes against persons, but how many offenders were actually sentenced to the galleys or were ever received there is not known. In 1787, a scarcity of rowers moved the king to issue another decree offering those presidiarios already serving in the arsenal of Cartagena reductions in sentences to volunteer for the galleys. Two years later further incentives were offered, and in view of these circumstances, it is likely that volunteers of this kind made up the main body of rowers. ⁽⁵⁷⁾ Since the degree to which re-manning of the galleys affected the distribution of prisoners to the North African presidios cannot be determined, the question of whether or not personal crime declined in the last years of the eighteenth century remains unresolved.

An occupational analysis of prisoners in Oran can be made on the basis of extant data for the years 1785-89 (see table 7.7). Although the period covered is short, the size of the sample is considerable, at least when compared with the dearth of like information for the galleys or the arsenals. This kind of data presents many difficulties, however. To begin with, the occupational lists were compiled separately from those containing crimes and sentences. Since the names on the two sets of lists do not correspond, there is no way to determine what crimes were perpetrated by specific offenders. Secondly, soldiers and smugglers were listed in separate categories without any indication of their former or original occupations. Smuggling in this period was clearly just as much of a profession as soldiering. Moreover, both groups are under-represented in these [130] data, because the lists contain only the names of prisoners transported to Oran on the regular monthly supply ships sent out from Málaga and Cartagena to the North African presidios. For security purposes, military prisoners and smugglers usually were grouped together and shipped to North Africa separately from other prisoners, whenever possible on warships. In addition, no divisions were made between journeymen and master craftsmen. Only in a few instances do journeymen appear as a separate category, and then there is no indication of their trade or occupation. ⁽⁵⁸⁾

Classifying the peasantry proved even more difficult. Since only one term, labrador, is used throughout the data to describe all farm workers, it is impossible to distinguish among them. In the eighteenth century, those peasants who worked their own land were commonly called labradores in contrast to the jornaleros or day laborers. ⁽⁵⁹⁾ But it is not clear whether or not those who compiled this data were using the term labrador all-inclusively, because on two of the lists (for the years 1788 and 1789) the expression del campo ("from the countryside") also appears. Since the problem is unresolvable, I have simply placed all those described as labradores and del campo, together with shepherds and gardeners, in the broad category of rural workers.
 
 

	Number of Prisoners	Percentage
Rural workers	705	45
Urban trades and services	591	37
Professional and privileged group	75	5
Soldiers	103	6
Smugglers	105	7
Total	1,579	100

The fact that almost half of the presidiarios in this sample (45 percent) came from the countryside seems to indicate that crime in the late eighteenth century was no longer as markedly an urban -phenomenon as surviving records for previous centuries imply. The increase in the number of criminals from rural areas may be accounted for by an enlarged population, since the bulk of the [131] demographic expansion in the second half of the eighteenth century came among the peasantry in the countryside. Another possible explanation is that it reflected changes in land cultivation and tenure occuring in this period as a result of the movement toward market agriculture. In most regions there was an effort to reverse terms of rent for peasant properties, taking advantage of the price rise and the increase in land values. In the southern and south central regions the trend was to evict peasant renters in order to form single-bloc farms and carry on large-scale cultivation. Property also was rented to wealthier peasants who sublet it to poorer peasants or hired laborers to cultivate large tracts for them. By the end of the century, according to the census of 1797, only a little more than 20 percent of the peasants were listed as property holders, while one-third were classified as renters and one-half as jornaleros. ⁽⁶⁰⁾ Given these circumstances, the increase in the number of rural criminals was, to a considerable extent, a matter of growing poverty and necessity.

Some 37 percent of the presidiarios came from the world of the crafts, trade, and domestic service. Within this category, artisans were the most numerous. They were the same group that predominated on the prisoner lists of previous centuries, and that had the highest rate of offenses against persons as well as a high rate of theft. In the sample data, cloth and clothing workers -- tailors, hosiers, hatters, weavers, carders, and shearers -- appear most frequently. Shoemakers are particularly conspicuous, but this is not surprising, since their craft is usually described in eighteenth-century sources as being one of the most miserable and poor. ⁽⁶¹⁾ Among construction workers, masons and carpenters have equal representation, while in the metallurgical trades, ironsmiths predominated. The food, service, and transportation industries were represented principally by bakers, innkeepers, and muleteers and coachmen, respectively.

Professionals and those belonging to the privileged classes made up the smallest percentage of presidiarios. This group, representing 5 percent of the total sample, included doctors, lawyers, notaries, officeholders, students, and noblemen. Some in this category appear on the lists with their professions, while others are listed by name only, but with the honorific title of don. In this period (unlike in previous centuries), the title don was not reserved for nobility, but [132] was applied to all men of wealth and position. Those whose names appear with the title don and the notation sin oficio (without occupation) were the real noblemen. ⁽⁶²⁾

Not all the prisoners in the sample data were being shipped to Oran directly from Peninsular jails. Quite a few were being transferred from other presidios to Oran. Presidiarios who committed crimes while confined to the presidios were tried by court martial and, except in extraordinary cases where the death penalty was required, were sentenced to serve additional sentences in other presidios. Prisoners from Melilla, Alhucemas, and El Peñón were transferred regularly to Ceuta and Oran, while the latter sent their offenders to the minor presidios. In 1786, because of overcrowding and lack of security in the minor presidios, the king ordered presidio officials at Oran and Ceuta to refrain from sentencing prisoners charged with new crimes to Alhucemas, Melilla, or El Peñón. Instead, prisoners were to remain where they were for punishment. ⁽⁶³⁾ The common penalties used in these cases included additional sentences, often to be served in chains and fetters, in addition to flogging or "running the gauntlet." ⁽⁶⁴⁾ Available documentation shows that most of those who were convicted of crimes in the presidios had committed theft or had killed or wounded a fellow prisoner.

The exchange of prisoners among different presidios was not confined to the North African establishments. Until the late 1780s, it was standard procedure to send deserters from the North African presidios to the chain pumps at the arsenal of Cartagena, after which they were returned to North Africa to complete their original sentences. ⁽⁶⁵⁾ The movement of prisoners extended across the Atlantic as well. In addition to the regular shipment to the New World of offenders who were sentenced there (in particular, recidivist deserters and some kinds of tobacco defrauders), exchanges of military prisoners between the presidios of North Africa and Spanish America were common. The most frequent transfers were between Havana and San Juan on the one hand and Oran and Ceuta on the other, but there are examples of military prisoners being sent from New Orleans, Pensacola, and even Manila to North Africa and vice versa. ⁽⁶⁶⁾

The ports of Cádiz in Spain and Havana in the New World were the principal receiving depots for the transatlantic prisoner traffic, while Málaga served as the distribution center for North Africa. Prisoners [133] from the North African presidios being transferred to the New World were shipped first to Málaga and from there to Cádiz. At Cádiz, they were placed aboard ships once again and transported across the Atlantic to Havana, Cuba, where they either remained permanently or were sent on to their final destinations. The trip from the New World to North Africa followed the same route. There thus existed in the last quarter of the eighteenth century a network of penal institutions encompassing the Spanish empire.

In the eighteenth century, the North African presidios went through the last stages in their transition into full-fledged penal institutions. The laxity and maladministration of the previous centuries were not totally eliminated, but changes in governance gradually effected improvement. Desertion continued to be a problem, but here, too, there was some amelioration, particularly after the reform statute of 1771 and the restitution treaties with the North African states. By the end of the century, the conditions had been laid for the transformation of the North African presidios into penal colonies in the nineteenth century.
 

1. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1687, f. 205; year 1658, f. 29.

2. Ibid., year 1677, f. 146.

3. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4699, Mar. 28, 1706. See also ibid., Apr. 22, 1701; leg. 4698, Oct. 10, 1692.

4. Ibid., leg. 4698, Mar 3, 1699; leg. 4699, Dec. 21, 1701; Mar 28, 1706.

5. Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:5.

6. Cadalso, Instituciones penitenciarias, p. 304.

7. For decrees against freeing prisoners before the termination of their sentences, illegal transfers, and other such practices, see AGS, Guerra Moderna, legs. 4698, 4699.

8. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1717, if. 270-73; AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4700, July 21, 1701.

9. Cadalso, Instituciones penitenciarias, p. 305.

10. Reglamento para el gobierno de desterrados en la Plaza de Ceuta, Oct. 15, 1743. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 3660. See also Cadalso, Instituciones penitenciarias, p. 305.

11. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 3660, Oct. 15, 1743, Reglamento, provisions 1-8.

12. Ibid., leg. 4698, Aug. 2, 1692; leg. 4700, Apr. 24, 1701.

13. Ibid., leg. 3660, June 16, 1749; Cadalso, Instituciones penitenciarias, p. 305.

14. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 3660, Oct. 15, 1743, provisions 11-16.

15. Ibid., provision 4.

16. Ibid., provision 7. For complaints about the quality and quantity of the food, see ibid., leg. 4919, Jan. 16, 1773.

17. Ibid., leg. 3660, Apr. 11, 1749; leg. 4977, Feb. 8, 1786.

18. Ibid., leg. 3660, Aug. 8, 1749; leg. 4898, year 1768.

19. For the Reglamento of 1791, see Cadalso, Instituciones penitenciarias, pp. 307-8.

20. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4919, Jan. 16, 1773; leg. 4945, Jan. 23, 1778 (Alhucemas).

21. AGS, Marina, leg. 699, Mar. 30, 1767.

22. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 3660, July 27, 1749; Aug. 1, 1749; Aug. 12, 1749.

23. AHN, Alealdes de Casa y Corte, year 1765, f. 671.

24. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2503, Feb. 25, 1769; AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4893, year 1766.

25. AGS, Marina, leg. 699, Mat 30, 1767. Of this number, 923 were serving in the arsenal, and 291 were in the depósito awaiting transportation to the overseas presidios.

26. A continuous series of monthly reports with figures for the number of presidiarios in each presidio is no longer in existence. Only a few reports for scattered years can be found. After 1776, the practice of sending yearly reports was introduced, but almost all of them have disappeared. Those that are still extant can be found in AGS, Guerra Moderna, legs. 4934 and 4935. Conclusions in this paragraph are based on this surviving material.

27. Salillas, Evolución penitenciaria, 2:8.

28. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4959, May 1, 1782; Gabriel de Morales, Datos para la historia de Melilla (Melilla: "El Telegrama del Rif," 1909), p. 595.

29. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4981, Mar. 25, 1787.

30. For example, the wife of a presidiario who was working as a baker in the presidio, and another, whose husband was a master dyer, in the town. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4972, May 5, 1785; May 10, 1785. For presidiarios in the fixed regiments, see ibid., leg. 4981, Mat 25, 1787.

31. Morales, Datos para Ia historia de Melilla, pp. 595-96. Documents in the AGS contain numerous petitions by former presidiarios asking to remain in the presidios, with both negative and positive replies.

32. AGS, Estado, leg. 495, Mat 10, 1620; AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4976, Aug. 10, 1786.

33. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4976, Aug. 10, 1786; leg. 4930, June 27,

1776.

34. Ibid. See also leg. 4918, Mar. 22, 1772.

35. Ibid., leg. 4930, June 27, 1776.

36. Ibid., leg. 4912, May 17, 1788.

37. Ibid., leg. 4898, May 14, 1768.

38. Novísima Recopilación, book 12, title 40, law 8, Nov. 24, 1782. For the legislation of 1765 and 1769, see AGS, Guerra Modema, leg. 4893, Feb, 27, 1765, and leg. 4906, Nov. 5, 1767, and Nov. 11, 1767.

39. Conclusions based on a study of cases in AGS, Guerra Moderna, Colección: Presidios y Presidiarios.

40. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4981, July 13, 1787. Some returned mutilated -- for example, a renegade who had been away for twenty two years and had lost both hands. Ibid., leg. 4971, 1784.

41. AGS, Gracia y Justicia, leg. 1049; AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, f. 443, year 1772; AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4898, May 14, 1768.

42. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1772, f. 443; ibid., Consejos, leg. 5993, f. 118, Sept. 25, 1770.

43. Novísima Recopilación, book 12, title 40, law 7, Mat 12, 1771.

44. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4951, May 12, 1780; leg. 4976, Aug. 10, 1786. In 1780 there was a new agreement with Morocco.

45. The extant sources can be found in AGS, Guerra Moderna, legs. 4934, 4935.

46. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4985. Conclusions in the following paragraphs are based on a statistical analysis of this material and in leg. 4934.

47. AGI, Arribadas, legs. 287, 548.

48. Conclusions based on data from the inventory of criminal cases of the Sala de Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, years 1780-89. AHN, Consejos, leg. 2793. For banditry in the 1780s, see Tomds y Valiente, El derecho penal, pp. 268-71.

49. Novísima Recopilación, book 12, title 40, law 7, Mat 12, 1771.

50. For tobacco smuggling in Spain, see José Pérez Vidal, España en la historia del tabaco (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Etnologia Peninsular, 1959).

51. Francisco Aguilar Piñal, La Sevilla de Olavide, 1767ù1 778 (Seville: Ayuntamiento, 1966), p. 131.

52. Pérez Vidal, La historia del tabaco, pp. 355-58.

53. Ibid., pp. 358-60.

54. Francisco Rodríguez Marín, Cantos populares españoles, (Seville: F. Alvarez y Compañía, 1883), 4:404-8; Pérez Vidal, La historia del tabaco, p. 352.

55. AHN, Consejos, leg. 5993, Sept. 25, 1770.

56. Novísima Recopilación, book 12, title 40, law 10, Dec. 31, 1784; Sevilla y Solanas, Historia penitenciaria española, p. 206.

57. Lasala Navarro, Galeotes y presidiarios, pp. 98-100.

58. Ibid.

59. Gonzalo Anes, El Antiguo Régimen: Los Borbones (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1976), pp. 93-94.

60. For changes in the countryside in the eighteenth century, see Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, Sociedad y estado en el siglo XVIII español (Barcelona: Ariel, 1976), ch. 22.

61. P. Molas Ribalta, Los gremios barceloneses en el siglo XVIII. La estructura corporativa ante el comercio de la revolución industrial (Madrid: Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 1970), p. 62.

62. Ibid.

63. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4975, Apr. 19, 1786.

64. "Running the gauntlet" is a punishment in which a double file of men face each other and, armed with clubs or other weapons, strike at an individual who is made to run between them. The usual sentence was eight to ten runs.

65. This provision applied to deserters who were serving sentences for other offenses in the presidios at the time of their desertion.

66. Novísima Recopilación, book 12, title 40, law 8, Nov. 24, 1782. AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4936, June 2, 1777 (Havana to Oran); leg. 4923, June 4, 1773 (New Orleans to Ceuta). In the other direction, AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2139, Sept. 8, 1786 (Ceuta to Havana); AGI, Arribadas, f. 548, Nov. 20, 1788 (Ceuta to Manila).