[134] Little attention has been given to the role of penal servitude in the history of the Spanish Empire, for historians traditionally have been more interested in other forms of coercive labor. With the exception of the textile industry, the systematic exploitation of convict labor in Spanish America has remained a relatively unexplored field of investigation. ⁽¹⁾ Yet throughout the colonial period, prisoners were an important source of cheap labor, and their utilization by the state as well as by private interests merits close attention by those interested in colonial labor systems. Moreover, the history of penal servitude presents a good opportunity for the approach to colonial Spanish American history suggested by the Belgian historian Charles Verlinden some years ago. ⁽²⁾ Although Verlinden stressed the continuity between medieval European societies based on classical origins and Spanish American colonial societies, he also placed emphasis on the reciprocal contacts between colonies and metropolises. Penal servitude, like slavery, is an excellent example of the survival of classical and medieval influences, but both institutions also existed simultaneously on the Peninsula and in the New World during the colonial period. Thus, penal servitude, with its long history in the Mediterranean world, was transplanted to the New World, where, [135] like its Peninsular counterpart, it reached its most extensive development in the eighteenth century.

In Spanish America penal servitude followed the Peninsular model, except that the line between public and private interests was blurred. In Spain, convicts could be used only in projects deemed to be in the interest of the state; for example, they labored on the galleys and in the presidios in the service of the king, and were under military control and jurisdiction. In the New World there was no such distinction, and anything that helped to further develop the economy was deemed in the public interest. Faced with a severe shortage of labor because of the decline in Indian population from the middle of the sixteenth century, the colonial courts sentenced men to terms of service at hard labor and then turned them over to private employers who used them in mines, factories, and mills. ⁽³⁾ The growth of population in the eighteenth century reduced the need for such labor in the private sphere, but the demand in the public sector continued to increase in response to the requirements of imperial defense.

Spain's losses to England during the Seven Years War (1756-63) convinced the Spanish government that the defenses of the New [136] World had to be reinforced. In the postwar years a plan was devised for strengthening and fortifying American ports, in particular Havana and San Juan, Puerto Rico, as a first line of defense. Havana had long been considered essential to the preservation of Spain's control over America, and its temporary loss to the British in 1762 was a severe blow. As for San Juan, the abandonment of the convoy system and adoption of a more flexible strategy of defense increased its importance. In the hands of the enemy, either of these ports could serve as a base for an attack on Spanish shipping in the Caribbean and threaten the security of Veracruz and Mexico. The rebuilding and improvement of their fortifications was therefore vital to the protection of the Spanish Empire. ⁽⁴⁾ A subsidy of 300,000 pesos a year was assigned to the fortifications of Havana, and 100,000 pesos to that of San Juan (both sums to be paid for the situado from Mexico), but it was clear from the beginning that these funds would not be adequate unless expenditures were kept low. ⁽⁵⁾ The success of the project therefore depended on the maintenance of a steady supply of workers at minimum cost. In the opinion of the planners, this problem could be resolved only through the use of penal labor, as had been done in Spain in the construction of the naval arsenals of Cartagena and El Ferrol. Thus, presidiarios came to play as important a role in the execution of Spanish defense plans in the Caribbean as they had performed on the Iberian Peninsula.

The improvement of the fortifications of Havana began immediately after the British returned it to Spain in July, 1763. The new governor, the Count of Ricla (1763-65), who arrived in June to supervise the transfer of power, had instructions to repair all fortifications and defenses on the island, to rebuild whatever had been destroyed, and to add whatever was needed as rapidly as possible. The reconstitution of El Morro and the erection of the forts of San Carlos de la Cabaña and Atarés were begun in July with a work force consisting of black slaves, free laborers, and some local prisoners. ⁽⁶⁾ Most of the black slaves were recent imports from Africa who had been introduced on the island during the British occupation. They were purchased by the governor specifically for this project from private owners at 150 pesos each, making a total investment of 954,000 reales for the original group of 795. ⁽⁷⁾ As far as can be determined, black slaves made up the largest percentage [137] of workers during the first two years of construction, but later their number decreased sharply. Available statistics show that a total of 4,198 of them worked on the fortifications during the years 1763-65, and that they reached their highest number (1,967) in 1764. Figures for 1766 and 1767 are nonexistent, but those for 1768 and 1769 show a decline in the number of slaves and a steady increase in presidiarios. In January, 1768, there were 636 presidiarios and 1,136 black slaves out of a total of 1,977 workers; but by the following January, of a total work force of 2,030, the number of presidiarios had risen to 1,115, while the black slaves had declined to 766. ⁽⁸⁾

In a letter to the king in May, 1769, Governor Antonio María Bucareli explained the apparent shift away from the use of black slaves to that of presidiarios. According to his account, the progress of the work had reached a critical point. The black slaves were proving too costly because of their high mortality rates, while free laborers required a daily expenditure of three reales per man in wages. The only way to keep costs down and to stay within the 300,000-peso annual subsidy was to replace the slaves and free workers with presidiarios. In August, 1769, the king ordered Bucareli to sell the remaining black slaves and to dismiss the free laborers in numbers equal to those of presidiarios arriving from Spain and Mexico . ⁽⁹⁾

In contrast to Havana, in San Juan a labor force made up predominantly of presidiarios was projected from the beginning. In September, 1765, when the king approved the plan to repair and reconstruct the forts of San Felipe del Morro and San Cristóbal, he authorized the use of 445 presidiarios from Spain, Cuba, and Venezuela, although it was expected that the majority would come from Spain. The shortage of available manpower on the island and the unwillingness to utilize black slaves because of the unhappy experiences with them in Cuba motivated this decision. Initially it was thought that the presidiarios could be supplemented by soldiers from the San Juan garrison, who were to be paid two reales a day for their services. ⁽¹⁰⁾ Apparently some were employed in the early days of construction, when there were few presidiarios, and later, when the pressure of work demanded extra laborers, but aside from these special occasions, the work force consisted of presidiarios.

[138] Work on the fortifications of San Juan began in January, 1766, but the period of greatest activity was 1769-83, during which the forts of San Felipe del Morro and San Cristóbal were converted into powerful strongholds. Statistics are lacking for the years 1766-70, but it appears that fewer than the assigned number of 445 presidiarios worked on the fortifications in that period, and the higher quota of 600 that was enacted after 1771 was never reached. ⁽¹¹⁾ It is possible to estimate the actual representation of presidiarios on the basis of existing data (see table 8.1). In the years 1771-76, there were an average of 476 presidiarios in the San Juan presidio; from 1778 to 1780, 446; from 1781 to 1783, 260; and from 1784 to 1786, seventy-seven (after 1785, the quota was reduced to 300). According to these figures, the number of presidiarios peaked in July, 1773, at 557; by December, 1783, there were only 163. These statistics coincide perfectly with the different periods of construction. The largest contingents of presidiarios appear during the years 1771-83, which was precisely the most intense stage of the work, while the sharp decline in 1783 and after reflects the completion of the major undertakings.
 
 

Month	1773	1774	1775	1776	1778	1779	1780	1781	1782	1783
January	480	517	--	467	--	479	--	338	286	251
February	--	--	--	466	539	477	402	338	275	233
March	459	500	--	455	541	475	396	341	273	266
April	436	--	438	434	526	465	--	341	294	170
May	--	--	430	432	517	472	387	345	282	148
June	447	--	479	432	513	459	378	331	260	142
July	557	--	--	431	459	448	376	321	258	144
August	504	--	--	417	483	447	352	323	265	150
September	--	--	439	413	480	447	367	318	268	163
October	504	--	442	421	477	--	362	315	282	170
November	479	--	443	--	472	--	357	306	276	169
December	528	--	460	--	480	--	349	306	272	163

These figures are somewhat misleading, because they reflect the total number of presidiarios in the presidio without adjustment for the number of those unable to work because of illness. The actual [139] number working at any given time was much smaller than appears from these statistics. Inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the official monthly reports make it difficult to calculate more than a rough estimate of the number of presidiarios who were incapacitated due to poor health. In a normal year (one in which there were no major infections), an average of some 10 percent of the presidiarios of San Juan were idle each month for health reasons (see table 8.2). ⁽¹²⁾ In times of widespread illness, the lack of presidiarios brought the work to a virtual standstill; for example, in October, 1773, at the height of an outbreak of scurvy in the San Juan presidio, some 361 men were incapacitated -- 72 percent of the labor force.
 
 

Month	Hospitalized	Confined to Quarters	Total number of Presidiarios	Percentage of Presidiarios either hospitalized or Confined to Quarters
January	22	33	467	12
February	22	33	466	12
March	22	51	455	16
June	8	64	432	17
July	8	16	431	6
August	11	16	431	6
September	11	18	413	7
October	10	19	421	7

The physical health of the presidiarios was closely related to their diet and living conditions. Climatic considerations were another factor, for life in the tropics, with its constant heat, frequent storms, and hurricanes, in addition to infectious disease, took its toll. The diet of the presidiarios in the New World was similar to the ration distributed in the Peninsular presidios (in particular, the naval arsenal of La Carraca). Modifications of the basic presidio diet in Spanish America resulted from two factors: the unavailability of wheat on the islands, and the greater supply of other food, especially meat. Biscuit made of cassava flour in the form of hard round cakes supplanted the hardtack of the Peninsular presidios, and the daily [140] allotment was reduced from twenty-four to twelve ounces per man. The reduction of the bread ration was made possible through the addition of meat (either fresh or salted) to the stews. Since meat was plentiful and cheap in the New World, eventually it replaced beans as the standard fare in the American presidios. The stews also contained a sprinkling of vegetables, such as potatoes and squash, missing from their Peninsular counterparts, all of which meant that the diet of the presidiarios in the New World was better balanced and more nutritious than in the Old, while the cost was the same (one real). ⁽¹³⁾ In addition to wine, the presidiarios in Spanish American received a daily ration of brandy that was distributed to stimulate greater activity in a kind of "morning break" between breakfast and lunch. ⁽¹⁴⁾

Although the food ration in the New World presidios was better than in the Peninsula, it still was insufficient, and therefore created a state of chronic malnutrition. Lack of fruits and vegetables in sufficient quantity resulted in the constant presence of deficiency diseases, especially scurvy. Furthermore, malnutrition made for lowered resistance to infections. As in the Peninsular presidios, the existence of scrofula and consumption in endemic form among the presidiarios can be attributed in part to their deficient diet. Poor living conditions were another factor in the incidence of disease. Lack of personal hygiene, infrequent changes of clothing, and crowding contributed to the high incidence of diseases such as scabies. ⁽¹⁵⁾ More serious were body lice, which carried typhus fever, a frequent cause of death in jails, presidios, and wherever the unwashed were crowded together.

Besides the presidiarios who were genuinely sick, there were those who feigned illness to avoid work. In 1770 this problem was serious enough to spur the presidio officials in San Juan to take measures against it. Since the guards and overseers could not readily ascertain who was genuinely ill, the doctor of the presidio hospital was engaged to examine daily the presidiarios who claimed that they were indisposed. ⁽¹⁶⁾ Many of the imposters probably were discovered by this means, but it was impossible to eliminate them all, and absenteeism of this kind continued to be a problem. In view of this situation, it is easier to comprehend the repeated complaints of [141] the presidio administrators in their correspondence with the king as to the scarcity of presidiarios.

In addition to those with temporary indispositions (whether real or feigned), the category of unserviceable presidiarios also included those who were permanently incapacitated through disease or injury. The principal source of information about this group is a list compiled by the San Juan officials in 1773 with the objective of securing their release so as to replace them with fresh contingents. It contains the names of sixty-five men classified as incurably ill. Most of these men were suffering from scrofula and consumption; the rest were incapacitated because of hernias or paralysis. Although this list covers a substantial period of time (1768-73), it does not correspond to the years of most intense activity, and therefore its statistical value is limited. ⁽¹⁷⁾ It seems likely that the number of incurables increased substantially when both the population of the penal contingents and the difficulty of work-loads reached their maximums.

The decision in 1773 to release the unserviceable presidiarios raised the question of what to do with them, as well as what to do with others in the same category in the future. Castilian law specifically required the return of former prisoners after the completion of their sentences to their places of origin, where they were known to authorities and could be under constant supervision. In practice, it was difficult to enforce this provision, because when prisoners were returned to Spain, few went back to their home districts. Most tended to congregate around their ports of entry, or to migrate to the larger towns and cities in these same regions. Many government officials blamed the high levels of crime in coastal Andalusia and Valencia on this situation, and believed that it was necessary in the interests of law and order to decrease the number of such elements being brought back to the Peninsula. ⁽¹⁸⁾ This idea accorded well with one of the objectives of eighteenth-century Bourbon reformism -- the elimination, or at least reduction, of criminals, social deviants, and other "undesirables." It ultimately prompted the royal decision in 1774 to resettle presidiarios on the island of Puerto Rico rather than having them returned to Spain. This measure further stipulated that they should be settled in groups in sparcely inhabited parts of the island and given some kind of supervision. ⁽¹⁹⁾ Although Spain, unlike other western European countries such as England and France, [142] never adopted the policy of transportation of criminals, the attempt to settle released presidiarios on the island of Puerto Rico in 1774 manifested a similar approach and, in effect, accomplished the same objectives. ⁽²⁰⁾

In Spain, the collection and distribution of convicted criminals sentenced to the New World presidios was the same as for those condemned to the Peninsular and North African presidios. Local justices first sent them to the central prisons of their respective judicial districts, and from there they joined the chains destined for Cádiz, the main distribution center for the presidios of America. ⁽²¹⁾ Once in Cádiz, they were placed in a jail (depósito de presidiarios) that was maintained for them in the naval arsenal of La Carraca to await shipment to the New World. Since, for purposes of security, presidiarios could be sent only on warships carrying troops, they often waited in the depósito for years before they finally were sent to their destinations. ⁽²²⁾

At La Carraca, prolonged incarceration in crowded and unsanitary conditions took its toll of the prisoners -- many of those who survived were so weakened as to be unserviceable by the time they were ready to be sent to America. Men in feeble health were shipped out regularly, notwithstanding the requirement that they be examined and officially approved by the arsenal doctors. In practice, only in cases of obvious incapacity -- for example, blindness or paralysis -- were men rejected; the remainder, regardless of age or infirmities, were sent. This was especially true in the years 1771-80, when the demand for presidiarios in San Juan was so great. ⁽²³⁾ In 1773, for example, the officials there complained to the king that most presidiarios coming from Spain arrived on the island in such poor health that they were "permanently incapacitated" or at least "temporarily unserviceable." ⁽²⁴⁾ Four years later, conditions among the prisoners destined for Puerto Rico in the depósito of La Carraca were so deplorable that the chaplain of the arsenal wrote the king's confessor asking him to intervene with the king to provide for their immediate transport to the New World. Apparently nothing came of this appeal, because two years later they were still awaiting shipment; the only difference was that those who were able were being employed in the work of the arsenal. ⁽²⁵⁾

[143] The exploitation of prisoners while they were in the depósitos was a departure from accepted procedure, which specifically prohibited their use except at their assigned destinations. This practice was introduced at La Carraca as a temporary expedient to serve the interests of both prisoners and the state. For the prisoners, it offered relief from constant incarceration, while the king benefited from the utilization of additional workers. While this system was introduced at La Carraca to meet a special situation, changing circumstances in the late 1770s and early 1780s led to its adoption in other depósitos as well. By the last decades of the century, this system was firmly established on both sides of the Atlantic. ⁽²⁶⁾

Although Cádiz was the principal port of embarcation for presidiarios being shipped to the presidios of Spanish America, prisoners from the northern and northwestern regions of the Peninsula (Galicia, Asturias, Basque Provinces) often were taken to the naval arsenal at El Ferrol in Galicia or to the port of La Coruña. ⁽²⁷⁾

The principal sources of presidiarios for both San Juan and Havana were Spain and Mexico, although it is impossible to determine exact numbers. In most instances, transcripts of sentences bore the designation "either Havana or San Juan," thereby allowing officials to assign presidiarios according to need. This practice gave rise to abuses on the part of the officials in Havana, since all presidiarios bound for the Caribbean from either Spain or Mexico had to pass through Havana before they could be sent to their ultimate destinations. Havana was the main distribution center for the New World presidios, and a depósito was maintained there for presidiarios in transit. The administrators of the Havana presidio made it a practice to retain prisoners destined for San Juan, on the grounds of acute labor shortages in Havana and lack of the necessary funds to cover the cost of their shipment to Puerto Rico. On this pretext, they detained prisoners "temporarily" and utilized them in the work of the presidio in the same manner as if they actually had been sentenced there. ⁽²⁸⁾ Once these prisoners were incorporated into the work force of the presidio, the Havana officials applied to the king to sanction their actions. Since royal approval usually was forthcoming, the retention of these prisoners became permanent. ⁽²⁹⁾

[144] From the beginning, fear of disorders arising from prisoner escapes dictated that the penal laborers sent to the New World be restricted to military deserters, and they continued to be in the majority to the end of the century. Later, prisoners who had committed other crimes, for example, homicide, assault, and theft, were added, along with a category of civilian prisoners --smugglers and violators of the royal tobacco monopoly. ⁽³⁰⁾ Sentences for deserters ran from eight years to life (in the case of recidivists, the life sentence represented a commutation of the death penalty), while smugglers and tobacco monopoly defrauders averaged terms of four to six years.

In 1772, as a follow-up to the legislation of the previous year eliminating indefinite sentences, maximum terms for the New World presidios were lowered to six years with the exception of those individuals whose sentences specified "retention." ⁽³¹⁾ Dissatisfaction with the law of 1772 led to its early modification. The presidio administrators in Havana complained that because of the six-year maximum, too many men completed their terms within a relatively short time, and there were not enough prisoners to replace them. In 1778 it was decided to apply the six-year maximum to those with terms of over eight years. For prisoners within this category who had committed heinous crimes, presidio officials were given the authority to determine on an individual basis whether or not they merited the reduction of their sentences. These new regulations still did not satisfy the Havana officials, and in response to further pressure from them, the king declared in 1780 that the previous decrees represented a special royal concession only, and were not designed to establish a general rule. ⁽³²⁾ Thus, the law restricting presidio sentences in the New World to a six-year maximum was duly abrogated.

Whereas the presidiarios sent to Havana and San Juan from Spain were almost all military men, those destined for the same presidios from Mexico were, with few exceptions, civilians. A large body of prisoners sentenced by the two principal judicial bodies in New Spain, the sala de crimen of the audiencia in Mexico City and the tribunal of the acordada, received presidio sentences, but it is difficult to determine what proportion of them served their terms in Veracruz (the most important Mexican presidio), Havana, or San [145] Juan. The majority of acordada prisoners, for example, served their terms in Havana or Veracruz, but significant numbers also went to Acapulco, Piedras Negras, Pensacola, and, in rare instances, the Philippines. ⁽³³⁾ In 1773, for example, among the hard-core offenders in Havana serving terms of over six years, 486 came from Mexico out of a total of 586 in that category. The remainder came from Spain (all military deserters), Cuba (military prisoners), and Cartagena de Indias (murderers serving ten years to life). ⁽³⁴⁾ As for San Juan, certainly not more than a small percentage of those shipped to Havana from Mexico were destined originally for San Juan; and of these, even fewer arrived there, because of the practice of retaining them in Havana.

Since the Indians, except in rare instances, usually served their sentences in Veracruz or some other presidio within the jurisdiction of modern Mexico, those sentenced by the Mexican courts to Havana and San Juan were Spaniards, mestizos, and mulattoes. ⁽³⁵⁾ Almost all had committed capital crimes meriting substantial sentences. According to the data of 1773, 15 percent of the Mexican offenders were sentenced for crimes against persons, some 13 percent for homicide alone. Among the property offenders, who composed 34 percent of the total sample, horse and cattle thieves, bandits and robbers predominated. A considerable number of these men had committed homicide as well. There were few petty criminals sent from Mexico to Havana, because in Mexico a substantial proportion of cases involving minor crimes were settled by local officials with short-term punishment. The regular judicial system came into play only when a case involved a serious crime that merited a public display of judicial authority. ⁽³⁶⁾

In the 1780s and 1790s, the labor demands of the Havana presidio far exceeded those of Veracruz and San Juan. During that period, officials undertook improvements of the port, the harbor, and the fortifications. The Castillo del Príncipe and the Battery of Santa Clara, both considered vital to defense, were completed during those years. In 1787, the governor of Cuba blamed the slow work on the Castillo del Príncipe on the lack of presidiarios, and he requested the Viceroy of Mexico to send 2,000 presidiarios to Havana to satisfy the requirements of the new fortifications alone. ⁽³⁷⁾ As for the needs of the port and arsenal, presidiarios manned the [146] crews of the twelve pontoons and barges engaged in dredging the harbor and formed the work gangs employed in excavation work for construction projects around the port area. They also were used to cut and transport timber needed in the shipyard and to move heavy equipment around the docks and arsenal. In addition, a steady supply of presidiarios was required to move the chain pumps that prevented the dry docks from flooding. As in the Peninsular presidios, this labor was so arduous that only men who had committed the most serious crimes were subjected to it, and their sentences always specifically assigned them "to the pumps." ⁽³⁸⁾

In contrast to the men condemned to work the pumps, the remaining prisoners could be utilized in any kind of presidio labor, since their sentences stated simply that they were destined for the "arsenal and fortifications of Havana." It became customary in this period to define work categories more carefully so as to achieve a better distribution of presidiarios. The inauguration of a municipal improvement program for Havana during those years (street paving, a water supply system, new buildings for the government) resulted in keen competition for penal labor. In order to secure an adequate supply of presidiarios for the presidio as well as the public works projects, the courts were asked to specify in their sentences the kind of labor to be performed by the prisoners, that is, either "arsenal and fortifications" or "public works." ⁽³⁹⁾

The shortage of presidiarios in Havana in the last decades of the century was not only the result of the volume and intensity of the work. Attrition rates from desertion, death, and releases also must be considered. Figures for Havana are lacking for this period, but the official correspondence between Havana and Madrid contains repeated reference to losses because of frequent escapes and completion of sentences by prisoners. Some statistics are available for San Juan during the years 1778-82 (see table 8.3). In this period, some 40 percent of the working force was lost through death, desertion, and releases, and it is likely that this ratio increased in the 1790s. Most surprising are the figures for releases, which show that twice the number of men completed their sentences and were freed than died during these years. It seems that the survival rate was higher during the last decades of the century than in the previous period, but there is no evidence to suggest that this change [147] resulted from better treatment or improved conditions for the presidiarios; on the contrary, the opposite was true. ⁽⁴⁰⁾ The decline in the death rate and the increase in the number of those completing their terms was more likely a reflection of the tendency in the last decades of the eighteenth century to reduce the length of sentences while at the same time extending presidio punishment to a greater number of offenders. A survey of extant data from the Sala de Alcaldes de Casa y Corte shows the degree to which the judges, influenced by the ideas of Beccaria, Lardizábal, and others, were using their discretionary powers to modify and change penal law. Presidio sentences (generally from four to six years) were given for serious crimes, while lesser offenses were punished with short terms at hard labor in the public works projects (six months to two years). The death penalty is infrequent, and only in cases of the most heinous crimes. A similar pattern of sentencing can be found in the data published for the tribunal of the acordada (Mexico) during the years l782-1808. ⁽⁴¹⁾
 
 

Year	Deserted	Died	Completed Sentences	Total Number of Presidiarios*
1778	52	37	18	499
1779	66	28	85	463
1780	63	27	108	373
1781	42	37	66	327
1782	55	36	59	274

Throughout the colonial period, the exploitation of penal labor was an essential part of the Spanish American labor system. In private industry, colonial employers regularly utilized penal labor, and some enterprises, notably those in the textile industry, were always associated with it. In the eighteenth century the military needs of the empire took precedence over private interests, and convicts began to be sent en masse to the presidios. By the end of the century, the state had become the principal employer of penal labor in the New World as in Spain.

1. On the obrajes, see Richard Greenleaf, "The Obraje in the Late Mexican Colony," The Americas 23 (1967): 227-50; John Super, "Querétaro Obrajes: Industry and Society in Provincial Mexico, 1600-1812," Hispanic American Historical Review 56 (1976): 197-216; and Samuel Kagan, "Penal Servitude in New Spain: The Colonial Textile Industry" (Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 1977).

2. Charles Verlinden, The Beginnings of Modern Colonization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970).

3. Greenleaf, "The Obraje," pp. 242-43; Charles Gibson, The Aztecs under Spanish Rule (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 244-46.

4. Bernard Bobb, The Viceregency of Antonio Maria Bucareli in New Spain, 1771 -1 779 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), p. 85.

5. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2501, July 15, 1765; leg. 2129, Nov. 31, 1772.

6. Prisoners from local jails worked on fortifications in Caribbean ports from the end of the sixteenth century. Bibiano Torres Ramírez, "Alejandro O'Reilly en Cuba," Anuario de estudios americanos 24 (1967): 1357.

7. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2129, Nov. 31, 1772.

8. Ibid.; and monthly reports for the years 1768 and 1769 in leg. 2122. The rest of the work force consisted of free laborers -- overseers and specialized workers.

9. Ibid., leg. 2129, May28, 1769; Aug. 13, 1769.

10. Ibid., leg. 2501, May 20, 1765; Nicolds Cabrillana, "Las fortificaciones militares en Puerto Rico," Revista de Indias 107 (1967): 172.

11. Although 445 prisoners were authorized in the decree of 1765, this number was reduced almost immediately to 350. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2503, Feb. 25, 1769. The period of Governor Miguel de Muesas, 1769-76, has been studied by Altagracia Ortiz-Squillaee in "Eighteenth-Century Reforms in the Caribbean: The Governorship of Miguel de Muesas, 1769-1776" (Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 1977). I am grateful to her for information on the progress of the fortifications during those years.

12. These figures seem modest when compared with those for Havana, where monthly rates in 1768 and 1769, for example, were never lower than 13 percent, and the average for both years was 16 percent. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2122.

13. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2366, June 30, 1786; leg. 2502, July 15,

1768; leg. 2506B, Nov. 17, 1775.

14. Ibid., leg. 2504, Nov. 20, 1771; Mat 20, 1772.

15. Ibid., leg. 2505, May 27, 1773; Sept. 30, 1773.

16. Ibid., leg. 2503, Nov. 30, 1769; Dec. 29, 1769; May 30, 1770.

17. Ibid., leg. 2505, May 27, 1773.

18. AGS, leg. 695, May 24, 1765; AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1779, f. 5l6v; Sevilla y Solanas, Historia penitenciaria, p. 213.

19. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2505, July 28, 1774; Oct. 25, 1774; leg. 2503, Oct. 25, 1774; AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4950, Mat 25, 1779. As early as 1769, O'Reilly had suggested resettling presidiarios on the island of Puerto Rico so as to increase its population. AGI,

Santo Domingo, leg. 2503, Feb. 25, 1769.

20. For additional comments on transportation, see chs. 3 and 7, above.

21. Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Sala de Manuseritos, Raros, 14.090, year

1566; Novísima Recopilación, book 8, title 24, law 13, Mat 12, 1771; AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Cone, year 1787, if. 898ù95; AGS, Secretaría de Hacienda, leg. 978; AGS, Guerra Moderna, leg. 4962.

22. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2127, Feb. 8, 1771.

23. Ibid., leg. 2929, Nov. 9, 1773.

24. Ibid., leg. 2505, May 18, 1773.

25. AGS, Marina, leg. 696, Aug. 22, 1777; leg. 697, May 17, 1779.

26. AHN, Alcaldes de Casa y Corte, year 1776, if. 124-42; year 1795, ff. 552-56; Novísima Recopilación, book 12, title 40, law 12, Jan. 27, 1787. For Havana and Veracruz, see AGN (Mexico), Ramo de Presidios y Cdrceles, vol. 24, if. 336-336v, Mat 14, 1786; f. 287, Dec.

31, 1791. Documents from the AGN (Mexico) facilitated by Dr. Samuel Kagan.

27. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2132, June 14, 1773; leg. 2127, Feb. 27, 1771.

28. Ibid., leg. 2509, Nov. 19, 1784; leg. 2128, July 7, 1771.

29. Ibid., leg. 2509, July 26, 1785.

30. AGS, Marina, leg. 697, Aug. 5, 1777; AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2505, May23, 1773.

31. Novísima Recopilación, book 12, title 40, law 7, Mat 12, 1771; law 15, Mat 28, 1772; AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2128, Aug. 24, 1772.

32. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2132.

33. Cohn MacLachlan, Criminal Justice in Eighteenth Century Mexico. A Study of the Acordada (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 81.

34. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2132, June 14, 1773.

35. MacLachlan, Criminal Justice, pp. 80-81, 115-16; AGN (Mexico), Cárceles, vol. 1, ff. 13-16v, 20-25; vol. 13, if. 180-84, 206-207v, 208-2l2v, 214-216v; vol. 24, ff. 6-7, 8-13. See also Christon I. Archer, "The Deportation of Barbarian Indians from the Internal Provinces of New Spain, 1789-1810," The Americas 29 (1973): 376-85.

36. MacLachlan, Criminal Justice, p. 42. For the data of 1773, see AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2132, June 14, 1773. I am indebted to Dr. G. Douglas Inglis for a copy of this list.

37. AGN (Mexico), Cárceles, vol. 24, ff. 294-95.

38. Ibid., ff. 314-17.

39. Ibid., ff. 260-89, 336.

40. AGI, Santo Domingo, leg. 2509, Apr. 3, 1789. For complaints by the Havana officials about desertions and releases, see, for example, AGN (Mexico), Cárceles, vol. 24, ff. 321-22.

41. MacLachlan, Criminal Justice, pp. 78-80, 115-16; and Alicia Bazán Alarcón, "El Real Tribunal de ha Acordada y la delincuencia en la Nueva España," Historia Mexicana 13 (1964): 3 17-46.