A municipal militia was marshaled for a variety of purposes. When it passed through the gates of the town to meet the challenges beyond, its objective might be the siege of another town or fortress, a booty-gathering foray, an attack upon hostile forces within its own boundaries, or union with a large royal expedition of which it would constitute only a small part. A myriad of terms exists to define these various activities, and the charters and chronicles are not always consistent in their usage. This spectrum of service opportunities can be divided into two basic categories: defensive and offensive.
 
 

In the performance of defensive tasks the municipalities made their greatest contribution to the monarch. The frontier towns constituted through their settlement pattern and their military preparedness a defense in depth. As strong points scattered along the frontier of the Iberian Christian kingdoms, they buffered the rear areas against Muslim attack. The towns gave warning of an approaching enemy force, harassed it on the march and, on occasion, defeated it in battle with their militias. Moreover, the militias remained on alert for the smaller Muslim raiding forays, styled rebatos and arrobdas, thwarting their assaults whenever possible. These towns absorbed much of the impetus of the Muslim military effort, adding many impediments to enemy campaigning. In the process of making this manifold contribution, [137] they eased the burden of the monarchs they served as well as providing security for their own daily life.

Defensive operations were not an easy category of military endeavor, since most of the ordinary advantages sought in combat had to be relinquished. The attacking force usually possessed initiative, planning and surprise. Small raiding forays often evaporated before the town could organize a resistance force, while a large army usually proved beyond the capacity of a single municipality to contain. The defenders had a better knowledge of the terrain, the incentive of defending their own lands, and the hope that the invaders would make a serious mistake. Since the townsmen needed to protect their families, possessions, crops and livestock while maintaining permanent settlement on an exposed frontier, the offensive capabilities of the invaders had to be countered. Survival meant a mastery of the techniques of defensive warfare, and this challenge faced the towns from the moment of their establishment. Moreover, it was a need to be met largely by their own resources.

The municipal defensive capability developed especially in the eleventh and twelfth centuries which provided the context to bring it to maturity. During this period the striking penetration of the Trans-Duero and Portugal by Fernando I and Alfonso VI opened frontier areas to settlement while exposing the populators to Muslim counterattack. Prior to this time, the efforts of such settlements had focused upon passive measures of defense which sought adequate fortification and the protection of livestock. The Aragonese and Navarrese determination to encroach upon the lands of Muslim Zaragoza in the upper Ebro Valley produced a similar capability for those towns in the later eleventh and early twelfth centuries. The contemporary southward thrust of the Counts of Barcelona largely devoted itself to the acquisition of Tarragona, a program in which small municipal settlements do not appear to play a large role. In Leon and Castile, however, the age witnessed the municipal efforts to organize militias which could take more active measures in striking back at an enemy expedition. These town efforts to contribute to their own defense attracted the attention of the chroniclers by the twelfth century, and their achievements in this endeavor probably assumed greater significance in the long run than their record on offensive expeditions. Among the most memorable of these defensive parries by the towns were those against Christian opponents, particularly Salamanca's stand against Fernando II's army at Salvatierra de Tormes in 1162 and the sharp repulsion of the Leonese invading force into Castile by the militia of Ávila in 1217.⁽¹⁾

The defensive system of the Peninsula and especially of the municipalities evolved steadily from its first appearance in the eleventh-century charters through the more systematic formulations stated in the Alfonsine codes of the later thirteenth century, the Espéculo and the Siete partidas. As it developed this system displayed both active and passive attributes. The active process of assembling a force to seek out and destroy the invading enemy was covered by the term apellido. From its origins as a generic term for warning, apellido had by the later eleventh century come to signify the military force mustered by the towns to deal with the danger heralded by that warning. In contrast to musters directed toward military activity initiated by the town, i.e. offensive endeavors, this situation required rapid assembly under the impending threat of enemy attack. The forces summoned by the apellido were expected to meet the enemy expedition in the field, to defeat it if possible, or harry its progress if that force proved too large. The passive side of defense consisted in the maintenance of an efficient warning procedure and a reliable system of walls and towers. Moreover, townsmen were enjoined to exercise great vigilance and extreme caution when an enemy invading force was in the region. The nature of the frontier induced a continual wartime mode of living which must have exerted a relentless price in stress.⁽²⁾

Apellido service clearly dealt with two types of military musters. Either some kind of invading or raiding force had entered the surrounding countryside (alfoz) of the town and required an immediate counterattack, or a royal force of some size sought a regional muster to deal with a large scale attack, an announcement which anticipated a contingent from the town to swell the king's ranks. In either incidence of imminent military danger, the law compelled those citizens with militia responsibilities to assemble in the plaza of the town or to seek out the standard of the town council wherever it might be located. The development of the active defensive posture that the word apellido suggests begins to appear in the later eleventh century. Excluding the charter of Peñafiel of 942 in which it is probably a later interpolation, the Leonese-Castilian kings begin to utilize the term with the charters granted by Fernando I to a number of Portuguese towns by 1065, followed by the charters given by Alfonso VI to the Castilian towns of Palenzuela (1074), Nájera (1076) and Sepúlveda (1076). Aragonese evidence starts with Pedro I's charter to Barbastro in 1100. Catalan sources indicate no use of the term whatsoever, and defensive obligation is probably presumed under the terms of hoste and cavalgada.⁽³⁾ By the end of the twelfth century the Navarrese monarchy, reacting to the pressures exerted by neighboring Castile and Aragon, compelled a number of towns to go beyond the one soldier per householder rule for offensive [139] expeditions, dispatching all able-bodied men with arms to the apellido.⁽⁴⁾ By the end of the thirteenth century, the Alfonsine codes offer a full statement of the defensive necessities of the realm and the obligation of the municipal militias to respond to those needs. In the chronicle of Alfonso X, written in the early fourteenth century, the term apellido has evolved into a verb form to describe the assembly of forces to deal with Muslim raids for 1269.⁽⁵⁾

The emergency nature of the service summoned by the apellido caused exemptions from it to be far rarer than those of offensive service by an overall ratio of more than seven to one in Leon, Castile, Navarre and Aragon. The infrequency of exemption from the obligation to respond to the apellido suggests that the peninsular monarchs anticipated the rendering of this service from most towns. Municipal self-defense and the security of its region were fundamental to the towns' own interests as well as that of the kingdom. In Portugal, where the survival rate of municipal charters is higher than in the rest of Iberia, apellido appears in the charters to a far greater extent than requirements for offensive service until the later twelfth century. The Portuguese towns often imposed limitations upon defensive service reminiscent of the sort identified with offensive service elsewhere. Some localities required that the militia would return within a day of its departure; ⁽⁶⁾ others stipulated the presence of the king; ⁽⁷⁾ yet others required that the enemy be Muslim to justify a defensive muster.⁽⁸⁾ The only other specification which appears with regard to the apellido in the shorter citations occurs in the Aragonese and Navarrese charters and stipulates that the king must be preparing for an actual battle to justify the defensive call, lest the town militia be drawn unnecessarily from its own defensive zone.

The apellido summons manifested itself in either audible or visual signals, portending the need of hasty preparations and urgent assembly of forces. This warning was sounded in the town and its alfoz by bells, horns, drums or any other instruments which could be heard at a distance, or visually by bonfires. The warning call applied to all obligated persons within earshot or who came in contact with another bearing the news. It applied throughout the entire territory under the town's control, villa and aldea, and on occasion to a region of towns. The Cuenca-Teruel and Coria Cima-Coa families of charters allow the resident twenty-four hours to locate the assembly area and take themselves there, but speed was encouraged. The Coria group urged knights to hasten at the gallop and footsoldiers at the run to the standard. The Cuenca-Teruel charters set the distance at that which could be walked in twenty-four hours, while the Coria Cima-Coa set the requirement at twelve hours.⁽⁹⁾ The almost [140] universal requirement that the peones respond to the apellido distinguishes this service notably from the offensive forms of assembly, where footsoldiers often enjoyed exemption or simply went unmentioned. The implicit philosophy behind such a distinction saw defense as the ultimate responsibility in the face of the gravest kind of frontier threat, a threat which all citizens must meet, regardless of class.

The Muslim raid on Talavera of 1182 generated an apellido with many of the typical elements. Taking advantage of some cloudy October days during the harvest season, an Almohad force under Ibn Wânúdìn moved up the road from Córdoba toward the central Tajo Valley. It met and captured a Christian scouting party, whose leader fled the skirmish to spread the warning to the region. The Muslim force bore down upon the town of Talavera and placed the municipality under siege, establishing themselves in a fortified camp in high ground outside the city. The Talaveran response may have been rusty, since, according to the Muslim chronicler, the only Muslims that these townsmen had seen in several decades were prisoners of war, but the defense alert promptly generated counter forces in an attempt to drive the besiegers from their position. The castle garrisons and settled areas of the vicinity joined with the Talaveran defensive forces to attempt to dislodge the Muslims, but paid heavily for their failure with casualties and loss of military gear as the Córdobans stood their ground. Finally, after the Muslims laden with their booty began their return to the south, a priest gathered a force of all able-bodied Talaveran men which overtook the Muslim force, defeating the rear guard and recapturing the Muslim booty. The Muslim army regrouped and retaliated, overrunning the Talaverans and their booty. More than enough knights, footsoldiers and even some non-combatant Jews were captured to assist the Cordobese in carrying their loot back to Aldalusia.⁽¹⁰⁾ Thus, the apellido, while mustering a militia mildly out of practice in defending itself, roused a force sufficient to defend the region. Though the Christians suffered ultimate defeat, Talavera itself did not fall, and the Muslim force had no opportunity to push beyond Talavera to Toledo or the towns of the Jarama-Manzanares valley to the north. It is interesting that much of this day to day frontier conflict by the municipalities was reported more frequently in the Muslim chronicles than in the Christian accounts. The monkish Christian chroniclers of the twelfth century paid little heed to the emerging municipalities. The Muslims who had to face them in combat had better reasons to remember.

Once the militia had been mustered to resist the invader, the urgency of the situation and the numbers of the enemy determined organization, [141] tactics and the length of the campaign. As noted in Chapter Five, many towns retained a reserve force held back from offensive and defensive expeditions to garrison their walls and the fortified places of the region. While militiamen must have experienced more than sufficient difficulties in readying themselves on short notice, towns often expected their mustered contingents to provide provisions for themselves.⁽¹¹⁾ The official in charge of the apellido force drew a substantial fine in the Coria Cima-Coa towns if the forces he mustered took provisions from the residents of the surrounding countryside (aldeas) or if he brought along any unauthorized guests who did so. This must have struck the twelfth-century mind as a kind of military junket so popular with twentieth-century legislators.⁽¹²⁾ The charters do not elaborate the tactical organization for the defense, causing one to assume that march order and battle techniques conformed to those used in offensive warfare. The true difference between the offensive fonsado and the emergency force convoked by the apellido lay not in the manner in which each fought, but the causes for summoning the militia at the outset. If this difference imposed itself on battlefield operations, the influencing factors were largely the hasty organization of troops, the lack of pre-combat planning, and a understrength militia due to the suddenness of the call.

Excuse from the apellido, when permitted, required an important personal reason to avoid a fine. The most common excuses were absence from the town, failing to hear the warning sounded, and illness. Knights also gained excuses if their horses were injured, ailing, had recently died, or were otherwise unavailable.⁽¹³⁾ The Coria Cima-Coa charters, revealing a suspicion toward knights who employed one of the equine exemptions, applied severe sanctions against an individual who tried to substitute another animal for a horse, attempted to give his horse to another person for the duration of the apellido call, or misstated the true condition of his mount.⁽¹⁴⁾ This same group of charters freed smiths who had made a specified number of plowshares, hired hands (madieros), and residents who had dwelled in the town for less than a year.⁽¹⁵⁾ Failure to appear for the apellido muster or to qualify for either an excuse or an exemption saw the offender fined. Little information regarding the right of appeal for such fines appears in the charters, but the Cuenca-Teruel charters granted their residents three days to contest the fine after the militia had returned from the field. Failure to appeal within this three-day limit made the fine automatic.⁽¹⁶⁾

Not all of the municipal charters state the amount of the fine that [142] they assess for missing the apellido, but Table 8-1 in Chapter Eight provides a list of the charters that do list the assessed amount. This same table compares these fines with the fines assessed for missing offensive expeditions, offering an interesting parallel between the experience of Castile and Aragon as against that of Portugal and Leon. Residents of the Portuguese and Leonese towns faced a greater likelihood of being fined for missing the apellido than one of the offensive musters, especially the peones. This underlines the heavy stress placed on the townsmen for defensive activity in the two western kingdoms, and may signal a more constant level of raiding from Muslim invaders attacking through the Alentejo and Leonese Extremadura. It may also suggest that the Portuguese and Leonese monarchies envisioned a less imaginative role for the town militias. Castile and Aragon fined vigorously for missing the offensive assemblies, and clearly expected their towns to pursue the initiative with their militias. Presumably, the defense would take care of itself.

The militia's ability to attack the enemy in the field comprised a vital part of the defensive protection of a town, but not its totality. The municipality depended equally upon its passive measure of defense, i.e. its surveillance system and its hard shell of fortifications, should the militia face an opponent too powerful to be attacked in the field or encounter defeat in that effort. The scouts and guards maintained by the towns assured that there would be ample warning time to prepare for possible resistance. These passive agencies of defense probably existed far earlier in the Reconquest than did the active capability, constituting the basic reason why townsmen could claim a section of the frontier as their own land.

One term occasionally cited in connection with the passive defense of towns was anubda, a term which has generated a good deal of scholarly debate concerning its meaning. The interpretative spectrum varies from the view that it signified a requirement for labor in the construction of fortifications analogous to castellaría (Puyol y Alonso and Palomeque Torres), to the notion that it was a mounted guard duty for livestock analogous to the rafala-esculca (Pescador), or the idea that it was a general service of watch duty (Loscertales and González). González makes the most convincing case in behalf of anubda being a form of vigilance service, primarily seen in Castile until the thirteenth century.⁽¹⁷⁾ Further investigation indicates that the origins of the term lie in the Rioja region on the frontier between Navarre and Castile beginning in the last half of the eleventh century, and that it tended to function as a co-equivalent term to apellido, although connoting by its emphasis on vigilance [143] a more passive means of defense. The widespread development of apellido service in Leon may have obviated the use of such a term, although anubda appears periodically in Portuguese forais where apellido was common.⁽¹⁸⁾

Passive defense entailed protection of two basic areas, the town itself, and its surrounding territory, the limits of which were marked by its boundary stones. The protection of this terrain required constant surveillance. To provide this, the residents kept watches in small fortifications and towers situated at key positions. The kings often granted castles to assist in the surveillance of their region.⁽¹⁹⁾ Sentries (velas, vigías and talaeros) manned these positions during the day when visibility was good. The night sentries were sometimes called ascuchas (listeners) when ears supplemented eyes as detectors of the unusual. Mounted sentinels termed arrobdas roamed the town's alfoz seeking any signs of potential rebatos (sudden strikes by the Muslims).⁽²⁰⁾ In all of this watchfulness, protection of the municipality's resources, its population, its livestock and its crops, remained the chief objective. All of these lay open to a sudden foray, but the charters indicated special concern for crops and animals. Grain and cattle guards drew exemption from military service in Oviedo and Avilés, while receiving booty shares in many others.⁽²¹⁾

Sheep and cattle rustling, a favorite enterprise of both Christian and Muslim frontiersmen, drew the attention of a number of the municipal charters. Townsmen who pursued enemy rustlers had claim on some of the animals retaken, the amount depending on how far the chase had carried them from the town. The municipalities came to base a considerable portion of their economies on the livestock industry, and thus cattle and sheep stood high on the priority list of spoils. Clearly a need for elaborate precautions existed to protect the territorial boundaries. Should the security measures detect a raiding party, fires provided a useful means of spreading the alarm; the igniters strove to make their signal fires smoke for daytime signaling, and to flame brilliantly for night-time visibility.⁽²²⁾ Once the alfoz resounded and glowed with the signals of alarm, this triggered the defensive muster of the militia, transforming passive surveillance into active defense.

When all else failed, the municipality relied upon the hard shell of its walls, which were except in the event of an extended and unrelieved siege or a surprise penetration, invulnerable to an enemy assault. The fortifications increased the effectiveness of the defenders by a substantial factor, since fewer individuals were needed to defend a wall effectively than were required to assault it. Much municipal legislation dealt with the town walls, including their construction, maintenance and repair.⁽²³⁾ Such an [144] interest made good sense, given the keenness of both Muslim and Christian armies to destroy walls in order to break resistance or curtail the ability of residents to remain settled in that particular area. From the famous destruction of Leon's town walls by the Cordoban army in 993, the fortification smashing spree of Emir cAlì ibn-Yúsuf against the Manzanares towns in 1109, and Archbishop Gelmirez's use of his Galician militias to destroy the walls of some of the troublesome local nobility near Santiago in 1121 and 1130, ample indications of the value of walls appear in the chronicles. Shortly after their establishment towns like Ciudad Rodrigo eagerly sought to gird themselves in stone. On occasion, wall-building had to be restricted, as was the case when Bishop Ramiro and King Sancho the Strong of Navarre curbed the aggressive construction of internal barriers by the hostile barrios of deeply divided Pamplona in 1222.⁽²⁴⁾ Towns derived the not inconsiderable resources required for wall building and maintenance through taxation, then apparently paying residents who performed fortification service a salary drawn from these revenues. Only the determination to increase the knightly class for the assault on Andalusia seems to have persuaded the Leonese and Castilian monarchs to exempt that class from the payment of these fortification taxes.⁽²⁵⁾

Deliberate damage to the municipal fortifications could be heavily fined, as Viguera did with a five hundred sueldo amercement for breaking a wall, sixty for harming a gate and ten for damaging any other aperture in the walls.⁽²⁶⁾ Heavy fining in these instances suggests that malicious damage to the municipal defenses placed the charge of traitor upon the perpetrator, for the walls constituted the only salvation for towns such Coimbra (1117), Huete (1172) and Santarém (1184) when they had to endure their long sieges.⁽²⁷⁾ When the threat of such serious assaults arose, the residents of the countryside could find shelter with their livestock within the fortifications, forcing the enemy to mount a siege in order to control the area and tie down the garrison. Should the invader fail to detach some of the strength of his expeditionary force to provide a containment force, he became liable to a rear assault from the town's militia. Undertaking a formal siege cost time and casualties while obviating other objectives which the expedition might have been pursuing. Sieges had a high failure rate (witness the numerous Muslim attempts to retake Toledo), and expeditions which squandered their resources in time and energy in these operations stood the risk of returning empty-handed. Thus, every walled town on a line of march presented a dilemma in its balance between opportunity and frustration.

The town walls fulfilled their function only when properly manned. The charters of Teruel and Albarracín offer particularly detailed accounts of their watch procedures. Sentinels (velas) received salaries, carried heavy responsibilities and were policed by an overseer (sobrevela). Each tower along the walls required two sentinels, with fines established in those instances when the sentinels failed to appear. The overseer checked the drowsiness of his charges with periodic challenges, with fining again the penalty for failure to respond within three calls. The sentinels kept their stations from sunset to the matins mass, facing fines for late arrival or premature departure. The functionary known as the janitor or portero retained custody over the gates of the town. His tasks included the closing and the opening of the gates at the prescribed times (usually sunset and sunrise). He was fined heavily for procedural violations and awarded a share of booty since he could not serve on campaigns.⁽²⁸⁾

Two occasions seemed exceptionally threatening to the municipalities: harvest time and after the militia had departed on campaign. These periods offered the greatest probability of an enemy raid or a surprise siege. The harvest presented an enticing target for raiders, while the campaign season saw the town's military resources fully committed in the field. To diminish this risk many towns never permitted more than a portion of their militia to take to the field at one time, as is especially noteworthy in the Salamanca-Numão and Ávila-Évora patterns of charters. The chroniclers' accounts of both Muslim and Christian styles of siegecraft indicated a decided preference for surprise, attack in bad weather or at night, and the frequent employment of fire as both a weapon of surprise and of extended siege. For all of these the town had to ready its defenses. With the militia absent, special concern manifested itself regarding night-time security and the movements of strangers in the municipality.

Sunset brought the closing of the gates, marked by the clashing of cymbals or the ringing of bells which announced the commencement of night security rules. At this point strangers lacking a proper reason for remaining within the town overnight were expelled. If the regular juez and the alcaldes commanded the departed militia, the concejo appointed an interim juez and two alcaldes to govern the town. In addition to the tower guards, the town placed sentinels in each parish (collación) and barrio. The sobrevelas patrolled the streets, exchanged passwords with the various sentries, and coordinated the surveillance in their area. The law required anyone moving in the streets of the town after sunset [146] to carry a light. The violators faced immediate arrest and incarceration.⁽²⁹⁾ In the Cuenca-Teruel charter towns, those apprehended for this reason faced the juez the following day. If the offender were a resident, he was liable to be stripped and beaten, then released; should the offender prove to be a stranger, the juez ordered him executed.⁽³⁰⁾

Fire loomed as a matter of grave concern. In any medieval town it constituted a serious hazard, but on the Iberian frontier fire saw frequent usage as a tactic of surprise attack, sometimes being ignited by a conspirator within the municipal walls. The outbreak of a conflagration initiated hasty emergency procedures designed to contain and extinguish the blaze before it raged through many districts of the town. While the fire absorbed the complete attention of the residents, the same conspirator or his confederates would throw open the gates to an awaiting enemy force. The juez and the alcaldes cast anyone suspected of planning such a scheme out of the town, or imprisoned them until the concejo and the militia returned from the campaign. For this reason the charters urged the townsmen to assure themselves that individuals were guarding the town gates before devoting their entire concern to any fire that broke out, whatever the cause. The Fuero de Plasencia hints at the reviving classicism of the era by making a very pointed analogy to the fall of Troy in advising this precaution. The charters recommended the same procedures be followed during the grain harvest in August.⁽³¹⁾ Defense of the town was a life or death matter on the Iberian frontier, thus harsh penalties were a necessity to strengthen internal discipline.

The municipalities thus combined their active and passive measures of defense to procure the overall protection of their territory and walls. The militia summoned by the apellido, coordinated with the fortifications and augmented by the vigilance of the residents, proved a combination indispensable to the protection of the town and its inhabitants. When the varied tasks and duties were performed efficiently, an enemy expedition could cross the deep frontier zone only with considerable effort and care. If the Christian towns, like the crusader castles of the Near East, did not form an impenetrable wall to Muslim invasion, they at least served as a defense in depth to entangle, delay and on occasion overcome the enemy expedition. More important, this system strengthened municipal resistance to the steady harassment of frontier raiding, enabling the townsmen to carve out a permanent place on the Iberian frontier.

The towns possessed a respectable defensive capability from at least the eleventh century onward. An offensive capability, i.e. tactical and strategic military activity planned and initiated by the municipalities and including long-distance campaigns with prolonged fighting, emerged somewhat later, having come within the capacity of the towns in the twelfth century. The chronicles begin to discuss the urban militias in this role as early as the reign of Alfonso VII of Leon-Castile (1126-57), and the charters of the late twelfth century are the first to concern themselves with the problems created by campaigns of long duration. The towns give indications of this offensive role both in the campaigns undertaken at their own volition and in campaigns where they served as a part of forces organized by the king and his representatives. In both categories the militias grew in size and in capability during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

A survey of the municipal charters and the royal codes indicates two fundamental types of warfare: large-scale pitched battles and smaller skirmishes and raids. The Siete partidas defines the first category as a conflict between large armies with organized divisions. These batallas (as the code defines them) presupposed battle signals in the maneuvering of units and the maintaining of a reserve force by both commanders.⁽³²⁾ Townsmen formed a part in this type of combat at least as early as the campaigns of Rodrigo Gunsalvo against Seville during Alfonso VII's reign, and were similarly in evidence at Alarcos (1195) and Las Navas de Tolosa (1212). On such occasions the militias drew placement in one of the three forward wings, probably being reformed into larger infantry and cavalry blocs with other militias. The Santarém charters indicate that the Portuguese kings redivided all knights exceeding the basic levy of sixty into their expeditionary force as they saw fit.⁽³³⁾ Commanders tended to retain a large reserve, usually consisting of cavalry, to be committed at the critical moment when victory hung in the balance.

Commanders directed these batallas primarily through signals and standards, the only means of controlling the movements of a large army once action had commenced. Much of this may have been learned in the many decades of experience acquired in fighting Muslim armies, which employed such techniques. Battle standards appear in the Mozarabic manuscripts from the tenth century onward. The charter of Molina de Aragón (1152-56) first noted concern among the urban fueros regarding who should bear the town standard. Leonese charters demonstrated a strong tendency to grant military [148] service excuses for standard bearers, giving them four excuses in the Castello-Rodrigo, Castel Melhor and in the city of Leon, eight in Sanabria, and twelve in the Benavente-Milmanda group. In the Cordilleran charters of Castile and Aragon, Alfambra and the Cuenca-Teruel towns, municipal officers granted more compensation for any lost lance with some kind of standard attached to it.⁽³⁴⁾ The municipal concern for protecting the standards grew more noticeable with the fuero of Córdoba in 1241, which required that the city officials retain possession of the standard in the field, guarded by twelve well armed knights who had mail for themselves and for their horses. Fernando III's charters to the Extremaduran towns in 1250 specified that the juez ought to bear the standard. The Alfonsine codes shared this concern, knowing that units and even entire armies would flee the battlefield if a cowardly standard-bearer ran with a concejo or royal standard. By the same token, enemy standards garnered large rewards for anyone who captured them, broke them, or brought them down in some way.⁽³⁵⁾ Given the crucial role which standards played on the battlefield, the Espéculo made a point of suggesting that they be kept out of the hands of the reckless and the accident-prone.

The municipalities had been providing knights for the expeditionary armies since the eleventh century. In the swift-striking engagements of the Iberian frontier, the mobility and shock characteristics of these warriors proved indispensable. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries witnessed an increased utilization of footsoldiers, a resource especially drawn from the towns. Exact numerical levies are rare in the records of this age, but one interesting example exists for the militarily active town of Ávila in the reign of Alfonso X. In a year when they paid a half fonsadera fee and therefore sent half of their normal full levy, seventy knights and five hundred footsoldiers joined with the king's army at Leon.⁽³⁶⁾ If this levy was in any way typical, it indicates that by the thirteenth century the forces sent by the towns were primarily infantry. The Alfonsine code cautions commanders to learn well the capabilities and limitations of such troops. Battles such as Las Navas taught the lesson of mixing infantry and cavalry to secure the advantages of both, while the Partidas conversely urged commanders to attempt the separation of the enemy's foot and horse by the use of cavalry flank attacks. The authors of the code recognized the infantry's ability to hold high ground, and by advising leaders to strike at the enemy footsoldiers in open country where cavalry possessed the advantage, they were clearly suggesting that open country was the very place to avoid for one's own unprotected infantry. The [149] Siete partidas also recommends attacking enemy infantry with the sun and wind at one's own back, indicating that the authors knew of standard ancient tactical advice for the exploitation of the elements.⁽³⁷⁾

In addition to the great combats or batallas, many smaller kinds of frays made up the more frequent and typical combat expectations of the municipal militias. These smaller scale raids, far more frequent in their daily life than the grander batallas, provided the training ground where the militias could sharpen their fighting skills. The municipal documents use a variety of terms to describe them, among the most common are: lid, facienda, rebato.⁽³⁸⁾ Some charters defined such minor encounters by their nearness to the town of its supportive fortifications, as cerca de villa or cerca de castillo as at Sahagún. By far, the most widely used term was lid, which described any conflict from a small cavalry skirmish to a small battle. The Siete partidas divided these smaller conflicts into well-planned battles which involved some prearrangement of forces by the commanders (faciendas) and unplanned skirmishes (lides).⁽³⁹⁾Lid was also cited as a word meaning duel, and the eleventh century fuero of Sepúlveda distinguished duels from combats against the enemies of the municipality by the term lid campal. The term enjoyed wide usage in northeastern Castile, the Rioja and Aragon in the late eleventh century, spreading over Castile and Leon in the twelfth. Córdoba, Carmona, Alicante and Lorca restricted such conflicts exclusively to engagements with the Muslims.⁽⁴⁰⁾ These smaller engagements, whatever the name, could be both the principal concern of an urban expedition or one of the several minor battles it fought in the course of a long, collaborative expedition. Either way such conflicts provided the prime portion of the combat experience which the municipal militiaman could expect in his lifetime of frontier military service.

The city officials customarily held the command of the militia at least until the municipal muster joined a larger force. The royal representative, the señor, led the militia in the Cuenca-Teruel charter towns, assisted by the juez and the alcaldes of the various parishes (collaçiones). Those who challenged the right of these officers to command hazarded the risk of stiff penalties for conspiracy. At the same time the knights of the Santarém charter towns of Portugal maintained their privilege of selecting the alcaldes who would lead their mounted raids (cavalgadas) on the expedition.⁽⁴¹⁾ Córdoba, Carmona, Alicante and Lorca put the juez in charge of the expeditionary force, while Túy and Fuentes de la Alcarria marched out beneath the standard of their bishop and archbishop, respectively. Usagre specified service under the direction of the Master of Santiago, instead.⁽⁴²⁾

The men in command bore responsibility in turn for the selection of [150] vital functionaries needed for the campaign. The militia required reconnaissance while on the march, and the commanders thought it particularly important to select good scouts (atalayeros). Individuals had to possess healthy horses to qualify for the position, for which they received fees drawn from the sale of booty taken on campaign. In the Santarém towns of Portugal, the king and the towns agreed each to provide one half of the scouts for their joint expeditions. Given the popularity of ambush and surprise in Iberian warfare, good scouts played an essential role in any commander's plans; without their services the militia moved blindly in the field, especially when it penetrated enemy territory. For sizable expeditions the municipality utilized herdsmen (pastores) and watchmen (guardadores) both to care for the militia's pack animals and for any four-footed booty rustled while on campaign (at least in the charters from the cattle-raising territories adjacent to the Iberian Cordillera). These guards, like the scouts, received salaries for the performance of these duties. To discourage the theft of their charges, the Siete partidas recommended that the guards be chosen especially for their trustworthy qualities and that they be paid early and well. The municipal councils could also require that these animal custodians provide bondsmen to vouch for their honesty. Eligible residents of the towns seem to have coveted the positions of scout and cattle guard, and the Cuenca-Teruel charters required that the municipal officials distribute such posts equally among the districts of the town.⁽⁴³⁾

The spiritual, physical and material needs of the campaign likewise required attention. Clerics obtained a salary for joining the expedition as chaplains in Sanabria, and probably in most other towns as well. Surgeons (maestros de las llagas) and doctors (físicos) drew fees for rendering medical assistance to the wounded, the fee dependent on the severity of the wound.⁽⁴⁴⁾ The material support of the militia belonged in the hands of the quadrilleros, individuals selected by the residents from each district to keep track of animals, meat provision and booty during the campaign. The temptations to embezzlement implicit in this position caused the municipal officials to insulate themselves from the threat by remunerating the office well and by punishing derelictions of duty with severity. Quadrilleros ought to possess the qualities of loyalty, good judgment and patience as the authors of Siete partidas saw it, if anything a tacit understatement of the job requirements.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Supply became an increasingly complicated problem for townsmen, particularly during the extended campaigns of the Cordilleran militias of Castile and Aragon. The forays of one, two or three days common [151] during the eleventh and early twelfth centuries must have been simple affairs from the point of view of logistics, but in extending the campaign time into weeks and even months the question of provisions became critical. The methods of supplying provisions varied from place to place. In eleventh-century Palenzuela, for example, the king's señor provided the necessary food for campaigns. The Navarrese and Aragonese charters of the early twelfth century required the militiamen to bring an amount of food sufficient for three days. On occasion towns not serving gave supplies to those who were.⁽⁴⁶⁾ In most cases the militiamen seem to have provided for themselves on the march. The Cordilleran charters of Cuenca-Teruel discuss the possibility of hunting as a supplement to the meat diet, and charge the alcaldes with the responsibility for portioning the game properly among the collaciones and sexmos of the militia. These charters also allow for the distribution of meat from the animals taken as booty in the campaign. The Siete partidas established stern penalties, including imprisonment with short rations, for those who recklessly or gluttonously squandered valuable provisions.⁽⁴⁷⁾

With the increasing supply needs, pack animals became all the more valuable. Moreover as the campaign progressed, the militia suffered its share of casualties, laying yet greater stress upon the available beasts of burden. The ill, the wounded, the aged prisoners and even the corpses of the dead required animals for transportation back to the town. The quadrilleros took charge of assigning animals from the available pool for these purposes, risking a fine if they failed in their responsibilities. This same area of logistical management required that the quadrilleros supervise the animal tenders, who acquired additional charges in the form of animal booty taken on the campaign. Any guards who mistreated the bestias in his care could be replaced and deprived of his fee, and they were also responsible for paying for any animals they lost.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Thus the military expeditions supplied themselves by bringing what they could from their home base, by requisitioning victuals and animals from any towns or villages which owed them, and finally by hunting and foraging. The municipal officials saw to it that their part in this process was handled smoothly and equitably.

The municipal officials did not necessarily lead the militia in combat. Even if they maintained some kind of overall responsibility, they usually provided small unit commanders if major conflicts loomed during the course of a campaign. The selection of commanders (caudillos) imposed the always challenging task of defining leadership and recognizing it in the potential commander. The Alphonsine Siete partidas took the view that qualities of leadership were innate and developed most readily by [152] the well born and highly positioned. Nevertheless, it recommended intelligence as a particular consideration in awarding command positions. The Espéculo added loyalty and good judgment as the marks of leadership, while pointing out that bad leaders performed in a disloyal manner, permitted discord among the followers through their dilatory and weak-willed style, and indicated bad judgment in battle which led to their consistently being defeated. This society had little use for losers.⁽⁴⁹⁾

Siete partidas established the criteria for both cavalry and infantry commanders. The code required that the mounted adalid should be an experienced horseman and warrior, approved by other veteran commanders for his potential ability. Beyond this, it assigned rather general qualities to such a leader: intelligence, strength, prudence and loyalty. In discussing the qualifications of the infantry commander, the almocadén, Alfonso's Partidas offered greater specification. The almocadenes charged with his selection sought an experienced infantryman for the position. His superiors weighed his bravery, strength, swiftness in driving toward an objective, loyalty and ability to command respect among the peones. Even a potential infantry commander's skill in giving medical treatment was taken into account. One senses here the imposition of a realistic set of qualifications for leadership at the footsoldier's level, since aristocratic criteria were removed from consideration. Upon the appointment of the new almocadén, he obtained good clothing and a lance with his own pennant affixed to serve as a position marker for campsite and battlefield.⁽⁵⁰⁾ How often the authorities actually applied these ideal standards to individual instances remains unknown. Alfonso's codes tended to be rather practical on military matters, and one infers that leaders sought these desirable characteristics in their commanders on the basis of much unpleasant experience in combat.

Intelligence information was of major concern on the march, especially in enemy territory. This included information regarding the terrain as well as the enemy likely to be encountered. The scouts had the task of doing much of this work but they were not the only sources of information, as the Cuenca-Teruel charters would indicate. Anyone who brought information regarding a Muslim force or movement of troops to the expeditionary force could expect a reward, provided that victory resulted when the hueste acted on this knowledge. In addition, those who were sent to gather intelligence by spying directly on the enemy could receive, at the direction of the royal señor or the alcaldes, half of the booty gained in action resulting from their reports.⁽⁵¹⁾ Notable in both these examples is the business-like approach of paying only for results, and not merely for information. [153] Bounty hunting also proved useful as a source of intelligence, instigated by the commanders' keen interest in reducing the military expertise on the Muslim side. Leading the concejo to the whereabouts of an Islamic commander gained the informer ten maravedís, with five more for personal identification of the individual. Once taken into custody, the concejo had complete latitude in dealing with Muslim adalides, including the right to execute such leaders, unless the king advanced a significant fee to secure possession of them.⁽⁵²⁾ Bounties like these would hardly have been paid out of the limited concejo funds unless intelligence information held great value for the municipal militias.

At the same time that the expedition commanders sought intelligence information regarding the position and the number of the enemy, they had to attend to their own security. The Siete partidas offered some general counsel for an army on the march. Standards and banners served to keep the different components of the army in order and inform the leader of the location of each of his units. The code recommended an extended line of march as against scattered columns marching abreast, a precaution necessitated not only by security but by the nature of the peninsular medieval roads.⁽⁵³⁾ By the mid-twelfth century it had become customary to divide large armies into forward and rear components. The charters referred to the forward division as the algara while Siete partidas described it as the delantera. The algara, a term derived from the Arabic for foray or raid, seems to have consisted of the best warriors of whom most if not all were knights. The sources described the algara as mobile and capable of acting as an independent raiding force as well as being detached for a variety of smaller sorties with limited objectives. Should the algara encounter a larger enemy body, try to force an impeded passage, or undertake the siege of a fortification or town, it could then be rejoined by the larger rear guard to reinforce the total attacking force.⁽⁵⁴⁾

The zaga constituted the rear guard or reserve. Here again in the terminology employed, one sees evidence of likely Muslim influence, since zaga found its origins in Arabic, where it means rear guard. The zaga usually comprised the slower moving peones, who played an important part in large pitched battles and sieges but otherwise handicapped the raiding activity of the advanced force. The Siete partidas also noted that the difficulties connected with fighting a large force approaching from the rear demanded a larger protective buffer in that quarter.⁽⁵⁵⁾ The municipal sources cited the use of this rear guard initially in Portugal, where it appears at Tomar, Pombal and Germanello during the [154] reign of Afonso I. The Santarém family from 1179 mandated that the municipal knights from these towns could not join the zaga in a royal military expedition, but should join the forward delanteira. The Cuenca group of charters included a discussion of the separation of the algara and the zaga, indicating an even division of troops between the two forces with remnants staying in the rear. Curiously, Aragonese Teruel and Albarracín lack this law. Ávila's chronicle records an interesting example of the joining and rejoining of the knights to the zaga by its own militia at the siege of Jaén in 1245-46.⁽⁵⁶⁾ To reinforce security, scouts and sentinels patrolled the flanks and front of the line of march as the militia advanced. Pack trains required similar protection, and the proximity of grass and water had to be considered in addition to security. Dangers threatened the return march from enemy territory to an even greater extent than the initial penetration. The warriors, intoxicated with victory and their guard lowered, moved more slowly as they bore homeward with their spoils. They stood highly vulnerable to surprise attack, especially in the case of stragglers. The Partidas might well have added that an army moving in enemy territory long enough to collect booty had also permitted the enemy sufficient reaction time to rally an emergency force and commence pursuit, as the classic instance of Sancho the Hunchback and his Abulense militia so amply testified in 1173.⁽⁵⁷⁾

While on campaign any militia stood in fear of ambush (cetada), a tactic which enjoyed considerable popularity on both sides of the frontier areas of difficult passage, such as passes, marshes, ravines or any place where the formation of the hueste into battle order could not be done quickly, provided the most likely ambush situations. The Siete partidas advised the avoidance of such dangerous places, if possible; lacking that option, commanders sent forces to secure the problematic area prior to the arrival of the forward elements. Should the initial probing force find the position already in enemy hands and no other alternative route available, the forward elements awaited the arrival of the zaga, joining with it to force passage by a pitched battle. Ambushes also served to cut an army off from its base or point of origin if launched against the rear; preventing that possibility constituted another good reason for maintaining a large zaga. Yet the Siete partidas cautioned against over-concentration to face a sudden attack, reminding commanders that such strikes might be a feint. Excessive troop concentration mustered at one place to meet a feint invited a more serious assault from another direction. In the final analysis, [155] the best defense against the relaxation in security which might provoke an ambush lay in maintaining a constant state of readiness while on the march. Thus, should the enemy stage a sudden assault, the reaction would be reflexive and instantaneous.⁽⁵⁸⁾

The municipal charters and the Alfonsine codes offer detailed comment on the proper methods of encampment. Leaders should locate such camps near water and grass, away from high ground and marshes, and contoured to the land forms. The commander and his chief unit leaders moved with the forward element of the army to select the proper site, post guards, and plant the unit standards to locate the various elements of the expeditionary force. Within the campsite they established paths, leaving a cleared area in the center for rapid muster, even digging a ditch around the camp if they anticipated a long stay. The Siete partidas advocated dispatching scouts to secure the region and keeping the mounted warriors on horseback until the zaga had arrived at the site. Guards remained with the baggage train until it was safely sheltered in the camp.⁽⁵⁹⁾ The Cuenca-Teruel fueros tell us that the towns viewed the encampment as any place the militia stopped for the night or to make bread, calling such a place a posada. Once settled, the juez and the alcaldes, accompanied by the records clerk, toured the entire camp noting the location of tents, men, animals and equipment. The next morning they took account of any items missing, and if someone had fled the camp during the night he was presumed to be a deserter to the enemy. All the men in the immediate posada area were held responsible for any of their party who were missing, sharing their punishment on the grounds that they should have prevented the departure. The policy probably served to keep desertions and their potential security threats to a minimum.⁽⁶⁰⁾ In the absence of other information in the sources, one infers that the various units gathered in the central assembly area in the morning and resumed the fixed order of march. The charters also note the process of redistributing the various posadas into the algara and zaga divisions after encampment.⁽⁶¹⁾ The smaller militia expeditions may have utilized few or none of the above procedures, but the increasing participation of the municipal armies in large-scale campaigns necessitated the adoption of rules to control the mustering of considerable numbers.

The Siete partidas also mentioned a number of battlefield formations which have the appearance of being drawn from a military handbook such as Vegetius rather than the accumulation of reconquest experience. The wedges, echelon arrangements, flanking squadrons, rounded and hollow squares therein described, seem well beyond the discipline [156] of the militias and there are no chronicle references to their use by the royal army.⁽⁶²⁾ The lines of infantry and cavalry into which the militias were doubtless reformed most certainly sufficed for the vast majority of pitched battles in which the municipal militias participated.

Aside from field battles and raiding forays, the contemporary chroniclers pay particular note to the performance of the municipal militias during sieges, especially the great Andalusian investments of Fernando III.⁽⁶³⁾ Militias probably utilized assault engines beyond the rudimentary level of simple catapults, slings, rams and ladders only when their armies formed a part of a larger royal force, despite the recommendation in the Siete partidas that the king keep siege equipment scattered in the frontier towns. The sources record at least three instances where townsmen assisted in building such devices: the Compostelanos at Tabeirós in 1126, the Aragonese militiamen at the siege of Burriana in 1223, and the Castilian militias at Jaén in 1245-46. ⁽⁶⁴⁾ The Siete partidas describes an elaborate procedure for undertaking an investment on a large scale which includes the most basic elements of medieval siegecraft: besieging a town or fortification with positions no closer than could be maintained without being forced to move back with a consequent loss of morale; blocking all entrances to the objective; constructing fortified encampments for extended sieges; and undertaking consumption or destruction of the enemy's crops before his eyes. Both the Espéculo and the Siete partidas recommended precautions against the espolonada, the sudden defensive sally from the besieged town which sought to catch the besiegers by surprise.⁽⁶⁵⁾ Possibly the municipal armies participated in these procedures of the long siege when they combined themselves with a large royal hueste, but in their own campaigns sudden investment and surprise penetration enjoyed more favor. The sources do not indicate that the towns had the capability of conducting a long siege when dependent solely upon their own resources.

Since the municipalities took numerous precautions to prevent entrance into the town by stealth and surprise, we must assume that the townsmen favored these same techniques when attacking fortified places themselves. Lacking the staying power that gives substance to a truly prolonged siege, they valued the swift move and the heroic act which could force a decision quickly. Knights and infantrymen therefore received rich shares of booty for leading an assault upon a key gate or tower, especially if they were the first to enter that structure.⁽⁶⁶⁾ A Christian leader (adalid) received a house of his choosing in any town he captured, while a Muslim adalid serving with the Christians received [157] not only this prize but also a guarantee of the safety of all his blood relatives in the captured town.⁽⁶⁷⁾ As long as the municipal militias concentrated on small objectives these techniques sufficed. The great sieges of Lisbon, Alcáçer do Sal, Córdoba, Valencia, Jaén and Seville necessarily involved the collaborative effort of king, nobility, military orders and town militias. Heroic deeds still had their place, but surprise and bold entry rarely won such complex objectives by themselves.

To this point discussion has centered on offensive enterprises of a relatively large scale, or, at least, activity intended to result in some formal type of combat: battles, skirmishes, sieges. A large area of offensive warfare existed for which pitched battles constituted a secondary consideration or even something to be avoided. Raids and forays best designate this category, of which several varieties are to be found in the sources. Some of these have relevance to the towns and their militias.⁽⁶⁸⁾

Among the raiding terms, algara suggests the largest-scale force. Corominas defines this as a brusque incursion into enemy territory or as a name given collectively to troops assembled for that purpose. Palomeque accepts the definition provided by Siete partidas: a foray organized to overrun the countryside, plundering, ravaging and stealing that which can be seized with little effort. The term also appears in the Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris in relation to municipal warfare, where it is used to denote a large expedition, almost in the sense of hueste.⁽⁶⁹⁾ Algara assumes a very limited meaning when it is found in the major Castilian and Aragonese fueros. In these it appears as the name assigned to the mobile forward section of a militia on the march, that part which separated from the zaga and which the Partidas calls the delantera. In the light of these various usages, it can be concluded that the algara was a large, long-range raiding body second only to the full-scale expedition in size. As the municipalities began to participate in these large expeditions, they adopted the term for their own use. While the algara may have been employed as an independent unit prior to 1100, the twelfth-century towns viewed it as a component detached from an expeditionary force to collect booty and relieve supply needs. By the thirteenth century the Partidas recommended that preparations for the algara include the provision of lightly armed men who knew the terrain, careful planning to avoid over-taxing the mounts, and once dispatched the use of the zaga to give rear guard protection, security and a locale for depositing booty.⁽⁷⁰⁾ By the thirteenth century, then, the algara seems to have been used more closely in coordination with the main body of the expeditionary force than any other form of raid.

Another term for raiding activity which had far broader usage and application is the cavalgada or cabalgada. The origins of its use in the Peninsula began with Carolingian mounted military service into Catalonia in the ninth century.⁽⁷¹⁾ After that, the use of cavalgada became so widespread and so variable that it defies tight definition. Depending on the context in which it is found, cavalgada can mean a large expedition or a small raid; include or exclude footsoldiers; and vary in its mission from large-scale devastation to mere combat patrolling. By the thirteenth century, the municipal charters of all of the peninsular kingdoms have cited the cavalcata-cavalgada as a form of military service, covering at least three different kinds of musters: the large hueste-style expedition, the algara large raid, and the swift, brief strike.⁽⁷²⁾ The formal definition given in the Partidas, which Palomeque basically accepts, fails to distinguish cavalgada sufficiently from algara to justify a separate term, save that the code defines two kinds of cavalgada, open and secret, which assist in pinning down its late thirteenth-century definition. The open cavalgada, the larger of the two, allows the pitching of tents and the igniting of campfires, and permits engaging in combat with an enemy squadron after having accomplished its basic mission. The secret cavalgada maintains a smaller size and seeks to avoid discovery and enemy contact. The covert force undertakes rapid raiding, movement by night and the use of low terrain to obviate the danger of being silhouetted on the horizon. It required adequate numbers of scouts, guards and patrols and the bypassing of any threat of battle with the enemy.⁽⁷³⁾

Another term cited in some of the charters is the almohalla or almofalla. Palomeque and Corominas offer a description of it as a word of Arabic origin. The Partidas code does not use the word, and almofalla appears most frequently in the Leonese Coria Cima-Coa group of charters, with two exceptions: the charters of Burgos (1167) and of Brihuega (1256), both in Castile. The Burgos charter gives little in the way of identification for almofalla save as a guard for those who were engaged in the building of a castle. However, the Coria group and Brihuega imply a long expedition, usually under royal auspices, thus analogous to hueste.⁽⁷⁴⁾ This equivalence to hueste is important because it places the Coria Cima-Coa family in approximation to the expeditionary tradition of the Castilian and Aragonese militias.

The corredura is yet another term for the small, swift raid, literally a running over of the countryside. Clearly a cavalry raid, it appears closer to the secret cabalgada than any other combat force. Correduras intended to be havoc-spreading, living from the supplies it gathered prior to its departure. Like the secret cavalgada, the corredura emphasized concealment and [159] avoided contact with an enemy military force at all costs. Only the charters of Cáceres and Usagre employ the term, although its inclusion in the Siete partidas indicates that corredura belongs to Castilian as well as Leonese Extremaduran tradition.⁽⁷⁵⁾

Muslim tactics appear to have dominated this style of raiding warfare in which the municipal militias participated. The early dominance of Islam in the eighth and ninth centuries, the continual warfare between Christian and Muslim towns and fortresses, and the climatic and geographic factors which affected both sides certainly controlled the manner in which each side fought, if not the institutions which produced the fighting units. Towns might not be able to launch many of the larger military expeditions single-handedly, but the hit-and-run raids (golpes de mano) characteristically employed by the Muslim forces cost less to outfit yet were fruitful in the gathering of combat spoils. Once raids and forays became predominant as a means of warfare, the Christian municipal militias could profit from their Muslim neighbors who were the masters of such tactics. The vocabulary for this kind of warfare is heavily Arabic, as words such as rebato, almofalla and algara would indicate.⁽⁷⁶⁾ The hot, dry summer climate of the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts as well as that of the Meseta favored the lightly armed, mounted warrior and the rapid execution of military operations. The increase of French influence and the expansion of Christian-controlled territory encouraged the larger expeditionary approach increasingly utilized by the peninsular monarchs during the Central Middle Ages, generating a combat style which appeared more massive, less mobile and more contact-oriented. However, all indications point to the continuing existence of the earlier style of offensive combat missions on the part of the towns.

The horse influenced significantly the form of this warfare because its use made possible the quick strike on offense and the extended patrolling and scouting for defense. The scope of cattle raiding and booty seizures required the horse's extensive capabilities. Its need for grass, fodder and water fortunately paralleled that of the animals gathered and defended by the militia. These needs nonetheless determined the routes of raiding and expedition and the rate at which distances could be covered. The ancient military authority Vegetius discusses varieties of horses and their foraging capabilities, and distinguishes between the survival capabilities of stable-raised and range horses, but offers no distance estimate for horses by themselves. He does suggest a one-day drill march of infantry and cavalry to cover twenty millia passuum (c. 30 kilometers), but this says nothing regarding the capability of horse and foot separately. [160] John Slaughter has made a useful summary of evidence from both medieval Iberian and modern sources concerning the range of horses. His evidence indicates that with ample grain and periodic rest horses could cover forty to forty-eight kilometers a day.⁽⁷⁷⁾

Another factor previously overlooked is that Iberian horses of the Reconquest were of two dominant breeds, the North African Barb and the Spanish Barb. The first had come into the peninsula with the Muslim invasions of the eighth century, and the second emerged as the resultant combination of that breed with the Iberian Celtic horse. Both of these breeds continue to be raised by the Horse of the Americas Research Ranch in Porterville, California, and Mr. Jeff Edwards, Rancher and Researcher of that establishment has offered me his observations (pers. com. 3 March 1985) regarding the speed and endurance of the modern survivors of these horses. Both the Barb and the Spanish Barb are famed for their endurance which exceeds that of Northern European breeds. Both breeds can survive on grass alone (and indeed have to be trained to eat grain). They eat available grass at a rate of intake based on their current exertions, but no more.

For the combat conditions of the Meseta, Barbs seem to have possessed superior qualifications in their well-developed digestive, circulatory, skeletal and respiratory systems. Based on modern endurance tests, Mr. Edwards affirms that these breeds could make fifty miles a day indefinitely on a grass diet with sufficient residual strength to engage in combat. For limited periods they might be capable of one hundred miles a day. Other breeds might be faster (the Barb's normal fast trot seems to be near eight miles an hour) but none more likely to come back again day after day to make the mileage. Adding grain to the Barb's diet (assuming he is trained to eat it) will hasten his recovery time after an extended run, but does not provide a nutritional necessity. Allowing for biological alterations in the modern versions of the Barb and Spanish Barb and adjusting somewhat for Mr. Edwards's justifiable pride in his breeds, fifty kilometers a day under combat conditions appears a conservative estimate of mounted raiding capability based on our sources ancient and modern.

Comparing this estimate to the territories controlled by a town, one can establish some idea of the challenge faced by the militia. While there is often a lack of information regarding the size of the total alfoz for a given town, some of the Cuenca-Teruel charters defined a line affecting booty rates for the rustling of livestock, increasing the share of booty beyond that line. Two placenames, probably transhumant grazing sites, which can be identified, [161] Villora and Iniesta, are sixty and seventy-five kilometers respectively to the southeast of Cuenca. Alarcón also offers a number of modern identifiable placenames (Villora, Iniesta, the Rus River, Palomares, Olmeda, Atalaya and Rubio) which vary from ten to forty kilometers in all directions. This would place normal defense and booty taking activities within a day to a day-and-a-half ride from Cuenca and Alarcón. Furthermore, the one hundred migeros (millia, c. 150 kilometers) cited by Espéculo as the range a town was responsible to defend in case of enemy invasion would have constituted a four-day ride. The normal scope of mounted raiding probably included the same radius. Long expeditions were unlikely to have maintained that rate of movement. The speed of the livestock booty, the infantry forces and growing fatigue of animals and men would certainly have slowed the mounted warriors, especially on the return trip.⁽⁷⁸⁾

Thus, the municipal contribution through its defensive and offensive capabilities was unquestionably substantial. The Reconquest generally advanced not by a series of magnificent triumphs, although these occur at intervals, but by numerous small victories. The Christian kings lost most of the major battles prior to the thirteenth century, yet they pressed southward at a relentless pace. The localized forays and skirmishes staged by the municipalities against the Muslims, supplemented periodically by the occasional huestes under royal leadership, found their greatest vindication in this long-term progress of the Christian advance. Municipal defenses provided stability in hard times while their offensive flexibility and initiative rendered incalculable value to the peninsular monarchs in the expansion of the frontier and the subsequent holding of terrain.

1. The first indications of vigorous defensive counterstrokes against invading Muslim forces appear during Alfonso VII's reign in Leon-Castile. CAI, 88, 110-12. This activity and that which follows in the later twelfth century will be centered in the defense of Toledo and the Tajo Valley, New Castile, the Lower Iberian Cordillera and the Portuguese Alentejo. Many of our best accounts of these events come from the Arabic sources. IIM, 2:21, 28-29, 39-40, 49-51. AMC, 17:22-24, 32-35. "Relation d'un raid d'Abû Yûsuf Yacqûb au Portugal," 28:64-65. "Relation de l'expédition," 28:66-67. CPA, 32, 35-36. "Anales Toledanos I," 23:393, 398. González, Regesta de Fernando II, 50-52. Fernando III's concern for the security of Toledo and its defense remained active as late as 1222. "Fernando III concede al Arzobispo Don Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada ...Toledo, 1222," 1:7.

2. Valdeavellano, "Apellido," 1:284-85. El fuero de Brihuega, 137-38. Valdeavellano, "El 'apellido': Notas sobre el procedimiento," 7:67-69. The first reference offers the conventional definition of an army mustered by a defensive warning call; the second describes a warning required of one man before he can legally attack another in Brihuega; and the third recounts a use of the term to summon residents to certain types of legal cases which required their presence, rather rare in the municipal charters.

3. "Forais de S. Joaão da Pesqueira, Penella, Paredes, Linares, Anciães, 1055-65," 1:346. "Fueros de Palenzuela, 1074," 1:26. "Fuero concedido a Nájera," 2:84-85. "Fuero latino de Sepúlveda, 1076," 48. "Fueros de Barbastro, 1100," 334. "Pedro I concede carta "Princeps namque," 88-89.

4. "Fuero dado á la villa de Lárraga, 1:508. "Sancho el Sabio, rey de Navarra, concede fueros a Artajona, 1193," 249. "Confirmación de los fueros de Mendigorría, 1194," 28-29. "Fuero concedido a Miranda de Arga," 10:270. Fuero de Viguera y Val de Funes, 50.

5. "El Espéculo o espejo de todos los derechos," 3:5:1-3, 11. Siete partidas, 2:19:4-7, 2:26:24-26. "Crónica del rey don Alfonso décimo," 66:14.

6. "S. João da Pesqueira, Penella, Paredes, Linhares & Anciães," 1:346. "Foral de Guimarães, 1095-96," 1:2. "Foral outorgado a Constantim de Panóias," 1:6. "Confirmação dos foros de Ansiães," 1:188. "Carta de foral concedida aos povoadores de Mesão-Frio," 1:290. "Carta de foral de Celeirós," 1:353. (Foral de) Covas," 1:388. "(Foral de) Soverosa, 1196," 1:501. "(Foral de) Abaças," 1:514. "(Foral de) Guiães," 1:520. Sabadelhe had advanced to a three-day limit for the apellido by 1220. "(Foral de) Sabadelhe," 1:584.

7. This first appears in the Santarém family (see Appendix A), followed by a series of early thirteenth-century references. "(Foral de) Valazim," 1:519. "(Foral de) Villa-Nova," 1:530. "(Foral de) Renalde," 1:537. "(Forais de) Ferreiros, Fontemanha e Valdavy," 1:546. "(Foral de) Canedo," 1:562. "(Foral de) Ceides," 1:573. FSabadelhe, 1:584. "(Foral de) Barqueiros," 1:597. "(Foral de) Sanquinhedo," 1:598. "(Foral de) Alijó," 1:605. One Castilian fuero of 1217 reflected this same view. "Fernando III concede a Frías el fuero, 1217," 2:16.

8. "FAnsiães," DMP, 1:188. "Carta de foral concedida aos moradores do Banho," 1:293. "Carta de foral concedida aos moradores de Sintra," 1:301. "(Foral de) Covellinas," 1:494.

9. FSepúlveda 1076, 48. El fuero de Avilés, 114. See Chapter One, note 52 for the probable thirteenth-century dating of this charter. "Alfonso II confirma los antiguos fueros y costumbres de Jaca, 1187," 72. "Fueros de Medinaceli," 440-41. FCfs, 31:1. FCmsp, 31:1. FTL, 447-48. FAlbL, 493. FCcv, 3:15:1. FTR, 612. FAlbR, 189-90. FP, 529. FAlz, 10:67. FAln, 644. FH, f. 87r. FZ, 671. FBa, 726. FI, 696. FAlr, ff. 101r-101v. FUb, 55A. MS8331, 735. FBe, 964-66. FVH, 542. FA, 190a, 342. FCO, 182, 336. FCR, 3:55. FCM, 126. FCA, 184-85. FCB, 187, 335. FU, 187-88. FViguera-Val de Funes, 50. "Arrendamiento hecho por el concejo de Nora á Nora," 154. "Los fueros de Villadiego," 137-38. "Privilegio en que el rey (Jaime I) sanciona los estatutos de Daroca, 1256," 35. Siete partidas, 2:19:4, 2:26:24.

10. IIM, 2:49-51.

11. FViguera-Val de Funes, 50.

12. FA, 391. FCO, 328, 369. FCR, 8:24, 65. FCM, 322, 363. FCA, 321, 371. FCB, 327, 379. FU, 330, 380.

13. FCfs, 31:1-3. FCmsp, 31:1-3. FTL, 447-48. FAlbL, 493-94. FCcv, 3:15:1-2. FTR, 612-14. FAlbR, 189-90. FP, 529-30. FAlz, 10:67-69. FAln, 644-47. FH, ff. 87r-87v. FZ, 671-73. FBa, 726-27. FI, 696-97. FAlr, ff. 101r-101v. FUb, 55A-55C. MS8331, 735. FBe, 964-70. FVH, 542-43. FA, 362. FCA, 344. FCB, 352. FU, 353. Alfaiates, Cáceres, Castello-Bom and Usagre permitted absences from the apellido if the wife was ill, assuming three vecinos would attest to the fact. "Fuero de Alcalá de Henares," Sánchez, ed., 286.

14. FA, 189. FCO, 179. FCR, 8:56. FCM, 354. FCA, 182. FCB, 184. FU, 185.

15. FA, 111, 226, 280. FCO, 110, 225, 280. FCR, 5:48, 6:14. FCM, 204, 243. FCA, 117, 217, 279. FCB, 106, 217, 279. FU, 119, 222, 287.

16. FCfs, 31:10. FCmsp, 31:6. FTL, 450. FAlbL, 494. FCcv, 3:15:5. FTR, 616. FAlbR, 191. FP, 533. FAlz, 10:75. FAln, 652. FH, f. 88R. FZ, 677, but nine days permitted to appeal here. FBa, 734. FI, 704. FAlr, f. 102r. FUb, 55F. MS8331, 739. FBe, 976. FVH, 545.

17. Puyol y Alonso, Orígenes del Reino de Leon, 205-09. Palomeque Torres, "Contribución al estudio del ejército," 15:225-29. Pescador, 37-38:99-124. Loscertales, "Anubda," 1:228. M. E. González, "La anubda," 39-40:13-15, 34-39.

18. "Fuero de Cuevacardiel," 122-23. "Fueros y privilegios de las villas sujetas a la ciudad de Burgos, 1073," 257. FPalenzuela, 26. "FNájera," 2:79-85. "Fuero concedido a Santa María de Dueñas," 16:627. "Fuero de Villaespasa y Rucepos," 125. "Fuero de Logroño," 335. Fuero de Miranda de Ebro (c. 1099), 47. "Fuero de Fresnillo, 1104," 46-48. "Fuero de Escalona, 1130," 45:465. "Fuero de Lara, 139-42. "Fuero de Salamanca," 148. "Fueros de San Vicente de la Sosierra," 4:205. "Alfonso VIII concede fuero a Navarrete," 3:125. "Alfonso VIII concede a Santo Domingo de la Calzada el fuero," 3:404. "Alfonso VIII concede fuero a Pampliega," 3:465-67. "Alfonso VIII concede fuero a Frías," 3:641. "Alfonso VIII concede a Medina de Pomar el fuero," 3:646. FCA, 413. FU, 435.

19. "Carta de foral concedida aos habitantes de Mós, Afonso I, 1162," DMP, 1:365. "Alfonso VIII da el castello de Olmos al concejo de Segovia, 1166," González, Alfonso VIII, 2:141-43. "(Foral de) Rebordãos, Sancho I, 1208," MPH-LC, 1:538. FViguera-Val de Funes, 49, 78. González, Fernando III, 1:341. "Privilegio rodado de Alfonso X concediendo a Lorca los Castillos y villas de Puentes y Felí, 1265," Juan Torres Fontes, ed., Repartimiento de Lorca (Lorca, 1977), 57-60. "Alfonso X concedan a los vecinos de Orihuela, para defenderlo contra los moros, 1268," Vicente Martínez Morellá, ed., Cartas de los Reyes de Castilla a Orihuela, 1265-1295 (Alicante, 1954), 34. "Alfonso X al concejo de Lorca concesión del castillo de Cella, 1277," Torres Fontes, Repartimiento de Lorca, 86-87. Juan Torres Fontes, Repartimiento de la Huerta y Campo de Murcia en el siglo XIII (Murcia, 1971), 65-84.

20. FCfs, 30:1. FCmsp, 30:1. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 484. FCcv, 3:14:1. FTR, 569. FAlbR, 179. FP, 492. FAlz, 10:1. FAln, 592. FH, f. 81v. FZ, 609. FBa, 670. FI, 639. FAlr, f. 95r. FUb, 54A. MS8331, 692. FBe, 893. FCO, 112. FCR, 8:12. FCM, 310. FCA, 177. FCB, 108. FU, 179. FViguera-Val de Funes, 78. Jaime Oliver Asín, "Origen árabe de 'rebato,' 'arrobda,' y sus homónimos," BRAH (1928), 74:496-98.

21. Fuero Avilés-Oviedo, 114. FSalamanca, 146. "Fuero de Uclés, 1179," González, Alfonso VIII, 2:520. Guards failing to resist cattle thieves with sufficient vigor had to pay the owners for the lost animals.

22. FCfs, 31:16. FCmsp, 31:12. FTL, 452. FCcv, 3:15:11. FTR, 623. FAlbR, 193. FP, 532. FAlz, 10:81. FAln, 656. FBa, 740. FI, 710. FAlr, f. 103r. FUb, 55L. MS8331, 745. FBe, 984. FVH, 550. FCA, 253. FU, 259. Siete partidas, 2:26:24. Oliver Asín, Origen, 74:309-10.

23. "Fuero de León, 1020," 15:490-91. "Fueros de Villafría, Orbaneja y San Martín," 3:379. FMiranda de Ebro, 75. "Confirmation de coutumes de Perpignan," 1:60. "Alfonso VIII concede al concejo de Toledo la renta, 1196," 3:155-57. "El fuero de Llanes," 1:115. Ballesteros y Beretta, Alfonso X el Sabio, 1064. Código de las costumbres escritas de Tortosa, I:1:1, III:11:1-12. "Crónica del Rey Alfonso Dcimo," 66:21. "Fuero romanceado de Sepúlveda, 1300," 63. Pescador, 37-38:92-93.

24. PCG, 2:446. CAI, 79-80. Lomax, The Reconquest of Spain, 76-77. Gautier-Dalché, "Islam et Chrétienté en Espagne," 47:191. "Historia Compostellana," 20:314-16, 322, 520. PGC, 2:674. "Nueva carta de composición para le pacificación de los habitantes de los barrios de Pamplona," 183-85.

25. FCfs, 1:6. FCmsp, 1:7. FCcv, 1:1:6. FP, 2. FAlz, 1:7-8. FAln, 6. FH, f. 4r. FZ, 7. FBa, 7. FI, 4. FAlr, f. 6v. FUb, 2A. MS8331, 7. FBe, 8-9. FVH, 7. "Fuero latino de Cáceres," iii-vi.

26. FViguera-Val de Funes, 79.

27. "Chronica Gothorum," 26-27. CAI, 77-78. ISS, 204-17. AMWM, 4:203-04, 210-11. IIM, 2:70-73.

28. FTL, 129-32. FAlbL, 432-33. FTR, 137-40. FAlbR, 44-45. The charter of Molina de Aragón divided the watch service year into two portions, with the first extending from Easter to St. Michael's feast at the end of September, and the second from then to the succeeding Easter. Fuero de Molina de Aragón, 153.

29. FCfs, 30:1. FCmsp, 30:1. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 484. FCcv, 3:14:1. FTR, 569. FAlbR, 179. FP, 492. FAlz, 10:1. FAln, 592. FH, f. 81v. FZ, 609. FBa, 670. FI, 639. These last two omit the light-carrying requirement. FAlr, f. 95r. FUb, 54A, also omitting the carried light. MS8331, 692. FBe, 893. FCO, 236. FCR, 8:70. FCM, 368. FCA, 239. FCB, 234. FU, 245. Costumbres de Lérida, 45. Some caution in such arrests was called for, in that the charter of Castello-Melhor laid a stiff 100 mrs. fine on any overseer arresting an alcalde under this provision.

30. FCfs, 30:1. FCmsp, 30:1. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 484. FCcv, 3:14:1. FTR, 569. FAlbR, 179. FP, 492. FAlz, 10:1. FAln, 592. FH, f. 81v. FZ, 609. FBa, 670. FI, 639. FAlr, f. 95r. FUb, 54A. MS8331, 692. FBe, 893.

31. FCfs, 30:1. FCmsp, 30:1. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 484-85. FCcv, 3:14:1. FTR, 570-71. FAlbR, 179-80. FP, 492. "...et por esta manera fue troya destroyda." FAlz, 10:1. FAln, 592. FH, ff. 81v-82r. FZ, 609. FBa, 670. FI, 639. FAlr, ff. 95r-95v. FUb, 54A. MS8331, 692-93. FBe, 893.

32. Siete partidas, 2:23:27.

33. CAI, 93-95. CPA, 32. Ximenius de Rada, "De rebus Hispaniae," 185. "Carta de Alfonso VIII al Papa Inocencio III," 168. PCG, 2:700. For the Santarém family of forais, see Appendix A.

34. FMolina de Aragón, 84. FCR, 8:18. FCM, 316. "Fuero de Benavente, 1200," 2:626. "Fuero de Milmanda," 2:181. "Fueros de Toro, 1222," 2:536. "Fuero de Parga (Coruña), (1225)," 16:652-53. "Fueros dados a León por el rey Fernando III, 1230," 2:315. FLlanes, 1:117. "El fuero de Sanabria," 13:286. Fuero de Alfambra, 33. FCfs, 30:31. FCmsp, 30:28. FTL, 427. FAlbL, 489. FCcv, 3:14:20. FTR, 588. FAlbR, 185. FP, 509. FAlz, 10:31. FAln, 618. FZ, 637. FBa, 695. FI, 666. FAlr, f. 98v. FUb, 54A'. MS8331, 710. FBe, 925. FVH, 521.

35. FCórdoba Lat, 3:223. FCórdoba Rom, 3:213. "Fuero de Carmona," 7. "Fuero de Alicante," 46. "Fuero de Lorca, 1271," 81-82. Espéculo, 3:5:13-15. Siete partidas, 2:23:9, 12-15.

36. CPA, 47. The only other numerical levy which appears with any frequency occurs in the Portuguese Santarém family (see Appendix A) where sixty knights are required. No infantry number is mentioned.

37. Siete partidas, 2:23:7.

38. Siete partidas, 2:23:27. FSalamanca, 194. FCO, 112. FCR, 8:13. FCM, 311. FCA, 177. FCB, 108. FU, 179.

39. "Fuero dado a la villa de Sahagún por Alfonso X, 1255," 2:230-31. Siete partidas, 2:23:27.

40. FSepúlveda 1076, 48. "El fuero concedido a Jaca por Sancho Ramírez, c. 1076," 3-4. "Fuero de Argüedas," 10:255. Fuero Avilés-Oviedo, 114. "Alfonso VIII concede fuero a la nueva puebla de Arganzón," 3:97. FA, 183. FCO, 177. FCR, 8:54. FCM, 352. FCA, 180. FCB, 182. FU, 182. FCórdoba Rom, 3:213. FCarmona, 7. FLorca, 82. FAlicante, 46, uses baraia in this context.

41. FCfs, 1:15-16, 30:9-10. FCmsp, 1:17-18, 30:9-10. FTL, 7, 426. FAlbL, 486. FCcv, 1:1:11, 3:14:6. FTR, 5, 579. FAlbR, 181-82. FP, 7-8, 490. FAlz, 1:18-19, 10:9-10. FAln, 15-16. FH, ff. 4v, 83r. FZ, 617-18. FBa, 16-17, 677-78. FI, 13, 648-49. FAlr, ff. 7v, 96v. FUb, 4A-4B, 54I-54J. MS8331, 12, 698. FBe, 21, 903-04. FVH, 17.

42. FCórdoba Lat, 3:223. FCórdoba Rom, 3:213. FCarmona, 7. FAlicante, 46. FLorca, 81-82. "FTúy," 370. "Fuero de Fuentes de la Alcarria," 18:363. FU, 417.

43. "Fuero de Marañon," 2:119-22. FMolina de Aragón, 83-84. "Fuero de Uclés, 1179," 2:520. For the Santarém group, see Appendix A. FCfs, 30:7-9, 17, 26-28. FCmsp, 30:7-8, 15, 23. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 486-88. FCcv, 3:14:5-6, 10, 17. FTR, 576-78, 581, 586. FAlbR, 181, 183, 188. FP, 498, 503-04. FAlz, 10:7-9, 17, 26-28. FAln, 599-601, 608-616. FH, ff. 82v-83v. FZ, 615-17, 624, 633-34. FBa, 675-77, 683, 692-93. FI, 646-48, 655, 663-64. FAlr, ff. 96r-97r, 98r. FUb, 54G-54H, 54\, 54V-54X. MS8331, 696-98, 701, 708. FBe, 900-902, 911, 921-22. FVH, 510, 517-18. FCO, 112. FCR, 8:12. FCM, 310. FCA, 177. FCB, 108. FU, 179. FViguera-Val de Funes, 78. FSalamanca, 146. "Ordenamiento de Alfonso X al concejo de Murcia, 1267," 1:42-43. Siete partidas, 2:23:18,22, 2:26:12.

44. FSanabria, 13:286. FMolina de Aragón, 128. FCfs, 30:25. FCmsp, 30:23. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 488. FCcv, 3:14:16. FTR, 585. FAlbR, 184. FP, 507. FAlz, 10:25. FAln, 615. FZ, 632. FBa, 691. FI, 662. FAlr, f. 98r. FUb, 54V. MS8331, 706-07. FBe, 920. FVH, 516. The Fuero real required certification for doctors and surgeons by their colleagues in the villa, plus an ortorgamiento of the alcaldes and a carta testimonial from the concejo. Fuero real del don Alonso el Sabio, 4:16:1. Fuero real de Afonso X, o Sábio: Versão portuguesa, 151-52.

45. ⁴⁵FCfs, 30:16-19. FCmsp, 30:14-17. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 487. FCcv, 3:14:10-11. FTR, 581-82. FAlbR, 182-83. FP, 503. FAlz, 10:16-19. FAln, 606-09. FH, ff. 83v-84r. FZ, 623-26. FBa, 682-85. FI, 654-57. FAlr, ff. 97r-97v. FUb, 54N-54P. MS8331, 701-03. FBe, 910-13. FVH, 510-12. Siete partidas, 2:26:12.

46. FPalenzuela, 19. FBarbastro, 334. FViguera-Val de Funes, 50. "Fuero de Pignero," 150.

47. FCfs, 30:35, 35:7. FCmsp, 30:32, 35:7. FTL, 431, 463. FAlbL, 489. FCcv, 3:14:23, 4:4:4. FTR, 590, 665. FAlbR, 185-86, 202. FP, 512. FAlz, 10:35, 11:55. FAln, 622, 707. FH, ff. 84v, 95v. FZ, 641, 741. FBa, 699, 799. FI, 670, 768. FAlr, ff. 98v-99r, 109v. FUb, 54E', 61G. MS8331, 607, 713. FBe, 929. FVH, 524, 589. Siete partidas, 2:28:9.

48. FCfs, 30:17-19. FCmsp, 30:15-17. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 487. FCcv, 3:14:10-11. FTR, 581-82. FAlbR, 183. FP, 503. FAlz, 10:17-19. FAln, 608-09. FH, ff. 83v-84r. FZ, 624-26. FBa, 683-85. FI, 655-57. FAlr, ff. 97r-97v. FUb, 54\-54P. MS8331, 701-02. FBe, 911-13. FVH, 510-12.

49. Espéculo, 3:6:1. Siete partidas, 2:23:4.

50. Siete partidas, 2:22:1, 5.

51. FCfs, 30:11, 31:17. FCmsp, 30:10, 31:13. FTL, 426, 452. FAlbL, 486. FCcv, 3:14:7, 3:15:12. FTR, 579, 624. FAlbR, 182, 193. FP, 500, 540. FAlz, 10:11, 82. FAln, 603, 657. FH, ff. 83r, 89r. FZ, 618, 683. FBa, 678, 741. FI, 650, 711. FAlr, ff. 96v, 103r. FUb, 54J, 55M. MS8331, 698, 747. FBe, 905, 987. FVH, 551. The monetary reward in the first case was customarily five maravedís, but at Plasencia the fee was fifteen, with no stipulation of victory required.

52. FCfs, 31:18-19. FCmsp, 31:14-15. FTL, 452. FCcv, 3:15:12. FTR, 625. FAlbR, 193. FP, 541. FAlz, 10:83-84. FAln, 657. FH, f. 89r. FZ, 684-85. FBa, 742-43. FI, 712-13. FAlr, f. 103r. FUb, 55N-\. MS8331, 747. FBe, 988. FVH, 551. Teruel and Albarracín paid one hundred solidos derived from the residents of the countryside, who may have seen themselves as the chief victims of such leaders. Alarcón, Zorita and Paris Arsenal MS 8331 add renegades to the bounty list, with Alarcón and 8331 accepting the heads of these men in lieu of live bodies.

53. Siete partidas, 2:23:14, 17.

54. Valdeavellano, "Algara," 1:479. Menéndez Pidal, Cantar de mío Cid, 2:795. Corominas, 1:120. CAI, 31-33. FCfs, 30:13-15. FCmsp, 30:12-13. FCcv, 3:14:9-10. FP, 502. FAlz, 10:13-15. FAln, 605-06. FH, f. 83v. FZ, 620-22. FBa, 680-82. FI, 652-54. FAlr, f. 97r. FUb, 54LM. MS8331, 700. FBe, 907-09. Espéculo, 3:6:8. Siete partidas, 2:23:17, 29.

55.  Corominas, 4:795. The Espéculo calls the rearward force the recua, 3:6:8. Siete partidas. 2:23:17. AMC, 17:36, 79, 143. Muslim experience may not be the only source for the zaga. Vegetius, the late Roman military writer, similarly called for a rear guard to protect baggage and prevent attacks from the rear while an army was on the march. Flavius Vegetius Renatus, De re militari, 3:6. It has been established that Vegetius was a source for the contemporary works of Juan Manuel, and was presumably available to the drafters of the Siete partidas, as well. Castro y Calvo, El arte de gobernar, 41, 52-54, 64.

56. "(Foral de) Thomar," 1:388. "(Foral de) Pombal," 1:398. "(Foral de) Germanello," 1:433. FCfs, 30:13-15. FCmsp, 30:12-13. FCcv, 3:14:9-10. FP, 502. FAlz, 10:13-15. FAln, 605-06. FH, f. 83v. FZ, 620-22. FBa, 680-82. FI, 652-54. FAlr, f. 97r. FUb, 54LM. MS8331, 700. FBe, 907-09. CPA, 45-46.

57. Siete partidas, 2:23:18, 22. IMM, 2:4-6. AMC, 1-3. AMWM, 4:162. ISS, 227-32.

58. Siete partidas, 2:23:17-18, 30. Vegetius, De re militari, 3:6.

59. Espéculo, 3:6:7-9, 3:8:2-8, is more general with regard to these procedures than the Siete partidas, 2:23:19-21. The latter in turn shows indications of deriving some of its guidelines from Vegetius, De re militari, 3:6.

60. FCfs, 30:12. FCmsp, 30:11. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 486. FCcv, 3:14:8. FTR, 580. FAlbR, 182. FP, 501. FAlz, 10:12. FAln, 604. FH, ff. 83r-83v. FZ, 619. FBa, 679. FI, 651. FAlr, ff. 96v-97r. FUb, 54K. MS8331, 699. FBe, 906. Some of the later charters in the Cuenca group urge that the alcaldes pitch their tents close to that of the juez to show municipal solidarity and to facilitate the calculation of the royal fifth of booty. FAln, 821. FBa, 916bc. FI, 885. FUb, 96. MS8331, 766.

61. FCfs, 30:13-15. FCmsp, 30:12-13. FCcv, 3:14:9-10. FP, 502. FAlz, 10:13-15. FAln, 605-06. FH, f. 83v. FZ, 620-22. FBa, 680-82. FI, 652-54. FAlr, f. 97r. FUb, 54L-54M. MS8331, 700. FBe, 907-09.

62. Siete partidas, 2:23:16. Vegetius, De re militari, 3:19-20.

63. "Historia Compostellana," 20:132-33, 443-45. CAI, 113-17. CPA, 41-42, 44-46. Ximenius de Rada, De rebus Hispaniae, 202-03, 205. PCG, 2:745-46, 751. Crónica latina de los reyes de Castilla, 107, 116-17, 123. "Llibre dels feits del Rei En Jaume," Ch. 53, 170-71, 211, 218. Crónica del Alfonso X, 66:6, 54. Muntaner, "Crònica de Ramon Muntaner," Ch. 10. The Espéculo discusses the role of municipal concejos at sieges, 3:5:6.

64. Siete partidas, 2:23:24-26. "Historia Compostellana," ES, 20:443-45. Llibre dels feits, Ch. 70-71. PCG, 2:745-46.

65. Espéculo, 3:7:6. Siete partidas, 2:23:23, 27.

66. FCfs, 30:29-30. FCmsp, 30:26-27. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 488-89. FCcv, 3:14:18-19. FTR, 587-88. FAlbR, 184-85. FP, 508. Plasencia adds to gates and towers "entre dos azes." Az can mean either encampment or wing of a battle formation. In the context this probably means any other strategically important place. This phrase also exists in all the members of the Leonese Coria Cima-Coa charters, suggesting the Leonese influence in the Plasencia fuero. FAlz, 10:29-30. FAln, 617. FZ, 635-36. FBa, 694. FI, 665. FAlr, ff. 98r-98v. FUb, 54Y-54Z. MS8331, 709-10. FBe, 923-24. FVH, 519-20. FA, 181. FCO, 173. FCR, 8:51. FCM, 349. FCA, 176. FCB, 178. FU, 178. Espéculo, 3:7:2. Siete partidas, 2:27:7-8.

67. FCfs, 31:15. FCmsp, 31:11. FTL, 452. FCcv, 3:15:10. FTR, 622. FAlbR, 192-93. FP, 538. FAlz, 10:80. FAln, 655x. FH, f. 88v. FZ, 682. FBa, 739. FI, 709. FAlr, ff. 102v-103r. FUb, 55K. MS8331, 744. FBe, 982-83.

68. Palomeque Torres offers a particularly rich discussion of these terms and their etymological origins in, "Contribución al estudio del ejército," 15:222-25. The value of this survey is somewhat limited by his acceptance of the definitions of the Siete partidas without reference to the considerably different understanding which can sometimes be found in the municipal fueros. Also see Oliver Asín, Origen, 74:354-78, and Pescador, 37-38:99-127.

69. Corominas, 1:120. Palomeque, "Contribución," 15:222-23. Siete partidas, 2:23:29. CAI, 32-33, 92-93, 146-48. The use of hueste to describe long expeditionary campaigns appears rarely in this chronicle, and did not become standard in Castilian documents until the later twelfth century.

70. FCfs, 30:16,22. FCmsp, 30:14, 20. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 487-88. FCcv, 3:14:10, 13. FTR, 581, 583. FAlbR, 182-83. FP, 503, 505. FAlz, 10:16, 22. FAln, 606, 612. FH, f. 83v. FZ, 623, 629. FBa, 682, 688. FI, 654, 660. FAlr, ff. 97r-97v. FUb, 54N, 54S. MS8331, 701, 706. FBe, 910, 916-17. FVH, 514-15. Siete partidas, 2:23:29.

71. Lewis, Southern French and Catalan Society, 313. Font Ríus, Instituciones medievales españolas, 55-59.

72. FBarbastro 1100, 334. "Privilegio de D. Alfonso I el Batallador confirmando los privilegios de la ciudad de Barbastro," 357. "Fuero de los pobladores mozárabes de Mallén," 504. FThomar, 1:388. FAlfambra, 25. FCfs, 26:14-15, 30:1, 33:21. FCmsp, 26:10-11, 30:1, 33:19. FTL, 257, 426, 460. FAlbL, 454, 484. FCcv, 3:10:10, 3:14:1, 4:2:9. FTR, 272, 569, 643. FAlbR, 90, 179, 198. FP, 308, 492, 664. FAlz, 9:10-11, 10:1, 11:34. FAln, 549, 592, 685. FH, ff. 75r, 81v, 93r. FZ, 551, 609, 717. FBa, 619-20, 670, 776. FI, 613, 639, 747. FAlr, ff. 89r, 95r, 107v. FUb, 50G-50I, 54A, 59J. MS8331, 527, 692, 590. FBe, 815-16, 893, 1024. FVH, 575. FCO, 388. FCA, 380. FCB, 400. FU, 389. FViguera-Val de Funes, 50. FParga, 653-54. FLedesma, 268. "Carta de franquicias otorgada por Alfonso I, rey, a los habitantes de Puigcerdá, 1182," 1:234. "Privilége pour les habitants de Thuir," 1:71. "Carta de paz entre Jaca y Aísa, 1215," 251-52. "Carta de población de Villalba," 1:345. "Los consejeros y los prohombres de Jaca, (1238?)," 334-36. "Homenaje prestado á D. Jaime por los vecinos de Sadava," 8:135. Llibre dels feits, Ch. 212. FBrihuega, 160. Espéculo, 3:6:0, 3:6:6.

73. Siete partidas, 2:23:28. Palomeque, "Contribución," 15:222. Valdeavellano, "Cabalgada," 1:609, defines it as a striking raid breaking off from an algara, largely a definition drawn from the charter of Cuenca.

74. Palomeque, "Contribución," 15:225. Corominas, 1:155. "Concede al concejo de Burgos un fuero, 1167," 2:167-68. FA, 179, 391. FCO, 171, 369. FCR, 8:18, 24. FCM, 316, 322. FCA, 175, 371. FCB, 176, 379. FU, 176, 380. FP, 186. Plasencia is a Castilian town with strong Leonese influence in its fuero. FBrihuega, 160. Cáceres and Usagre occasionally intermix almofalla with oste (the local cognate for hueste) in their laws.

75. FCA, 461, 464, 469, 488. FU, 484, 486, 491, 509. Siete partidas, 2:23:28-29. Palomeque, "Contribución," 15:223. Menéndez Pidal, Cid, 2:454-55. There are other terms often confused as municipal military operations, such as the wood-gathering party called azaría and the cattle guard escort entitled rafala or esculca. They are not primarily military and therefore will not be discussed here. See Palomeque, "Contribución," 15:224, 244. Pescador, 37-38:99-127. Bishko, "Peninsular Background of Latin American Cattle Ranching," 32:508.

76. Oliver Asín, Origen, 74:354, 375-78. Lévi-Provençal, Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane, 3:59-66. Corominas, 3:1028.

77. John E. Slaughter, "De nuevo sobre la batalla de Uclés," AEM (1974-79), 9:396-97. Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Digestorum Artis Mulomedicinae Libri, Ernest Lommatzsch, ed. (Leipzig, 1903), 3:6-7. De re militari, 1:27. Useful for their discussion of the pasturing and grazing needs of horses are: Rudi Paul Linder, "Nomadism, Horses and Huns," Past and Present (1981), 92:3-19, and Denis Sinor, "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History," Oriens Extremus (1972), 19:171-83. Bernard S. Bachrach, "Animals and Warfare in Early Medieval Europe," 714-26, has thirty kilometers as his estimate, an estimate I believe to be somewhat conservative. However, his research is based on equine nutrition, and offers an interesting approach to the problem.

78. FCfs, 31:16. FCmsp, 31:12. FTL, 452. FCcv, 3:15:11. FTR, 623. FAlbR, 193. FP, 532, 539. FAln, 656. FBe, 984. All of these towns list a number of placenames, but they often cannot be identified or are accidental borrowings from the Cuenca or Teruel fueros. Plasencia lists Cuidad Rodrigo (seventy kilometers to the north, two-days ride) and the Tajo River (thirty kilometers to the south, one day). Espéculo, 3:5:16. Vegetius discusses varieties of horses and their foraging capabilities, and distinguishes between the survival capabilities of stable-raised and range horses, but offers no distance estimate for horses by themselves. Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Digestorum Artis Mulomedicinae Libri, 3:6-7. He does suggest a one-day drill march of infantry and cavalry to cover twenty millia passuum (c. thirty kilometers), but this says nothing regarding the capability of horse and foot separately. De re militari, 1:27. Useful for their discussion of the pasturing and grazing needs of horses are: Linder, "Nomadism, Horses and Huns," 92:3-19, and Sinor, "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History," 19:171-83. Bachrach, "Animals and Warfare," 715-18.