Military justice offers an opportunity to observe one last facet of the municipal militias' impact upon the towns they served. Military punishments ran the gamut from lesser and greater fines through temporary loss of privileges up to exile, juridical mutilation and even death. Such grim subjects hold our interest because the fines, restrictions and punishments imposed for misdeeds connected with military service yield important insights into the psychology of an exposed and dangerous frontier situation. The laws of military justice embrace every aspect of militia activity: the citizen's obligation to serve when summoned; to conform to certain norms in the conduct of a campaign; to observe properly the practices vital to the security of the town; and to distribute equitably any booty taken as the result of battle. The municipal charters of Leon, Castile and Aragon render the bulk of the information, the product of their more active militia tradition. These sources can be supplemented by the great Alfonsine codes of the later thirteenth century, the Fuero real, the Espéculo and the Siete partidas.

The severity of military justice as compared to that available under civil law remains a topic of periodic discussion, made more vivid for us in the recent critiques of military conduct in the Vietnamese conflict or in the Australian film Breaker Morant which makes some telling analogies to that conflict in its own examination of the Boer War. Certainly warfare both appears to magnify the wrongness of an act unacceptable to a particular society, while at the same time multiplying the situations in which these acts are likely to occur, thus deadening our sensitivity to the increased level of violence. Another important [189] factor is the frontier. Two contrasting societies in conflict along their borders can generate sufficient violence to provoke the descriptive word "savage", as is the case with the English wars against the North American Indians which saw the non-Western opponent as "savages", here probably confusing both its primitive and its fierce connotations. Francis Jennings has argued that this frontier savagery is largely contained in the eye of the beholder, and may have involved fierce (and primitive as well, for that matter) conduct at least as frequently on the European side as the Indian. The Christian and Muslim conflict in Iberia similarly operated in a frontier situation, described alternatively as a "crusade" or "jihad", sufficiently violent in its nature to convince at least two Spanish scholars that frontier legal traditions were exceedingly harsh.⁽¹⁾

It remains difficult to factor into the military justice of the Iberian militias the impact of the continual conflict along this frontier, save to argue that this incipient violence on a daily basis probably intensified the scale of punishments in the hope of maintaining the norms of society under such pressure while deterring the most unacceptable of battlefield violations. It is significant that the sanctions examined in the present study were executed by Christians against Christians, not against differing religious groups on opposite sides during a battle. To best understand the municipal and royal perceptions of military misconduct and the levels of seriousness of these infractions, this survey will proceed from lesser sanctions and punishments to greater ones, seeking patterns in the correspondence of the violations and levels of punishment.

Small monetary levies are the least severe forms of sanction and offer a good starting place. The fueros give indication of special concern regarding the assembly of the municipal militia and the presence of those who offer service. In one sense, wartime taxes and fines constitute a form of fiscal support for the military enterprise, lying within the option of the individual and carrying no stigma for offering payment in lieu of service. Kings often preferred the funds to service and negotiated with towns for payment.⁽²⁾ In another way, however, these levies can be seen as a kind of military sanction, since those who pay these fees do so because they take no active part in the war effort, and need to compensate those who do make such a contribution. Indeed, specific occasions existed when the taxes levied for absence from the military muster were divided among the militiamen who did serve.⁽³⁾ The unpopularity of rendering service periodically surfaced. Jaime I, for example, told of the difficulty he found in holding his troops together even with punishments he personally [190] meted out, so great was their desire to return to their harvests during the campaign to retake Murcia. There is at least one Portuguese instance of assigning military service as a punishment for antisocial conduct in the community.⁽⁴⁾

Table 3 indicates the fee in lieu of service exacted for both offensive (fonsadera for fonsado, hueste, cavalgada, exercitus) and defensive campaigning (apellido) across three centuries of those municipal fueros which cite a specific fee.⁽⁵⁾ The table indicates that the levy ran from one to ten maravedís (with a few higher exceptions), tended to be double for knights as against peones, and seemed to tax offensive and defensive absence with rough equality. The amount of tax, levy or fine here is roughly at the same level for minor infractions committed in military situations (i.e. ten or fewer maravedís). The larger exceptions, although not always specifically noted in the text, are in all probability a collective fee taken from the entire town rather than from individuals.

Within the range of most of the non-service levies listed in Table 8-1 (one to ten maravedís), a number of smaller fees existed which could more clearly be defined as fines, exacted in connection with military activity. Quadrilleros who failed to provide animals to carry the ill, wounded or aged during campaigns forfeited one maravedí per day for each person who was inconvenienced thereby. Watchtower guards in Teruel and Albarracín who failed to respond to calls from below while on duty paid a levy of two maravedís, and five maravedís if they began their watch late or left early. Gatekeepers in the same towns paid five maravedís if they opened the gates during the night without proper authorization. All of these violations presumed no harm to anyone as a result, and were simple violations of everyday security procedures. Indeed, a watch supervisor (sobrevela) who covered for a sleeping sentry owed a thirty-maravedí fine to the town and lost his office for good. Similarly, if a gatekeeper allowed a criminal to pass through the gate, that portero paid the same thirty-maravedí fine to the town, lost his office, and owed double damages to any party harmed by his action.⁽⁶⁾ Christian raiders who accidentally seized the animals of fellow residents during their rustling raids owed a fine of five maravedís for each horse or mule so taken in Calatayud, and one maravedí for each ox, cow or ass.

† Member of a larger fuero family with fees differing from norm.
‡ Fee levied on amount of property, not social class.
All fees in solidos-maravedís.

A general levy of ten maravedís is assessed in the Cuenca-Teruel charters for the same offense.⁽⁷⁾ In one interesting instance regarding animals, a wartime situation removed an occasion of fining. Ordinarily if the owner of a mare left her to graze in municipal territory in the same meadow as a stallion, the owner of the male received a stud fee of one maravedí, but military danger to the town permitted mare owners such a promiscuous placement of their animal without fine, since animals needed to be left in all manner of emergency locations.⁽⁸⁾

Ten maravedís constituted the fine for minor infractions related to campaigning and to the collection and distribution of booty. Alcaldes who failed to bring their own supplies when mustering a defensive apellido in the rural districts of the municipality paid a nominal (for an alcalde) ten maravedí fine if they attempted to live off the district.⁽⁹⁾ The Cuenca-Teruel towns levied the same fine against individuals who failed to yield booty found on the battlefield, and against commanders who tried to shave some of the royal fifth tax on booty before handing it over to the royal representative. Any disgruntled participants in the division [194] of booty who shouted "robber" or the like at some decision regarding their share had to pay a ten maravedí fine and forfeit the booty share for their loss of control.⁽¹⁰⁾

With a couple of small exceptions, the next tier of fine payments began at sixty maravedís exacted against wrongdoing of a substantial nature.⁽¹¹⁾ The Alfonsine Espéculo singles out three areas of special concern: disloyalty and deception against the expedition; killing or wounding one's comrades and provoking fights with them while on campaign; and stealing, hiding themselves during combat or perpetrating any act which harms their own military force.⁽¹²⁾ Viguera penalizes an individual sixty maravedís who steals from the home of a militiaman absent on military service. Wounding a fellow militiaman on campaign also cost sixty solidos in three Portuguese towns, and a hundred maravedís in the Espéculo if it led to the loss of a limb. Killing a Muslim captive on campaign cost the murderer one hundred maravedís in Sepúlveda.⁽¹³⁾ Beyond this level the levies soar. Individuals who leave their unit in combat whether to hide, as an act of cowardice, or to undertake premature gathering of spoils, face a four hundred maravedí fine in the Cordilleran fueros. Taking advantage of a military crisis to plan or participate in a conspiracy against the juez, alcaldes or the town concejo draws a five hundred maravedí fine in the same towns, a levy also exacted by Viguera for rendering serious damage to the town walls.⁽¹⁴⁾

In a number of instances, the town charters and the Alfonsine codes mandated the doubling of a normal fine or the restoration of a double value for an object. This applied when items of booty were illegally kept or when failing credit pledges after the auction were not met. Town officials were liable for a number of fines during the setting up and administering of the booty auction, when they could be sanctioned for distributing shares improperly or wrongly collecting the military tax.⁽¹⁵⁾ Questioning a fonsadera assessment produced a doubling of that fee at Aguilar de Campó, and disputing an alcalde's ruling during a fonsado or apellido doubled the normal fine for that transgression in the Coria Cima-Coa charters for non-nobles and quadrupled it for knights.⁽¹⁶⁾ The Alfonsine codes give multiples of fines of three, four, six, eight and even nine times for infractions where in similar instances the municipal charters content themselves with set fines. Such instances include unjustifiable loss of a captive's property by official captive redeemers (alfaqueques), quadrilleros who mishandle booty division, and instances of booty theft and royal fifth tax embezzlement by officials who possessed community and royal trust.⁽¹⁷⁾ These fine multiples in the royal codes along with the often high level of fines in the municipal [195] codes strongly suggest the great potential disruption caused by cheating in the division of the spoils of war. Judging by the frequency of repetition of the sanctions, these efforts may not have been completely effective in dissuading such temptations. Most statutes of limitation in the charters allow brief time periods within which an individual is liable for the levy. For example, in the Cuenca-Teruel family of charters, the fee for non-attendance at the defensive muster had to be collected within three days of the return of the militia from that muster, or else no assessment could be taken.⁽¹⁸⁾ Even sanctions against the more serious crime of taking unauthorized booty had time limits. If an individual seized items from warfare and failed to render them to the booty division process, the municipal officials had twenty-seven days to prove that this had occurred and to deal with the thief. If no steps had been taken by that time, the perpetrator retained the things he had purloined without future levy of fine or other punishment.⁽¹⁹⁾

Beyond fining, monetary penalties existed through the deprivation of the share of booty one would normally have earned from the expedition. Scouts who failed to perform their duty well lost their stipend. The Espéculo recommends that an entire group of warriors should lose their collective shares if they failed to cooperate with a larger group in an ambush (fearing that the larger body would gain more by striking first) with resultant loss of spoils to the king. Those who insulted the booty dividers in the Cuencan towns similarly lost their shares of booty.⁽²⁰⁾ The Cuenca-Teruel charters mandated this same punishment for campsite theft and an unauthorized second registration for an extra booty share, while the Coria Cima-Coa fueros laid down this sanction for those who fled skirmishes in the field. In all of these charters, mutilation of the guilty parties was combined with share loss to underline the grievous nature of the transgression.⁽²¹⁾

Municipal officials bore a good deal of responsibility for the smooth operation of the military and security activities in the town, and should they violate the procedures in some manner, in addition to fines and the other assorted punishments available they could lose their present offices and their right to hold future office permanently. Careless gatekeepers and watch supervisors stood this risk in Teruel and Albarracín, as did quadrilleros and auctioneers caught in fraudulent booty division throughout the Cuenca-Teruel family and the Alfonsine codes.⁽²²⁾ At the same time a number of laws protected officials in their performance of their military duties. In the Cuenca-Teruel charters anyone who became disorderly in [196] response to an official decision regarding spoils division was fined and deprived of his share. The Coria group went further, permitting an alcalde or battle leader to wound a disruptive person without fear of fine during the division of booty. Similar guarantees of immunity protected the watch supervisors of Teruel and Albarracín who rounded up unidentified persons in the streets of those towns after dark.⁽²³⁾ The anti-conspiracy laws have already been noted. With all of this, the municipal authorities thus possessed a reinforcement to their authority to parallel the increase in their responsibilities during wartime and its aftermath.

Imprisonment occurs as a punishment for military offenses with comparative rarity in the municipal charters, but more frequently in the Alfonsine codes. This suggests that the towns could not afford to give over municipal space to incarceration facilities beyond rather short term needs. Indeed, all municipal examples of imprisonment occur in discussing the town security procedures while the militia was in the field. During militia operations or anytime during the harvest season, the town felt particularly exposed and intensely sensitive to the possibility of attack. For that reason, officials viewed offenses against security procedures with much gravity. Individuals in the towns with Cuenca-Teruel charters had to carry a light through the streets of the town after the sunset closing of the gates for the purpose of visibility and ready identification. Failure to obey the requirement resulted in a night in jail, prior to being brought before the representatives of the concejo on the following day. This "jail" may have constituted little more than retention in open space in some kind of stocks. Authorities in these towns could also imprison suspected arsonists in the same manner during tense periods of heightened militia activity. Lérida also required a light in the streets at night, but merely fined the transgressor.⁽²⁴⁾ These measures extended to those who wished to leave the town for the surrounding countryside in the Coria Cima-Coa charters.⁽²⁵⁾ The Siete partidas also recommended temporary imprisonment in irons and fetters for the duration of the campaign as a sanction against those who refused to follow orders, those who fomented discord on campaign, and as a third offense punishment for those who recklessly consumed provisions while in the field. This kind of imprisonment often functioned as a temporary holding action until more serious steps could be taken to punish a transgressor.

In contrast to the records for fines, the more serious violations and their punishments find no accounting until the later twelfth century. Among the more serious legal sentences is exile, a kind of outlawry depriving the individual of his legal protections, which in municipal law drives the resident [197] from his town and its surrounding alfoz and in a royal code expels the individual from the entire realm. Exile from the kingdom tended to be the result of major battlefield failures, such as not serving in the face of a major emergency, cowardly flight from combat, abandoning a standard during a conflict or failing to pick a fallen one up when the opportunity arose, neglecting to care properly for a major siege engine resulting in the failure of a siege, dishonoring a combat leader, causing an uprising over booty division in combat, or stealing some of the booty if one were a combat leader.⁽²⁶⁾ Excessive pillaging and scavenging for booty while active combat continued could result in outlaw status in both town and kingdom. The charter of Parga of 1225 alludes to virtual "free companies" of raiders under renegade alcaldes, mandating exile for those who damage the region and refuse to be brought under control.⁽²⁷⁾ Unwarranted flight from the battlefield, which caused serious harm to the militia or the royal army, similarly merited exile.⁽²⁸⁾ The Cuenca-Teruel charter towns also exiled an individual convicted of robbing the house of a warrior while the victim was rendering his military service, while the Coria Cima-Coa towns of Leonese Extremadura exiled citizens for lying to secure an unjust indemnification for a horse lost in combat and those who slept on guard or scouting duty.⁽²⁹⁾ While outlawry and exile appear on the surface to be an exceedingly harsh punishment, the fluidity of the Reconquest allowed individuals to move from town to town rather easily, or even from kingdom to kingdom within the Peninsula. They often forfeited their properties in the former area of residence, but with their horse and military gear intact, a new start might be undertaken in another place.⁽³⁰⁾

to modern minds a more striking punishment is the practice of judicial mutilation. This form of sanction, inhuman as it appears to us today, had a long ancient and medieval background, giving psychological and symbolic overtones which made its use seem natural to the time. A variety of grades and types of mutilation existed to fit different crimes, some temporary and others permanent in their effect. This kind of punishment did not primarily aim at cruelty as an end in itself, but rather as a reminder to all who saw the punished culprit that he had committed a serious violation against community interests. Mutilation brought a form of forced repentance on the individual, and induced emotional satisfaction in the minds of those troubled by such crimes in their midst. Crown and facial hair offered the possibility of both temporary and permanent disfigurement. Should the concejo wish to cause an individual temporary disgrace, he could be sentenced to have his head or beard (or both) [198] shaved (Latin tondere, vernacular desquilar or trasquilar). The Cuenca-Teruel charters contain laws which fine any person who performs this act on another without just cause. Compared to more serious mutilations, the fines are small, although the guilty shaver had to assist in managing the house of the victim until his hair grew back.⁽³¹⁾

By itself this shearing of the prideful male hair and beard in the manner of a sheep constituted a potent penalty. The Cid and other heroes swore by their beards and the shearing must have induced an intense humiliation. However, shaving was often paired with the cutting of the ears in the Cuenca-Teruel Cordilleran fueros (for theft at the military campsite or for fraudulently attempting to obtain an extra booty share) and with exile in the Leonese Extramaduran charters (for lying regarding a horse indemnity or falling asleep on guard and scouting duty). These last charters also applied this sanction without exile for fleeing from a battle.⁽³²⁾

The disfigurement of the ears was a punishment for theft in the Cuenca-Teruel charters and in the Alfonsine codes, although the Partidas indicates a royal preference for face branding over ear cutting for the first offense.⁽³³⁾ Another even more ferocious penalty appears in the removal of a hand, which tends to be associated with unlawful violent acts that injure other residents during wartime, for rousing dissent leading to an individual striking a commander, or for injuring any battle commanders while on the campaign or as they made booty awards.⁽³⁴⁾ The Coria group also removed the hand of one who stole the horse of a companion during a mounted cabalgada raid. The charters do not indicate whether left or right hand is to be severed, but certainly this goes well beyond cosmetic mutilation to affect the very ability to function effectively in this frontier society. Ransomers (alfaqueques, exeas) suffered the same atrocities they inflicted, should they perform them on those they brought back from Muslim lands. Blinding was recommended for non-aristocrats who stirred up discord on campaign.⁽³⁵⁾

Another form of mutilation closely related to shaving of face and crown hair but far more gruesome and permanently disfiguring was that act described in the Latin charters by the verb depilare and in the vernacular Romance versions as mesar or pelar. The Cuenca-Teruel fueros discuss this act in a law which immediately follows the law on shaving another without just cause. The individual who "depilated" another, instead of a fine of ten maravedís and some caretaking chores in the victim's dwelling until his locks returned, paid a two-hundred-maravedís [199] fine and is exiled for his misdeed or fights a judicial duel to avoid that fate.⁽³⁶⁾ As to the meaning of the words, a certain ambiguity exists. Depilare can mean either skinning or close shaving, but seems sharply distinguished from the tondere type of shaving notable in the preceding law. Mesar appears to connote plucking or uprooting of the hair while pelar suggests the removal of a layer of skin. I have concluded that at least in so far as the crown of the head is concerned, something very like scalping is being practiced. Certainly one of the easiest ways to remove hair is to peel the layer of skin containing the hair roots, while grasping the hair assists in peeling back the scalped layer of skin. Scholars have debated an earlier tradition of potential decalvation in Visigothic law, concerning themselves as to whether shaving or actual skinning was being sanctioned.⁽³⁷⁾ One might gainsay this decalvation interpretation by observing the close connection of death and scalping on the American and Indian frontier, but both sides used scalping as a recording device after a kill, not as a way to kill. Numerous examples of Westerners surviving a scalping have been recorded, giving wig merchants a potential income. This information is not intended to contribute to the recent misinformed debate regarding the theory that Europeans taught New World Indians to scalp, which has recently been put to rest. Rather it simply indicates that Iberians in all probability did not need to be taught the grisly skill by the Indians of the New World. Both possessed ample experience upon their first encounter.⁽³⁸⁾

Whether skinning, scalping or uprooting constituted the preferred technique, the result had to be devastating to the pride of the victim in a society that made much of the male mane. In addition to the Cuenca-Teruel penalty for attacking another person in this manner, Alfonso X's charter to Palencia charged the perpetrator one sueldo per hair uprooted. Leonese Extremaduran charters most frequently draw on this form of punishment for military misconduct, such as; withdrawal from a conflict to take booty, stealing booty from companions, or misappropriating spoils during distribution. Peones who dragged their feet on the way to a defensive apellido muster in the Coria Cima-Coa charters (if three residents so testified) also received this unpleasant treatment, although knights convicted of the same dalliance suffered the mutilation of their horse, instead.⁽³⁹⁾ The mutilation of a horse customarily took the form of cutting off its tail. In addition to knightly delay regarding proper haste in getting to the military assembly, the Leonese Extremaduran charters also amputated the horse's tail if its master tried to give it to another in order to avoid military service. Since this embarrassing loss of a horse's tail also occurred accidentally in battle, the Alfonsine codes [200] authorized compensation for a horse so injured so that a knight might acquire a replacement, avoiding the recriminating stares of his fellow warriors who may not have been aware of the manner in which his horse came to its present state.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Beyond this, the most extreme form of sanction in any society can only be capital punishment. Iberian frontier society did not apply this terminal sanction with the rapidity one might expect along a military frontier in the Middle Ages. It was invoked only for exceedingly serious crimes: refusal to pay large fines for great misdeeds; acts with grave consequences; and repeated commission of grievous anti-communal behavior.

On the field of battle, wounding a fellow citizen who subsequently died brings death to the perpetrator.⁽⁴¹⁾ Despoiling a battlefield while a conflict remained in progress and thus endangering one's comrades or tempting their greed could lead to the death sentence if the royal señor was killed as a result, the king in any way harmed, or the heavy four hundred maravedí fine was not paid. A non-noble who violated the agreement made with a surrendering town by taking booty paid with his life.⁽⁴²⁾ Refusing to assist a fellow militiaman in need, hiding or fleeing during combat also incurred a large four hundred maravedí fine or death if no payment, although the Espéculo concerned itself with such variables as: flight with a battle standard (thus taking all other participants off the field with oneself); distance from the conflict at the moment of flight (thus making one's own flight the cause for the flight of others); the ultimate harm done by the flight (such as the failure of the enterprise, the death of a commander, and personal harm to the king).⁽⁴³⁾ The Alfonsine laws also applied the death penalty for giving critical information to the enemy or traitorous conduct during battle, wounding or killing a battle commander, persistent failure to obey orders, and persisting in the provocation of an uprising against a leader.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Marginal to the battlefield situation were traitorous gate keepers or security guards who slept at critical times or refused to serve resulting in the militia being defeated, the death of the señor or harm to the king.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Ransomers who betrayed the town or who killed their charges stood liable to execution, as well.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Under this marginal category we can also place the illegal dealers in the arms trade. Here there is a strong contrast between conviction for selling to other Christians, where the levy of a twenty maravedí fine is standard for the offense, and the conviction for taking arms into Muslim territory to sell them, when the death penalty was imposed in the Cuenca family of charters and a one hundred maravedí [201] fine in Teruel and Albarracín, transmutable to the death penalty if the fine was not promptly paid.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Such a severe sanction can only suggest the prevalence of this trade and the deep concern for its effects.

The most serious kinds of military theft made one liable for execution, as well. The Espéculo explains that theft under any conditions is unacceptable, but in a wartime situation it can only be dealt with by magnified fines and severe retaliation, including death. The royal codes saw the theft of provisions as particularly outrageous, and a second conviction for this crime meant death to a non-noble (and exile to a noble).⁽⁴⁸⁾ Officials who managed booty had to be especially trustworthy so as to generate community confidence in its proper distribution. Quadrilleros (municipal parish booty dividing officers) who stole or misappropriated booty owed a triple-value fine and were executed if they did not pay. Battle commanders also risked large fines, and a second conviction of theft by a commander brought him death if he were not a noble. Auctioneers of spoils and town clerks who committed deliberate fraud in their division tasks similarly received the terminal sanction.⁽⁴⁹⁾

The forms of death applied by the community and king have their curious side. The killing or morally wounding of a fellow citizen while on campaign required that the murderer be buried alive with his victim in the Cuenca-Teruel towns and the Alfonsine codes. Only Teruel and Albarracín allowed the parents of the victim to chose hanging for the offender as an option, doubtless to allay the concern over the company their son's bones might be keeping to eternity. The Leonese Extremaduran fueros specified hanging the offenders, except in the case of guards who out of ill will permitted harm to befall the militia, in which case they were to be burned to death.⁽⁵⁰⁾ For the crimes of despoiling the field, battle cowardice, traitorous acts, and for the murderous ransomer, the Cuenca-Teruel towns had their respective standard forms of municipal execution. Cuenca, Alarcón, the town receiving the Arsenal 8331 manuscript, and Béjar threw the convicted parties off a nearby cliff. Teruel, Albarracín and Plasencia traditionally hanged such persons. Zorita de los Canes and Alcázar sometimes employed either of these methods. Alcaraz, Huete, Baeza, Iznatoraf and Úbeda do not specify the method of execution.⁽⁵¹⁾ The Alfonsine codes offered their own interesting variants. The second conviction for theft of provisions brought death by starvation, but the Siete partidas offered a sporting alternative. The convicted party could be buried to the waist while another person (possibly the victim of his provisions theft) hurled a spear at the half-interred thief from a distance of nine paces. A miss allowed the perpetrator to go free; if he was [202] hit he suffered the consequences of the wound.⁽⁵²⁾ For the recalcitrant traitor who escaped after his capture and returned to the enemy, a noble was beheaded if retaken again. The king recommended execution in the most unusual way possible for the non-noble, although offering no suggestion as to what method he had in mind. Given the methods of execution reviewed so far, that sanction must have been remarkable, indeed. If such a traitor avoided recapture and died in enemy territory, he was never to be buried in the kingdom. Here royal wrath was truly unremitting, for if anyone subsequently discovered the unauthorized burial site of the individual within royal lands, the body was to be disinterred and the bones scattered or burned.⁽⁵³⁾

The spectrum of sanctions from petty fines to capital punishment were applied in the context of a municipal system of justice, administered by officials with quasi-judicial titles, the royal juez and the parish alcaldes, with occasional appeal to the municipal assembly or concejo. Lacking the modern investigative agencies with their legal staffs, one cannot assume that trials connoted the same procedure to the Iberian townsmen that present day versions mean to us. Justice was anything but impartial. The codes differentiated between knights and non-nobles, between men and women, between those of good reputation and those less highly regarded. Obviously any new settler, particularly one thought to have been mutilated in another town, would stand at an obvious disadvantage in a society where one's reputation and word carried a great deal of weight. For example, if an individual missed a defensive muster in the Cuenca-Teruel towns, he could explain his failure by asserting that he was absent from the town or for some other reason did not hear the call. If he swore this to be true, it was accepted. The same applied if an individual seized another resident's livestock in a cattle raid, and insisted this had been accidental. If the accuser or victim had no countering independent testimony to offer, the raider could successfully swear his innocence and be free of the fine.⁽⁵⁴⁾ For more serious violations or accusations, the municipal officials sought witnesses to establish the facts. In Leonese and Portuguese charters the number of witnesses is occasionally specified. Two witnesses had to testify in behalf of an individual who stood accused of missing the apelido in Urros if he wished to be free of the fine. The Coria Cima-Coa charters specify two witnesses to prove an individual slept on guard duty, and three in cases of establishing horse theft and proving delay in route to the defensive muster.⁽⁵⁵⁾

When witnesses gave the concejo officials a clear case, the individual [203] received the appropriate penalty. As with modern justice, the case proving that a person had committed the transgression for which he stood accused could not always be convincingly demonstrated. In such an ambiguous instance, the municipalities resorted to a favorite medieval legal technique: the taking of oaths in behalf of a person, presumably meant to establish that a person of this character was an unlikely perpetrator of the crime being investigated. Here, especially, the established reputation of an individual in the community came into play, since a stranger would have been unlikely to acquire the necessary number of oath pledgers to clear the accusation. The number of swearers required varied with the seriousness of the charge. Two persons sufficed in Teruel and Albarracín to free one of an unproven charge of petty theft, and to clear an individual of hurting a Muslim captive in Sepúlveda.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Four to five swearers had to be found when individuals stood accused of illegally shaving a resident in the Cuenca-Teruel charters or of selling arms to the Muslims in the Coria Cima-Coa fueros.⁽⁵⁷⁾ Twelve tended to be the most commonly cited number of oath jurors required for military infractions and crimes. Molina de Aragon required this number in cases dealing with guards accused of injuring humans or animals while on duty. Theft, premature battlefield despoilment, hiding or flight during a battle, failure to assist a comrade during combat, scalping or plucking the hair of a resident, and stealing from the home of a militiaman while he was in the field -- all of these instances required twelve oath takers in the accused's behalf to free him in an uncertain case in the Cuenca-Teruel charters.⁽⁵⁸⁾ The option of a judicial duel in lieu of the twelve jurors is granted in the scalping/plucking cases by all of the Cuenca-Teruel towns save Zorita. This option also appears in Teruel and Albarracín for house robbers, and in those two towns plus Plasencia, Huete, Zorita and Béjar with regard to theft.⁽⁵⁹⁾

Militia activity also had an impact upon the normal working of the municipal judicial system. The town suspended legal business until the militia returned from service, delayed the testimony of witnesses, and did not customarily resume these matters until a three- to nine-day time lapse had occurred after the militia reentered the walls.⁽⁶⁰⁾ The towns extended the pledges of debtors when they were absent on military service, although taking care to inquire of the commander after the militia returned whether the person in question had served on that campaign. If an individual had been captured, the pledge extension could last a year. Given the ready acceptability of a debtor's militia comrades as debt pledge supporters, [204] their return from the field also necessitated delays. Even servants could not legally leave their masters until the conclusion of the latter's military service.⁽⁶¹⁾

Any conclusions we can draw regarding military justice in the municipalities must be tempered by certain limitations. For one, the law codes represent ideals for conduct and we lack the records of enforcement and adjudication that would inform us of their detailed application and their total impact. It is thus difficult to be certain of the regularity with which these penalties were imposed. In a fluid frontier situation, many of the death penalties may well have evolved into sentences of exile since the offender could simply move to another town or another kingdom rather than submit to the municipal or royal sentence. These sanctions do tell us something of townsmen's intent and their views regarding military infractions and crimes. The military context of the times certainly magnified the crimes and their respective sanctions. Frontier mobility may have, however, had an indirect effect. Towns and kings were never sufficiently blessed with settlers and warriors in the Central Middle Ages. The crimes of one area might be unknown, readily forgiven, or overlooked in another. It is this steady flow of violent persons from one frontier zone to the next that may have been the most important stimulus for stringent laws, and the greatest problem in enforcing them. In an age that lacked passports, identity papers and credit cards, this may have provided the best rationale for mutilation, an extremely negative form of identification which made clear to an individual's new neighbors the sort of settler and militiaman with whom they were dealing.

Moreover, as is the case with for booty division, the Leonese, Castilian and Aragonese charters are the dominant sources for military justice. Beyond fining for missed service, the Cuenca-Teruel charters of the Castilian-Aragonese Cordillera and the Coria Cima-Coa charters of Leonese-Portuguese Extremadura provide us with most of the details we have regarding military infractions and their punishments. Since the Portuguese, Navarrese and Catalans also required forms of municipal military service, obviously many of the same problems were encountered, but the records which would detail their experience in these matters have not survived. What the upland fueros and the Alfonsine codes do offer us is a detailed sketch of the well-developed system of military justice evolved by these towns. Both here and in the case with booty division, developed procedures strongly suggest a mature military system being pressed into fairly consistent use.

Since it can be assumed that active militias required operating procedures, [205] it is not surprising that this society created or evolved a body of law and the sanctions to keep it in force. Any human organization has certain mores and norms which it holds to be basic for conduct in its society, built from a matrix formed by the traditions and the environment in which it exists. Inevitably penalties are necessary to punish those who attempt to circumvent these standards, and the frontier tendencies toward disorder could only sharpen the desire for securing conformity to law. Any frontier milieu increases pressure on the sheer ability to survive, pressing compliance with municipal regulations as a vital ordering principle in a world where any carelessness could engender substantial losses of persons and wealth. Violators of the law faced the weight of community wrath when the stability of the town was at stake. By adding to this fierce concept of frontier justice the stern tendencies of military law in any society, the heavy penalties and cruel punishments which hung over the collective heads of the municipal militiamen become more understandable. Any town had to be able to count on the conduct of its militia, and any commander on the reliability of his men. Even with sanctions, there is ample evidence of renegades of both religions, freebooters and outlaws who lived in defiance of these norms in a fluid frontier situation.

The development of the municipal militia placed considerable power in the hands of a town warrior, a power which required control and channeling. The military laws of the fueros pointed to the proper goals while the concurrent sanctions sought the assurance that the resident would adhere to them. While the charters are generally obscure on the subject of military justice until the late twelfth century, indications lead one to the conclusion that the more active the municipal militias became in combat and the more sophistication their military organization, the harsher was their application of military law. The expansion of the municipal role in the maintenance of territory and the frontier brought a mature awareness of the great cost of lawlessness and insubordination. This accounts for the growing prevalence of exorbitant fines, mutilations, exiles and death sentences so notable in the great charter families. If the concept of punishment seems primitive to us, so too was the environment in which the townsmen lived. If the lure of booty provided the carrot of incentive to procure full effort from the militiamen, the sanctions applied by military justice constituted the stick.

1.  Jennings, The Invasion of America, 146-70. Sacristán y Martínez, Municipalidades de Castilla y León, 285. Ubierna y Eusa, Fueros municipales castellanos, 30-31. For a useful brief review of the sanctions in medieval Iberian military justice, see Moxó, "Derecho militar," 35-59.

2. CPA, 47. "Carta de franquicias de Almacellas," 1:449. Canellas López, Colección diplomática del Concejo de Zaragoza, 1:239-42.

3. ³"Fuero de Lara," 142. FTR, 140. FAlbR, 45. Fuero de Torre de Tiedar, 1247, MSS 13080, f. 77v. "Alfonso X de Castilla, a petición de los habitantes de la villas de Extremadura, desagravia a los de Cuéllar, 1264," 64. "Fuero de Sepúlveda, 1300," 92.

4.  "Llibre dels feits del Rei En Jaume," Ch. 403. "Confirmação do foral alfonsino de Lisboa, 1217," 1:3-4.

5.  "Carta-puebla de Peñafiel, 942,", 66:373. "Fuero de Canales de la Sierra," 50:317-18, 54:196. "Fueros de Valdesaz de los Oteros," 2:35. "Fuero concedido a Nájera," 2:84-85. "El fuero latino de Sepúlveda, 48. "Pedro I concede carta de fueros de Caparroso," 371. "Pedro I concede los fueros de Santacara," 373. "Fuero de Fresnillo," 46-48. "Foral outorgado aos habitantes de Ferreira de Aves," 1:49. "Fuero de Carcastillo," 470-71. "Fuero de Cáseda," 474-77. "(Foral de) Numão, 1130," 1:368. Fuero de Calatayud, 37. "Fuero de Marañon" 2:121. FLara, 140. "Fuero de Guadalajara, 1137," 108. "D. Afonso Henriques dá carta de foral aos habitantes de Leiria," 1:234. Fuero de Molina de Aragón, 84-85. "Fuero de Cetina," 24:591. "Foral outorgado aos povoadores de Freixo, 1:309-13. "Fuero de Estella," 1:1:87, 144-45. "Recopilación de los fueros de Toledo (hacia 1166)," 45:474-75. "Fuero de Escalona, 1130," 45:465. For the Trancoso and Évora families, see Appendix A. Fuero de Alfambra, 25. "Fuero de Pancorbo," 2:447. "Fuero de Castrotorafe," 480. "Carta de fueros otorgada al concejo de Zorita por el rey Don Alfonso VIII, 1180," 418-19. "Alfonso VIII mejora ciertos fueros de Calahorra, 1181," 3:57. "Alfonso VIII concede fuero a los concejos de Villasila y Villamelendro," 2:556. "Foral concedido aos moradores de Urros," 1:466. "Alfonso VIII concede un fuero de Haro," 2:804-06. "Alfonso II confirma los antiguos fueros y costumbres de Jaca, 1187," 72. "(Foral de) Bragança," 1:463. FCfs, 30:3, 31:1. FCmsp, 30:3, 31:1. FTL, 426, 447. FAlbL, 485, 493. FCcv, 3:14:2, 3:15:1. FTR, 573, 612. FAlbR, 180, 189-90. FP, 494, 529. FAlz, 10:3, 10:67. FAln, 593, 644. FH, ff. 82r, 87r. FZ, 611, 671. FBa, 672, 726. FI, 641, 696. FAlr, ff. 95v, 101r-101v. FUb, 54C, 55A. MS8331, 693, 735. FBe, 895, 964. FVH, 542. FA, 190a. FCO, 182. FCR, 3:55. FCM, 126. FCA, 184. FCB, 187. FU, 187. "Fuero del valle de Gulina," 458-59. "Fuero octroyé, en 1192, aux habitants de la vallée d'Odieta," xvi. "(Foral de) Marmelar," 1:489. "Alfonso VIII concede al concejo de Salinas (de Añana) un fuero 3:122. "Fuero dado a Molinaseca," 2:157. "Fuero de Inzura," 59-60. "El obispo de Calahorra don Juan, el prior y el concejo de Albelda," 3:203. "(Foral de) Souto, 1207," 1:535. "(Foral de) Rebordãos," 1:538. "Alfonso VIII determina el tributo de los vecinos de Deza," 3:636. "Alfonso VIII concede fuero a Ibrillos," 3:651-53. "Fuero de Abelgas, 16:646-47. "Fueros de población de Toledo dado a los muzárabes y castellanos, 1222," 314. "Fuero de Alcalá de Henares," Sánchez, ed., 286. "Fueros de Ribas de Sil," 2:570. "(Foral de) Sancta Cruz," 1:603. Fuero de Viguera y Val de Funes, 50. "Fuero de Ledesma," 263-64. "Fuero de Pignero," 150. FCórdoba Lat, 3:221-22. "Fuero de Carmona," 4-6. "Fuero de Alicante," 42, 45. "Privilegio en que el rey (Jaime I) sanciona los estatutos de Daroca, 1256," 35. El fuero de Brihuega, 173. "El Obispo de León y el Concejo de Mansilla llegan a un acuerdo," 20:740. "Fuero de Campomayor," 500. "Teobaldo II concede a los pobladores de Torralba los fueros," 242. "Fuero de Lorca, 1271," 78. "Privilegio confirmación del rey Don Alfonso concediendo a los de La Riba," 1:626. "Fuero de Fuentes de la Alcarria," 18:382.

6. FCfs, 30:19. FCmsp, 30:17. FTL, 129-32, 426. FAlbL, 432-33, 487. FCcv, 3:14:11, the only version which includes the right of the deceased to receive an animal for portage back to town. FTR, 137-40, 582. FAlbR, 44-45, 183. FP, 503, a quarter maravedí per day. FAlz, 10:19. FAln, 609. FH, f. 84r. FZ, 626. FBa, 685. FI, 657. FAlr, ff. 97r-97v. FUb, 54P. MS8331, 702-03. FBe, 913. FVH, 512.

7. FCalatayud, 45. FCfs, 33:21. FCmsp, 33:19. FTL, 460. FCcv, 4:2:9. FTR, 643. FAlbR, 198, at five maravedís. FP, 664, at one maravedí. FAlz, 11:34. FAln, 685. FH, f. 93r, at five maravedís. FZ, 717, at five maravedís. FBa, 776. FI, 747. FAlr, f. 107. FUb, 59J. MS8331, 590. FBe, 1024. FVH, 575.

8. FA, 355. FCO, 341. FCR, 7:11. FCM, 277. FCA, 339. FCB, 346. FU, 348.

9. FCO, 328. FCR, 8:65. FCM, 363. FCA, 321. FCB, 327. FU, 330.

10. FCfs, 30:41-42, 60. FCmsp, 30:38-39, 56. FTL, 437-38. All versions of the Teruel and Albarracín charters lack the reference to the commanders retaining some of the fifth tax. FAlbL, 490. FCcv, 3:14:26, 3:14:35. FTR, 595-96. FAlbR, 186-87. FP, 516-17, 526. FAlz, 10:41-42, 10:59-60. FAln, 625, 637. FH, ff. 85r, 86v. FZ, 647, 664. FBa, 704-05, 719. FI, 675-76, 689. FAlr, ff. 99r, 100v-101r. FUb, 54K', 54L', 54C". Úbeda breaks the ranks of the group to mutilate the ears of the unhappy share participant. MS8331, 717-18, 729. FBe, 935-36, 956. FVH, 528, 539.

11.  The exceptions were selling arms illegally to Christians from another town (twenty maravedís) and the aforementioned watch supervisor who failed to report a sleeping sentry and the gatekeeper's fine (both thirty maravedís) for permitting a criminal to pass his gate. FCfs, 29:29. FCmsp, 29:27. FTL, 130, 132, 425, the only manuscript containing a thirty maravedí fine for arms sales. FAlbL, 432-33, 483. FCcv, 3:13:19. FTR, 138, 140, 563. FAlbR, 44-45, 178. FP, 349. FAlz, 13:28. FAln, 586. FH, ff. 80v-81r. FZ, 603. FBa, 665. FI, 636. FAlr, ff. 94r-94v. FUb, 53C'. MS8331, 569. FBe, 885-86.

12.  "El Espéculo o espejo de todos los derechos," 3:8:0.

13. FViguera y Val de Funes, 50-51. If such theft involved housebreaking in the Cuenca-Teruel towns, the punishment was exile. FFreixo, 1:311. FUrros, 1:466. FSancta Cruz, 1:603. Espéculo, 3:8:4. "Fuero romanceado de Sepúlveda, 1300," 77. Sepúlvedans paid 10 maravedís for bruising a Muslim captive unnecessarily, although this probably says more about their property value than any human concern in their behalf. Stealing an item of booty which should have been placed in a common pool cost the thief one hundred maravedís in the Coria Cima-Coa charters. FA, 188. FCO, 178. FCR, 8:55. FCM, 353. FCA, 181. FCB, 183. FU, 183.

14. FCfs, 31:11-13. FCmsp, 31:7-9. FTL, 451-52. FAlbL, 495. FCcv, 3:15:6-8. FTR, 617-20. FAlbR, 191-92. FP, 534, 536. FAlz, 10:76-78. FAln, 653-54. FH, ff. 88r-88v. FZ, 678-80. FBa, 735-37. FI, 705-07. FAlr, ff. 102r-102v. FUb, 55G, 55H, 55I. MS8331, 740-42. FBe, 977-80. FVH, 546-47. While none of the conspiracy statutes mention a militia-related situation specifically, they are positioned in the block of military laws in their respective charters. The Siete partidas demands up to seven times the amount of the damage done in the case of such an uprising. Las siete partidas, 2:26:16-7. FViguera y Val de Funes, 79.

15. FCfs, 30:42-55, 30:64-65. FCmsp, 30:39-52, 30:60-61. FTL, 438-44, 445. FAlbL, 490-93. FCcv, 3:14:26-32, 37. FTR, 596-605, 609-10. FAlbR, 187-89. FP, 517-24, 527. FAlz, 10:42-55, 64-65. FAln, 625-34, 641-42. FH, ff. 85r-86r, 86v-87r. FZ, 647-60, 668-69. FBa, 705-16, 723-24. FI, 676-86, 693-94. FAlr, ff. 99r-101r. FUb, 54L'-54Y', 54G"-H". MS8331, 718-26, 733. FBe, 936-51, 961-62. FVH, 528-36, 541. FLedesma, 264. Espéculo, 3:8:8. Siete partidas, 2:26:34, 2:29:4.

16. "Privilegio del Rey D. Alfonso X, en que condonando a la villa de Aguilar de Campó," 1:314-15. FA, 191. FCO, 186. FCR, 2:57. FCM, 73. FCA, 189. FCB, 190-91. FU, 192. Cáceres and Usagre have the above statement conforming to the other members of the family, but list no fines and leave the multiplying factor thereby unclear.

17. Fuero real del don Alonso el Sabio, 4:4:13-14. Fuero real de Afonso X, O Sábio: Versão portuguesa, 133. Espéculo, 3:8:3-8. Siete partidas, 2:26:12, 20. 2:28:6-7, 2:30:3.

18. FCfs, 31:10. FCmsp, 31:6. FTL, 450. FAlbL, 494. FCcv, 3:15:5. FTR, 616. FAlbR, 191. FP, 533. FAlz, 10:75. FAln, 652. FH, f. 88r. FZ, 677, the only charter extending the period to nine days. FBa, 734. FI, 704. FAlr, f. 102r. FUb, 55F. MS8331, 739. FBe, 976. FVH, 545.

19. FCfs, 31:14. FCmsp, 31:10. FTL, 452. FCcv, 3:15:9, where the period is only nine days. FTR, 621. FAlbR, 192. FP, 537. FAlz, 10:79. FAln, 654. FH, f. 88v. FZ, 681. FBa, 738. FI, 708, where the period is thirty-six days. FAlr, f. 102v. FUb, 55J. MS8331, 743, where any booty, not just Muslim booty, is allowed. FBe, 981. FVH, 548.

20. FCfs, 30:8-9, 41. FCmsp, 30:7-9, 38. FTL, 426, 437. FAlbL, 486-87. FCcv, 3:14:6, 26. FTR, 577-78, 595. FAlbR, 181, 186-87. FP, 498, 516. FAlz, 10:8-9, 41. FAln, 600-01, 625. FH, ff. 82v-83r, 85r. FZ, 616-17, 647. FBa, 676-77, 704. FI, 647-48, 675. FAlr, ff. 96r-96v, 99r. FUb, 54H, 54I, 54K'. MS8331, 697-98, 717. FBe, 901-02, 935. FVH, 528. Espéculo, 3:8:7.

21. FCfs, 30:37-38. FCmsp, 30:34-35. FTL, 433-34. FAlbL, 490. FCcv, 3:14:24. FTR, 592-93. FAlbR, 186. FP, 514-15. FAlz, 10:37-38. FAln, 624. FH, f. 84v. FZ, 643-44. FBa, 701-02. FI, 672-73. FAlr, f. 99r. FUb, 54G', 54H'. MS8331, 715-16. FBe, 931-32. FVH, 526. FCO, 112. FCR, 8:13. FCM, 311. FCA, 177. FCB, 108. FU, 179.

22. FCfs, 30:55. FCmsp, 30:52. FTL, 130, 132, 444. FAlbL, 432-33, 492. FCcv, 3:14:32. FTR, 138, 140, 605. FAlbR, 44-45, 189. FP, 524. FAlz, 10:55. FAln, 634. FZ, 660. FBa, 716. FI, 686. FAlr, f. 100v. FUb, 54Y'. MS8331, 726. FBe, 951. FVH, 536. Espéculo, 3:8:3. Siete partidas, 2:26:33, 2:28:8.

23. FCfs, 30:41. FCmsp, 30:38. FTL, 130, 437. FAlbL, 44, 490. FCcv, 3:14:26. FTR, 138, 595. FAlbR, 44, 186-87. FP, 516. FAlz, 10:41. FAln, 625. FH, f. 85r. FZ, 647. FBa, 704. FI, 675. FAlr, f. 99r. FUb, 54K'. MS8331, 717. FBe, 935. FVH, 528. FCO, 122. FCR, 8:13. FCM, 311. FCA, 177. FCB, 108. FU, 179. Espéculo, 3:8:9. Siete partidas, 2:23:16.

24. FCfs, 30:1. FCmsp, 30:1. FTL, 130, 426. FAlbL, 432, 484-85. FCcv, 3:14:1. FTR, 138, 569-71. FAlbR, 44, 179-80. FP, 492. FAlz, 10:1. FAln, 592. FH, ff. 81v-82r. FZ, 609. FBa, 670. FI, 639. FAlr, ff. 95r-95v. FUb, 54A. MS8331, 692-93. FBe, 893. Costumbres de Lérida, 176.

25. FCO, 236. FCR, 8:70. FCM, 368. FCA, 239. FCB, 234. FU, 245.

26. FCfs, 31:12. FCmsp, 31:8. FTL, 451. FAlbL, 495. FCcv, 3:15:6. FTR, 618. FAlbR, 192. FP, 534. FAlz, 10:77. FAln, 653. FH, ff. 88r-88v. FZ, 679. FBa, 736. FI, 706. FAlr, f. 102v. FUb, 55H. MS8331, 741. FBe, 978. FVH, 546. Espéculo, 3:5:2-3, 3:5:9, 3:5:13-15, 3:6:9-10. Siete partidas, 2:26:16-17, 2:28:6-7. The Partidas also exiled a noble convicted for a second time of stealing provisions.

27. FCfs, 31:11. FCmsp, 31:7. FTL, 451. FAlbL, 495. FCcv, 3:15:6. FTR, 617. FAlbR, 191-92. FP, 534. FAlz, 10:76. FAln, 653. FH, f. 88r. FZ, 678. FBa, 735. FI, 705. FAlr, ff. 102r-102v. FUb, 55G. MS8331, 740. FBe, 977. FVH, 546. FCO, 112. FCR, 8:13. FCM, 311. FCA, 177. FCB, 108. FU, 179. Espéculo, 3:6:2., 3:7:4. "Fuero de Parga (Coruña), 1225," 16:653-54.

28. FCfs, 31:12. FCmsp, 31:8. FTL, 451. FAlbL, 495. FCcv, 3:15:6. FTR, 618. FAlbR, 192. FP, 534. FAlz, 10:77. FAln, 653. FH, ff. 88r-88v. FZ, 679. FBa, 736. FI, 706. FAlr, f. 102v. FUb, 55Hx. MS8331, 741. FBe, 978. FVH, 546. Espéculo, 3:5:17.

29. FCfs, 30:65. FCmsp, 30:62. FTL, 446. FAlbL, 493. FCcv, 3:14:38. FTR, 611. FAlbR, 189. FP, 528. FAlz, 10:66. FAln, 643. FH, f. 87r. FZ, 670. FBa, 725. FI, 695. FAlr, f. 101r. FUb, 54I". MS8331, 734. FBe, 963. FVH, 541. FCO, 112. FCR, 8:12. FCM, 310. FCA, 177. FCB, 108. FU, 179. Plasencia and Escalona also formed a mutual agreement between their two towns (c. 1200) which noted that any resident of one town who killed a resident of the other while on campaign should be exiled. "Carta de hermandad entre Plasencia y Escalona," 3:507.

30. Espéculo, 3:5:2-3, 3:5:12, 3:5:17-18, 3:6:4-7.

31. FMolina, 115. FCfs, 12:17. FCmsp, 12:17. FTL, 387. FAlbL, 473. FCcv, 2:2:9. FTR, 499. FAlbR, 165-66. FP, 87. FAlz, 4:70. FAln, 274. FH, f. 40v. FZ, 289. FBa, 291. FI, 291. FAlr, f. 46r. FUb, 30:3L. MS8331, 284. FBe, 372. FVH, 274. Molina charges a fifty maravedí fine for this act, the Cuenca group list a ten solido fine, Teruel and Albarracín have sixty, and Plasencia states one hundred.

32. FCfs, 30:37-38. FCmsp, 30:34-35. FTL, 433-34. FAlbL, 490. FCcv, 3:14:24. FTR, 592-93. FAlbR, 186. FP, 514-15. FAlz, 10:37-38. FAln, 624. FH, f. 84v. FZ, 643-44. FBa, 701-02. FI, 672-73. FAlr, f. 99r. FUb, 54G', 54H'. MS8331, 715-16. FBe, 931-32. FVH, 526. FCO, 112. FCR, 8:12-13. FCM, 310-11. FCA, 177. FCB, 108. FU, 179. Strangely enough, while the Coria Cima-Coa charters omit the paired punishment of exile for battle flight, the Cuenca-Teruel charters assign the exile for this same act of cowardice.

33. FCfs, 30:35, 30:37-38. FCmsp, 30:32, 30:34-35. FTL, 431, 433-34. FAlbL, 489-90. FCcv, 3:14:23-24, which allows the hand or the ears to be taken off. FTR, 590, 592-93. FAlbR, 185-86. FP, 512, 514-15. FAlz, 10:35, 10:37-38. FAln, 622, 624. FH, f. 84v. FZ, 641, 643-44. FBa, 699, 701-02. FI, 670, 672-73. FAlr, ff. 98v-99r. FUb, 54E', 54G', 54H'. MS8331, 713, 715-16. FBe, 929, 931-32. FVH, 524, 526. Teruel and Albarracín also shave and cut the ears of those who intend to send messages to the Muslims. Espéculo, 3:8:5. Siete partidas, 2:28:6. The Partidas envisioned this punishment as suitable for non-noble persons, only.

34. FCfs, 30:9-10. FCmsp, 30:9-10. FTL, 426. FAlbL, 486. FCcv, 3:14:6. FTR, 579. FAlbR, 181-82. FP, 499. FAlz, 10:9-10. FAln, 601-02. FH, f. 83r. FZ, 617-18. FBa, 677-78. FI, 648-49. FAlr, f. 96v. FUb, 54I, 54J. MS8331, 698. FBe, 903-04. Alarcón and Alcázar note the wounding of a knight rather than a leader to bring on the penalty. FA, 183. Alfaiates lacks the hand-removing law. FCO, 112, 175. FCR, 8:13, 8:53. FCM, 311, 351. FCA, 177-78. FCB, 108, 180. FU, 179-80. Espéculo, 3:8:4. Siete partidas, 2:28:5. The only Portuguese foral to mention injuring another on campaign levied a fine of sixty solidos in that instance. FSancta Cruz, 1:603.

35. FCO, 112x. FCR, 8:12. FCM, 310. FCA, 177. FCB, 108. FU, 179. Siete partidas, 2:28:4, 2:30:3.

36. FCfs, 12:18. FCmsp, 12:18. FTL, 391. FAlbL, 473. FCcv, 2:2:10. FTR, 503. FAlbR, 166. Teruel and Albarracín leave the choice of the fine-exile or the duel to the pleasure of the victim. FP, 94. FAlz, 4:71. FAln, 275. FH, f. 40v. FZ, 290. FBa, 292. FI, 292. FAlr, ff. 46r-46v. FUb, 30:3M. MS8331, 285. FBe, 373. FVH, 275.

37.  King, Law and Society, 90. Lear, "The Public Law in the Visigothic Code," 26:15-16.

38. Axtell and Sturtevant, "The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping?" 37:451-72. For pre-Columbian scalping, see Friederici, Skalpieren und ähnliche Kriegsgebräuche in Amerika, passim.

39. Valfermoso de las Monjas permitted the victim a year to make his complaint to the alcaldes, or forfeit the right to recompense. "Fuero dado á Valfermoso de las Monjas," 123. "Fuero romanceado de Palencia," 11:511. FA, 183, 188, 342. FCO, 177-178, 336. FCR, 3:55, 8:54-55. FCM, 126, 352-53. FCA, 180-81, 185. FCB, 182-83, 335. FU, 182-183, 188. The miscreant booty dividers were given the opportunity to pay a one hundred maravedí fine first, but if unable to pay suffered this penalty. "Fuero de Badajoz," 74.

40. FA, 189. FCO, 179. FCR, 8:56. FCM, 354. FCA, 182. FCB, 184. FU, 185. Espéculo, 3:7:12. Siete partidas, 2:25:5.

41. FCfs, 30:45-47. FCmsp, 30:42-44. FTL, 441-42. FAlbL, 491. FCcv, 3:14:28. FTR, 599-600. FAlbR, 187. FP, 519. FAlz, 10:45-47. FAln, 628-29. FH, f. 85r. FZ, 650-52. FBa, 707-08. FI, 678-79. FAlr, f. 99v. FUb, 54\', 54O', 54P'. MS8331, 720. FBe, 939-41. FVH, 530-31. FCO, 112. FCR, 8:13. FCM, 311. FCA, 177. FCB, 108. FU, 179. Espéculo, 3:8:4. Siete partidas, 2:28:5, a punishment for non-nobles, while nobles are exiled.

42. Espéculo, 3:6:2-5, 3:7:2-3. Siete partidas, 2:26:19. The knight who violated the rights of a surrendering town drew exile as a punishment. FCfs, 31:11. FCmsp, 31:7. FTL, 451. FAlbL, 495. FCcv, 3:15:6. FTR, 617. FAlbR, 191-92. FP, 534. FAlz, 10:76. FAln, 653. FH, f. 88r. FZ, 678. FBa, 735. FI, 705. FAlr, ff. 102r-102v. FUb, 55G. MS8331, 740. FBe, 977. FVH, 546.

43. FCfs, 31:12. FCmsp, 31:8. FTL, 451. FAlbL, 495. FCcv, 3:15:6. FTR, 618. FAlbR, 192. FP, 534. FAlz, 10:77. FAln, 653. FH, ff. 88r-88v. FZ, 679. FBa, 736. FI, 706. FAlr, f. 102v. FUb, 55H. MS8331, 741. FBe, 978. FVH, 546. Espéculo, 3:5:17-18. Viguera y Val de Funes simply see these failures as acts of traitors unless properly excused, but offer no sanction. Fuero de Viguera y Val de Funes, 49.

44. Espéculo, 3:8:2, 3:5:12, 3:6:10. Siete partidas, 2:28:2-3, 2:26:16-17.

45. FTL, 129, 131-32. FAlbL, 432-33. FTR, 137, 139-40. FAlbR, 44-45. Espéculo, 3:6:7.

46. FCfs, 41:2. FCmsp, 41:3. FTL, 507. FCcv, 4:11:(10)3. FTR, 730. FAlbR, 221. FP, 682. FAlz, 12:24. FAln, 776-77. FH, f. 106r. FZ, 805. FBa, 869. FI, 825. FAlr, f. 119v. FUb, 70A. MS8331, 660. FVH, 645. Siete partidas, 2:28:6.

47. FCfs, 13:4, 29:19. FCmsp, 13:4, 29:27. FTL, 413, 425. FAlbL, 477, 483. FCcv, 2:3:4, 3:13:19. FTR, 526, 563. FAlbR, 170, 178. FP, 151, 349. FAlz, 4:91, 13:28. FAln, 295, 586. FH, ff. 44r, 80v-81r. FZ, 311, 603. FBa, 314, 665. FI, 315, 636. FAlr, ff. 48v-49r, 94r-94v. FUb, 30:7C, 53C'. MS8331, 309, 569. FBe, 397, 885-86. FVH, 295. Curiously enough, the Coria Cima-Coa charters settled for confiscating the contraband weapons, unless the individual could prove he was not going to sell them. FA, 257. FCO, 234. FCR, 8:63. FCM, 361. FCA, 237. FCB, 232. FU, 243.

48. Espéculo, 3:8:5. Siete partidas, 2:28:6.

49. Siete partidas, 2:26:12, 2:28:7, 2:26:33-34.

50. FCfs, 30:45-47. FCmsp, 30:42-44. FTL, 441-42. FAlbL, 491. FCcv, 3:14:28. FTR, 599-600. FAlbR, 187. FP, 519. FAlz, 10:45-47. FAln, 628-29. FH, f. 85r. FZ, 650-52. FBa, 707-08. FI, 678-79. FAlr, f. 99v. FUb, 54\', 54O', 54P'. MS8331, 720. FBe, 939-41. FVH, 530-31. FCO, 112. FCR, 8:12-13. FCM, 310-11. FCA, 177. FCB, 108. FU, 179. Espéculo, 3:8:4. Siete partidas, 2:28:5, a punishment for non-nobles, while nobles are exiled.

51. FCfs, 31:11-12, 41:2. FCmsp, 31:7-8, 41:3. FTL, 129, 131-32, 451, 507. FAlbL, 432-33, 495. FCcv, 3:15:6, 4:11:(10)3. FTR, 137, 139-40, 617-18, 730. FAlbR, 44-45, 191-92, 221. FP, 534, 682. FAlz, 10:76-77, 12:24. FAln, 653, 776-77. FH, ff. 88r-88v, 106r. FZ, 678-79, 805. FBa, 735-36, 869. FI, 705-06, 825. FAlr, ff. 102r-102v, 119v. FUb, 55G, 55H, 70A. MS8331, 660, 740-41. FBe, 977-78. FVH, 546, 645.

52. Espéculo, 3:8:5. Siete partidas, 2:28:6.

53. Siete partidas, 2:28:6.

54. FCfs, 31:2-3, 33:21. FCmsp, 31:2-3, 33:19. FTL, 448, 460. FAlbL, 493-94. FCcv, 3:15:1-2, 4:2:9. FTR, 612, 614, 643. FAlbR, 190, 198. FP, 529-30, 664. FAlz, 10:68-69, 11:34. FAln, 645, 647, 685. FH, ff. 87v, 93r. FZ, 672-73, 717. FBa, 727, 776. FI, 697, 747. FAlr, ff. 101v, 107v. FUb, 55B, 55C, 59J. MS8331, 590, 735. FBe, 968, 970, 1024. FVH, 543.

55. FUrros, 1:466. FA, 342. FCO, 112, 336. FCR, 3:55, 8:12. FCM, 126, 310. FCA, 177, 185. FCB, 108, 335. FU, 179, 188.

56. FTL, 443. FAlbL, 491. FTR, 601. FAlbR, 187-88. FSepúlveda 1300, 77.

57. FCfs, 12:17. FCmsp, 12:17. FTL, 387. FAlbL, 473. FCcv, 2:2:9. FTR, 499. FAlbR, 165-66. FP, 87. FAlz, 4:70. FAln, 274. FH, f. 40v. FZ, 289. FBa, 291. FI, 291. FAlr, f. 46r. FUb, 30:3L. MS8331, 284. FBe, 372. FVH, 274. FA, 257, which foregoes witnesses and hangs the accused. FCO, 234. FCR, 8:63. FCM, 361. FCA, 237. FCB, 232. FU, 243.

58. FMolina, 83-84. FCfs, 12:18, 13:4, 30:48, 31:11-12. FCmsp, 12:18, 13:4, 30:45, 31:7-8. FTL, 391, 413, 451. FAlbL, 473, 477, 495. FCcv, 2:2:10, 2:3:4, 3:14:28, 3:15:6. FTR, 503, 526, 618. FAlbR, 166, 170, 191-92. FP, 94, 151, 520, 534. FAlz, 4:71, 4:91, 10:48, 10:76-77. FAln, 275, 295, 629, 653. FH, ff. 40v, 44r, 85r-85v, 88r-88v. FZ, 290, 311, 653, 678-79. FBa, 292, 314, 709, 735-36. FI, 292, 315, 680, 705-06. FAlr, ff. 46r-46v, 48v-49r, 99v, 102r-102v. FUb, 30:3M, 30:7C, 54Q', 55G, 55H. MS8331, 285, 309, 721, 740-41. FBe, 373, 397, 942, 977-78. FVH, 275, 295, 531, 546. There are some variances in the Cuenca family in these laws. Zorita requires only six jurors for scalping and battlefield despoilment, and on petty military theft Plasencia, Alcaraz, Alarcón, Zorita, Alcázar and MS 8331 follow the example of Teruel and Albarracín requiring only two oath swearers.

59. FCfs, 12:18. FCmsp, 12:18. FTL, 391, 443, 446. FAlbL, 473, 491, 493. FCcv, 2:2:10. FTR, 503, 601, 611. FAlbR, 166, 187-89. FP, 94, 520. FAlz, 4:71. FAln, 275. FH, ff. 40v, 85r-85v. FZ, 653. FBa, 292. FI, 292. FAlr, ff. 46r-46v. FUb, 30:3M. MS8331, 285. FBe, 373, 942. FVH, 275.

60. "Fueros de Medinaceli," 439. FCfs, 26:14-15, 40:12. FCmsp, 26:10-11, 40:12. FTL, 257, 505. FAlbL, 454. FCcv, 3:10:10, 4:10:7. FTR, 272, 716. FAlbR, 90, 216. FP, 308, 452. FAlz, 9:10-11, 12:13. FAln, 549, 764. FH, ff. 75r, 103r-103v. FZ, 551, 793. FBa, 619-20, 860. FI, 613, 818. FAlr, ff. 89r, 117r-117v. FUb, 50G, 50H, 50I, 68G. MS8331, 527, 648. FBe, 815-16. FVH, 637. FA, 235. While the remainder of the Coria Cima-Coa group allow the delay for both fonsado and azaria, Alfaiates mentions the azaria only. FCO, 224. FCR, 4:23. FCM, 153. FCA, 225. FCB, 224. FU, 231.

61. FEstella, 1:1:113. FCfs, 23:12, 23:14-15, 25:2, 36:3. FCmsp, 23:12, 23:14-15, 25:2, 36:3. FTL, 188-89, 237, 465. FAlbL, 449. FCcv, 3:7:4, 3:9:2, 4:5:3. FTR, 194, 259, 677. FAlbR, 63bis-64, 83-84, 205. FP, 263, 297, 411. FAlz, 8:89, 8:91-92, 8:135, 11:68. FAln, 495-96, 531, 719. FH, ff. 66r, 71r, 97r-97v. FZ, 482-83, 485-86, 530, 750. FBa, 555-58, 597, 811. FI, 557, 593, 781. FAlr, ff. 80v-81r, 89r, 111r. FUb, 44K-44N, 47A, 62C. MS8331, 474, 509, 619. FBe, 720, 722-23, 779. FVH, 599.