Egiça, one of the last kings of the Goths, had tried to establish a dynasty with hereditary rights in place of the system of election which had obtained previously. He set up a sort of vice-royalty for his son, Vitiza, in approximately the territory of the former Swabian kingdom. ⁽¹⁾ The device proved to be effective, for Vitiza succeeded his father on the Visigothic throne in Toledo. The next link in the dynastic chain would normally have been the assumption of authority by Akhila, the son of Vitiza, but events did not duplicate those of the previous accession. Visigothic nobles rejected Akhila and in his place elected Rodrigo, the Duke of Córdoba, who assumed his throne "tumultuously," ⁽²⁾ in face of the opposition and plotting of the family of Akhila.

Rodrigo was not to have his position for long, however. The treachery of the family of Akhila furthered the Moslem conquest, [145] and after the death of Rodrigo in 711, in the battle which opened the peninsula to the Moslems, their services were rewarded. Akhila was established as surrogate for the Moslem rulers. Isidore of Beja, the first chronicler of the time, does not end the list of Visigothic monarchs with Rodrigo, but continues with Akhila and then Ardobast. ⁽³⁾ In view of this fact, it may be said that the official Goths were Moslem allies. Actually, however, not all Christians accepted this relationship, and many dissidents took refuge in the north and northwest of the peninsula. ⁽⁴⁾ One of these refugees, Pelayo, is given credit for the origins of the Christian resurgence.

Traditionally, the reconquest of Iberia from the Moslems began with Pelayo "the Goth" and the battle (e. 721) near Cangas de Onis, below the Peñas de Europa in Asturias. Pelayo was a man of the north, or perhaps the northwest. ⁽⁵⁾ His father, the dux Fáfila, had been killed in Túy by Vitiza, ⁽⁶⁾ the man who later became king of the Goths. It is obvious that Pelayo had no reason to feel affection for the house of Vitiza. From the outset he was opposed to both the complacent heirs of Vitiza and to the Moslems with whom they had become associated. He seems to have been involved in the early revolts in the northwest, for he was taken as hostage by Abde Alazis in the year 716 to assure the obedient submission of the dissidents there. He was taken to Córdoba in the same year, but promptly escaped. ⁽⁷⁾

For the period after his escape there is a hiatus of several [146] years in our knowledge of his actions and affairs. He is an obscure figure and the record is far from clear. One Portuguese scholar advances an interesting argument with regard to the lost years. He suggests that Pelayo spent this time in the northwest, in the Portuguese Minho or Galicia, and not in Asturias as commonly believed. ⁽⁸⁾ There is some reason for such a belief, as Pelayo had formerly lived in the western area. It would have been natural for him to return to the place where he was known and had friends and where Moslem power had never been established. This seems a possibility, particularly in view of the fact that Asturias, the commonly accepted place of his refuge, was held during those years by the Berber, Munuça, who had his headquarters at Gijón ⁽⁹⁾ in Asturias. Furthermore, the Arab historian, Ibne Idari, referred to the refuge of Pelayo and his small group of supporters as being in the mountains of Galicia, and the chronicle of Alfonso III attests that the conquest of Asturias was made by men from the west and that the counts from the west and their men were mostly Swabians and not Goths. ⁽¹⁰⁾

Also obscure are the original intentions of Pelayo. The idea, which has been so widely accepted, that he was imbued with the desire to free Iberia from the Moslem yoke is almost certainly manufactured to suit a national mythology, but his resentment [147] against the Moslems, and the Vitizana dynasty allied with them, can hardly be doubted. It is possible that simply this resentment led him to stubborn and perhaps planless opposition. Or he may have envisaged a re-establishment of the political unit he had known in the northwest under Vitiza, essentially the territory of the Swabian kingdom. Whatever may have been his reasons, they had less to do with his success and that of subsequent Christian monarchs than did the opportunities offered by the Moslems themselves, opportunities too obviously favorable to be overlooked.

The pristine Moslem enthusiasm for their cause was greatly diminished in the early years following the conquest. The Berbers, especially, were dissatisfied with Arab rule. Munuça, of Gijón, was one of the dissidents, as was shown by his ultimate willingness to make bargains with the Christians against the interests of the Arabs. That he was not alone in his feelings was shown by other revolts. If it had not been for this sentiment, the forces of Pelayo might not have been able to win the skirmish in Asturias. ⁽¹¹⁾

The whereabouts of Pelayo became a matter of record again at the time of the so-called battle of Covadonga which took place near Cangas de Onis in present Asturias. Although this affair has been greatly romanticized since its occurrence and perhaps should not be termed a battle at all, there was a skirmish, sometime between the years 721 and 725, ⁽¹²⁾ and Pelayo's group may have included as many as three hundred men. ⁽¹³⁾ His forces are said to have emerged victorious, although perhaps the Moslems would not have concurred in this judgment. It seems that Pelayo used the hit-and-run tactics common to the Portuguese area and especially notable under the Lusitanians. [148] His forces damaged the Moslem contingent and then took refuge in the hills. The Moslems may well have taken this to be a retreat and credited themselves with the victory.

Subsequent to this fracas little is known of Pelayo, and his successor, Fáfila, ⁽¹⁴⁾ was obscure. It was the third in this line who most distinguished himself as a conqueror. This was Pelayo's son-in-law, who became known to history as Alfonso I (739-757) ⁽¹⁵⁾ and who is famous for his great extension of Christian control. His successes, however, like those of his father-in-law, are to be credited only partly to his valor and to that of his followers. Several events of importance, contributory to his success, had taken place in the early years of his reign. First, Berbers in Africa had revolted against Arab domination, and this action had inspired the restive Berbers of northern Iberia to do the same. They marched south against Córdoba in 739 and left the northern territory largely undefended ⁽¹⁶⁾

The historical record for the period has many blank pages. We know that there was a famine and plague which may have been caused by warfare. However, as there has never been a large food surplus in this area and living has been successful only through frugality, it might be expected that difficulties would ensue through the Moslem conquest. Disruption would have been caused by the most understanding of conquerors, and the Berbers were hardly this. Their home environment, diametrically different from that of northern Iberia, gave them little grasp of the local economy and requirements.
 

Between 751 and 754, Alfonso I took Chaves, Braga, Porto, Viseu and other settlements and castles. ⁽¹⁷⁾ Then he continued his conquest by taking Astorga, León, Zamora, Salamanca, [149] Simancas, Avila, and Miranda de Ebro. ⁽¹⁸⁾ To accomplish these victories, he had made thrusts through most of the northern meseta, and such a conquest was too rapid to be permanent. Alfonso realized this fact, and to protect the weak frontier he decided to strengthen the Asturian nucleus. To do so he created a politically impotent zone south of Asturias extending to the Duero River. The Chronicon Sebastiani says that he killed the Arabs of the cities and that he removed the Christians, taking them back to Asturias with him. ⁽¹⁹⁾ The Chronicon Albedense reports that he desolated the lands down to the Duero River. ⁽²⁰⁾ The view that a desert waste was literally created was accepted by Herculano, and thus until recently found almost universal acceptance in Iberia. It is still defended by many historians. For example, Sánchez Albornoz ⁽²¹⁾ brilliantly catalogues the breakdown of civil and religious authority and institutions, and his proof is beyond cavil. However, his assumption that this collapse indicates desertion of the land by the self-sufficient small peasant farmers is in no way demonstrated. His contention ⁽²²⁾ that a great band of desert was created from the Atlantic to the Ebro and that depopulation was complete cannot be accepted. The statements to this effect by early chroniclers, upon which he depends, were obviously hyperbole. Nor can his later statement, ⁽²³⁾ that the interruption of life on the meseta was absolute, be accepted, although the desertion of lands on the meseta of present Spain was undoubtedly far greater than that in the mountainous Portuguese north. ⁽²⁴⁾

[150] The opponents of such a literal acceptance of the early chronicles base their opinions upon facts which the proponents do not take into consideration (or at least do not mention). Alberto Sampaio ⁽²⁵⁾ pointed out that the Christians of the zone of "desert" could not have been taken back to Asturias. It would have been impossible to move that many people into Asturias and to support them there. Undoubtedly individuals followed the king back to the north, including, perhaps, all of the Christian city dwellers, but the great majority must have remained. ⁽²⁶⁾ These would have been the country people, most of them isolated from the main routes.

The terms "desert" and "uninhabited land" can be accepted in only a limited sense. The statement of the Chronicon that Alfonso eliminated the cities is reasonable. This would have been a logical procedure, for they were not only nodal points of communication but forts as well. But the suggestion that the individual farmers, scattered across the hilly countryside of North Portugal, could have been eliminated completely strains credulity. The area has always been one of country people rather than one of town dwellers. Armies do not scatter over the land. They march along roads and fight for key points -- cities. As both cities and roads were few in North Portugal, the "desolation" was more strategic and political than human.

David describes the conditions of a later period when peasants in France, similarly circumstanced, remained on the land. ⁽²⁷⁾ That the same thing occurred in the Minho is indicated by the typical peasant practices of the area which have their roots in ancient times, long predating the period of the so-called desolation. Undoubtedly contributing to the continuity was the remembrance of the church and of holy places. Even though many churches and monasteries were in ruins, the evidence is plain that they remained places of veneration, for with the re-establishment of the institutional framework, the rebuilt [151] churches were given their saints' names of the Roman period. New settlers were taken into the old religious framework of the primitive parishes, marked by the church and the cemetery. ⁽²⁸⁾

In terms of politics, however, it was an empty land. Cities, the political nerve centers, were eliminated. So, in the struggle for power, the politically unimportant area of small farmers was a "desert" in the eyes of ambitious men. This condition of political "desolation" between the Minho and Douro rivers in Portugal lasted for about a century. ⁽²⁹⁾
 

Alfonso II asked for and received aid from Charlemagne in 795. The aid of the Franks made possible Alfonso's advance into Middle Portugal, which reached at least as far as Lisbon. Relieved of the Moslem threat on the south, urban life began to take form again in the Douro-to-Minho region. In 840 the king met with a council of counts and bishops in Guimarães to promote the settlement of these "desolated" lands. From Guimarães they went to Braga to consider its restoration. Nothing was done immediately, for a document of 841 mentions the "great decay of the place," ⁽³⁰⁾ and the Metropolitan of Braga fulfilled the obligations of his office in Lugo. ⁽³¹⁾ Perhaps their intentions to resettle were thwarted by the considerable difficulties of the decade 840-850, with its internal revolts in the northwest and Norman attacks on the coasts. ⁽³²⁾

Temporarily the trend toward the re-establishment of cities languished, but during the reign of Alfonso's successor, Ordoño I (850-860), another start was made. It was during this period that Túy, on the lower Minho River, was re-established. ⁽³³⁾ Alfonso III (866-910) [152] continued the policy of resettlement with even more vigor than that of his predecessors. ⁽³⁴⁾ He ordered the re-establishment of Porto, ⁽³⁵⁾ which was done in 868, largely by refugees from Coimbra. After this event the area to the north was repopulated. ⁽³⁶⁾ That this re-establishment was accomplished out of Coimbra and Porto is of fundamental importance for the later Portuguese national state.
 

The resettlement of the north was made in the "desert" zone, which had had no political affiliation for over a century and had severed its economic ties with Galicia and León. Politically and economically, this zone started afresh with new alignments, whereas Galicia had had an unbroken tradition of adherence to the Leonese kingdom of the Iberian plateau. The cultural [153] similarity between Galicia and the north of Portugal remained, but there was a new economic focus and a consciousness of difference, beginning at the north border of the formerly "deserted" zone, the line of the lower Minho River.

In a Guimarães document of 841 there is reference to the "Provincia Portucalense," tacitly underlining the special character of the area south of the Minho River, the southern section of the former Swabian realm, the germ of the future Portugal. ⁽³⁷⁾ Thus the present province of the Minho, plus extensions southward, was recognized as a place apart, one with distinct personality. In a document of Alfonso III, of 883, the name "Portugal" was used to identify the Minho-to-Douro lands. The term "Galicia" was restricted to the area to the north of the Minho River. ⁽³⁸⁾ Another document, of 938, uses the term "Portugal" in this precise sense. One of 959 describes Galicia as being only to the north of the Minho River. ⁽³⁹⁾ In the middle of the following century, documents refer to Portugal as one of the parts of the kingdom of León, but as being distinct from Galicia. It seems quite clear that for people of that period the area of present northwest Portugal was distinct from the area of present Galicia, to the north of the Minho River. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the "desert" of Alfonso existed still in part of the present Portuguese lands, making an economic separation between the organized area of Galicia and the area being organized out of the south.

The resettlement of the region of the present province of Minho was not accomplished suddenly. As late as the eleventh century the term Portugal usually referred to the lands between the Mondego and Lima rivers, including the cities of Coimbra, Porto, Braga, Guimarães, and Barcelos. ⁽⁴⁰⁾ It must be remembered that the resettlement of the "desert" started with the re-establishment of Porto by men from Coimbra. Out of Porto [154] the settlement of the cities to the north was effected. As late as the early part of the eleventh century the northern part of present Portugal, the territory lying between the Lima and Minho rivers, had not been effectively resettled. Nor had the present province of Trás-os-Montes become a part of the northwestern nucleus. It remained remote from the martial and political events affecting the lowland area to the west and the meseta to the east. Even in the early twelfth century it was politically outside of the incipient Portuguese state, although its south and west sections were within the orbit of Portuguese economic affairs. But by the middle of the following century all of the province had become an integral part of Portuguese territory. ⁽⁴¹⁾
 

The northwest, which had lived with a large degree of isolation and self-sufficiency, had problems of its own that it was forced to meet in its own way. Norman ⁽⁴²⁾ attacks which began in the ninth century were repeated and became especially troublesome during the tenth and early eleventh centuries. In 968 there was a great raid, and in 1016 ⁽⁴³⁾ an especially vicious attack destroyed Túy completely. Against these attacks the problem of defense was local, for the Leonese king and his forces were too remote, and usually too occupied, to offer aid. The local barons had to maintain themselves, and the self-sufficiency engendered by such demands upon their courage and resourcefulness added to the ideas of rebellion common to the times.

Even before the devastation and weakening of León by al-Mansur in the last of the tenth century, attempts had been made by local barons of Galicia to throw off Leonese control. In the last half of the tenth century they rebelled against [155] Ordoño III,⁽⁴⁴⁾ and in 1031 other revolts in Galicia against the king of León were aided by the king of Navarra. ⁽⁴⁵⁾ By the end of the eleventh century the sense of independence had grown so lustily that in 1071 the barons of Entre-Douro-e-Minho (Minho Province) revolted against King García of the ephemeral kingdom of Galicia. ⁽⁴⁶⁾ This revolt was a precursor of the one of 1128 when Affonso (or Afonso) Henriques took the successful step toward Portuguese independence. The barons might well have advanced the day of Portuguese independence by three generations had it not been for the opposition of Sesnando, Count of Coimbra. Because of his opposition, the barons were squeezed between two forces and defeated. ⁽⁴⁷⁾

The remote, increasingly self-sufficient northwest was an obvious candidate for separatism. If means had not been found to avoid it in Galicia, that section of Iberia would almost surely have been lost to Spain, as Portugal was ultimately lost. A device that probably can be credited with maintaining the bonds between Galicia and the meseta kingdoms was suggested, perhaps quite fortuitously, by the church. This was the establishment and development of the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela along the route from France across north Spain.
 

The rebelliousness of the northwest had been not only political but also religious. This part of Iberia had long been restless and independently disposed toward Rome (note earlier references to the Priscillianist and Manichaean heresies in Chapter 9). This sense of detachment from the remainder of Iberia was largely dissipated in Galicia by the development of the pilgrimage to the supposed Iberian resting place of the remains of [156] St. James, the first reference to which was made in the ninth century. ⁽⁴⁸⁾

Although the pilgrimage was started only in the ninth century, by the end of that century it was well known in Iberia. Alfonso III (the Great) came with all of his family. In the tenth century pilgrims came from as far as Egypt and Nubia. By the eleventh century the great movement was thoroughly established. ⁽⁴⁹⁾ In the twelfth century further efforts were made by the monks of Cluny and by Diego Gelmirez, Archbishop of Santiago, and the pilgrimage became one of the most famous tourist enterprises of all time. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

The intermingling of religious and political purposes is indicated by the relations of the leading figures to each other. Calixtus II was a member of a noble Burgundian family, and was chosen Pope at Cluny. As Pope, with support from Cluny, at that time the chief center of religious influence throughout Western Europe, his support of the pilgrimage was an important factor. His decisions may have been influenced by the fact that Raymond, Count of Galicia, had been his brother, ⁽⁵¹⁾ as well as the son-in-law of Alfonso VI (see below).
 

The rebellious northwest was an obvious and great problem for the king, but it was not his only problem. Conditions in the remainder of the peninsula had been growing worse for León during the centuries. These tangled affairs of the peninsula in general had a decisive bearing upon the achievement of Portuguese independence.

Along the Duero River, in present Spain, where Alfonso I had created the strategic "defensive desert" between the Caliphate and the kingdom of Asturias, the desolation of the open [157] meseta lands was undoubtedly far greater than that of North and Middle Portugal. In the broken terrain of Portugal it was not difficult for individual farmers to remain; the case was otherwise in the open plateau. Even in prehistoric times the destruction of forests had been largely accomplished on the meseta. ⁽⁵²⁾ During the period of the reconquest the advancing Christians, for strategic reasons, eliminated most of the remaining trees and woody growth. It was not a useful refuge area. ⁽⁵³⁾

During the last half of the ninth and the early tenth centuries, resettlement was begun on the meseta. The southern part of the province of León was repopulated mostly by Galician and Asturian colonists. ⁽⁵⁴⁾ This fact, undoubtedly, had an influence upon the later alliance of Galicia with the meseta kingdoms. North Portugal, as was pointed out above, was resettled out of the south. This is an important difference and casts more light upon the ultimate separation of Galicia and Portugal.

On the meseta the course of resettlement was less smooth than in the remote west. During most of the tenth century Moslem influence was dominant, either by reason of its vigor or because of Christian inefficacy. The Leonese kings seem to have been thoroughly unexceptional. In company with the rulers of Navarra, the counts of the Marca (Catalonia), the great counts of Castile, and even those of Galicia, ⁽⁵⁵⁾ they were continually found at the court of the Caliphs, both to pay their respects and to receive information about external and even [158] internal affairs of their own domains. The focus of much of Iberia was upon Córdoba,⁽⁵⁶⁾ and the Moslems certainly were not interested in Christian resettlement.

That this subservience of the Christians to the Moslems diminished in the last half of the century is made apparent by revolts and the strenuous efforts of al-Mansur to quell them. In a series of thrusts through Iberia, he slashed the countryside through which his armies passed, leveling any cities that resisted. Even the remote northwest was involved, for a revolt there brought him through southwest Spain, up through Coimbra (which he destroyed in 987), ⁽⁵⁷⁾ Viseu, and to Porto, where he met his fleet, which had sailed from the presently named Alcácer do Sal. From Porto the combined forces marched northward to Galicia. Near Vigo, a few stalwarts set up a brief opposition, but it was a minor incident in the victorious march of al-Mansur. From there they continued to Santiago de Compostela, which was sacked and burned. ⁽⁵⁸⁾ All along the route destruction was the price of resistance, but the cities of present Portugal, for the most part, chose discretion as the better part of valor and, as they submitted without resistance, were not damaged. The Portuguese counts of the northern province, lying between the Douro and Minho rivers, submitted as allies. ⁽⁵⁹⁾ In general, by choosing non-resistance, Portugal saved itself from the destruction that was wrought upon the resisters, and especially upon León.
 

León was the strongest opponent of the Moslems and thus the center of their attack in several campaigns. Not only were cities sacked and burned, but the desolation of the farms and [159] groves was frightful. ⁽⁶⁰⁾ Nevertheless, even after these afflictions, León remained the most powerful of the Christian kingdoms in the early eleventh century. ⁽⁶¹⁾ But the bell was beginning to toll. The blows of the Moslems had been debilitating ⁽⁶²⁾ and constituted an important reason for its decline. Other reasons for decline are harder to assess but, without doubt, they were of importance. For example, the rigidity of customs and law was such that it was impossible for León to adjust to the changing times. The old Visigothic law, the Fuero Juzgo, was grimly applied, even though it failed to fit the conditions of this revolutionary situation. Nor did the Visigothic bequest of unpredictable regal succession help matters. ⁽⁶³⁾ It led to internal tensions arid spawned revolts, when unanimity of purpose might have saved the kingdom.

Castile, on the other hand, largely discarded the Visigothic regulations wherever they failed to be suitable, and thus made its whole political structure more resilient and adjustable. Castilian judges, beginning with the early tenth century, began basing their judgments upon local customs, rather than on the Fuero Juzgo. ⁽⁶⁴⁾ This attitude, coupled with the fact that Castile was not the center of Moslem attack and suffered less than León in battle, led to its increasing political importance.

Some relief came to the Christian kingdoms with the death of al-Mansur in 1002, which left a political vacuum in Moslem territory. The disorder that ensued among Moslems did not redound to the benefit of León particularly, although it meant relief from pressure. Castile was the chief beneficiary. During the eleventh century Ferdinand I (1038-1065), king of Castile (and ultimately of Galicia, León, and Navarra), achieved great victories. He reconquered extensive territories from the prince of Badajoz and made incursions into the domains of the king of Saragossa. He made vassals of the kings of Toledo and Seville. [160] By 1054 he had everything from Galicia to the Ebro in his power, and in Portugal he established the south border of Christendom at the Mondego River. ⁽⁶⁵⁾

It must have seemed, then, a propitious time for the complete triumph of Christian arms in the peninsula, but such an outcome was still more than four centuries away. The delay was caused by many things, but the immediate reason was that Ferdinand divided his kingdom into three parts and by so doing again set up internal conflict in Christian lands. Although his son, Alfonso VI of León and Asturias, continued the struggle against the Moslems, taking Toledo, virtually controlling Valencia and raiding south of Seville to the sea, ⁽⁶⁶⁾ he was at odds with the other Christian kingdoms; Castile was against León and Navarra; Aragon was opposed to Catalonia. Moreover, one of the great motivating forces of the reconquest precluded complete victory over the Moslems. This was the desire for quick profit -- through loot, ransom for the return of persons or cities, or payment for protection. For centuries, the ordinary way of living was by marauding and pillaging, and Christian armies of the meseta (less so in Portugal) often had more interest in winning battles that would involve loot or payment  for future protection by Moslem kings than any wish to possess or settle new territory. Christian princes extracted extortionate levies from Moslem kingdoms. Time and again, cities were captured only to be relinquished after they had been sacked or had given promises of payment. ⁽⁶⁷⁾

The conquest of Alfonso VI led the Moslems of the south to appeal to the Almorávides of Africa for help. They responded, and in 1086 won a great victory at Zalaca, near Badajoz. After this, the fanatical, well-organized Almorávides controlled a large part of Iberia for over a generation before power began to slip from their grasp. In 1120 they were badly beaten by [161] Alfonso of Aragon, el Batallador. But they were not the last of the Africans to invade Iberia. Later in the century they were followed by the Almohades, who, although never as effective as the Almorávides had been in the first years of their power, established control over the southern part of the peninsula. Moslem pressure from the south remained a serious problem for the Christians until 1212, when the Almohades were decisively beaten at Navas de Tolosa.

The twelfth century as a whole was one of disruption and devastation for the area of present New Castile with the alternating advances and withdrawals of Christians and Moslems, each in turn scorching the land as they passed through it. The inhabitants of the south meseta, trying to eke out a living, found that it was useless to plant trees. Such long-term plans were profitless in face of the planned destruction of the countryside. Grain was less a gamble, as it required only a few months' wait before the harvest. Best of all, however, were mobile flocks of animals which could be moved out of harm's way. Moslems complained to the Emperor in Morocco that they could not live isolated on the meseta to fall prey to marauders. ⁽⁶⁸⁾ That Christians were in the same predicament is borne out by Edrisi's twelfth-century report, in which he said that the function of Medellín, Trujillo, and Cáceres was to serve as forts from which raids could be made to devastate and sack Christian places. ⁽⁶⁹⁾ Loot seems to have been a large part of the motivation.

A change in attitude may be first observed in the mid-eleventh century, when Castile began to exhibit greater interest in the permanent expansion of its borders, rather than the immediate profit to be squeezed from Moslems either for protection or for the recession of conquered territories. ⁽⁷⁰⁾ This did not represent a complete change in Castilian policy. The predilection for raiding and loot was too strongly ingrained to be [162] eliminated quickly. It continued to have importance until Granada fell. The change in attitude was sufficient, however, to give Castile an advantage over León where the preoccupation with loot continued unabated.

Of the three distinct centers or nuclei of the north of Iberia, León had been the most powerful and was the object of Moslem attack. Leonese strength in this case was its disadvantage and it suffered under repeated and devastating attacks. Castile, on the east, was less in the Moslem focus and continued to grow in power and to form itself as a political unit. On the other side was the area of present North Portugal, considerably isolated by topography. It was a wet, green country in a blind alley position and had little to recommend it to either the Moslems or the meseta Spaniards. León had its hands full with insuperable problems without being concerned about a remote, somewhat strange and unattractive land. Even less would that part of the peninsula have come into the ken of Castile, so far away and so involved in the great social and military changes that eventuated in its becoming the supreme power of Spain. The emergence of Castile as dominant over León was all to the good for Portugal. It left the latter a free choice of remaining largely aloof, or of taking part in the affairs of the rest of the peninsula. When its interests were served it could take part in the conflict, but otherwise there was little compulsion. When Portugal struck for its freedom, León was well along the road of its decline, but Casille had not yet succeeded in consolidating its power over the more important areas in the east and the south.

The political advantages of the offside position of Portugal are obvious but there was another advantage to this avoidance of involvement in the martial affairs of the peninsula. It allowed the Portuguese farmers, who were more strongly rooted in the land than their meseta relatives, an opportunity to continue to [163] improve their agriculture. At the time of the raids and counter-raids on the meseta, where potential agricultural land was converted by reasons of necessity into sheep runs, the Portuguese farmers continued their agriculture without disruption. On the Spanish side, the herder, always strong, was strengthened further, whereas on the Portuguese side if there was change it was in favor of the farmer.

2. Manuel Torres, "Las Invasiones y los Reinos Germánicos de España (Años 409-711)," Historia de España, III, 135.

3. Francisco José Velozo, "As Origens Nacionais de Portugal e de Espanha e o domínio Islámico na península," Reprint from the journal Gil Vicente (1951), p. 5.

4. Ibid., p. 27.

5. Francisco José Velozo, "Ainda a contribüição Luso-Galaica para a reconquista. A primeira invasão de Entre-Douro-e-Minho pelos Arabes," Braga, Boletim do Arquivo Municipal, I, No. 12 (Aug., 1949), 324-328.

6. Menéndez Pidal, Historia de España, III, Ii.

7. Velozo, "Ainda a contribüição Luso-Galaica para a reconquista," Braga, Boletim do Arquivo Municipal, I, No. 12 (Aug., 1949), 324; "As Origens Nacionais de Portugal e de Espanha," Reprint from the journal Gil Vicente (1951), p. 31; "Contribüição Luso-Galaica para a reconquista," Minia, I, No. 3 (Dec., 1946), 228.

8. Velozo, "Contribüição Luso-Galaica para a reconquista," Minia, I, No. 3 (Dec., 1946), 235.

9. Velozo, "As Ongens Nacionais de Portugal e de Espanha," Reprint from the journal Gil Vicente (1951), p. 36.

10. Velozo, "Contribüição Luso-Galaica para a reconquista," Minia, I, No. 3 (Dee., 1946), 235. The Arab historian Almacari speaks definitely of the invasion of Galicia by the Arab Muça in 716 and the conquest of Viseu in present Portugal. Velozo, "Contribüição Luso-Galaica para a reconquista," Minia, I, No. 2 (May, 1945), 110-111. Muça also conquered Lugo in middle Galicia and ordered "explorations that arrived at the Penha de Pelayo." Velozo thinks that the Penha de Pelayo can be located not far from Lugo, within the triangle Cape Finisterre, Padron (ancient Iria Flavia), and La Coruña, that is, in the extreme northwest area of the peninsula, bordering the Atlantic. Velozo, "As Origens Nacionais de Portugal e de Espanha," Reprint from the journal Gil Vicente (1951), p. 26.

11. Ibid., p 38.

12. Damião Peres, "A Reconquista Cristã," História de Portugal, I, 436.

13. Velozo, "As Origens Nacionais de Portugal e de Espanha," Reprint from the journal Gil Vicente (1951), pp. 22, 55.

14. Pierre David, Etudes historiques sur la Galice et le Portugal du VIe au XIIIe siécle, p. 32.

15. Peres, "A Reconquista Cristã," História de Portugal, I, 436.

16. Torquato de Sousa Soares, "O Repovoamento do Norte de Portugal no século IX," Congresso do Mundo Português, 11(1940), 396.

17. Loc. cit.

18. Peres, "A Reconquista Cristã," História de Portugal, I, 436.

19. Soares, "O Repovoamento do Norte de Portugal," Congresso do Mundo Português, II (1940), 396.

20. Peres, "A Reconquista Cristãö," História de Portugal, I, 436.

21. Claudio Sánchez Albornoz y Menduiña, Ruina y extinción del municipio romano en España e instituciones que le reemplazan, p. 120.

22. Ibid., p. 120.

23. Ibid., p. 124.

24. Sánchez Albornoz is not alone in these beliefs. See, for example, Amando Melón y Ruiz de Gordejuela, Geografía histórica española, I, 223-225. António Jorge Dias, in his Rio de Onor, Chap. I, Note 52, p. 40, has a useful summary of the various positions taken in this argument by various scholars.

25. Alberto Sampaio, "As Vilas do Norte de Portugal," Estudos históricos e económicos, I, Pt. 1, 54.

26. A. A. Mendes Corrêa, Raízes de Portugal, pp. 16-18, 80-81.

27. David, Etudes historiques, p. 171.

28. Pierre David, "Les Saints Patrons d'églises entre Minho et Mondego jusqu'à la fin du XIe siécle," Revista Portuguesa de Hístória, II (1943), 250-251.

29. Damiao Peres, Como nasceu Portugal, p. 38.

30. Peres, "A Reconquista Cristã," História de Portugal, I, 441.

31. David, Etudes historiques, pp. 123-124, 128.

32. Peres, "A Reconquista Cristã," História de Portugal, I, 441.

33. Peres, Como nasceu Portugal, p. 38.

34. Peres, "A Reconquista Cristã," História de Portugal, I, 441.

35. David, Etudes historiques, p. 159. Porto is the ancient Portus Cale on the Douro River. Calem was probably a Lusitanian citânia that later was used by the Romans as a place of embarkation, hence the prefix portus. See J. Augusto Ferreira, Memória Archaeológico- históricas da Cidade do Porto, I, 11. The Itinerary of Antoninus placed it on the left bank of the river, in the approximate location of the present Vila Nova de Gaia. H. Lautensach, "Portugal: Auf Grund eigener Reisen und der Literatur." I. "Das Land als Ganzes," Petermann's Mitteilungen, No. 213 (1932), 1. Leite de Vasconcellos thought that it was probably on the right bank, in the approximate place of the present Porto. J. Leite de Vasconcellos, "Delimitañão da fronteira Portuguesa," Boletim da Classe de Letras, XIII (1918-1919), 1279. The Swabian parochiale seems to place Roman Portucale to the south of the Douro, Portucale on the north being Swabian. David, Etudes historiques, p. 79. During the period of Swabian rule, the bishop Idatius distinguished the unfortified Portucale locum on the right bank from castrum on the south bank, which was a fortified place on an eminence. Ferreira, Memórias Archaeológico-históricas da Cidade do Porto, I, 11. In the twelfth century there seems to have been a settlement on the left bank. Charles Wendell David, De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, p. 67. This, of course, does not rule out the probability of the complementary settlement on the other side of the river.

Anciently and persistently there has been a tendency for the development of settlements facing each other across the Douro. The position on the river, as a crossing place, has had enduring importance.

36. "Repopulated" here means the re-establishment of cities and communications.

37. Alberto Sampaio, quoted by Damião Peres, "Origens da nacionalidade," Congresso do Mundo Português, II, 33.

38. Ibid, p. 15.

39. Peres, "Origens da nacionalidade," Congresso do Mundo Português, II, 16.

40. David, Etudes historiques, p. 332.

41. Conde de São Payo (D. António), "Esboço da carta histórica de Província de Trás-os-Montes (séculos XIII a XIX) ," Congresso do Mundo Português, II, 421-433.

42. That is, "northmen," including various Scandinavians.

43. Ramón Menéndez Pidal, La España del Cid, p. 68.

44. Peres, "A Reconquista Cristã," Hístória de Portugal, I, 454.

45. Menéndez Pidal, La España del Cid, p. 68.

46. Peres, "A Reconquista Cristã," História de Portugal, I, 366.

47. Sesnando was the son of a wealthy mozarabe who became vizier to the Emir of Seville. He transferred his allegiance to Ferdinand the Great and was rewarded by territory south of the Douro River. Alexandre Herculano, História de Portugal (7th ed.), p. 10.

48. Georgiana G. King, The Way of Saint James, I, 48-49, 58-59, 62, 93.

49. Ibid, p.99.

50. Marques de la Vega ludan, Guía del Viaje a Santiago, V, 7.

51. Ibid., p. 11.

52. Hermann Lautensach, "Die Iberische Halbinsel als Schauplatz der geschichtlichen Bewegung," Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin, Nos. 3/4 (June, 1948), 104.

53. Although betokening the tenacity with which peasants cling to their land, it seems probable that even during the long centuries of recurrent disaster it was never completely uninhabited.

54. Menéndez Pidal, La España del Cid, p. 54.

55. One may safely assume that the northwest, never an area of interest to the Moslems, was less influenced by this political situation than were other Christian areas.

56. Menéndez Pidal, La España del Cid, p. 36.

57. It was leveled so completely that for seven years afterward there was no occupation of the site, according to the Chronicon Conimbricense. Quoted in Evariste Lévi-Provençal, Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane, II, 239.

58. Ibid., p. 249.

59. Loc. cit.

60. Ibid., pp. 234-249.

61. Menéndez Pidal, La España del Cid, p. 40.

62. Ibid., p. 65.

63. Ibid, pp. 66-68.

64. Ibid., p. 55.

65. J. Leite de Vasconcellos, "Delimitação da fronteira Portuguesa," Boletim da Classe de Letras, XIII (1918-1919), p. 1276.

66. This was the period of Rodrigo de Vivar, El Cid Campeador, d. 1099.

67. Louis Bertrand, The History of Spain, p. 159, Peres, "A Reconquista Cristã," História de Portugal, I, 451.

68. António Dominguez Ortiz, "La Población española a lo largo de nuestra historia," Boletín de la Real Sociedad Geográfica, LXXXVI, Nos. 4-6 (Apr.-June, 1950), 273-274.

69. Abu-Abd-Alla-Mohamed-al-Edrisi, Descripción de España, p. 25.

70. Menéndez Pidal, La España del Cid, pp. 42-43.