DIOCESE OF VIC
THE HEROIC ERA
OF THE CHURCH OF VIC,
IN THE NINTH AND TENTH CENTURIES
The region of Vic -- the district, or comarca, of Ausona and those portions of the comarcas of Bages, Anoia, and Bergueda lying within the diocese -- suffered longer from the Islamic incursions of the eighth and ninth centuries than did the neighboring regions of Urgell, Besalú, and Girona. Islamic armies occupied these latter territories for several decades, but the Frankish offensive that began in 785 restored them to Christian rule a century before Vic was definitively reconquered.(1)
The Plain of Vic and the adjoining Bages district were more exposed to the west and served as natural routes for raiding armies on their way to the Pyrenees or beyond. For most of the eighth and ninth centuries, Ausona and its hinterland were sparsely populated, occupied by neither Christian nor Islamic authority.(2) Completing the devastation wreaked by Islamic razzias was the rebellion, centered in Ausona, of "Count Aizo" against the Franks in 826-827.(3) Aizo, an Islamic hostage at the Frankish court who escaped to the frontier, took advantage of the turbulent freedom of the frontier and of anti-Frankish sentiment among the inhabitants of much of the Spanish March. The  outbreak was suppressed in 827, and the Plain of Vic was left as a no man's land between the Spanish March and the Caliphate. Yet recent investigation shows that, despite the political vacuum, the countryside of Ausona was not deserted.(4) Cultivation persisted, and land was divided, bought, and sold before the official resettlement began in 878. A relatively secure peace with Islam in 863 encouraged a spontaneous movement of settlement. It is now widely recognized that throughout the Iberian peninsula the "deserts" (as contemporaries called them) that separated the hostile peoples were not as empty as the term implies.(5) Nevertheless, the fifty years that followed Alio's rebellion are the dark ages of Vic's history. Whatever activity that endured has left only archaeological traces and fugitive documentary references.
In 878 the count of Barcelona, Guifré I, "the Hairy," who is traditionally accorded the honor of being the first independent ruler of Catalonia, established the county of Ausona and appointed a viscount over it. It is possible that Guifré did not originally plan the restoration of the bishopric of Ausona. According to Odilo Engels, its foundation in 886 was the product of an intrigue of the bishop of Girona, acting for the count of Empúries, who wished to expand westward in competition with Guifré's designs on the frontier.(6) Robert-Henri Bautier, however, has called into question the evidence on which accounts of this dispute are based.(7) He believes that it was at Count Guifré's insistence that the restored diocese was recognized by the metropolitan see of Narbonne. Such official backing would explain the perseverance of the new and fragile foundation.(8)
In any event, owing to the separate foundations and original spheres of influence, the diocese of Vic and the county of Ausona did not share precisely the same border during the Middle Ages (see map 2). The orientation of the diocese was more northern and eastern than was the county's. The monastery of Ripoll, one of the jewels of the diocese, lay not in the county of Ausona but rather in Besalú. On the other hand, the castle of Cardona, where the viscount of Ausona normally resided, was a vital part of the county of Ausona but subject ecclesiastically to Urgell.
Until recently it was thought that the new bishop of Ausona  received comital jurisdiction over the inhabitants of his diocese and a number of public revenues, particularly tolls. This impression is based on a privilege issued by the Frankish king Odo in 889, but the surviving text has numerous later interpolations.(9) All that the bishop received for certain was a military stronghold in the Bages district (the castle of Artés) and one-third of certain public revenues in the diocese. From this foundation, however, aided by close relations with the count of Barcelona, the bishop of Vic became the effective ruler of his diocese, supplanting the viscount of Ausona in all but name. In 911 the will of the recently deceased Count Guifré II Borrell allowed the church of Vic one-third of the profits from the coinage struck at Vic.(10) According to Ramon d'Abadal, the Frankish king Louis IV d'Outremer confirmed the bishop's monetary rights in Vic.(11)
During the tenth century the church gradually acquired nearly complete control of the town.Given the absence of the viscount (who resided at Cardona) and the prevailing confusion of public with private rights -- the well-known medieval inclination to assimilate everything from tithes to taxes to rents into private lordship -- the success of the bishop and chapter in turning public revenues to their own benefit is not surprising. The process took place between 911, when the church held one-third of the coinage profits, and 957, when, without formal authorization, it kept the entire amount.(12)
Outside the town, in the remainder of the diocese, the church increased its power not by such nibbling but as a direct result of the count's favor. Toward the end of the tenth century, as the first efforts were made to settle the western parts of the diocese, the count granted castles to the bishop to serve as focuses for protection and administration of the frontier territories.(13)
Thus, by the late tenth century, the bishop and chapter of Vic were quite powerful. The church held castles, tolls, judicial rights, the mint, and market revenues and was master of the city of Vic. Four factors promoted the good fortune of the church: the peculiar circumstances of its reestablishment, the proximity of the frontier, the transformation of rights delegated by the count into purely ecclesiastical ones, and the policy of collaboration  between counts and bishops. The last deserves particular emphasis because it is important to avoid explaining the powers enjoyed by the bishop and chapter as merely the result of a void left by a weakened central government. Although it was common in tenth-century Europe for comital power to succeed and then emulate the disintegration of royal supremacy, some regions resisted this trend, including Normandy, Flanders, and Catalonia, where the count ruled effectively.(14)
Naturally, the counts of Barcelona did not establish a proto-modern state with a central bureaucracy. Rather what they accomplished was the prolongation of Carolingian (and ultimately Romano-Visigothic) notions of public authority.(15) They succeeded in maintaining themselves as the unquestioned government of the former Spanish March. Their success was not quite total, however, for they shared the Carolingian weakness for partitioning territory among heirs. In the tenth and eleventh centuries a fluctuating number of counties disputed among themselves, although all were ruled by the same family. Despite their acrimonious relationships, there was little warfare among the counties. Their counts were violent and erratic, but they held an unusual degree of respect for law and correct procedure and may be said to have governed well.(16) The comital tribunals remained the ultimate source of judgment, public land (the fisc) stayed in the count's possession, and castles and taxes were alienated only to the most dependable allies, such as the church.(17)
The strength of the count may have been due in part to the proximity of the frontier.(18) Exterior danger is a natural corrective to internal disunity and also provides a place to which violent energies within society may conveniently be channeled. Yet the presence of the frontier will not entirely explain the preservation of centralized government. If danger unifies people in the absence of strong, credible institutions, one would expect tenth-century Europe, a place in great danger from invaders, to have been internally unified rather than anarchic, as it in fact was. The counts of Barcelona, like their colleagues in Normandy and Flanders, benefited from other sources of strength, including the traditional recognition of and loyalty to public, institutionalized  authority, which derived from Roman, Visigothic, and Carolingian times. That authority provided a debased, but comparatively sophisticated, form of law and maintained the reality of a qualitative difference between private license and public right.(19)
The count also benefited from another traditional source of strength: the church. Carolingian government, especially in its later years, defined itself in ecclesiastical terms as a form of ministerium. The ruler was appointed by God to protect the church, to rule his land physically, and to further the people's spiritual destiny as well. The ruler sanctified in this fashion had duties that blended with those of a church charged with secular responsibilities. The functions of church and secular government became so closely joined that the two institutions became nearly indistinguishable.(20)
The counts of Barcelona inherited these habits of interpenetration and overlapping jurisdiction, stripped of some of the l iturgical and rhetorical complexity elaborated by the Visigoths and Carolingians. Cooperation amounted to something more significant than simple control of the church by the count, although there was never any doubt about which was the more powerful partner.(21) The secular lordship of the church was delegated by the count but exercised quite autonomously. The church in tenth-and eleventh-century Catalonia was an aspect of government, not a tool of the laity, an "église au pouvoir des laïques."(22)
More than the challenge of the frontier, it was the tradition of strong public authority that influenced the structure of government in early Catalonia. And this conservative tendency, more than the frontier or the circumstances of 886, enabled the church of Victo prosper. The resilience of the church and counts was due not to an especially skillful adaptation to changed conditions but to the reverse -- to a form of reactionary ideology that continued on a regional scale the political theory of sub-Roman times.
During its heroic phase, before 1100, the church of Vic saw itself as the associate of the counts of Barcelona, and it was situated in a manner that allowed it extensive power within the county and diocese of Ausona. Vic was closer to the southwestern  frontier than either Girona or Elne, and it was less overawed by the immediate presence of the count than were the sees of Barcelona and Urgell. That bishops might possess secular jurisdiction was not a novel idea in medieval Europe. Bishops were normally members of the same aristocratic families that dominated the diocese, and their rights and income were built on the same combination of land, jurisdictional monopolies, and miscellaneous taxes that supported the nobles and knights. What distinguished Catalonia and some other areas, such as the Rhineland, was that princely power for bishops was achieved in association with a strong ruler and represented not a further fragmentation of authority but a collaborative arrangement. Within Catalonia, the frontier gave particular strength to Vic insofar as the newly settled lands made effective military and political control necessary. Until the frontier was extended in the twelfth century, and until the count became less dependent on the church, the bishop of Vic would be the most powerful man in Ausona and a strong presence within the entire territory subject to the counts.
The close identification of Catalan bishops with the fortunes of the House of Barcelona tempted the counts to select members of their own family as bishops. The branch that ruled the northern counties of Cerdanya and Besalú was particularly enamored of this practice, allowing its influence to be extended into areas outside the political boundaries of its territory, which had no diocese of its own.(23) The manifestly unreformed system of episcopal selection worked fairly well, notwithstanding the House of Barcelona's reputation for few gentle or contemplative virtues. The mingling of episcopal and comital rulership and the often blatant appearance of simoniacal practices coincided with the most innovative and artistically flourishing period of the national church. It is doubtful that the Gregorian reform, when it came, allowed a better church everywhere to replace the corrupt indigenous institution.(24)
The unreformed church produced certain paradoxes. One finds counts w h piously retired from the world to die in the calm confines of such monasteries as La Grasse, Monte Cassino, and Canigou.(25) At the same time, the list of bishops who died  violently is extensive. Three successive bishops of Vic met unnatural ends. Ató was murdered in 971, apparently because of his efforts to elevate Vic to archepiscopal status.(26) His successor, Frujà, was consecrated by the archbishop of Narbonne, who had opposed the plan to elevate the status of this suffragan church. Frujà was killed in 992 by a faction supporting an anti-bishop.(27) He was followed by Arnulf, who was among three Catalan bishops who died during the attack on Córdoba in 1010.(28) Arnulf's military adventures were especially noteworthy: he had been among those prisoners taken in the raids of Almanzor (al-Mansur) in 985 and held in Córdoba for ransom.(29)
In such conditions the church and
the world could not always appear widely separated. A dispute such as that
over the metropolitan status of Vic was born of the count's desire to end
trans-Pyrenean influence on his territory. Ató and Count Borrell
journeyed to Rome and obtained five bulls that ordered Catalan dioceses
to be separated from Narbonne's jurisdiction and grouped under Ató,
who was proclaimed archbishop of Ausona while the former metropolitan see
of Tarragona remained in Moslem hands. Ató's untimely death put
an end to the scheme. Two of the impressive papal papyri were preserved
in the cathedral archives of Vic, where they are still to be found. No
further attempt was made to secede from Narbonne for over a century, until
the bishop of Vic, Berenguer, was recognized as archbishop of Tarragona.
That claim would represent both the zenith of Vic's stature and the point
of most intimate collaboration with the count.
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE FRONTIER
The violent intrigue surrounding the failure to separate the Catalan church from Narbonne is a reminder of the difficulties attending an excessively close connection between church affairs and the secular world. Among the more fortunate results of this connection was the placement of new settlers on frontier lands. Resettlement was organized in several ways and under different auspices. Large-scale planned movements of population, such those supervised by the church, were of considerable importance,  although to some degree their significance is exaggerated by the nature of the surviving records, which are silent regarding the painful efforts of individual peasants acting on their own. Count Guifré and such monasteries as Sant Joan de les Abadesses and Sant Cugat del Vallès are often credited with consolidating the early frontier. Later, in the more structured setting of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, large organizations such as the military orders would certainly be in charge of arranging the terms of settlement.
For the early years, however, recent research has made clear the paramount role of unplanned efforts by small groups of farmers in the development of Ausona and other pre-Pyrenean comarcas.(30) Peasants were effective owners of their holdings, not part of a seigneurial estate system, and more was achieved by their initiative than by the direction of church or count.(31) Even before its official pacification at the end of the ninth century, the Plain of Vic attracted settlers. Its easily worked soil and relatively moist climate assured rapid and fruitful development. The narrow, cramped valleys of the Pyrenees, refuge for much of the Christian population during the Islamic ascendancy, were extremely crowded, and it needed little propaganda to entice people away from them.(32) The role of the count and the church was more to confirm and protect patterns of settlement than to create them.
Further to the west and south, however, the comarcas of Anoia and Segarra were difficult to populate. These were true frontier territories, exposed to Islamic attack during the period of stable, but not peaceful, borders. The terrain is more irregular and rugged, and the climate is drier than that of Ausona or Bages. Natural and human obstacles presented severe problems for settlers throughout the tenth and during much of the eleventh century.
In these western regions, in contrast to the practice on the Plain of Vic, the count's interests were served by investing the cathedral with castles to protect and administer the fledgling communities. Other regional powers might receive similar responsibilities, but often the church must have appeared more competent to undertake the administrative and even military aspects of this role than the lay officers of the count. In 1010, for  example, the castle of Calaf in the comarca of the Segarra was transferred to the cathedral from the incompetent rule of the viscount of Ausona.(33)
The church appointed its own canons to rule such castles, but despite such direct supervision, it could not always attract or consolidate settlement.(34) Though an effective military protector and judge of disputes, the church was less successful in sustaining the peasants in their struggles with the land. From 985 to 1015 a series of reverses, including war, drought, and famine, induced the church to ally with and co-opt the members of the self-made military elite, that is, magnates who were not the representatives of the count (like the viscount of Ausona) but who were sympathetic to the church.(35) In return for intercessory prayers and other spiritual benefits, such as privileged burial and liturgical commemoration, pious knights of established military prowess were invested with castles on the frontier. The support of these knights was crucial to the bishop, and in the early eleventh century he offered them the added inducement of attachment to the cathedral chapter as lay canons, or levitae.
A levita was equivalent to a deacon or subdeacon.(36) As did cathedral chapters throughout early medieval Europe, the church of Vic included a number of clergy below the priestly rank, who were therefore not bound to world-renouncing standards of behavior. The rank of levita was a genuine clerical level, if a lesser one, and for a layman to be called levita implies more than a rhetorical or honorific title. Although one meets a large number of perfectly ordinary clerical levitae in documents of the twelfth century, the military levitae of the early eleventh century were different.(37)
The late Monsignor Junyent, for many years canon-archivist of Vic, noted the distinction between clerical levitae and lay canons who held the same rank and title.(38) Lay levitae received major responsibilities, in contrast to the routine duties of those bearing the title a century later. That prominent canons were openly married and had children led Étienne Baluze (in his edition of Pierre de Marca's monumental collection Marca Hispanica) to ridicule and castigate the alleged immorality of the Catalan clergy.(39) The levitae that Baluze singled out were brazen about their domestic arrangements, not because of the corruption of society, but because they were laymen.
When colonization of the west was resumed after the raids of Almanzor and his successor had ended, Bishop Borrell of Vic decided not to undertake the job of protecting the new settlements directly. In 1015 the castle of Calaf and its two satellite fortresses were placed under the command of Guillem de Mediona, a levita, who was to hold the castle in obedience to the church.(40) Guillrm was already lord of the frontier castle of Clariana and presumably had proven his skill in defending settlers and his good will toward the church. In 1023 and 1031, under Borrell's successor, Oliba, Guillem received the castles of Tons and Montbui, to be held from the church.(41) More than protection of the frontier may have been envisaged in these grants to Guillem de Mediona. During the 1020s a more assertive and independent aristocracy was undermining the previously unquestioned supremacy of the counts.(42) Grants to Guillem and other levitae may reflect anxiety over internal disorder as well as setbacks on the frontier. If so, it would not be the last time the church sought an alternative form of lay support in the absence of effective comital protection.
There are indications that at least one levita was intimately involved with capitular administration. Bonfill de Gurb-Queralt was a member of one of the most powerful families of Ausona and the frontier region of the Anoia River.(43) In documents of the 1020s and 1030s he appears as a levita and then as sacristan, the latter one of the most important chapter offices. Bonfill was married and had a son who succeeded him as castellan of the episcopal fortress of Meda, not far from Vic.(44)
What advantages did a levita obtain in addition to new castles (over which his control might be circumscribed)? The benefits of status as a canon included sharing in the chapter's common revenue, inscription in the commemorative books marking the saints' feast days and the anniversaries of the death of chapter members, and the right to be buried in or near the cathedral.(45) Further, the largely intercessory nature of early medieval piety made lay affiliation attractive.(46) Lacking such later means as auricular confession  or crusade indulgence to assure remission of punishment for sin and to aid personal salvation, laymen were eager to associate themselves with forces that could placate the stern judgment of God. Monasteries were the particular beneficiaries of this desire for intercession because their liturgical routine and guardianship of notable relics endowed them with tremendous spiritual power. Other churches, such as the cathedral of Vic, also attracted pious donations, bequests, and wealthy members, all products of a climate of spiritual anxiety that possessed few outlets to the divine.
The levitae were an active form of this intercessory mentality. Their association with the chapter is a precedent for the crusade spirit and the organization of military orders, instruments that would enlist laymen in the work of the church. Such men would obtain remission for the penalties of their sins, yet remain adept in skills of violence, now turned to presumably more legitimate ends.(47) In one sense the levitae were closer to the church than members of confraternities or military orders would be in the future: they were full members of the chapter, something that later generations would seldom permit. In another sense the levitae remained more distant from the clerical life than their successors because they neither took vows nor lived in common. What the levitae exhibit most distinctly is the combination of spirituality, practicality, and patriotism that marked the habits and policy of the church of Vic. "Orationes optime dependent patriam" the words of Sala, the lay magnate who founded the monastery of Sant Benet de Bages, express the widespread desire for cooperation between the church and great laymen, and they display the expectations of the levitae.(48)
After 1050 the levitae no
longer appear in surviving documents, perhaps because the frontier was
less perilous or because the first influence of church reform required
greater distinction between clergy and laymen. The custom of joining laymen
(and laywomen as well) to the chapter would survive through the twelfth
century, however. Several members of the laity were commemorated in the
memorial books (martyrologies) of the chapter as canons (although they
possessed no clerical title such  as levita).(49)
More common would be a form of honorary membership as a confrater of
the cathedral community. Pere de Santa Eugenia, for example, who died sometime
after 1176, was remembered as a "miles egregius et huius sedis confrater."(50)
Even at this late date the church associated to itself members of leading
THE PEACE AND TRUCE OF GOD
The levitae of the early eleventh century were both a facet of the ambiguity of ecclesiastical and secular boundaries and a creative solution to the difficulties of repopulation and protection. An even more striking example of such ambiguity and creativity is the movement known as the Peace and Truce of God. Active throughout Catalonia, the movement may also be considered a response to the crisis of the count's authority that began in 1020.
The Peace of God attempted to control the growth in private warfare by the use of spiritual sanctions.(51) Church councils defined places and persons that were to be exempt from violence, and those who broke the conciliar decrees were to be excommunicated. Protected were church buildings, an area of land around them, the clergy, peasants, and a varying list of other noncombatants (widows, merchants, and the like) and their possessions. In some cases knights were required to appear at the councils and swear obedience to the terms of the Peace. Occasionally the spiritual threats against violators of the Peace were supplemented by the physical persuasion of a militia composed of sworn knights and lesser folk. The first Peace councils were held in the late tenth century in Languedoc and Burgundy, regions in which the disintegration of secular authority was nearly total. In these anarchic territories, the intervention of the church to maintain a modicum of order was necessary, faute de mieux.
The Truce of God was an outgrowth of the Peace. It regulated the time during which warfare was licit in addition to exempting certain places and persons. Fighting on Sunday and other holy days was outlawed, and in successive councils the list of prohibited days was extended to include Lent, all Fridays, Saturdays,  Mondays, and a host of minor holidays -- to the point of making permitted warfare impossible. Traditionally, Catalonia and Roussillon receive credit for inventing the Truce, and the Council of Toulouges (1027) is cited as the first truce council.(52) That council was presided over by Oliba, the bishop of Vic, although some authorities believe that an earlier truce was proclaimed by Oliba and his colleague, the bishop of Elne (within whose diocese Toulouges lay).(53) In 1033 a more sweeping truce regulation, covering merchants in addition to peasants and clergy, was issued at a council of Catalan bishops held at an unidentified place, perhaps at Vic itself.(54) Subsequent councils, mostly assembled in southern France, especially at Narbonne, extended the number of days during which the Truce was to apply.(55)
Jean-Pierre Poly has challenged the
Catalan claim to priority in inventing the Truce, based as it is, according
to Poly, on faulty dating of Catalan councils that took place later than
those of Provence and Languedoc.(56) Poly
admits that the word treva first appeared at Toulouges; however,
he feels that this council did not mark any advance over earlier councils
of the Peace of God. He believes that although the idea of the Truce may
have originated with Oliba and his circle, its realization took place in
the Rhône region of Provence. Poly considers a Narbonne council of
1043 and the Council of Saint Gilles (between 1042 and 1044) the inspiration
of Catalan councils, the first of which was the 1043 council (wrongly dated
We may leave aside the problem of whether or not Catalonia preceded Provence. The Truce was undoubtedly popular in Catalonia, and with its triumph the provisions of the Peace were also introduced. Why the Peace and Truce should have spread in a realm that, unlike Provence or Languedoc, had a tradition of secular authority, is a question of more significance than that of precedence.
The importance of the Truce in Catalonia was in part a symptom of the decline in the count's power, to which we have already alluded. Between 1020 and 1050 a series of aristocratic rebellions undermined the already ineffective government of Count Berenguer Ramon I (1018-1035) and the regency of the  dowager Countess Ermessenda. The Peace and Truce, however, amounted to more than responses to political disorder. The church did not seize power during a period of waning secular authority. Rather, the bishops, most notably Oliba of Vic, continued to rule in concert with the House of Barcelona, part of the inner circle of Ermessenda's regency, and part of the old guard (a group that included Gombau of Besora and Ermessenda), whose ideas on rulership rested on the merging of ecclesiastical and secular legitimacy.(58) Truce added new tools of enforcement but did not detract from the basic ideology of political control. To guarantee civil peace by enlisting the spiritual weapons of the church was a fundamental idea whose origins were Carolingian, Visigothic, and Roman.
The Truce must not be thought of,
therefore, as a desperate measure designed to substitute spiritual for
secular enforcement of order; rather, it assumed that the two powers should
act in concert. Above all, the Truce and Peace preserved the distinction
between public and private forms of coercion, underscoring difference between
private warfare and the use of violence in the defense of the commonwealth.
There remained a qualitative and spiritual difference between feudal conflict
and the exercise of political supremacy by a partnership of the count and
In the early centuries of the Catalan counties, it sould now be apparent, the church functioned as an aspect of a legitimate public authority. It was not simply the tool of the counts' private interest but a power in its own right, one whose influence overlapped with that of the state in matters of taxation, coinage, frontier defense, and internal peace. The most powerful example of the overlapping role of the church is the career of Bishop Oliba, the greatest in a series of strong eleventh-century bishops of Vic.(59) Oliba was a member of the Cerdanya-Besalú line of the House of Barcelona. His father, Count Oliba Cabreta, died peacefully at Monte Cassino after the cares of a turbulent life in the secular  world, leaving three sons to share the title of count (a fourth, Berenguer, was already bishop of Elne). Oliba, who was drawn to the contemplative life, entered Ripoll as an ordinary monk in 1002 and ceased to call himself a count. Abadal believes that his decision to enter Ripoll was inspired by an instance of the typical confusion of roles during this period, the edifying death of the Venetian Doge Pietro Orseolo at the Pyrenean monastery of Cuixà in 998 and the violent death of Oliba's brother, Bishop Berenguer of Elne, at the hands of the Moors at Albesa in 1003.(60)
Oliba became abbot of Ripoll in 1008 and was elected abbot of Cuixà in the same year. He was appointed bishop of Vic in 1018, probably because of his friendship with Ermessenda, the wife of Count Ramon Borrell.(61) As bishop, Oliba was able to mediate between his family and the senior branch of the House of Barcelona and to heal the frequent disputes between Ermessenda and her son and grandson. Oliba's harmonious relations with powerful laymen are also evident in his alliance with Guillem de Mediona, whom he invested with most of the cathedral's frontier castles, and in the creation and strengthening of the Truce of God.
Oliba's pontificate lasted until 1046 and was a time of notable artistic, spiritual, and political accomplishments. These were made possible by a partnership with magnates and princes that typified - in this case, favorably -- the conditions of the church before the Gregorian reform. Even while Oliba defended the possessions of his church against lay usurpation, he remained very much a member of the ruling family; his favorite nephew appears to have been Guifré, archbishop of Narbonne from ca. 1019 to 1079, who was, already in Oliba's lifetime, notorious for his militantly unreformed behavior.(62)
Oliba's inspiration may have been unique, but it is worth realizing that his energy was not. Despite the obvious drawbacks to the Catalan proprietary church system, it managed to produce bishops of skill and accomplishment who defended the rule of the counts and the authority of their own church. What was unusual about Oliba, who was otherwise so typical of the alliance of church and count, was his personal sanctity and calmness of character.
THE PONTIFICATE OF BERENGUER DE LLUÇA
Oliba was succeeded by his nephew Guillem de Balsareny (1046-1076), who continued who continued the policies of alliance with the count and concern for public order. The apogee of the church of Vic, or at least the height of its pretensions, was achieved during the incumbency of Berenguer Seniofred de Lluçà (1076-1099), known to later generations as simply "the archbishop," for he was titular archibishop of Tarragona after 1091.(63) The title would die with him, as would Vic's direct role in Catalonia's expansion. The association of the archepiscopal title with Berenguer serves as a nostalgic symbol of a time of overreaching grandeur.
On one level, Berenguer's career marks the continuation and fulfillment of policies historically identified with the bishops of Vic: close alliance with the House of Barcelona and with important magnates, separation of the Catalan dioceses from Narbonne, and activity on the frontier. There was, however, a radical difference between Berenguer's dominance within the government of Barcelona and the conservative inclinations of his predecessors, for Berenguer was more than a mediator for the count or his responsible but passive supporter. During the difficult reign of Berenguer Ramon II (1076-1097), who was considered responsible for his brother's murder in 1082, Bishop Berenguer acted, in effect, as a regent.
The church's accelerated involvement in secular affairs reflected the difficulties of the count, but it was also a consequence of the papacy's increased activity to further the effort of reform. The earlier, occasional, friendly contacts between Vic and Rome were replaced by frequent communication and papal intervention to create a program linking reform to reconquest. The accession of Bishop Berenguer coincided with the first excommunication of Emperor Henry IV by Pope Gregory VII, the beginning of the Investiture Conflict. The bishop of Vic would henceforth be identified with such aspects of spiritual reform as the imposition of a common, disciplined life on cathedral clergy. Berenguer also became involved in the direction of the government of the county of Barcelona, in keeping with the belief of  Pope Gregory that all of Spain belonged by right to the Holy See.(64) A tradition of secular and ecclesiastical cooperation was replaced by the supremacy of the latter partner.
Berenguer's activism was most evident in the campaign to restore the metropolitan see of Tarragona.(65) Berenguer worked ceaselessly to persuade the pope of the justice and feasibility of restoration and to cajole the count and nobility into undertaking a military effort to seize and hold the deserted city, which lay exposed on the plain separating Christians from Moslems. Several years of persuasion culminated in the official restoration of Tarragona in 1089 and the bestowal of the archepiscopal title on Berenguer in 1091.(66) The military campaign started as well in 1091. Tarragona was captured but never secured. Berenguer lived to see the unraveling of his plans following the Almorávid counterattack of 1096, although the final debacle over Tarragona would come only in 1104.(67) In 1118, a new effort launched under the direction of the count and the bishop of Barcelona, Saint Oleguer,(68) though encountering its own frustrations, succeeded in freeing Tarragona permanently from Islam and eventually extended the conquest to Tortosa. Vic would be only minimally involved in this later struggle.
It is important to consider Bishop Berenguer's ambitions in terms of their novelty. Although Berenguer built on Bishop Ató's aborted scheme of 971 to eliminate the trans-Pyrenean control over the Catalan church,(69) Ató had envisaged no more than separation from Narbonne, not the conquest of Tarragona. He would have exalted Vic itself by making it substitute for occupied Tarragona, much as Santiago de Compostella would in 1120 be allowed to assume the earlier supremacy of Mérida.(70) Ató would have been archiepiscopus Ausonensis.
Berenguer, on the other hand, desired the complete restoration of the old see, not merely the exaltation of Vic's ambitions or a practical accommodation to political and military conditions. After 1091 Berenguer was archiepiscopus Tarraconensis, an achievement indicating his personal might more than the prestige of Vic. Berenguer launched a new movement to seize Tarragona, a crusade that blended spiritual rewards and violence, organized  knights in a fashion that anticipated the military orders, and was closely watched by the papacy -- all attributes of the forthcoming great crusades in the Holy Land.(71) Although fruitful in creating some of the institutions used in later Hispanic wars, Berenguer's crusade was nevertheless a révolution manquée as far as Vic was concerned. Berenguer did not want to exalt Vic, but neither did the diocese escape the consequence of the frustration of his plans, namely, a separation between the interest of the diocese and that of the count of Barcelona more radical than any seen before. The collapse of the crusade discredited Berenguer personally and ended the tradition of alliance between the bishop of Vic and the count.
The consequences of Berenguer's ambitions must be understood in connection with the influence of the Gregorian reform and the scandal created by the murder of Ramon Berenguer II. Between 1082 and 1097, from the murder until the abdication of the suspected fratricide, Count Berenguer Ramon II, ecclesiastical guidance of the state reached its height. Whether Berenguer Ramon was directly responsible for his brother's murder or not, his subsequent behavior was that of a penitent, and he gave up much of his executive power. Bishop Berenguer headed a regency council set up in 1085 while Ramon Berenguer III, the son of the murdered count, was growing up. Under the guidance of the bishop of Vic, Catalonia experienced an unprecedented degree of papal intervention, culminating in the act of 1090 by which Berenguer Ramon II, encouraged by the bishop, donated to the pope his share of what would have been the partitioned inheritance of Ramon Berenguer I had the murder not taken place.(72) Subbordination to Rome was part of a trend to make real the papal claims to Spain. Sancho Ramírez had placed Aragón in obedience to Rome in 1068, and Bernat II had donated Besalú to the pope in 1077.(73)
Even more significant than the donation of counties was the hegemony that monasteries in southern France achieved over Catalan houses in the name of reform. Especially active in the eastern part of Spain were the monasteries of Saint Pons de Thomières and Saint Victor de Marseilles.(74) In the years of the  count's penance, two of the most powerful men in Catalonia were the papal emissaries Frotard, abbot of Saint Pons, and Richard, abbot of Saint Victor. The remarkable generosity of the Catalan government encouraged these monasteries to forge networks of subordinate foundations, including such venerable houses as Ripoll, Sant Benet de Bages, and Cuixà.(75) Berenguer of Vic was closely identified with the expansion of the French monasteries, just as he was also the voice of reform for local churches and a supporter of papal intervention. Some of Berenguer's plans were judicious, particularly the encouragement he gave to the congregation of Saint Ruf at Avignon to undertake to bring a genuine communal life to Catalan cathedral and collegiate chapters.(76) In this case the missionary zeal of Saint Ruf did not become obscured by the aggrandizement of its influence, but in the expansion of the French monasteries an aggressive colonialism tarnished the reputation of the monasteries and their supporters, notably Bishop Berenguer.
The leading opponent of French expansion within the church was Bishop Bernat of Barcelona, himself an Augustinian trained at Saint Ruf.(77) Bernat bitterly resisted the attempt of Abbot Frotard to annex Sant Llorenç del Munt to Saint Pons de Thomières, going so far as to ally with the archbishop of Narbonne, the most implacable opponent of the papacy and of reform in the area. Alliance with Narbonne also led the bishop of Barcelona to oppose the Tarragona reconquest. Narbonne was eager to prevent the dismemberment of its jurisdiction, and Bernat looked with little favor upon the ambitions of the bishop of Vic, whose territory would surround the diocese of Barcelona if the reconquest were successful.
Despite the obstacles in his way, Berenguer persuaded the pope that Tarragona could be effectively restored. In 1091, once military support had rallied and after the count had pledged his vassalage, Pope Urban II placed Tarragona in Vic's tutelage. Berenguer might now style himself archbishop of Tarragona, a fragile title despite its resounding grandeur, dependent as it was on the success of a difficult military venture and the repression of strong domestic opposition.(78)
 The course of the crusade is difficult to reconstruct. When the Christian army entered Tarragona is unknown, as are the institutions set up there, if any, and what efforts were made to repopulate the town. It was one thing to seize a deserted city near the border, quite another to hold it securely. Exposed to attack from hills to its south, the Plain of Tarragona could only be safe if the conquest extended as far as Tortosa, something not achieved until 1148. Although Tarragona was occupied by 1092, its fate remained uncertain until the Almorávid attacks forced a retreat in 1105. Even before this date it was clear that the the crusade was in peril.(79)The Almorávid success against Castile in 1097 undermined the Tarragona project, but the deciding factor in the failure was the attainment of majority by Ramon Berenguer III and his break with the former regent, Archbishop Berenguer.
According to Santiago Sobrequés, a new policy was established when Ramon Berenguer III came to power, a policy that ended the humiliating subordination to the church by expelling the French monks and winding down the Tarragona crusade.(80) The papacy acquiesced and sent a new legate, the archbishop of Toledo, who had opposed the Tarragona campaign and the efforts of Vic to supervise it.
Lawrence McCrank doubts that any such revisionist policy existed.(81) He notes that the Tarragona crusade was not completely abandoned, that Ramon Berenguer III supported Berenguer of Vic in a dispute with the Queralt family over tithes, and that the councils of Girona (1097) and Vic (1098) show no evidence of hostility between the church and the count. Yet it is difficult to deny that after 1097 Berenguer de Lluçà was considerably less active or important than he had been before Ramon Berenguer III ruled. McCrank believes the waning of Berenguer's star may have owed more to ill health than to disgrace.(82)
More likely, perhaps, than a spectacular break between count and bishop is a polite dissociation. In Vic itself the immediate result of the transition of 1097 was a sudden decline in episcopal power over the town. This took place despite the presence of Archbishop Berenguer, who spent his last years, until his death  in 1099, reforming the chapter and attempting to repel threats to episcopal lordship. His activity indicates his continued competence and energy, but it also suggests a crisis in his power, probably due to lack of support on the part of the count. This indifference, if not outright hostility, would characterize the attitude of the counts toward the bishops of Vic through the entire twelfth century.
Berenguer's efforts to reform the cathedral chapter at Vic had started earlier, between 1080 and 1090. He tried to correct the manner of life of his canons by first expelling them all and then allowing back those who sincerely desired to amend their behavior.(83) A second reform effort, launched in 1098 at a council held at Vic, over which the papal legate, the archbishop of Toledo, presided,(84) redistributed the wealth of the chapter to benefit the communal property by confiscating the possessions of certain higher capitular offices. In return for the increase in capitular property, the ordinary canons were to live communally. The bishop increased the chapter's wealth by contributing revenues from the market of Vic, but this significant alienation of what had been an episcopal monopoly established an unfortunate precedent. Guillem Ramon de Taradell, master of a castle slightly to the south of Vic, obtained the right to receive a portion of the money coined at Vic, to be held in fealty to the chapter.(85) This was an intrusion of private claims against what had previously been a clear exercise of church lordship. That Guillem Ramon de Taradell held his revenue as a grant from the chapter shows that Berenguer probably had granted his canons part of the coinage earlier, perhaps simultaneously with the grant of market revenue.(86)
Another alienation, known only from a later document, was made by Bishop Berenguer to his family, the lords of Lluçà, whose seat was a castle northwest of Vic. In 1104 grants made earlier to the Lluçà were renewed by Bishop Arnau, but the document leaves unclear the terms of the previous transaction.(87) Berenguer almost certainly alienated income from protected territories (baiuliae) in the diocese and gave the Lluçà the right to guard the episcopal palace; the renewal of 1104 specifies these as  already established. It is also likely that the right mentioned in 1104 for the Lluçà to use the mint to coin twenty sous' worth of silver reflects an earlier gift. It is impossible to tell if the share of judicial profits and the toll on pigs entering the market were additions made in 1104, or if they represented Berenguer's arrangements.(88)
Without strong comital support, the prerogatives of the church were undermined during Berenguer's last years. Further erosion of the cathedral's position resulted from a three-year interregnum following Berenguer's death, a time of crisis for the diocese and of continued indifference on the count's part.(89) Under Bishop Arnau (1102-1109), judicial rights, tolls, and market revenues were partially or totally controlled by the Taradell, the Lluçà, and the seneschals of the count of Barcelona. During this time several episcopal castles similarly passed out of church control.
What caused this sudden dismantling? Odilo Engels says that once the idea of divisibility was applied to such former monopolies as coinage revenue (that is, once something was perceived as allodial property rather than public right), the aristocracy would demand a share.(90) While episcopal rights were seen as an exercise of public authority, no challenge would be mounted. But in giving part of his income to the canons in 1098, the bishop indicated that church property was as divisible as that of nobles, hence fair game for the magnates' ambitions.
It is more likely that, given the opportunity, families such as the Taradell would not have stood on legal distinctions of this sort and would have asserted themselves before any ideological change encouraged them to do so. The real opportunity was offered by the bishop's weak position. Berenguer may even have felt some physical danger; hence the palace guard provided by his relatives.
The sudden decline in the power of the bishop and the apparent unwillingness of the count to proffer aid tend to confirm Sobrequés's belief. there was a coldness between the count and the elderly "archbishop of Tarragona." If there was a quarrel, it would not have been the first between a bishop of Vic and his count and need not have had permanent consequences. What  made the isolation of Vic last so long was a change in the nature of comital authority. The count relied less on churches of independent traditions such as Vic and more on the local see of Barcelona. Moreover, the counts were able to govern with less reliance on the church altogether.(91) The twelfth-century counts still made use of the heritage of merged spiritual and secular rule, but they were more firmly under the guidance of secular administration. The old practice of delegating sweeping secular rights was abandoned in favor of a more closely supervised partnership, one that did not involve the now peripheral diocese of Vic. Moreover, the count no longer depended on the legitimacy conferred by alliance with the church. Even before the death of Ramon Berenguer I, the count was taking over the Peace and Truce of God and binding the social fabric of the county by aristocratic forms of personal loyalty in place of ecclesiastical definitions or Carolingian traditions of mixed rulership.(92)
The aristocratic rebellions of 1020 to 1050 erased the distinction between the public power of the counts and the private sway exerted by the nobility. The rebellions did not destroy the counts' power so much as demonstrate its weak foundations. Catalonia belatedly embarked on a course of political fragmentation similar to that endured by northern Europe since the ninth century. The conservative advisors of Countess Ermessenda (including Bishops Oliba and Guillem of Vic) were unable to restore the strength of the count by reasserting Carolingian notions of sanctified rule or even by means of the Peace and Truce councils. The restoration of authority took place under Ramon Berenguer I, who imitated the practice of the aristocrats. The count ceased to emphasize unique sovereignty, except in receiving the tribute of Islamic client states. He based his power on personal loyalty and a network of castles, bought by the tribute money, which replaced earlier symbols of public control, such as judicial monopolies. The church, whose members had guarded the distinction between public and private, was less necessary when the count's own power became a form of private sway writ large.
By 1060 the adaptation of aristocratic methods was in place, but the circumstances of the late eleventh century temporarily  obscured it. If the meekness of Berenguer Ramon II and the intervention of the papacy restored and even expanded the power of the Catalan church, the underlying shift remained and became manifest after 1097. More than any other Catalan diocese, Vic both preserved the traditions of nonaristocratic authority and overextended itself in the heady atmosphere of the years around 1090. Its fall from grace was quite pronounced after 1097, and there were long-term as well as immediate reasons for this.
The church of Vic entered the twelfth
century with the shock of sudden disfavor still in effect. In the terse
expression of Paul Kehr, Vic was "im Schatten gestellt" and would remain
so throughout the century.(93) The reasons
for this obscurity should now be clear. In part, the specific consequences
of Berenguer's excessive ambition were responsible. More gradual and irresistible
was the change in the basis of comital power and the ability of the ruler
to ignore the church except in areas that he could not easily control.
Finally, the movement of the frontier sealed the isolation of Vic. After
so many failed attempts, the frontier was extended in the renewed Tarragona
campaign of 1118, the Plain of Tarragona was repopulated late in the succeeding
decade, and the pace of conquest radically accelerated with the fall of
Lleida and Tortosa. At this point Vic was clearly behind the lines, and
although, as will be demonstrated, it was not in a condition of stagnation,
it was removed from the center of political attention. Yet it was not exclusively
the movement of the frontier that created Vic's isolation. By 1100 Vic
was a post-frontier society, even though its political boundaries had not
changed. Until 1200 the bishop and canons would be on their own.
1. Joseph F. O'Callaghan, A History of Medieval Spain (Ithaca and London, 1975), pp. 102, 106.
2. For this period, see Abadal, La plana de Vic.
3. On Aizo's rebellion, see Salrach, El procés, 1:73-90.
4. Abadal, Els primers comtes, pp. 77-78; Bonnassle, La Catalogne,1:99-106; Ordeig, Els orígens històrics, pp. 24-36.
5. See, for example, the arguments for the persistence of cultivation in northwest Iberia in Alberto Sampaio, "As villas do norte de Portugal," in his collected Estudios históricos e económicos (Oporto, 1923), 1:131-162; Dan Stanislawski, The Individuality of Portugal: A Study in Historical-Political Geography (Austin, 1959), pp. 149-151.
6. Odilo Engels, "Die weltliche Herrschaft des Bischofs von Ausona-Vich (869-1315)," GAKS 24 (1968), 4.
7. Robert-Henri Bautier, "La prétendue dissidence de l'episcopat catalane et le faux concile de 'Portus' de 887-890," Bulletin philologique et historique, année 1961 (1963), 477-498.
8. Ibid., pp. 494-495.
9. Catalunya carolingia, vol. 2: Els diplomes carolingis a Catalunya, ed.R. d'Abadal i de Vinyals, pt. 2 (Barcelona, 1952), pp. 293-296; Diplomatari de la Catedral de Vic, segles IX-X, ed. E. Junyent, in fascicles (Vic, 1980-), no. 12. See also O. Engels, Schutzgedanke und Landesherrschafi im östlichen Pyrendenraum (9.-13. jahrhundert) (Münster, 1970), p. 41. R.-H. Bautier, in his edition of Recueil des actes d'Eudes, roi de France (888-898) (Paris, 1967), pp. 20-29, shows how much of the charter is genuine.
10. ACA, Canc., perg. Guifré II, 3, and another version, ACV, c. 9, Ep. 1, 23. Both appear in Diplomatari de la Catedral de Vic, ed. Junyent, no. 55.
11. Catalunya carolingia, ed. Abadal, vol 2, pt. 2, p. 300. The document has not survived and may never have existed.
12. Ordeig, Els orígens històrics, p. 79.
13. Tons and Montbui were granted in 970 (ES, 28:94); one-half of Miralles in 987 (LFM, 1:no. 268); the other half in 992 (ES, 28:103-104); l'Espelt in 996 (VL, 6:ap. 27).
14. A comparison noted by Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 1:130-131.
15. Ibid., 1:136-144.
16. On the Visigothic emphasis on respect for law, see Jean Devisse, Hincmar, archevêque de Reims, 845-882, 3 vols. (Geneva, 1975-1976), 2:698-702; Marc Reydellet, "La conception du souverain chez Isidore de Séville," in Manuel Díaz y Díaz, ed., Isidoriana: Collección de estudiossobre Isidoro de Sevilla, publicados con ocasión del XIV Centenario de su nacimiento (León, 1961), pp. 457-466. On Visigothic background to church-state cooperation in early Catalonia, see Engels, Schutzgedanke, pp. 47-48.
17. Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 1:144-203.
18. Ibid., 1:132-136.
19. Ibid., 1:183-203.
20. François Louis Ganshof, "Louis the Pious Reconsidered," History
42 (1957), 171-180; Hans H. Anton, Fürstenspiegel und Herrscherethos in der Karolingerzeit (Bonn, 1968), pp. 56-65, 404-419; Devisse, Hincmar, 2:671-723, esp. pp. 709-723.
21. Cf. Magnou-Nortier, La société laïque, p. 315.
22. The title of a book by Emile Amann and Auguste Dumas, published in 1940 as vol. 7 of Histoire de I'Église, depuis les origines jusqu'a nosjours, ed. Augustin Fliche and Victor Martin.
23. R. d'Abadal, L'abat Oliba, bisbe de Vic i la seva época, 3rd ed. (Barcelona, 1962), reprinted in Abadal, Dels Visigots, 2:141-277. Pages 202-203 of the reprint provide a list of bishops who were members of the comital family. The territory ruled by the counts of Cerdanya-Besalú was divided among the ecclesiastical provinces of Elne, Girona, Urgell, and Vic. An abortive attempt to create a bishop of Besalú was made in 1017; see Johannes Josef Bauer, "Rechtsverhältnisse der katalanischen Köster von der Mitte des 10. Jahrhunderts bis zur Einfilhrung des Kirchenreform," GAKS 22 (1965), 95-104; Paul Kehr, "Das Papsttum und der katalanischen Prinzipät bis zur Vereinigung mit Aragon," Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophische-historische Klasse (1926), pp. 19-21. In Languedoc the vicomital families supplied the region's bishops; see Magnou-Nortier, La société laïque, pp. 344-348.
24. Magnou-Nortier, La société laique, pp. 447-518; Fletcher, TheEpiscopate, pp. 1-26.
25. Count Sunyer died at La Grasse in 950 (Abadal, L'abat Oliba, p.164). Count Oliba Cabrera of Cerdanya-Besalú died as a monk at Monte Cassino in 990 (Abadal, Els primers comtes, p. 293). Count Guifré II of Cerdanya died at Canigou in 1050 (Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages, p. 22).
26. Abadal, L'abat Oliba, p. 198.
27. Abadal, Els primers comtes, p. 311.
28. Santiago Sobrequés i Vidal, Els grans comtes de Barcelona, 2nd ed.
(Barcelona, 1970), p. 21.
29. Abadal, L'abat Oliba, p. 160.
30. Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 1:99-106; Joan Vilà Valentí, El món rural
a Catalunya (Barcelona, 1973), pp. 31-32; André Dupont, "Considérations sur la colonisation et la vie rurale dans le Roussillon et le Marche d'Espagne au IXe siècle, " Annales du Midi 67 (1955), 223-245.
31. Vilà Valenti, El món rural, pp. 25-32. Archibald Lewis notes, however, that many grants to settle land were made not to individual peasants but to mounted knights, who were given large tracts; see Lewis, "Land and Social Mobility in Catalonia, 778-1213," in Geschichte in der Gesellschaft: Festschrift für Karl Bosl zum 65. Geburtstag (Stuttgart, 1974), p. 315. Lewis also states that a large number of peasants were in possession of allodial holdings, especially in Ausona, tending to confirm the impression that an unofficial movement existed along with the official settlement policy.
32. Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 1:86-91.
33. Abadal, L'abat Oliba, p. 238.
34. For example, the archdeacons Sunyer and Adalbert held the castles of Meda and Vilagelans, respectively, during the early eleventh century (ACV, c. 6, 816 ).
35. On the hard conditions obtaining in the west, see Josep Igléslas i Fort, La reconquesta a les valls de I'Anoia i el Gaià (Barcelona, 1963), pp. 16-18. Other ecclesiastical establishments turned to lay entrepreneurs to defend their castles; for example, Sant Cugat enlisted the knight Isnabert (Abadal, L'abat Oliba, p. 231). Isnabert was not, however, associated with the monastic community.
36. See Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, 6:996, for levitae as deacons or subdeacons. Spanish inscriptions of the tenth century use levita and diaconus interchangeably; see Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie, vol. 8, pt. 2, p. 2996.
37. Clerical levitae include Pere Berenguer de Balenyà, levita and sacristan, who first appears in 1138 (ACV, c. 6, 2232), made his will in 1181 (ACV, LD, f. 38v), and died in the same year (ACV, Martirologi I, f. 110); and Pere, levita and provost, whose first subscription is in 1145 (ACV, c. 6, 2313). His will was made in 1158 (ACV, LD, f. 16v). He was still active in 1162 (ACV, c. 6, 2360).
38. Mons. Junyent called attention to the levitae in conversations with me and with others. Unfortunately, he wrote almost nothing about them. There is a brief notice on them in his article "Vich" in the DHEE, 4:2752.
39. Marca Hispanica, sive Limes Hispanicus . . . . ed. Pierre [Petrus] de
Marca (Paris, 1688), col. 448: "Tum Canonicii Ausonenses addicti erant vitae canonicae. Quare mirum valde est fuisse inter eos Canonicum conjugatum. Sed id tamen insuetum non fuit ea tempestate in hiis regionibus."
40. ACV, c. 9, Ep. II, 16.
41. ACV, c. 9, Ep. II, 30. At the same time, Guillem gave up his castle of Aguilar, near Vic, but he continued to hold it in fealty to the church (Abadal, L'abat Oliba, p. 240). The same desire to secure castles close to home in preference to those on the frontier is apparent in the exchange made by the monastery of Sant Cugat, giving up the frontier castle of Gelidas in return for the nearer and more secure Mazquefa (Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 1:102).
42. These rebellions are discussed below, pp. 26-27, 36.
43. For the importance of the Gurb-Queralt, see Bonnassie, La Catalognc, 1:290; Albert Benet i Clarà, "La familia de Gurb-Queralt (956-1276)" (Tesi de Llicenciatura d'història medieval, Universitat de Barcelona, 1978).
44. Antoni Pladevall, Ermessenda de Carcassona, Comtessa de Barcelona, Girona i d'Osona: Esbós biogràfic en el mil.lenari del seu naixement (Barcelona, 1975), p. 54.
45. Examples of lay canons commemorated in the necrologies of the chapter can be found in ACV, Martirologi I f. 74v: "iiii idus iulii. Eodem die obiit Bernardus de Castellar, laicus et Sancti Petri canonicus, pro quo Deum fratres rogemus ut el misereri dignetur"; f. 96: "x kalendas septembris. Eodem die obiit Carbonellus de Tona, laicus et canonicus Sancti Petri, qui de suo proprio alodio nostram benigniter ditauit ecclesiam, pro quo Deum fratres rogemus." Burial rights are inferred from a later indication that lay confratres of the chapter had a special place in the ecclesiastical cemetery; ACV, Martirologi I, f. 44: "vii. kalendas maii. Ipso die fuit interfectus Bernardus de Meda, miles clarus ac nobilis, qui predia cum rebus huic dimisit ecclesie, sepultus in cimiterio nouo ubi requiescunt huius loci confratres, anno Domini M.oCoxloVo. pro quo Dominum exoremus ut semper sit ei miseretus." Although the cemetery itself was new, it is likely that earlier cemeteries had also included a place for conftatres or lay canons.
46. On lay picty in the eleventh century, see H.E.J. Cowdrey, The Cluniacs and the Gregorian Reform (Oxford, 1970), pp. 121-128.
47. On penance and the crusade spirit, see Hans Eberhard Mayer, The Crusades, trans. John Gillingham (Oxford, 1972; orig. publ. Stuttgart, 1965), pp. 25-40. For early confraternities in Catalonia, see Lawrence J. McCrank, "The Foundation of the Confraternity of Tarragona by Archbishop Oleguer Bonestruga, 1126-1129," Viator 9 (1978), 157-177. For the military orders, see Peter Schickl, "Die Entstehung und Entwicklung des Templerordens in Katalonien und Aragon," GAKS 28 (1975), 91-228; A. J. Forey, The Templars in the Corona de Aragón (London, 1973).
48. For the career of "El noble Sala" see Vila Valentí, El món rural, pp. 13-16.
49. Examples of women commemorated as canons include ACV, Martirologi I, f. lllv: "xii. kalendas octobris. Item ipso die obiit Aledis de Clochario, canonica Sancti Petri cui sit requies"; f. 128v: "nonas novembris. Eodem die obiit Adaledis de Rieria, canonica Sancti Petri cui sit requies, in anno Domini MCXCV." The collegiate church of Solsona in the diocese of Urgell also associated men and women with the chapter; see Manuel Riu, "La canònica de Santa Maria de Solsona. Precedents medievals d'un bisbat modern," Urgellia 2 (1979), 223, 236-237.
50. ACV, Martirologi I, f. 35v. Similar terminology was used at Solsona (Riu, "La canònica," p. 236).
51. On the Peace and Truce movement in Catalonia, see Hartmut Hoffmann, Gottesftiede und Treuga Dei, vol. 20 of MGH, Schriften (Stuttgart, 1964), pp. 73-79; E. Junyent, La pau i treva (Barcelona, 1975); Thomas N. Bisson, Conservation of Coinage: Monetary Exploitationand Its Restraint in France, Catalonia, and Aragon (c. A.D. 1000-c. 1225) (Oxford, 1979), pp. 45-64; Pierre Ponsich, "Oliba et la trêve de Dieu," CSMC 3 (1972), 31-42; Karen Kennelly, "Catalan Peace and Truce Assemblies," Studies in Medieval Culture 5 (1975), 41-51.
52. Its acts are recorded in P. de Marca, De Concordia sacerdoti et imperii (Paris, 1704), col. 435-437. Its originality is noted by Anselm Albareda, L'abat Oliva, fundador de Montserrat (971[?]-1046) (Montserrat, 1931), p.146, and Abadal, L'abat Oliba, p. 265.
53. Hoffmann, Gottesfriede, p. 74. Junyent, La pau, p. 19, believes this earlier council took place in 1022.
54. Hoffmann, Gottesfriede, p. 260.
55. Ibid., pp. 73-79.
56. Jean-Pierre Poly, La Provence et la société féodale (879-1166): Contribution à l'étude des structures dites féodales dans le Midi (Paris, 1976), pp. 194-204. The errors in dating are described on pp. 197-199 (note 157).
57. Ibid., pp. 194-199, esp. P. 195, note 142: "L'idée de la trêve revient peut-être à Oliba. Mais nous nous occupons ici de sa réalisation...."
58. Pladevall, Ermessenda, pp. 40-54. The Peace was less a new invention than an outgrowth of Carolingian traditions of secular cooperation with the church. See E. Magnou-Nortier, "La place du Concile de Puy (v. 994) dans 1'évolution de l'idée de paix, " in Mélanges offerts a Jean Dauvillier (Toulouse, 1979), pp. 489-506.
59. On Oliba, see Albareda, L'abat Oliva; Abadal, L'abat Oliba; E. Junyent, Esbós biogràfic: commemoració mil.lenària del naixement de I'abat-bisbe Oliba (Montserrat, 1971); Diplomatari d'Oliba, comte, abat i bisbe, ed. Junyent (forthcoming); Esteve Albert i Carp, L'obra social i política de l'abat-bisbe Oliba (Barcelona, 1966).
60. Abadal, L'abat Oliba, pp. 172-174.
61. Ibid., pp. 206-207.
62. Ibid., p. 259. Guifré, notorious for his violence and rapacity, was a symbol to the Gregorian reform of the evils of simony. A revised estimate of his character is given in Magnou-Nortier, La société laïque, pp. 463-474.
63. The only full study of Berenguer is that of A. Pladevall, "Berenguer Seniofred de Lluçà, obispo de Vich y arzobisbo de Tarragona (1076-1099)" (Ph.D.diss., Université catholique de Louvain, 1963). I have not seen this work, which, according to its author, is now lost.
64. La documentación pontificia hasta Inocencia III (965-1216), ed. Demetrio Mansilla, vol. 1 of Monumenta Hispaniae (Rome, 1955), nos. 6, 13.
65. Berenguer's central role in this effort is the subject of an excellent study by L. McCrank, "Restauración canónica e intento de reconquista de la sede Tarraconense, 1076-1108," Cuadernos de historia de España 61-62 (1977), 145-245.
66. The bull of 1089 announcing the pope's intention to restore Tarragona is JL 5401. The title was conferred on Berenguer by JL 5450. On the maneuvering necessary for Berenguer to achieve his desire, see Kehr, "Das Papsttum," pp. 42-52; McCrank, "Restauración," pp. 147-197.
67. McCrank, "Restauración," pp. 236-243.
68. On the successful reconquest, see L. McCrank, "Restoration and Reconquest in Medieval Catalonia: The Church and Principality of Tarragona, 971-1177" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1974), pp. 290-338; J. lglésias, La restauració de Tarragona (Barcelona, 1963).
69. A quixotic precedent for the attempted restoration of Tarragona was the intrigue of Abbot Cesari of Santa Cecilia de Montserrat (the ancestor of the renowned Santa Maria de Montserrat). Cesari is supposed to have persuaded the Council of Santiago de Compostella in 956 to recognize him as archbishop of Tarragona, but this came to nothing, and he was never acknowledged in Catalonia (R. Abadal, "L'abat Cesari, fundador de Santa Cecilia de Montserrat i pretès arquebisbe de Tarragona. La falsa butlla de Santa Cecilia," in Abadal, Dels Visigots, 2:25-41). McCrank, "Restoration and Reconquest," pp. 78-94, cites a number of reasons for doubting that Cesari ever traveled to Santiago, but he admits that Cesari did arrogate to himself the archepiscopal title.
70. That supremacy was bitterly opposed by Braga and Toledo; see Antonio López Ferreiro, Historia de la Santa A. M. Iglesia de Santiago de Compostela, 11 vols. (Santiago de Compostela, 1898-1909), 4:57-58, 77-89; Peter Feige, "Die Anfänge des portugiesischen Königtums und seiner Landeskirche," GAKS 29 (1978), 313-344.
71. McCrank, "Restauración," pp. 166-169, 219-224.
72. Sobrequés, Els grans comtes, pp. 143-145. McCrank believes there was a purely political motive for the donation, unrelated to any sense of remorse ("Restauración," pp. 185-188). On the count's use of the papacy in building a strong territorial justification for his rule, see Engels, Schutzgedanke, pp. 234-252.
73. McCrank, "Restauración," pp. 185-186.
74. Kehr, "Das Papsttum," pp. 36-40; Anscari Mundó, "Moissac, Cluny et les mouvements monastiques de l'est des Pyrénées du Xe au XIIe siècle," Annales du Midi 75 (1963), 551-570 (translated in Noreen Hunt, ed., Cluniac Monasticism in the Central Middle Ages [London, 1971], pp. 98-122); J. Bauer, "Rechtsverhältnisse der katalanischen Klöster in ihren Klosterverbänden (9.-12. Jahrhundert)," GAKS 23 (1967), 69-130.
75. Ripoll was given by Count Bernat 11 of Besalú in 1070 to St. Victor (Cartulaire de I'Abbaye de Saint-Victor de Marseille, ed. Benjamin Guérard, 2 vols [Paris, 1857], 2:nos. 817, 819; Bauer, "Katalanischen Klöster in ihren Klosterverbänden," pp. 72-77. Sant Benet de Bages was more or less seized by Saint Pons de Thomières in 1075 ( VL, 7:217). Cuixa was obtained by Saint Victor from Count Guillem Ramon of Cerdanya in 1091 (Cart. Saint-Victor, 2:no. 826; Bauer, pp. 90-92).
76. For these reforms, see J. Bauer, "Die vita canonica der katalanischen Kathedralkapitel vom 9. bis zum 11. Jahrhundert," in Homenaje a Johannes Vincke (Madrid, 1962), 1:81-112; idem, "Die vita canonica an den katalanischen Kollegiatkirchen im 10. und 1 1. Jahrhundert," GAKS 21 (1963), 54-82.
77. Kehr, "Das Papsttum, " p. 44.
78. The bull, addressed to the bishop of Ausona, is JL 5450; La documentación pontificia, ed. Mansilla, no. 32.
79. McCrank, "Restauración," pp. 233-236.
80. Sobrequés, Els grans comtes, pp. 163-165.
81. McCrank, "Restauración," pp. 237-239.
82. Ibid., p. 239. A document of 1097 includes a subscription by "Arnau, Bishop of Vic," that may indicate the brief existence of an antibishop while Berenguer was alive (Sobrequés, Els grans comtes, p. 164). McCrank believes it is more likely that the subscription was added later by Arnau de Malla, bishop from 1104 to 1109 ("Restauración," pp. 240-241).
83. ACV. c. 9, Ep. II, 70; ES, 28:ap. 16. Bauer, "Die vita canonica ...Kathedralkapitel," p. 90n, dates this document between 1080 and 1090. The typewritten checklist catalogue of documents from calaix 6 and 9 of ACV gives the date as 1087 or 1088.
84. ACV, c. 9, Ep. II, 91: ES, 28:ap. 19.
85. This grant is known from a later concession to the seneschals of the count (ACV, c. 6, 1977 ; Joseph Gudiol y Cunill, Las monedas episcopals Vigatans: Estudi de las encunyacións que s'han fet en Vich desde'lsigle X al XIV [Vic, 1896], pp. 17-18). The relevant passage reads: "et ipsam dragmam de moneta quam nunc tenet nostra canonica preter duobus solidis plate quos tenet Guillelmus Raimundi de Teradell per feuum canonice iam dicte sicut adquisiuit per Berengarium archiepisopum. " The date of the concession to the Taradell was 1098, according to E. Junyent, in Jurisdiccions i privilegis de la ciutat de Vich, ed. Junyent (Vic, 1969), no. 20.
86. Such is the contention of Engels, "Die weltliche Herrschaft, " p.18. The bull of Urban 11 in 1099, confirming the endowment of the chapter, does not mention coinage among the chapter's rights (JL 5798; VL, 6:ap. 5). At his death, Berenguer left to the chapter the stamping instrument used in making the coins, which implies some capitular right to coinage revenues (ACV, LD, f. 13v ).
87. AME 13, 11 renewed an earlier grant, now lost. The renewal is phrased: "Donat denique idem episcopus eidem Guillelmo .xx. solidos operandos in Uicensi moneta et comendat ei palacium ad custodiendum et ad habitatendum et baiulias quas habet in Ausona sicut solitus erat habere in diebus archiepiscopi, et donet ei terciam partem placitorum uille Uici et in baiulis terciam partem placitorum et quatuor porchos de theloneo Uicensis merchati."
88. The original grant could have been made earlier in Berenguer's pontificate, although there are no traces of such significant intrusions into episcopal monopolies until the end of the century. The right to "guard" the palace was clearly worth having. In 1171 Bishop Pere de
Redorta bought out the Lluçà's rights in this connection for 50 gold morabetins (AME 13, 12, and ACV, LD, f. 9v).
89. Concerning the interregnum and the ephemeral Bishop Guillem (elected but never confirmed), see Appendix 1.
90. Engels, "Die weltliche Herrschaft," pp. 18-19.
91. The shift in the counts' means of political action is described in Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 2:662-680.
92. Ibid., p. 662. In general, on the secular assumption of responsibility for the Peace, see Aryeh Grabois, "De la trêve de Dieu à la paix du roi: Étude sur les transformations du mouvement de la paix au XIIe siécle," in Pierre Gallais and Yves-Jean Riou, eds, Mélanges offerts a RenéCrozet à l'occasion de son 70e anniversaire . . . (Poitiers, 1966), 1:585-596; Jesús Lalinde Abadia, La jursidicción real inferior en Cataluña ("corts, veguers, batlles") (Barcelona, 1966), pp. 69-79.
93. Kehr, "Das Papsttum," p. 50.