DISTRIBUTION OF CHURCH CASTLES
 

[90] The crisis in episcopal control over the town of Vic during the early twelfth century was accompanied by a decline in the other major form of ecclesiastical jurisdiction: power over castles in the diocese of Vic. But whereas the monopoly that the bishop enjoyed over the regalia in Vic was undermined suddenly between 1098 and 1104, the challenge to episcopal castles was more gradual, starting before the cathedral's weakness became apparent with the unraveling of Bishop Berenguer's schemes.

Like the urban regalia, castles were largely gifts made by the counts to exalt the church and to protect the diocese and county of Ausona. Exercise of its possession of the regalia occupied the church almost exclusively in Vic itself, but its castles were distributed throughout the diocese. Those on the frontier were more important to the church than castles on the Plain of Vic. It is in considering episcopal castles that one is most clearly faced with the consequences that occurred when the Islamic frontier moved well beyond Vic. Of course, with or without the frontier, secure possession of the castles depended on the favor of the count. When that ceased after the Tarragona debacle, there could be no effective appeal to the central authority to combat the [92] pretensions of aristocrats and castellans. Even before Bishop Berenguer's death, however, the frontier castles were less posed and thus more tempting targets for domestic usurpation. In addition, before the time of Bishop Berenguer, the counts had begun to control the castles themselves, rather than delegating them to subordinates such as the bishops of Vic.

At different times the bishop owned or was responsible for approximately twenty-five castles. From the re-establishment of the diocese, the ecclesiastical patrimony had included a castle, the fortress of Artés (then on the frontier), possession of which conferred lordship over a surrounding area, a unit of Jurisdiction called a castrum.⁽¹⁾ Particularly in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, as previously noted, the counts gave the bishops of Vic a number of castles at the western edge of the diocese in exchange for military obligations (defensive and offensive) and for ecclesiastical aid in supervising resettlement efforts. It has also been pointed out that the church was not always successful at the latter task, and, in the years near 1020, it appointed knights like Guillem de Mediona to administer the frontier as members of the chapter (levitae).

In addition to the dangerously vulnerable castles of the frontier districts of Anoia and Segarra, the bishop also held castles in more prosperous and settled places. Artés, which by 1000 was no longer on the frontier, remained a lucrative possession. Even on the Plain of Vic, far from immediate danger, the bishop exerted power over a number of castles through chapter members who came from leading families. Castles such as Vilagelans and Meda were held in fidelity to the bishop by dignitaries of the chapter whose families had invested them with a castle at the time of their entrance. The church thereby obtained a permanent claim to the castles, although never a secure possession.⁽²⁾

A distinction must be made between the "outer castles," those on the frontier given by the counts, and the "inner castles" on the Plain of Vic and in the district of the Lluçanès, which were acquired through partnership with local families. In neither area was the bishop always in complete control over his castles. Those on the frontier were subject to the desires of the count; the [93] inner fortresses remained objects of persistent interest on the part of their original owners. The bishop's difficulties in retaining effective sway over castles after 1060 was, therefore, the product of several developments: the changes on the frontier, the count's desire to own castles directly, the usurpation of local magnates, and the complexities of family claims. In Table 2 the outer and inner castles known to have belonged to the bishop between 889 and 1200 are listed with their dates of episcopal control.

Throughout the eleventh century the bishops found it more difficult to retain their castles than to preserve their urban lordship. The threat of Islamic raids and the perils of resettlement induced them to exalt the levitae. To these problems was added the constant temptation for lords of other castles to expand their influence by taking over episcopal fortresses. For both conceptual and tactical reasons, lay lords were more likely to enter into conflict with the church over castles than over urban jurisdiction. They already understood and practiced a form of control over castles, and it was natural for them to seek to extend themselves in this direction rather than to subvert the complex episcopal regalian rights.

Usurpation of castles was therefore a constant problem for the church, long before any shifts in the count's alliances or in the frontier took place. The eleventh-century bishops resisted attacks on their castles by ringing denunciations and threats of excommunication, both backed up, ultimately, by the Peace and Truce of God .⁽³⁾ The church achieved moderate success with this form of defense, and proof of its effectiveness, or at least of its image of competence, is found in the count's concession in 1060 of castles that had belonged to the first seneschal, Amat Eldric. The church was to guard these inner fortresses in its ancient capacity as the repository of public trust and power.⁽⁴⁾

By 1060, however, the count was already trying to keep as many castles for himself as he could. When Ramon Berenguer I finally suppressed the rebellions in 1060, he began to rebuild his power by relying less on old allies like the bishop and the older high aristocracy and more on his subordinates, whom he bound with ties of the sort used by other great lords.⁽⁵⁾ Rather than [99] depending upon his uniqueness as the expression of public right, the count assured loyalty by means of the conveniencia, an agreement by which property (especially castles) was exchanged for loyalty (fortified by an oath).⁽⁶⁾ The count preferred to retain title to his castles, entrusting their guardianship to knights loyal to him alone rather than conferring them on powerful allies (like the church of Vic), however friendly. Using the tribute from the Islamic client states and the forms of aristocratic loyalty, he gathered to himself at least seventeen castles between 1060 and 1076.⁽⁷⁾ Further, in 1065 and 1067 the count bought from the bishop the frontier castles of Copons and Montfalcó (with the latter's subsidiary, Veciana) and the inner castle of Malla.⁽⁸⁾ After 1088 the count's seneschals held Orís, Voltregà, and Solterra. Whatever connection they were supposed to have with episcopal suzerainty was lost by the end of the century: they were part of the lordship of the seneschal, held in loyalty to the count.⁽⁹⁾ Other castles gradually passed out of episcopal influence by means of several quiet forms of usurpation that can be deduced in three ways: when the bishop later had to buy back rights that had been his to begin with (as at the castles of Vilagelans and Eures), where control originally regarded as a usurpation was regularized (Meda), and where the bishop's effective and even theoretical power lapsed without any formal gesture (Miralles).⁽¹⁰⁾

It is difficult to assign a span of years during which the episcopal castles were subject to the greatest degree of subversion. Between 1060 and 1106 the bishop gave up, willingly or not, most of the fortresses to which his claim was tenuous and had to settle for partitioning his rights over others. In cases where his claims were strong, the bishop might still see his former castellan become the effective lord (as at Eures) or acquiesce to the existence of several degrees of command between himself and those actually guarding the fortress (as at Artés).⁽¹¹⁾

By the early twelfth century the bishops exercised only a [100] fraction of their former hegemony over castles. The count himself had taken over several, great families (the seneschals, the Queralt, the Cabrera viscounts of Girona) occupied others, and lesser men rose from positions as mere knights guarding the castles to challenge church control over such places as Eures and Tous. As was the case with urban revenues, however, episcopal castles were not entirely lost, and during the twelfth century certain of them, especially the historic fortresses of Artés and Tous, were vigorously and successfully defended. Again, these successes were accomplished by combining degrees of resistance and compromise appropriate to the individual situation. The church allowed innovations like the convenienciae and other trappings of private oaths of loyalty. It also adapted itself to settling disputes by informal reconciliation of castellans and clerics at a time when formal judicial remedies were nonexistent. As a result, the bishop suffered little net loss after 1110, an impressive achievement in view of the ambitions of his enemies, the indifference of the count, and the difficulty of protecting a dispersed group of important possessions.
 

THE BISHOP'S POWER OVER CASTLES

Eleventh-century castles were the centers of government for the territory surrounding them. The castrum, with the castle at its center, was an administrative unit with known boundaries.⁽¹²⁾ Thus, whereas most documents identify a piece of land by reference to the parish encompassing it, the castrum was well enough defined to serve the same purpose.⁽¹³⁾ The castle was a cohesive entity and not subject to partition, except insofar as the man in charge of it, the castellan, might receive some of the revenue produced in the district.

By the twelfth century, in keeping with the tendency to replace public with private forms of rule, the castle and its rights were subject to division.⁽¹⁴⁾ Such divisions made it nearly impossible for the bishop to maintain his former pre-eminence, but they also afforded room for concession without having to give up an entire territory. It must be emphasized that the change that took place near 1100 was not that secular lords managed to take over episcopal [101] castles outright but that those castles became fiefs in the northern European sense, subject to division into a theoretically infinite variety of rights and revenues. When the bishops of the eleventh century complained against usurpers, they were resisting total invasions, complete takeovers. Controversies in the twelfth century were not over possession of the castle itself but over the incidents of lordship attached to it: the military service owed, the right of the bishop to receive hospitality, and the right to tax those who cultivated land in the castle's environs. In 1174, for example, the bishop of Vic complained that his castellan Ramon de Tous refused to swear loyalty or give hospitality to the bishop and his entourage.⁽¹⁵⁾ At Artés questions arose over what the castellans might demand from farms within the castrum.⁽¹⁶⁾ At both Tous and Artés a distinction was made between that portion of the castrum directly subject to the bishop (his dominicatura)and that land outside his immediate supervision.⁽¹⁷⁾ The eleventh-century castle, essentially a public unit of administration, gave way (much as did the urban jurisdiction of the bishop) to divisible revenue that could be broken up or shared between the bishop and any number of castellans. The details of partition arrangements were established by convenienciae or through disputes and their resultant compromises.

In some cases partition took the form of allowing the bishop occasional use of a fortress. The viscount of Girona in 1106 and 1109 promised the bishop entrance into Vilagelans when he should want it and aid in person or in the form of twenty armed knights when he required help. Yet, although the viscount agreed to assist the bishop as his lord, he in no way implied that Vilagelans was an episcopal castle, and the terms of the agreement were the result of negotiation and concessions by the bishop over other lands in and near Vic.⁽¹⁸⁾ Vilagelans, like many other former episcopal castles, was a source of benefit to the bishop, but not part of his territorial rule. In all of the nominally episcopal castles the bishop enjoyed some power, but lordship was everywhere fragmented and negotiable, and it could not be said that the bishop's power was anywhere absolute. The castle had become a complex of rights shared by the bishop and one or more categories of armed laymen, ranging from grand senyors [102] like the Cabrera and Queralt to the milites and caballerii (knights) who guarded the fortresses.

What did the bishop receive from his castellans? At Tous there were several quarrels over military aid, loyalty, and hospitality during the twelfth century. From Artés the bishop received large revenues from his castrum, which seem to have excited more controversy than did the incidents of military tenure. At some castles military assistance may have been the paramount obligation; at others it was revenue. Our impressions are based on what was disputed and so found its way into surviving documentation, not what was assured.

At Tous the military demands of the bishop are most clearly evident. This frontier castle in the Anoia district was among those given to the bishop in the late tenth century and defended by Guillem de Mediona in the early eleventh. The castle was supposed to provide armed horsemen for the episcopal army and hospitality, especially if the bishop led an expedition beyond the confines of the diocese. In 1174 a dispute between Bishop Pere and Ramon de Tous was sufficiently severe to require the summoning of a tribunal of nobles and clerics, presided over by the archbishop of Tarragona, that heard evidence in unusual solemnity and detail.⁽¹⁹⁾ Ramon refused to swear loyalty, alleging that the bishop had dealt with Ramon's brother in bad faith. The castellan also rejected the right of the bishop to hospitality (alberga) for himself and his retinue. These military matters were part of a complex group of questions that the tribunal, to some extent at least, resolved. The alberga was recognized, and a subsequent agreement, in 1188, confirmed that the bishop had a right to lodge with forty horsemen and their animals at Tous.⁽²⁰⁾

Direct military aid meant contributing armed men to the bishop's army and a promise to aid him and protect his property. Although aid and protection were part of the standard conveniencia, the vagueness of the terms of the contract meant that a specific sacrifice of men or appearance on the castellan's part was never guaranteed. At Vilagelans the bishop could expect twenty mounted knights or the viscount of Girona himself to show up, but most other documents leave unstated precisely what the bishop could demand. In any event, little is known about the [103] military campaigns led by the bishops of Vic. There is only scant evidence of bishops enforcing their will locally with any sort of armed following.

The church itself owed military service to the count of Barcelona. There is no evidence that bishops of Vic sent troops to such important engagements as the siege of Tortosa (for which money was levied instead), but the bishop appears to have led a force to aid the count in 1144 at the siege of Lorca (in Murcia).⁽²¹⁾ Near the end of the century Bishop Guillem de Tavertet participated in King Alfonso's expedition to wrest lands belonging to the monastery of Poblet from their secular usurpers.⁽²²⁾ These campaigns were outside the diocese of Vic, and the bishop was expected to pay his troops for such unusual service. This obligation was in fact the excuse offered by Ramon de Tous in 1174 for refusing to swear loyalty.⁽²³⁾ He claimed that his brother had accompanied the bishop to Lorca but had not been compensated for losses suffered there. Bishop Pere responded that Arnau Pere de Tous had served in the expedition not as a vassal (in which case he would have deserved compensation) but as a private individual in search of plunder and spiritual benefits, hence at his own risk, as was the case of all who took part.⁽²⁴⁾ Ramon de Tous, it should be noted, ultimately agreed to swear loyalty and promised the normal thirty days' military service when summoned.⁽²⁵⁾

In the case of several castles the form of aid in war, although not specified, was sufficiently important to justify expenditure of church revenue. In 1147, at a time when the cathedral's patrimony was so reduced that the proceeds of the high altar were pawned, the bishop concluded an agreement with the brothers Guillem and Pere, castellans of Eures, a small fortress near Vic, by which the bishop obtained use of the castle, received fealty and homage from the brothers, and agreed to make annual payments to them in grain. Eures had once belonged to the bishop but had since passed into the orbit of the Taradell family.⁽²⁶⁾ The castellans promised assistance to the bishop against all save the lord of Taradell, and they even agreed to provide one armed knight in case of a conflict between the bishop and the Taradell.

The Eures arrangement is a useful indication of the bishop's [104] interest in improving his military position rather than in simply defending old claims. Although he had a historic connection with Eures, it was his desire for aid and his eagerness to exploit the strategic position of Eures that led to the agreement of 1147, not the defense of his eleventh-century rights, an effort that would have proved fruitless at this point.

The bishop was an active military leader, although it is difficult to trace his specific campaigns. Castles were necessary to support this military responsibility, and the bishop's desire for castles was constant throughout the twelfth century. In 1101 the ephemeral bishop-elect, Guillem, paid his relative Gerbert Hug sixteen pounds of silver for the castles of Montlleó, Briançó, and Pomar.⁽²⁷⁾ Although they did not long remain episcopal property, the three castles were considered important enough at the time of their purchase to warrant the large sum paid.

Another frustrated expansion involved the castle of Palomera, within the area (in termino) of Lleida. The count gave Palomera to the bishop shortly before Lleida fell to the army of Barcelona in 1149.⁽²⁸⁾ This was one of the few gifts to the church of Vic made by a twelfth-century count, and, as an anachronistic gesture to the old habit of conferring frontier castles on the church, it had little long-term effect. In 1169 Palomera was sold to the seneschal for 200 morabetins and some land in and near Vic.⁽²⁹⁾ Though in 1149 the bishop was still eager for additional castles, as he had been in 1101 and 1147, it was clear by the time of the sale of Palomera that a more prudent policy called for consolidating urban territories rather than struggling over distant military outposts.

The foregoing examples of episcopal interest in castles show the military significance of these fortresses, but wartime assistance was not always the only use for episcopal castles. Several, especially those that the bishop would defend energetically, were important sources of income. Money and produce were at issue at the castle of Tous in the 1180s. An agreement of 1183, renewed with some changes in 1188, confirmed the bishop's right to collect wood, straw, and feed grass from the inhabitants of the castrum of Tous and confirmed his monopoly over wine sold within the castrum between Easter and the seventh of July.⁽³⁰⁾

[105] At Artés military obligations, though significant, were secondary to the money and produce due to the bishop. Documentation for Artés is comparatively rich for the twelfth century, allowing a glimpse of the bishop's policy in dealing with this oldest of his castles.⁽³¹⁾ More than any other castle, Artés was firmly the possession of the bishop of Vic, held since the reestablishment of the medieval diocese. It would still belong to the church in the seventeenth century. Even here, however, rights and revenues in the twelfth century were divided among the bishop, castellans, local lords, and a bailiff.

Ramon Gaufré and Guillem de Guàrdia were clearly castellans, to whom Artés was committed in return for fidelity, aid, and defense. The bishop controlled a part of the castrum directly, an area that constituted his dominicatura. Another part, the honor (or castellania), belonged to the castellan, who divided its revenue with those who garrisoned the castle. Within the honor of the castellan, lucrative income was obtained from dues in kind, judicial fines, and miscellaneous rights such as the alberga.⁽³²⁾ The partition of Artés was never simple or definitive, however. The castellans were limited in their ability to exploit their honores, and, in particular, they were not supposed to levy arbitrary payments from the peasants.⁽³³⁾ Troubles between the bishop and the castellans arose over farms that were apparently the unquestioned possession of neither party but that lay within the castrum of Artés. In 1151 and 1199 particular care was lavished on the chief farms (mansi capitales) of Artés, over which both the bishop and the castellan held rights. The agreement of 1199 includes a long list of farms considered mansi capitales. In each case the castellan, Gulllem de Guàrdia, might levy certain quantities of barley, spelt, chickens, wine, straw, and wood. Provision was made for resolving questions over certain manses that Guillem claimed were mansicapitales, and the immunity of the episcopal dominicatura was reaffirmed.⁽³⁴⁾

We now touch on matters of land tenure, matters that can be avoided because they are not central to the purpose of this discussion.⁽³⁵⁾ What deserves emphasis is the significance of Artés as a source of revenue in addition to its strategic importance. The [106] produce of the mansi capitales alone was substantial, and to it must be added the monopolies, judicial rights, and other banalités collected in the castrum.

Artés also demonstrates how difficult it might be to determine the extent of the bishop's rights. Not only were there conflicting claims between the bishop and the castellans, but outsiders as well might assert some real or fancied right. Arnau de Roca, in 1159, succeeded in establishing his "protection" over Artés (as well as over Montbui and the episcopal palace of Vic), for which he swore an oath to the bishop.

Even in the most securely held episcopal fortress, then, the real problem of the twelfth-century bishops is apparent. Regardless of whether the castle was important by reason of military aid or revenue (or both), episcopal control was hindered by division of rights. The bishop shared the castle not only with the castellan immediately below him but also with several subordinate layers of command that made still more complex the way in which rights over the castrum were partitioned. We shall now turn to these subordinate levels.
 

THE CASTELLANS

The conveniencia by which a castle was commended to a castellan on condition of loyalty was a straightforward arrangement. The castellan received the castle to guard, along with lands and rights within the castrum as a fief. Fidelity and homage followed investiture of the castle and fief. By the twelfth century, however, fidelity and homage were conceptually divorced from castle holding. In imitation of northern European models, fidelity and homage had become personal alliances that might easily exist apart from matters relating to guarding castles.⁽³⁶⁾ Conversely, convenienciae over castles could now be made without any pledge of loyalty.⁽³⁷⁾

Some episcopal castles continued to be held directly from the bishop of Vic, and in those cases fidelity was pledged in the traditional manner. In other instances a conveniencia over a castle might include an oath, but not because that castle was considered the gift of the bishop. At Vilagelans the viscounts of Girona [107] avoided implying that they held the castle from the bishop. They promised the bishop use of the castle when he wished and swore fidelity according to the traditional formula,⁽³⁸⁾ but they did not by this oath recognize any episcopal overlordship for Vilagelans. Their fidelity was personal, not an oath for Vilagelans. It was offered in return for concessions over lands once held from the church by Vilagelans archdeacons of Vic, to whose claims the Cabrera family, viscounts of Girona, had succeeded.

Another example of fidelity divorced from castle holding occurred in regard to the castle of Quer. The powerful senyors of Lluçà performed fidelity and homage, but not for the castle, although it was legally the property of the chapter by reason of the gift of Bishop Berenguer.⁽³⁹⁾ The agreements between the Lluçà and the bishops clearly involved both Quer and personal loyalty, but in a loose, flexible, confusing way, not a neat exchange of one for the other. The usual pattern, by which the person to whom homage was performed kept direct title to the castle, was reversed at Quer. The Lluçà had the castle, but the bishop retained much of the surrounding land as dominicatura. The Lluçà might perform homage, but not as a condition for their occupation of Quer.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Indicative of the variation in twelfth-century practice is that homage was offered once for Quer, in 1167, and was thereafter absent from arrangements that succeeded.⁽⁴¹⁾

The laymen with whom the bishop dealt at Quer and Vilagelans were referred to as castellans but were in fact men of great status from grand families. One would not expect such figures to be tied closely to their lord in the manner of lesser castellans, who actually resided at a castle and guarded it. The word castellan" is a general term that encompasses a variety of ranks within the military class entrusted with castles. Both the great men of the nobility and the actual custodians of the castles were loosely termed "castellan" in contemporary documents.

The highest-level castellans came from such great families as the Queralt and Cabrera. They might have held property in fealty to the bishop of Vic, but they also possessed immense power and property independently. They may be called lords or senyors.⁽⁴²⁾Below them were those who, in accordance with the [108] usage in Catalan documents, will be called castlans;these men, like Ramon de Tous, occupied episcopal castles but dealt directly with the bishop.⁽⁴³⁾ One would also consider as castlans those who guarded the Queralt castles or others belonging to powerful lords. They stood in relation to their lord in a manner similar to that obtaining between Ramon de Tous and the bishop of Vic. Such, for example, were the knights of Gurb, who held the fortress belonging to the Queralt (or formally the Gurb-Queralt) family. This confusion between a castlà and a senyor who shared the same name was common in Catalonia.⁽⁴⁴⁾ We shall call castlans even those men who resided at episcopal castles but who were subordinate to great magnates like the Queralt. The resident guardian of Meda, for example, was a significant power, in his own right, although separated from his ultimate lord, the bishop, by an immediate superior, the senyor of Queralt.⁽⁴⁵⁾ He was a castlà, as opposed to simple knights (milites or cabelers), who had no independent power and were merely members of an armed gang. At Artés there was a resident castlà in 1199, but below him were what the document calls "other castlans."⁽⁴⁶⁾ In complex divisions an intermediary was created who was of lesser status than the Queralt in the case of Meda, but above the ordinary castlà. At Artés this chief castlà functioned as what Bonnassle calls a feudataire.⁽⁴⁷⁾

However complex the distinction among the senyor, feudataire, and castlà, they shared jurisdiction over the castle district and extracted revenue from its peasant population. Below the castlà came knights who had no governing role but who nevertheless represented a further level in the chain of command. These were the cabelers, members of the castle retinue who terrorized the countryside. Their fortunes were tied to their immediate superior, and they had no recognized or hereditary right to exert authority within the castrum. The milites that Guillem de Eures was supposed to furnish the bishop, the cavalarii armati to be provided by the viscount of Girona, and the quartus militum owed by Ramon de Tous were all of this lowest level of knighthood.⁽⁴⁸⁾

The castlà was more secure. Although his tenure was theoretically revocable at his lord's will, it was sufficiently identified [109] with his family to encourage creation of numerous dynasties for this modest level of military service. The Eures, Santa Eugenia, Castellterçol, and Sentfores were families of the Plain of Vic that held castles from nobles such as the Queralt or from the bishop of Vic. They transmitted this service to their children and built a patrimony that served as the means for elevating their status.

The significance of such diversity is that it worked to the disadvantage of the highest lord, cut off as he was by layers of command from actual sway over his castle. Difficulties might erupt at any level, and attempts to rationalize the system often complicated it even more. For example, in 1106 Pere Fulcó and his wife Adalgard invested Ramon Bernat with the fortress of Oló in return for fidelity and aid in war.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Below Ramon's level of feudataire were several castlans with whom Pere Fulcó was disputing concerning the lord's dominicatura.⁽⁵⁰⁾ A large part of Ramon Bernat's job was to take charge of these castlans and their fiefs and compel them to perform homage to Pere Fulcó (although, interestingly enough, Ramon himself did not have to perform homage).⁽⁵¹⁾ Below the castlans were milites. The distinction between them was that the former had land (their fiefs) and some role in the region of Oló that was hereditary.

If Ramon Bernat proved trustworthy, the problem of disobedience would be solved in the short run. What must be considered, however, is the likelihood that introducing a fourth level, making Ramon Bernat an overseer for the castlans, simply distributed power even more and weakened its exercise at the top. Recalcitrance on the part of the feudataire, according to the document, would be solved by resorting to the good offices of leading men of the region (boni homines).⁽⁵²⁾ In the event of such a dispute, however, the chances of Pere Fulcó getting anything out of the castle of Oló would be small, and the original uncooperativeness of the castlans would be compounded.

The division into levels of authority was matched by confusion over multiple lordship. A castellan might hold several castles of different lords, or he might have more than one lord for a single castle. As was true with the multiple levels of authority, multiple lordship introduced greater complexity that damaged the lord's [110] power and enhanced that of the castellan. The Eures brothers parlayed multiple loyalties dazzlingly. They succeeded to tenure of the former episcopal castle of Eures after the death of their father, Guillem Borrell. Guillem d'Eures by his sobriquet indicates the security of their identification with the castle. Episcopal interest was renewed in 1147, when the brothers allowed the bishop use of Eures, promised aid, and performed homage, all in return for payments in kind. They promised the bishop use of the castle against all except the lord of Taradell, to whom the Eures owed service for the castle simultaneously.⁽⁵³⁾

The Eures also administered the castle of S'Avellana for the Cabrera viscounts, and Guillem in addition served the Queralt. Among the castellans who performed homage to the bishop for the long-disputed tithes in Gurb was Guillem d'Eures.⁽⁵⁴⁾ Guillem and his brother thus managed to receive favors from and owe service to most of the powerful figures of the Plain of Vic.

The Santa Eugenia, mentioned earlier as an example of a family that achieved social ascent by means of identification with the chapter, were also encouraged by the forms of multiple homage and the fragmentation of twelfth-century castle holding. They started as castlans of Taradell and its neighbor Santa Eugenia. By 1200 they had absorbed the Eures family and its claims and enjoyed rights over the Montcada castle in Vic and the castles of Sentfores, Tona, Montmany, and Castellcir.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Multiple lordship meant that even the count could be ignored at times. Scant attention was given to his pre-eminent rights in convenienciae of the twelfth century (see Table 3). This slight indicates in another fashion the isolation of the diocese from the count, but it also shows how difficult it was for the highest lords to secure their castles. Promises of defense or use of castles might normally be expected to be valid against all attackers save the count, whose superior authority was acknowledged to outweigh private arrangements. In the documents listed in Table 3 such exclusions are found in only seven instances. The table also shows how little strength the bishop of Vic had in compelling recognition of his supremacy. Though all the castles included in the table were supposedly episcopal, the castellans could often avoid [112] admitting the suzerainty of the bishop while agreeing to provide him services as a vague (hence evadable) superior.

Like any lord, the bishop of Vic tried to minimize the disadvantages of a complex structure of castle holding. When Gerbert Hug gave the bishop-elect Guillem the castles of Montlleó, Briançó, and Pomar in 1101, he guaranteed that their castlans would comply with the bishop's will, and the castlans in fact swore an oath of loyalty separately from Gerbert.⁽⁵⁶⁾ In conferring the castle of Artés on Guillem de Guàrdia, the bishop attempted to make it clear that the castlans held some of their fiefs directly from the bishop and not solely through their proximate superior, the castellan.⁽⁵⁷⁾

Apart from the oaths and occasional acts of homage, how might the bishop enforce compliance by his castellans and castlans? In many cases he could not. Consequently, episcopal rights were diminished to the point where, as at Eures or Vilagelans, castles already legally belonging to the bishop were the objects of negotiations as if they were independent. One method of ameliorating the fundamental deficiencies in the bishop's position was to buy military rights when they were available. To some degree cooperation might also be encouraged by spiritual means. Berenguer Bernat de Queralt made concessions over the castle of Meda and other issues when he lay near death in 1164.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Although excommunication was used once in connection [113] with a twelfth-century dispute, a controversy about the dominicatura of Quer,⁽⁵⁹⁾ the church did not resort to that extremity over such issues as frequently as it had in the previous century. Equally striking is how infrequently the bishop resorted to judicial procedures to enforce obedience. Only over Tous in 1174, when the castellan renounced all ties to the cathedral, did the bishop take his case to a tribunal.⁽⁶⁰⁾

Another possible way of restraining the castellan was to reserve rights not only over parts of the castrum (the normal episcopal dominicatura) but also over a portion of the fortress itself, which would be reserved for the bishop's exclusive use. At Artés in 1199 the bishop reserved for inclusion within his dominicatura the smaller tower and the palaces attached to both the greater and the lesser tower.⁽⁶¹⁾

The bishop also used the chronic cash-flow problems of his castellans to advantage. In 1184 Ramon de Tous received a loan from Ramon de Masdan and Pere de Vila de Odio, pledging as security his share of the tithes in Tous with the permission of Bishop Pere, who acted as a guarantor of Ramon's good faith (a fideiussor).⁽⁶²⁾ It is probably not coincidental that a year earlier Ramon had acknowledged that he held the castle in loyalty to the bishop, something he had refused to do ten years before.⁽⁶³⁾

Even with all these tactics at their disposal, the bishops were st ill less than stunningly successful in controlling their castles. A large number of magnates acquired privileges within even the most tightly managed episcopal fortresses.⁽⁶⁴⁾Senyors carved virtual satrapies for themselves, and their castlans were inclined to be more loyal to the castellan than to the bishop. Most of all, the bishop was hurt by the divisibility of castle tenure, which presented administrative complications and let in a large number of competing interests for castles that had once been indisputably episcopal.

The bishops did exert themselves, and especially at Tous and Artés their efforts were not wasted. As is true for the maintenance of urban jurisdiction, the bishop's ability to preserve any control at all over castles is impressive. His lesser success [114] with the castles than with the city of Vic must be attributed in part to their dispersal and to the accessibility of such castles to men well versed in the tactics of military intrigue and secular loyalty.

Strong episcopal interest in castles was abandoned only in 1318, at the same time that the cathedral relinquished its urban jurisdiction to the king. In 1318 the church sold rights to Calaf, Tous, Montbui, Salo, and l'Espelt to Jaume II, but even in the seventeenth century Artés and three other castles would symbolize the military lordship of Vic's bishop.⁽⁶⁵⁾

1. The privilege of King Odo, issued in 889, confirmed the bishop's lordship over Artés (Catalunya carolingia, ed. Abadal, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 293-296; Bautier, "La prétendue dissidence," p. 478, note 2).

2. Vilagelans was held in loyalty to the bishop by archdeacons Sunyer and Adalbert (ACV, c. 6, 816 [1012]). For their relation to the Vilagelans castellans, see Els castells, 4:905-910 (note 17). Meda was obtained from the count by Bonfill de Gurb-Queralt, a canon of Vic, in 992 and was the object of several eleventh-century disputes between the church and the Queralt family; see A. Pladevall, "El monasterio de Sant Llorens del Munt," Ausa 4 (1961-1963), 97; Els castells, 4:313-314 (note 27); Moncada, pp. 326-329.

3. For example, the decree of the Council of Narbonne in 1020 (ES, 32:ap. 14; for the correct date of this council see Pladevall, "Els senescals," p. 112, note 2), and the excommunication of 1055 (ACV, c. 9, Ep. II, 56; VL, 6:ap. 33). Between 1091 and 1097 a strong complaint was made against numerous usurpations, especially of episcopal castles, and an interdict against the perpetrators was threatened (ACV, c. 9, Ep. II, 90; VL, 6:ap. 37; dated as 1095 by A. Pladevall, "La canónica de Santa Maria de Manlleu," Manlleu 25-26 [1978], no pagination).

4. Pladevall, "Els senescals," pp. 118-119. The castles were Orís, Voltregà, and Solterra.

5. Bonnassle, La Catalogne, 2:647-680.

6. Bonnassle has identified the conveniencia as the key feudal agreement in Catalonia; see his "Les conventions féodales dans la Catalogne du XI^e siècle," Annales du Midi 80 (1968), 529-550. The military organization of Catalonia and the guarding of castles is dealt with in Lewis, Development, pp. 287-314.

7. See Bonnassie's table in La Catalogne, 2:690-691. His list also includes three castles purchased in 1048 and 1049.

8. Ibid. Montfalcó (with its subsidiary fortress, Veciana) should be added to Bonnassie's list. Although the count normally paid for castles with gold, in this instance he exchanged one-half of the tithes in Manresa (which slipped in and out of the bishop's possession) for the three castles (Els castells, 5:433).

9. Pladevall, "Els senescals," pp. 121-123.

10. Vilagelans: AME 3, 116 (1106), 116bis (1109). Eures: AME 8, 41 (1147); J. Gudiol, "La torre de Saladeures, " Anuari de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans 3 (1909-1910), 380-381; AME 6, 11 (1115). Miralles: last evidence of episcopal rights appeared in 1079, when Guerau Alemany de Gurb-Cervelló promised the bishop access to Miralles, already something less than an admission of episcopal lordship (ACV, c. 9, Ep. II, 74). An oath of fidelity for Miralles, dated by the editor of LFM as 1100 (LFM, no. 271) on the assumption that it took place during the abortive pontificate of bishop-elect Guillem, is in fact from the time of Bishop Guillem de Balsareny (1046-1076). The bishop is addressed as episcopus, whereas the later Guillem was always called bishop-elect. The parchment from which the LFM text was copied is from the parchments of Ramon Berenguer II (1076-1082). Miralles, therefore, had ceased to be an episcopal castle by 1100.

11. Eures: ADV, CE, f 41 (1113), already shows a castellan independent of episcopal control, as does AME 8, 41 (1147). Artés: AME 10, 6 (1199), indicates that below the castellan, Guillem de Guàrdia, there were lesser castellans who had to accompany Guillem when the bishop issued a summons. They were, however, so distant from the bishop's real command that they are called Guillem's castellans: "si idem episcopus fuerit in hostem et dictus Guillelmus albergauerit cum eo, alii kastiani albergent cum prefato Guillelmo. Sin autem episcopus mandet ipsum seruici[um dic]to Guillelmo, et Guillelmus mandet suis kastlanis illius kastri ut albergent cum ipso episcopo et seruient ei sicut suo meliori seniore."

12. The castrum extended about one day's march from the castle and would encompass perhaps five parishes (Bonnassie, La Catalogne,1:174-175).

13. For example, ACV, c. 6, 2659J (1128), 1641 (1131); AME 9, 35 (1165).

14. Within the castrum, a part would be reserved for the lord, the dominicatura, and the remainder would be divided among the castellan and his subordinates (AME 10, 3 [1157], 6 [1176] [both dealing with Artés]; ACV, c. 6, 1924 [1183], 1787 [1188] [for Tous]). On this subject generally, see T. N. Bisson, "Feudalism in Twelfth-Century Catalonia," in Structures féodales et féodalisme dans l'occident méditerranéen (X^e-XIII^e siècles): Bilan et perspectives de recherches (Rome, 1980), pp. 176-180.

15. ACV, c. 6, 1746.

16. AME 10, 1 (1151), 6 (1199).

17. See above, note 14. AME 10, 1 (1151), is explicit: "Iterum vero recognouit iam dictus Guillelmus quod in dominicaturam episcopi seu in dominica[turam] canonice Sancti Petri . . . nichil habet nec habere debea[t] de illis nec aliis."

18. AME 3, 116 (1106), 116bis (1109).

19. ACV, c. 6, 1746. In addition to the archbishop of Tarragona, the judges included: Pere, abbot of Sant Benet de Bages; Guillem de Malla, archdeacon of Vic; and the leaders of the Aguiló, Claramunt, Pujalt, Palaçiol, and Grimau families.

20. ACV, c. 6, 1787. On the right of alberga, see Eulalia Rodón Binué, El lenguaje técnico del féudalismo en el siglo XI en Cataluña (contribución al estudio del latin medieval) (Barcelona, 1957), p. 15.

21. ACV, c. 6, 1746 (1174): "Postea conquestus est R. de domno suo episcopo dicens quod P. frater suus perdidit cum eo apud Lorcham .vii. equitaturas quas ei non reddiderat." For the expedition to Lorca, see Gran enciclopèdia Catalana, 12:331.

22. L. McCrank, "The Cistercians of Poblet as Landlords: Protection, Litigation and Violence on the Medieval Catalan Frontier," Citeaux: commentarii cistercienses 26 (1975), 277.

23. See above, note 21.

24. ACV, c. 6, 1746 (1174): "dixit [episcopus] quod cum eo non iuit sicut uassallus uadit in hostem cum domno suo, sed pro certa mercede et lucro iuit, quod dabatur singulis ire uolentibus apud Lorcham tunc temporis." The bishop about whom Ramon de Tons complained in 1174 had not been bishop in 1144, when the expedition took place. It is probable that Ramon's unlucky brother had served Bishop Ramon, but it is also possible that Pere, before he was bishop, led a contingent of which the lord of Tons formed a part.

25. In 1177 Ramon swore fidelity (ACV, c. 6, 1757). In 1183 he performed homage and agreed to the 30-day obligation (ACV, c. 6, 1924).

26. AME 8, 41. Eures had been given by the count to the bishop of Vic in 1039 (ACV, c. 9, Ep. II, 44). It is not certain from that document whether a castle was already on the site.

27. ACV, c. 9, Ep. II, 68.

28. ACV, LD, ff. 9-9v.

29. ACV, c. 6, 2383. The castle was supposed to be held in loyalty to the bishop, but the effect of the agreement was to alienate it completely to the seneschal. In 1200 Ramon de Montcada sold his rights over Palomera to Esteban de Soria (AHN, Clero, Santes Creus 2768, no. 2).

30. ACV, c. 6, 1924 (1183), 1787 (1188).

31. Twelfth-century records for Artés: AME 10, 2 (agreement with Ramon Gaufré de Bages, Aug. 5, 1111), 1 (settlement of a dispute with Guillem Ramon, castellan of Artés, July 27, 1151), 3 (establishment of Ramon de Medera as bailiff for Artés, Jan. 2, 1157), 31 (oath of fidelity by Arnau de Roca, Oct. 24, 1159), 5 (settlement of a dispute with Berenguer de Pujalt, July 24, 1171), 6 (agreement with Guillem de Guàrdia, Sept. 24, 1199).

32. AME 10, 1 (1 151), 5 (1171). For a discussion of the castellania and dominicatura, see Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 2:603-606.

33. AME 10, 1 (1151): "recogn[ouit Guillelmus] Raimundi iam dicti castri castellanus prenominato episcopo presentibus omnibus aliis castellanis quod ipse nec alii ca[stellani] in iam dicto honore non habent forciam nec toltam." Forcia and tolta were exactions levied on peasants forcibly and with no justification.

34. AME 10, 6 (1199).

35. On this subject, with particular reference to Vic, see P. Freedman, "The Enserfment Process in Medieval Catalonia: Evidence from Ecclesiastical Sources," Viator 13 (1982), 225-244.

36. Oaths of fidelity over land without castles: AME 6, 111 (1179); ACV, c. 6, 1842 (1185). Oaths over personal ties without land: AME 6, 56 (1191), 84 (1198). Military obligations without castles: ADV, CE, ff. 18-18v (1134).

37. AME 8, 41 (1147); AME 13, 12 (1171).

38. AME 3, 116 (1106): "Et conuenit ei predictus uicecomes ut seruiat ei sicut debet facere ad suum seniorem et faciat ei hostes semper et caualcades et sequimentum quando opus fuerit. . . ." The words are repeated in AME 3, 116bis (1109).

39. ACV, LD, ff. 99-99v (1104), an exchange of allods for the castle of Quer. Berenguer had obtained Quer from his brother in 1074, and it formed part of the donation made to the church (reserving life tenure) upon Berenguer's entrance into the chapter (Els castells, 4:815). Berenguer left Quer to the chapter in 1099 (AME 13, 10; more accessible in the copy in ACV, LD, ff. 13v-14).

40. AME 13, 19bis (1167).

41. AME 13, 12 (1171), 21 (1176); ACV, c. 6, 1756 (1176).

42. Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 2:571, uses châtelain for the masters of the castles. The closest English equivalent, "castellan," is too broad and implies an excessive degree of subordination.

43. For the castlà, see Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 2:571-573, 598-608.

44. Bofill i Boix, "Lo castell de Gurb," p. 194; A. Pladevall et al., Síntesi històrica de Taradell (Taradell, 1974), p. 13.

45. AME 6, 11 (1115), an oath made by the castlà Berenguer Bernat (de Gurb) directly to the bishop.

46. AME 10, 6. See above note 11.

47. Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 2:603.

48. AME 8, 41 (1147); AME 3, 116 (1106); ACV, c. 6, 1924 (1183). On cabelers, see Rodón Binué, El lenguaje técnico, pp. 46-47.

49. ADV, perg. de l'Estany, 1.

50. Ibid.: "et donat ei ipsos feuuos quos castellani soliti sunt tenere pro patre de supra dicto Petro et milites in predicto honore, excepto ipsa terra et ipsa dominicatura unde predictus Petrus conqueritur de predictis castellanis et suos milites de quo Raimundus super scriptus conuenit ei facere directum."

51. Ibid.: "Conuenit ego Raimundus suis senioribus ut mandet suis castellanis ut totum seruicium que faciunt uel facere debent faciant a supra dictos seniores. . . . Iterum conuenit premissus Raimundus sepedictis senioribus ut commendet eis suos castellanos manibus propriis qui hodie sunt uel in antea erunt."

52. Ibid.: "Si autem infregerit aud aliqua malefacta fecerit ipse aud sui castellani in predicto honore, restituad per directum aud per laudamentum bonorum hominum infra quinquaginta dies quando seniores sui ei requisierint."

53. AME 8, 41: "et habeant supradictum castrum predicto modo contra cunctos homines et feminas et nullum hominum contra eos nisi domnus de Taradello et domnus castelli de Éderis." The lord of Taradell was also lord of Eures; A. Pladevall, "El castillo de Taradell y su primitivo término," Ausa 2 (1955-1957), 500-501.

54. The Eures as castellans of S'Avellana: Els castells, 4:843. S'Avellana was theoretically under the ultimate lordship of the bishop of Vic. The homage for the tithes: AME 9, 35 (1165). Although the names of the castlans arenot specified here, they appear in the agreement of 1164 (AME 9, 37) that preceded the ceremony, and among them is Guillem de Eures.

55. Els castells, 4:844, 846, 999, 1043, 1052 (note 80).

56. ACV, c. 9, Ep. II, 68. The separate document reporting the oath of the castlans has been lost but is mentioned in Moncada, p. 390.

57. AME 10, 6 (1199): "Et donet ei kastlaniam eiusdem kastri retentis ibi feuis que episcopus poterit probare quod kastlani debent tenere per episcopum."

58. AME 9, 37.

59. AME 13, 19bis (1167), not really a dispute over a castle but rather over its surrounding territory, the castrum.

60. ACV, c. 6, 1746.

61. AME 10, 6 (1199): "Comendat namque predictus episcopus iam dicto Guillelmo kastrum de Artes retenta ibi turre minori in propria dominicatura cum omni palacio quod est in turrem minorem et maiorem."

62. ACV, c. 6, 1912.

63. ACV, c. 6, 1924.

64. Thus Arnau de Roca obtained rights over Artés in addition to those he held over Montbui and the episcopal palace of Vic. He swore fidelity to Bishop Pere for these, although he was castellan of none of them (AME 10, 3 [1159]).

65. The sale of castles in 1318 is noted in Els castells, 5:414, 457. In the seventeenth century it could still be said, however, "Los 4 seguents son del Bisbe de Vich: Artés, Cellent, Castellnou, Sarrayana" (Els castells, 5:488).