Borrowing a phrase from Hugh of St. Victor, Johannes de Turrecremata described the clergy as the more worthy side of the ecclesiastical body.¹ But Turrecremata had to vindicate such an exalted status in his own era, by demonstrating the right order of this worthier part of the Church. Lollard and Hussite movements threatened the traditional privileges of the clergy, criticized their possession of temporal goods, and denied that sinful priests could validly perform the sacraments. This last challenge was the gravest, for though it retained the medieval emphasis on sacramental grace, it created uncertainty about the availability of that grace to the faithful. Nor would these heretics accept correction by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, not even by popes and councils, but took their stand on Scriptural grounds, thereby implying a difference between the teachings of the visible Church and the Truth accepted by the invisible Church.² Though he shared his assault on such heresies with the conciliarists, among them John of Ragusa, Turrecremata thought conciliarists were themselves adherents of the heresies of Marsilius and Ockham. Their false doctrines, especially that of placing the Church’s authority in opposition to the pope’s, threatened ecclesiastical unity. Turrecremata believed that the unified work of the clergy for the salvation of souls depended on loyalty to the Roman see.³
In refuting such errors of his day, Turrecremata had to discuss the two chief powers of the clergy, orders and jurisdiction, whose distinction had first been clearly developed by the canonists. Lollard and Hussite errors, which threatened the basic sacramental structure of the medieval Church, related to the power of orders, the ability of an ordained priest to perform the sacraments. Conciliarist errors and the failure of the heretics to accept correction pertained to the power of jurisdiction: the ability of the clergy, particularly prelates, to govern the ecclesiastical institution. Though both of these God-given powers belonged to the clergy, they were distributed in different ways for use in the Church's saving work. And it was incumbent on Turrecremata to show that the right ordering of those two powers entailed obedience to the pope.

The Catholic doctrine of priesthood considered the benefit of sacraments to their recipients as independent of the administering priest's sanctity of soul or state of election. This doctrine had been firmly established by Augustine in polemics against the Donatists; it had endured, despite opposition from heretics like the Waldensians, and became a part of scholastic theology. Turrecremata was thus reaffirming traditional beliefs when he argued that the indelible stamp of ordination on the soul could not be blotted out by sin. The sinful priest might be deprived of the use of his powers but not of the powers themselves. So Turrecremata charged the Hussites with believing that human malice could impede the workings of grace and thus denying the faith surety of salvation. Further, a key role in the sacrament of orders belonged to bishops, who had the power of ordaining priests. Although Marsilius, Wycliff, and Hus had all questioned the nature of bishops' superiority over priests, Turrecremata restated Hugh of St. Victor's argument that the episcopate had the fullness of priestly power, since its sacerdotal acts extended to the whole Mystical Body through ordination and the consecration of new bishops. Nevertheless, Turrecremata did not describe episcopacy as a higher ordo ("sacramental grade") than simple priesthood; neither did he claim that the bishop of Rome had a higher power of orders than other bishops. He simply had no need to assert papal supremacy in the power of orders. For proof of supremacy
in the other powers, jurisdiction—the power of ecclesiastical government—was sufficient to place the Roman pontiff above all other prelates as the visible head of the Church, its ruler and unifying force.

In the sphere of jurisdiction, Turrecremata could challenge communal or corporate conciliarist doctrines with weapons drawn from an ample legal and theological heritage. For one, he used what has come to be known as the "mendicant doctrine" of supreme papal jurisdiction. Some early canonists had suggested that the confirmation of episcopal election by higher powers, not the election itself, conferred jurisdiction upon a bishop-elect. Then, in controversies at the University of Paris, the same doctrine was adopted by many apologists for the papally granted privileges of the mendicant orders—they used it to claim that bishops were the pope's agents in all matters of ecclesiastical government, a form of argument that shocked their adversaries, the secular masters. The mendicant doctrine was first taught by such Franciscans as Thomas of York and Bonaventure. Augustinians later took up the Franciscan doctrine and carried it to extremes, but the Dominicans were slower to follow. Only in the fourteenth century did Herveus Natalis firmly establish this doctrine of jurisdiction in the thought of the Order of Preachers, setting an example that Turrecremata would follow in his papalist polemics. With his lively concern for the welfare of the Church, however, Turrecremata would not repeat the excesses of his mendicant predecessors, who often seemed to be more interested in arguments on the distribution of power in spiritual and temporal spheres than in the salvation of souls.

In his *Summa* Turrecremata defined jurisdiction as the governmental power of "ruling the Christian people according to divine law." Like orders, jurisdiction was derived from God rather than men and thus, he ventured, came down from God by way of the pope. Yet, unlike orders, jurisdiction was not conferred once for all time, as it allowed (although it did not automatically cause, as the Hussites contended) the deposition of prelates who abused their authority. Jurisdiction, involving as it did the subjection of inferiors to superiors, naturally lent itself to an orderly, hierarchic disposition." Further, jurisdiction ex-
isted to promote the salvation of souls and not just the good order of the ecclesiastical institution, which was itself a means to that higher end. In addition, Turrecremata departed from the excesses of previous mendicant papal apologists to specify that jurisdiction was subordinate to the vital sacramental power of orders—an emphasis that probably reflects his experience of the Schism that had so badly impeded the saving work of the Church.12

Not surprisingly, Turrecremata argued for papal supremacy in both fora of jurisdiction as distinguished by the early scholastics: the internal forum of penance and the external forum of ecclesiastical trial and censure. Aquinas and Bonaventure had already imported the canonistic idea of jurisdiction into the discussion of these fora, and Turrecremata followed their example.13 In the internal forum of conscience Aquinas had noted a close connection of orders and jurisdiction: jurisdiction assigned to the priest the "material" over which he exercised power of absolution. To be sure, this was the original arena of jurisdictional debate between mendicants and seculars, who disputed the papally granted right of friars to hear confessions. By Turrecremata's day the main fight had moved into the external forum of causes, with conciliarists and papalists disputing the location of supreme governing authority in the visible Church.14 Nevertheless, Turrecremata was also concerned with issues of the older controversy, as he and Johannes de Montenegro had fought an attempt in the Council of Basel to revoke the privileges of the mendicants. Turrecremata argued that the equal sacramental powers of priests must be regulated by jurisdiction in order to preserve the good order of the Church and insure its efficient work for the salvation of souls. This regulating power was given by the pope to bishops, who in turn assigned cures of souls to priests. But the pope's cure of souls covered all the earth; so, he could use his supreme power of jurisdiction in the internal forum and thereby license friars to hear confessions from the faithful whenever such exemptions would serve the welfare of the Church.15

The pope was also supreme in the external forum of causes, in which obdurate sinners were punished by censures, the spiritual weapons of the Church, such as excommunication.16 Imposition and removal of censures was a
power of jurisdiction reserved to bishops, who could be punished if they abused it. Again, the pope was the source and overseer of this power of excommunication, able to redistribute the power of jurisdiction in the external forum to benefit the welfare of the Church.

This contention of Turrecremata's—papal supremacy in both fora of jurisdiction—needed extensive supporting argumentation, for there was a solid tradition that argued that bishops, as the successors of the Apostles, received jurisdiction from Christ. The secular masters at Paris taught the episcopalist doctrine, which was often extended to making parish priests the direct successors of the Disciples; and their adherence to this proto-Gallican notion was undeterred even by papal condemnation of one of their number, Jean de Pouilly, who was prosecuted for heresy by the Dominicans Herveus Natalis and Petrus de Palude. In addition, Turrecremata had to redeem papalism from the disgrace of the Schism, a task for which he found able collaborators in Nicholas of Cusa, Antoninus of Florence, Petrus de Monte, and Arévalo. But among them, it was Turrecremata who made the most effective use of the mendicant doctrine of jurisdiction. He held that jurisdiction descended from the Roman pontiff in a hierarchic pattern to all prelates and pastors. Just as Cod was the sole distributor of grace, so the supreme pontiff distributed all powers of ecclesiastical government:

> Although neither the Spirit nor grace are distributed to others by the pope, but by God alone; nevertheless, the power of jurisdiction is distributed to him by others, [that is] the motive power of direction and ecclesiastical government, to prelates and rectors; and this suffices for headship [of the Church].

Ecclesiastical unity, an abiding concern in the aftermath of the Schism, required subordination of all other ecclesiastical powers to the papacy. In Turrecremata's view, therefore, any denial that prelates received jurisdiction from the pope was tantamount to an attack on the ideal of unity.

In supporting this doctrine, so relevant to his age, Turrecremata had to show that it reflected conditions in the early Church. No power could be ascribed to the popes that had not first been conferred on Peter; accordingly,
Turrecremata argued that there were no references in Scripture to Christ's granting episcopal powers to the other Apostles. Proof of this contention required some of his greatest dialectical efforts, including proof that all Scriptural texts concerning the powers of the other Apostles referred to orders and not to jurisdiction.

A particular problem was the "power of the keys," a term that had both sacramental and governmental implications. Matt. 18:18 recorded Christ's promise to the Twelve of the power to bind and loose—a promise made in terms similar to those in the Tu es Petrus, the promise of the keys to Peter (Matt. 16:18). Turrecremata reduced Matt. 18:18, along with similar texts in Luke and John, to a promise of priestly ordination. But to round out this argument, Turrecremata had to reinterpret the Tu es Petrus, which most theologians, publicists, and canonists considered the record of Peter's institution as first bishop and first pope. Turrecremata, on the contrary, reduced it to a promise of future elevation to episcopacy and to the Vicariate of Christ. Like Herveus Natalis before him, Turrecremata argued that the Church needed no other bishop, not even the future bishop of Rome, while Christ was present on earth. For Turrecremata the crucial passage in Scripture, recording Peter's institution as pope, was John 21: 15–17, the injunction "Feed my lambs. . . . Feed my sheep." Turrecremata thought this an unmistakably papalist text, which could not be confused with any other, recording Peter's episcopal consecration and conferral of the supreme power of jurisdiction in the visible Church.

The Petrine pontificate therefore set a permanent pattern, for the prince of the Apostles was able to rule the Church without the consent of others, whether given individually or in council. As the number of believers increased, Peter named his fellow Apostles as bishops, with a share in his power of jurisdiction. Later still, Peter chose Paul and other worthy men to share in these labors, conferring jurisdiction even on those he had not directly ordained; Peter's successors, the popes, inherited this sole right to confer the power of jurisdiction. Such reasoning, as we have noted above, was Turrecremata's interpretation of Augustine's dictum that Peter had received the keys in figura ecclesiae.
Besides the power of the keys, an episcopalist doctrine presented yet another obstacle to wide acceptance of Turrecremata's mendicant doctrine of papal jurisdiction: the idea that an individual bishop received both orders and jurisdiction (through a line of predecessors) from whichever Apostle had founded his see. This concept of apostolic succession was an ancient one and a cardinal point of episcopalist ecclesiology, one which suggested that a bishop had an inalienable right to rule his diocese. Mendicants like Herveus Natalis were willing to go to extreme lengths in attacking such an interpretation. Turrecremata's approach to the problem, though less cavalier, was colored by these past polemics. The cardinal argued that Peter had allowed the other Apostles to transmit the power of orders to their successors (the bishops) but had retained for himself and his successors (the popes) the sole right to confer the power of jurisdiction. In jurisdiction, the only apostolic succession was that of bishops receiving from the papacy powers similar to their predecessors.

Finally, Turrecremata summarized the pope's jurisdictional supremacy under the heading "plenitude of power" \((\text{plenitudo potestatis})\). The term had been coined by Leo I to describe papal power in comparison with the power of a papal vicar \(\text{in partem sollicitudinis}\), who shared in the Roman pontiff's work for the welfare of the Church. The canonists gradually turned "plenitude of power" into a description of the pope's supreme governing authority in the Church. Bernard of Clairvaux popularized the term among theologians, and the mendicants, Aquinas among them, were quick to adopt it. Moreover, Innocent III introduced the idea of plenitude of power, with all its legal and theological implications, into his decretals. It was this very supreme power of ecclesiastical government—whether understood as including or excluding any reference to the power of orders—that Turrecremata denied could be held or exercised by the whole Church.

By virtue of the plenitude of power, the pope was head of the visible Church, commanding obedience from the other bishops even to the point of intervening in their work of ecclesiastical government. Bishops were papal agents who received a share of jurisdiction \(\text{in partem sollicitudinis}\). Even the power of orders, in which bishops were the pope's
equals, was affected by the plenitude of power, which regulated pastoral ministry. Bishops, metropolitans, primates, and patriarchs were all part of a hierarchy of jurisdiction whose summit was the papacy. Jurisdiction was diffused through this hierarchy via confirmation of elections, made directly or through intermediaries. Each grade of the hierarchy was supposed to supervise the conduct of members in the lower grades, correcting or removing unworthy prelates. Unjust sentences could be appealed all the way to the pope, the font of all jurisdiction. Since the lesser clergy received their share of jurisdiction from the bishops, the pope could grant local exemptions from episcopal authority, making monks and friars directly subject to Rome. The important principle to be safeguarded in granting of exemptions was that of obedience to the Vicar of Christ.

But Turrecremata reminded his readers that this governmental hierarchy, even the papacy with its plenitude of power, was no end in itself. He wrote that Christ had given the clergy the power of jurisdiction only to promote proper reception of the sacraments:

The pope and other ministers of the Church do not seem to have ministry with this power (jurisdiction) except for the preparation of the subject for the dispensation of the sacraments.

Thus, exceptions to the ordinary exercise of ecclesiastical power could be made in the interest of the salvation of souls, for example, allowing a priest to absolve the dying of excommunications usually reserved to higher powers. So, even when struggling against conciliarism and Hussitism, Turrecremata never lost sight of the pastoral mission of the Church—a vision of the Church's saving labors which sets him apart from the more doctrinaire papal apologists of the Middle Ages.

Magisterium and Infallibility

In Turrecremata's day magisterium, the power to authoritatively teach Christian doctrine, was seen as an aspect of jurisdiction in the external forum. In tackling this aspect of jurisdiction, Turrecremata had perforce to deal with the
unsettled question of" infallibility and indefectibility, previously developed by canonists, Franciscans, and, in his own time, conciliarists and papalists. Although the canonists had regarded the pope's right to settle doctrinal controversies as quite incontrovertible, they seem never to have regarded the Roman pontiff as infallible. Canon law included several references to popes who had fallen into heresy and lost their immunity to judgment by lesser powers. Nor did the jurists ignore the distinction between authority and learning, arguing that official pronouncements bound the wisest doctor, even if he be more aware of the truth than an individual pope of prelate. The Roman Church, usually understood to be the whole Church or some loyal portion of it, was believed to be free of wrinkle or stain and thus never lose the true faith. Nevertheless, the canonists did not readily translate the Church's indefectibility into an unerring magisterial authority.  

The claim of infallibility was first put forward by the Franciscan theologian Pierre Olivi, who wanted to prove that Nicholas III's decretal Exiit, affirming the Minorite doctrine of Christ's poverty, was an irreformable doctrinal definition. In terms borrowed from the canonist Huguccio, Olivi argued that any pope who contradicted an infallible, irreformable decree of a predecessor fell from his see because of his errors." Accordingly, John XXII's decision to turn against the Conventual Franciscans after he quashed the Spirituals forced their minister general, Michael of Cesena, to believe that the pope had fallen from his see when he tried to tamper with the provisions of Exifi. Michael took into exile with him the brilliant theologian William of Ockham, whose polemical works suggested that a small remnant of the Church, some small group of believers, might remain the only guardian of the truth, able to judge the errors of popes, prelates, and councils. Ockham's doctrine, dangerously close to a subjective view of Christian doctrine, would have a widespread influence on later thinkers.

In the fourteenth century, the Franciscan development of a suspect theory of infallible magisterium was countered by arguments from other mendicant theologians, some of them involved in official inquiries into Olivi's orthodoxy. Most of these writers, including Augustinus Triumphus
and Petrus de Palude, were inclined to consider infallible the papal office itself—pope and cardinals together—not the Roman pontiff alone. The most coherent and forthright papalist theory of infallibility was advanced by the Carmelite Guido Terreni, who dismissed Gratian’s examples of papal heresy and largely ignored the canonists’ safeguards against the ill effects of papal error on the Church. Terreni’s argument that God would not allow the pope to err when pronouncing judgment in matters of faith is believed to have weighed heavily in John XXII’s decision not to condemn the idea of infallibility because it was favored by the Michaelists. After the outbreak of the Schism, however, Terreni’s doctrine of infallibility, which foreshadowed the future definition by the First Vatican Council, was largely ignored. Conciliarists, faced with the need to reunite and reform the Church while defending orthodoxy, tended to describe a general council as possessing supreme teaching authority, though they did not agree on whether the Holy Spirit’s guidance made a council’s doctrinal decrees infallible. In their response papal apologists and champions of orthodoxy—Eugenians like Antoninus, Petrus de Monte, and Turrecremata himself—had to prove the pope, not a council, the most reliable guardian and teacher of the truth.

Turrecremata’s papalist discussion of magisterium, like all of his anticonciliar arguments, was closely tied to his concern for the welfare of the church. The Church needed a single teaching authority to preserve its characteristic unity. Were there no one power to decide difficult doctrinal questions, the Church would split into a multitude of bickering sects, as the Hussite movement had done. So the preaching office given to priests at ordination was regulated by prelatical authority guided by the learning of the doctors. In doctrinal disputes supreme power of decision was the pope’s, the Church’s chief teacher, whose pronouncements bound all doctors. Turrecremata, combining law and polemic, argued that this papal magisterium was an aspect of jurisdiction in the external forum. Since the pope was the font of this aspect of jurisdiction as of all others, papal decisions in matters of faith were virtually those of the whole Church.

Turrecremata had to explain how such supreme mag-
isterial authority could be properly exercised, especially when learned doctors disagreed. Ancient church councils had been assemblies of the wise and powerful, whose decisions had overwhelming prestige, and Turrecremata still accepted conciliar condemnations of false doctrine issued in his own day. But he had lost faith in the absolute reliability of ecclesiastical assemblies when the Council of Basel compounded its antipapal endeavours with another offense, the attempt to define Mary's Immaculate Conception as dogma. So he turned once more to the papacy, which had power to end divisive theological disputes by making pronouncements binding upon all doctors.\textsuperscript{52} The pope's decisions were more trustworthy than those of the multitude and unrivalled by even those of general councils, which received their authority from the Roman see.\textsuperscript{53} According to Turrecremata, Christ had made Peter the Church's chief teacher when he said, "I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail. Strengthen your brothers" (Luke 22:32).\textsuperscript{58}

As guardian of the truth, the pope judged disputes over doctrine and "edited" creeds, adding clauses that affirmed sound doctrine or condemned heresies. It was exactly this type of editing, the addition of the filioque to the Nicene Creed, to which the Greeks at Florence had objected. Turrecremata answered that the filioque served as a weapon against heresy and thus was worthy of acceptance in the East.\textsuperscript{55} The Roman pontiff's plenitude of power also gave him a unique ability to canonize saints.\textsuperscript{56} In addition, the papacy regulated the study of theology, approving the works of learned doctors and watching over the universities. (There is a remote echo of old disputes at Paris in Turrecremata's claim that the pope could compel the schools to accept friars as students or as masters.)\textsuperscript{57}

Turrecremata's exalted conception of papal magisterium forced him to confront several burning issues of late medieval theology: the relationship of Church and Scripture; the relationship of Scripture and Tradition; the possibility that the pope might fall into heresy.

Because of the errors of Lollards and Hussites who thought the visible Church might embrace error while the invisible Church held to truth grounded in Scripture, the first of these problems—the relationship of Church and
Scripture—was the most important. Moreover, Catholic theologians had been discussing the same possibility even before Ockham attacked John XXII's orthodoxy, at least since Henry of Ghent's residence in Paris in the thirteenth century. The fathers at Constance had been forced to confront this issue when John Hus demanded that his errors be refuted on Scriptural grounds, a demand implying that truth and magisterial authority did not agree. Conciliarists like Gerson, d'Ailly, and Thomas Netter were forced to take up this challenge and try to prove that Scripture and Church could not be in conflict. In their argument they invoked the authority of Augustine's statement that the Church moved him to accept the authority of Scripture, which they understood as proof that the Holy Spirit had inspired the Church's recognition of the canonical books of the Bible. Thus, the visible Church was divinely guided to accept and teach the truth. More conservative theologians, on whose authority Luther would draw, strongly criticized this line of reasoning, preferring to emphasize the independent value of Scripture as divine revelation.

In his solution, as throughout his career, Turrecremata believed he was defending a body of uniform truths, unfailing and universally valid principles whose acceptance by the faithful was necessary for their salvation. Scripture governed theology, while universal Tradition and local traditions guided the Church's work. Everything necessary for salvation was contained, at least implicitly, in the Old and New Testaments. The Holy Spirit had implanted in Scripture an evident meaning, which could be ignored only by a heretic. Turrecremata therefore regarded the Church as the witness to the value of Scripture, not as the source of its authority. His understanding of the Augustinian text about Church and Holy Writ was a papalist version of the argument used by Netter and other conciliarists. The Church, in the pope's person, had been divinely guided to accept as canonical only genuinely inspired books, precluding the possibility that truth and the magisterium of the Church could be in conflict.

Granted the fundamental agreement of Holy Writ and Holy Church, Turrecremata still had to discuss the second problem—Scripture and Tradition—the relationship of Scripture to other authoritative materials derived from
universal Tradition or local traditions. In previous centuries, *hierarchies of authorities* had been created for use in legal and theological argument, and for his own doctrine Turrecremata would draw variously on the past thinkers.

The canonists, whose interest in ecclesiastical discipline had led them to emphasize the value of Tradition, had been in the forefront of developing such hierarchies. One of the most influential lists of authorities was prepared by Huguccio, who listed—after Scripture—the canons of the Apostles and of councils, papal decretals, the Greek and Latin Fathers, and the examples of the saints. Conservative theologians like Thomas Bradwardine were quick to accuse the canonists of making Tradition a rival to Scripture, a criticism violently restated by Wycliff and Hus. William of Ockham, composing antipapal polemics, prepared a different and extremely influential list of authorities, which made Tradition, apostolic or postapostolic in origin, a source of truths that might be used in condemning the pope himself. Ockham listed—after Scripture—doctrines derived from Holy Writ by necessary reasoning, orthodox traditions handed down from apostolic times, truths found in trustworthy ecclesiastical histories, conclusions drawn from these sources by necessary reasoning, and postapostolic revelations—including the Franciscan doctrine of Christ’s poverty. In Turrecremata’s day, Ockham’s hierarchy of authorities was employed by such theologians as the conciliarist Johannes de Breviscoxe and the papalist Gabriel Biel.

Turrecremata’s own development of hierarchies of authority responded to the problems he was confronting. Quite early his obvious zeal for orthodoxy caused the Council of Basel to employ him as a theological expert; one commission, to debate the proposed definition of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, led Turrecremata to prepare his own hierarchy of authorities for citation in any theological debate. Turrecremata listed—after Scripture—dogmatic definitions of councils, those of popes, and officially approved definitions prepared by learned doctors. In this first list, magisterial authority weighed more heavily than erudition; indeed, he gave no place whatever to Tradition, whether apostolic or postapostolic. Had Turrecremata always employed this hierarchy, he would
have belonged to what Heiko Obermann calls “Tradition I,” that which emphasized the sufficiency of Scripture.\textsuperscript{71} In his later works, however, the dual exigency of defeating Hussitism and conciliarism led him to restate his hierarchy of authorities.\textsuperscript{72} Turrecremata began to draw upon both Ockham and Huguccio, borrowings which led him to place greater weight on the value of Tradition, at least in ecclesiological questions.\textsuperscript{73} Scripture, and the truths derived from it by necessary reasoning, kept pride of place.\textsuperscript{74} After these Turrecremata listed non-.Scriptural truths handed down orally by the Apostles to subsequent generations of believers.\textsuperscript{75} Such truths did not conflict with Scripture, since there was nothing necessary for salvation that was not taught, to use Turrecremata’s curious phrase, "by the gospels or by Christ."\textsuperscript{76} The next rank in the hierarchy belonged to the canons of councils, while the fourth place belonged to papal decrees—neither of which could err.\textsuperscript{77} After these authorities were ranked the works of the Fathers, portions of which had been sanctioned by the Church as the best refutations of heretical doctrines. Other theological works, although without official approbation, were useful in the interpretation of Scripture, while valuable materials could also be found in the works of learned pagans. (In the Commentaria, which is concerned with the sources of ecclesiastical law, Turrecremata also listed trustworthy histories and the examples of the saints—derived respectively from Ockham and Huguccio.)\textsuperscript{78}

The high rank Turrecremata gave to conciliar canons had a historical background and demanded further explanation. The pronouncements of the four great councils—Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon—had been compared by Gregory the Great to the four gospels because of their fundamental importance for the teaching of Christian doctrine.\textsuperscript{79} Some conciliarists, upon finding Gregory’s words in the Decretum, used them to prove that the council was superior to the pope.\textsuperscript{80} This interpretation based on Gratian’s texts was exactly the sort of error Turrecremata had set out to refute. Turrecremata argued that the four great councils were important because they defined key Christian doctrines, but their theological importance did not infringe on the Roman pontiff’s supremacy in matters of positive law, which pertained to his plenitude of power.\textsuperscript{81}
Although Turrecremata never thought of changing the accepted emphasis on Scripture, the exigencies of ecclesiological debate compelled him to place increasing weight on Tradition as the Church’s guide to right actions and source of truth. It is the change of emphasis, based on the exigencies of papalist polemic, which lies behind George Tavard’s claim that Turrecremata contributed to the development of the Tridentine doctrine of the two sources of revelation, a modified version of Ockham’s hierarchy of authorities. In Obermann’s terms, Turrecremata passed over from Tradition I to Tradition II.\(^8\)

Turrecremata’s preoccupation with the nature and extent of papal power obliged him to discuss the third problem agitating his contemporaries: the old belief that a pope could, publicly or privately, fall into heresy.\(^8\) The Councils of Constance and Basel had claimed to have power directly from Christ to decide matters of heresy, schism, and reform. The Eugenians, with Turrecremata in the vanguard, were gradually led to reemphasize the pope’s supreme magisterium, which displaced the council’s authority in matters of faith. In the process, the Dominican cardinal developed his own notable views on infallibility, which have remained a subject of modern controversy and misunderstanding.

Turrecremata’s first adumbration of a doctrine of papal infallibility appears in a tract written at Basel, although he placed little emphasis upon that doctrine until he was on legation in Germany.\(^8\) In his debate with Cesarini at Florence, Turrecremata seems to have had second thoughts about combining infallibility and papalist polemic, for he denied ecclesiological implications in the old belief that Mary alone had remained faithful at the time of the Schism, when even Peter, the chosen vicar, had fallen away, since Peter—not Mary—had received the power of the keys:

\[\text{Although the blessed Virgin Mary, mother of God, spouse of Christ, queen of the world and lady of the angels, was full of grace and ever unshakable in faith; nevertheless, that does not prove that she was greater than Peter in the power of the keys.}\]

In the \textit{Summa} and \textit{Commentaria}, Turrecremata abandoned this line of argument and returned to the doctrine of infallibility. He expressed himself as willing to believe that
providence would not let the Church's chief teacher err in matters of faith,* since the alternative was a prospect of the Church drifting into doubt, division, and error.*

In Turrecremata's time, there was no common opinion among theologians and canonists on the idea of infallibility. He was therefore free to borrow from the ideas of Olivi and Terreni, while rejecting the excesses of Ockham and the Michaelists. Also, Turrecremata founded his doctrine on an identification of *indefectibility* and *infallibility*—unfailing faith and unerring judgment in matters of faith—again, an identification that was not new. Huguccio and Johannes Teutonicus had interpreted Christ's prayer that Peter's faith might not fail (Luke 22:32) as a guarantee that the Church would adhere to the truth even if the pope fell into heresy. Ockham had argued that even an individual might judge prelates if he alone adhered to the truth. Some conciliarists had assigned the general council the role of unfailing exponent of the Church's unfailing faith.

For his own doctrine, Turrecremata argued that the best location for the Church's unfailing faith was the papacy, the teaching authority which God would not allow to err:

The pope, head of the Church, teacher and leader of the Christian people, can not err concerning matters of faith which must be held and believed. The apostle [the pope], *by virtue of his public office* [italics mine] of teaching the Christian people, discerns or defines what must be believed and held. The judgment of the apostolic see is indefectible, which is the same thing.89

Turrecremata thought the Church's own indefectibility devoid of juridical implications, since (like Mary) it lacked the power of the keys to translate its unfailing faith into unerring decisions.90 Moreover, the Church's unerring faith belonged only to that body of believers in communion with the Roman see.91

To support his position, Turrecremata had to prove that Peter had received infallible *magisterium* along with the governing powers assigned to him by Christ. He argued that infallibility was inherent in the *Tu es Petrus* (Matt. 16:16) and—assuming that indefectibility and infallibility were the same thing—in Luke 22:32.92 Turrecremata had to dispose of two objections to this argument: Peter's lapse of confi-
dence at the time of the Passion and his erroneous treatment of the gentiles. In the first case, Turrecremata argued that Peter had lost the strength to proclaim his faith, not faith itself, when he denied Christ, and that he did not receive infallible *magisterium* until after the Resurrection (John 21:15—17). Infallibility was thus an attribute of the papal office, not a grace granted the individual pope, and was consequently inherited by all of Peter's successors. In the second case, the conciliarists had used Paul's rebuke of Peter for not eating with the gentiles (Gal. 2:11-14) as a proof that the pope could be corrected for misusing his powers. Turrecremata replied that Peter had committed, at most, a sin but had not fallen into serious error. Paul had administered fraternal correction for that lapse—an incident devoid of juridical significance.

Briefly attracted by Guido Terreni's insistence that God would keep the pope from falling into heresy in the exercise of the *magisterium*, Turrecremata even claimed that God would intervene if the pope tried to teach false doctrine. However, guided by traditional ideas on papal heresy or by his own experience of the Schism, the Dominican cardinal did not leave the matter entirely in God's hands. Like Herveus Natalis, he emphasized the infallibility of the papal office. If the pope attempted to teach false doctrine—Turrecremata's argument was drawn from Huguccio rather than Terreni—the Pontiff would fall from his see *ipso facto*:

If the Roman pontiff becomes a heretic, he falls from Peter's chair and see by the very fact of calling from Peter's faith. Consequently, a judgment rendered by such a heretic is not the judgment of the apostolic see.

This recourse to Huguccio's doctrine allowed him to separate the infallible see from the fallible person who might embrace false doctrine. And Turrecremata even gave up his flirtation with Terreni's ideas on papal infallibility, dismissing them as unacceptable:

Some say that "God would not permit the pope to define heresy, or anything contrary to the faith; but would prevent him by death, by resistance of other believers, by the instruction of others or by internal inspiration, or by other means."
But we give another explanation . . . namely that, if the Roman pontiff should fall into a condemned heresy, by the very fact that he falls from Peter's faith, he falls from Peter's chair and see.\textsuperscript{100}

The First Vatican Council (1869-70) launched an ongoing debate on whether Turrecremata's views agreed with its own definition of papal infallibility, namely, that papal pronouncements on faith and morals, issued \textit{ex cathedra} with the guidance of the Holy Spirit, could not err. Lederer, though noting Turrecremata's distinction between pope and office, assumed that the cardinal had foreshadowed the Vatican Council definition.\textsuperscript{101} Pacifico Massi has claimed that infallible office and \textit{ex cathedra} definition are the same thing, while Joseph Fenton, trying to explain away Turrecremata's references to a pope falling from his see, has argued that the errors in question were purely private ones.\textsuperscript{102} But Fenton has ignored Turrecremata's argument that heretical pronouncements were not those of the apostolic see, a clear reference to attempted abuse of papal \textit{magisterium}. Moreover, if in Turrecremata's view a Roman pontiff could forfeit his see for issuing an erroneous pronouncement, then the cardinal had no idea of infallible \textit{ex cathedra} pronouncement. Like Fenton, Massi has ignored Turrecremata's fear that the pope might abuse his teaching office.\textsuperscript{103} Rather than adumbrating the doctrine of the First Vatican Council, which (like Terreni) emphasized the divine guidance of the pope, Turrecremata presented the incongruity of a pope losing his see by placing himself at variance with his infallible office.\textsuperscript{104}

Turrecremata's belief that divine guidance of papal \textit{magisterium} was not automatic is equally evident in his discussion of the power of the keys. The Michaelists, trying to prove \textit{Exiiit} an irreformable doctrinal definition, argued that the pope had the "key of knowledge" (Luke 11:52), which they understood as a special, divinely granted \textit{habitus scientiae} (state of knowledge). (This was an unusual use of a scriptural term normally applied by theologians and canonists to the pope's magisterial authority or to the confessors' power to inquire into a penitent's state of soul before granting absolution.) In reply to the Michaelists, John XXII hotly denied that the pope had special \textit{habitus scientiae}.\textsuperscript{105} Tur-
recremata, writing with an eye to past controversies, maintained that the power of the keys consisted of keys of knowledge and of power, that is, the powers of inquiry and absolution. But he denied that the key of knowledge conferred a special gift of knowledge. Thus, although it seems that Turrecremata did not apply this argument directly to papal magisterium, evidently there was no room in his ecclesiology for a belief that the Roman pontiff received a special habitus scientiae for teaching the faithful.

Eventually Turrecremata concluded that divine guidance of a general council was, similarly, not automatic unless pope and council reached unanimous agreement. Increasingly hostile to the conciliarist emphasis on the corporate Church, Turrecremata denied that a general council acting alone could translate the Church’s unfailing faith into infallible doctrinal definitions. Even in his early polemical treatises, he expressed a preference for decisions made by pope and council acting together. In his mature works, Turrecremata still argued that a council separate from the pope could fall into error, citing the examples of the Council of Rimini and the Second Council of Ephesus. Nevertheless, he did not deny the value of a general council, which—with the advice of learned doctors and the prestige of consultation with leading prelates of the Church—could lend much to the decisions of the Roman pontiff. No good Christian could argue with the decisions of a pope in council. Moreover, the council became indirectly involved in Christ’s promise to Peter of unfailing faith, helping to preserve the Church from doubts and dissensions. Turrecremata shared with Nicholas of Cusa this preference for unanimous agreement of pope and council, which would provide an unfailing assurance that God had guided the Church to the acceptance of the truth.

All in all, Turrecremata’s doctrine differed significantly from that defined by the First Vatican Council. It was, rather, the cardinal’s coherent response to the dual problem of identifying an unquestionably reliable teacher of sound doctrine and preventing an erring pope from harming the Church—replacing his unsuccessful polemical attempt to include the ideas of Guido Terreni in his system.
The Doctrine of Hierarchy

Johannes de Turrecremata was deeply concerned with the preservation of ecclesiastical unity, a preoccupation based on his own experience of the Church's troubles, as well as on traditional ecclesiological concepts. The Dominican cardinal saw his chief foes, conciliarists and Hussites, as threats to this ideal of oneness. So he sought some unifying principle that would harmonize his discussion of the distinct but interrelated powers of orders and jurisdiction. (He referred to possible ambiguities in the distribution of these powers with the usual canonistic example: an archdeacon superior to an archpriest in jurisdiction but interior to him in orders.)

As one such unifying principle Turrecremata employed the canonistic concept of *majoritas*, an idea of superiority closely linked to obedience. (Boniface VIII's bull *Unam sanctam*, declaring obedience to the pope as necessary for salvation, would appear in the *Extravagantes communes* under the title *De maioritate et oboedientia*.) Thus, Turrecremata assigned the papacy a share in both the priestly superiority in orders and the episcopal superiority in the conferral of orders. Also, the Roman see was senior to all other bishoprics in time of founding because of Peter's selection by Christ as a bishop. Moreover, the papacy held unrivalled *majoritas* in the realm of jurisdiction, the power of governing the Church and maintaining its unity.

But Turrecremata leaned far more heavily on another proof that unity involved subordination to the Roman see: the doctrine of hierarchy. The idea of orderly subordination to higher powers was common in medieval thought, with roots in Christian tradition and in the actual ordering of Christendom. This principle was most evident in the Neoplatonic writings that formed the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus. Thus, Turrecremata readily embraced the doctrine of hierarchy, arguing that the Hussites threatened the Church with chaos when they denied its validity. The Church was a microcosm of the universal order, which imitated the hierarchic disposition of angels beneath the divinity. Jesus, a prudent legislator, had created a hierarchy of orders and had given Peter the authority to create a hierarchy of jurisdiction, the most efficient and decorous
pattern for ecclesiastical government.\textsuperscript{119} The pope presided over the Church Militant as Christ presided over the Church Triumphant, or as God presided over the angels. There was no power of jurisdiction that did not descend from above, that is, from the pope to the lower ranks of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.\textsuperscript{120} As a good Thomist, however, Turrecremata did not think the ecclesiastical hierarchy was a perfect reflection of its celestial exemplar. Individual details had to be flexible, so that the pope might make arrangements that promoted the Church's saving work.\textsuperscript{121}

Antony Black has described hierarchy as the fundamental principle of Turrecremata's ecclesiology.\textsuperscript{122} But in an attempt to fit Turrecremata into Walter Ullmann's paradigm of ascending and descending theories—categorized, respectively, as Aristotelean and Platonic—Black has described the cardinal as a Neoplatonist led by his metaphysics to adopt a monarchist political theory. Turrecremata's references to Aristotle and Aquinas thus become mere proof-texts for a descending theory of government.\textsuperscript{124} This assessment overemphasizes Turrecremata's use of Pseudo-Dionysius, one of many authors cited by medieval polemicists for different ends. Moreover, Turrecremata's analogies between the angelic hierarchy and the ordering of human society are little more than commonplaces.\textsuperscript{125} Turrecremata was a Thomist more interested in the Church's mission than in political theory. And he discussed the limits of papal power alongside his affirmation of papal primacy in order to safeguard the right functioning of the ecclesiastical institution.\textsuperscript{126}

Turrecremata shared in the common medieval polemical technique of piling up citations to all relevant authorities. He made more use of Scripture than of philosophy and at least as much use of law and theology.\textsuperscript{127} Nor were the works of the pseudo-Areopagite susceptible to a single ecclesiological interpretation, that of the papalist comparison of the Roman pontiffs status to that of the godhead. Pseudo-Dionysius, despite the special status he accorded Peter, considered the episcopate, not the papacy, the highest level of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Episcopalists had argued that this proved the bishops were immune from papal meddling in the right order of their sees, and Gerson had placed the ecclesiastical hierarchy within the common
body of the Church, to which Christ had given the supreme governing power. While Turrecremata used the doctrine of hierarchy to support papal power, Nicholas of Cusa employed it in both his conciliarist and papalist writings with no apparent worry that mention of Pseudo-Dionysius hound him to accept one or another ecclesiological doctrine.

Turrecreniata and his contemporaries were not blind ideologues. Conciliarism might be termed nominalist or realist, ascending or descending, but its real focus was the reunification and reform of the Church, not system building. Papalism, too, despite its excesses, was concerned with the unity and good order of the ecclesiastical institution, promoting its work for the welfare of souls. Whatever the varying ambitions, fortunes, and ideas of men like Turrecremata, Cusa, Piccolomini, Panormitanus, and John of Segovia, they had a lively concern for the welfare of the Church that precluded their maintaining rigid doctrinal postures. Whenever the welfare of the Church seemed to dictate a change of ecclesiological stance, even the rethinking of cherished ideas, Turrecreniata and his contemporaries were quick to do that thinking and to make that change.