A final aspect of Johannes de Turrecremata's ecclesiology concerns his doctrine on the relation between the spiritual and the temporal powers—a compromise position which reflects his view of the place of the temporal power in Christendom. As we would expect, Turrecremata's theory responded to conditions in his own age, but in this case it was a typically Dominican answer to a controversy that had developed during a millennium.

By Turrecremata's day, Western Europe—a region guided by popes and princes—had been nominally Christian for a thousand years. In the beginning Western theologians, unlike their Eastern counterparts, had adopted a cautious attitude toward Christian princes. Neither Ambrose nor Augustine identified the Church with the Christianized empire, and Gelasius warned the emperor against meddling in the affairs of the more exalted ecclesiastical power. But emperors and popes soon entered the ideological fray. Imitating their Byzantine counterparts, the Holy Roman emperors patronized writers who closely identified empire and Church and envisioned the emperor (as Christ's anointed) guiding and guarding a united Christendom. And many ecclesiastical reformers, including Leo IX and Peter Damian, similarly accepted lay intervention that served the welfare of the Church. But others, led by Humbert of Silva Candida, argued that pernicious lay influence
bred evils, such as simony. Acting on this supposition, Gregory VII challenged Emperor Henry IV by opposing imperial pretensions with a claim to papal supremacy over princes. After the Investiture Controversy, popes claimed an ever greater political role in Christendom as guides of princely acts, even those whose bloody nature barred their direct exercise by clerics. Innocent III and Innocent IV broadened and systematized these claims, basing them on solicitude for the welfare of the sinful laity. And Innocent IV described this papal temporal power as an indirect consequence of spiritual primacy.

In subsequent centuries, papal temporal power won support from canonists and theologians. Decretists, particularly Huguccio and Alanus, argued about the extent and legitimacy of temporal power: one thought that princes received their powers directly from God; the other made the pope an intermediary between the divinity and the secular power. Decretalists, glossing the decrees of Innocent III, described the pope as the chief judge of Christendom, able to use his plenitude of power to correct evils. Among theologians, Bernard of Clairvaux and Hugh of St. Victor developed papalist arguments subsequently taken up by the friars. Some mendicants, like Aquinas, kept papal temporal power in perspective; others, especially the Augustinians, carried papalist arguments to a hierocratic extreme. These various strands of papalist polemic were woven together by Boniface VIII in his decree Unam sanctam, which made spiritual and (indirectly) temporal dependence of all Christians on the pope an article of faith. On the other side, however, the princes never lacked apologists. Frederick Barbarossa tried to reassert imperial power over Rome; his grandson Frederick II, locked in a death struggle with Innocent IV, claimed that wealth and power had perverted the Church's spiritual mission. Philip IV of France, who totally defeated Boniface VIII, enjoyed the support of apologists like the Thomist John of Paris. And in the fourteenth century, the empire was supported by such formidable polemicists as Dante, Marsilius, and Ockham. All told, centuries of argument had produced two camps; papalist claims that the spiritual power served the higher end of man opposed ancient claims that the secular power was God's agent (or the Church's strong arm).
Into this polemic, Aristotelean ideas and Thomism introduced a new element that would be strongly developed by our protagonist. Aristotle's notion that civil society promoted temporal felicity gave the nascent state a separate rationale for its existence—a rationale conducive to our present Church and State dichotomy. To be sure, there was no single, unwavering use of Aristotle even among Thomists. But most Dominicans, from Aquinas through Petrus de Palude to Turrecremata, thought that the spiritual and temporal ends of human life were best served by a coordinated effort of the two powers. However, Tolemy of Lucca and Antoninus of Florence taught more hierocratic doctrines; John of Paris was more favorably inclined toward the independence of princes. Arguments adverse to papal power, by Dante and Marsilius, made other uses of Aristotle; and those of Marsilius were so extreme that they were condemned by the papacy.9

Modern assessments of these thought currents have varied widely, from emphasis on the monarchic papacy10 to emphasis on the coordinate role of the two powers.11 Perhaps the most judicious assessments underline the pope's role as guide of Christendom toward its higher end, at the same time that they point out that few medieval authors went to either hierocratic or cesaropapist extremes.12 Turrecremata's own time, when princely power was resurgent, was inopportune for a reassertion of hierocratic theories. Like his predecessors, the Dominican cardinal could presuppose that there was a respublica Christiana in which the pope played a leading role, but he had to compromise with the realities of the age. For Johannes de Turrecremata, the Thomist vision of coordinate powers promoting coordinate ends was an ideal framework for such compromises—though perhaps, in the light of the religious politics of later princes, he and other papal apologists too readily made these accommodations.13

Like Huguccio and Aquinas, Turrecremata thought that the temporal power derived its legitimacy from God separately, without ecclesiastical intermediary. In Thomistic terms he argued that each power existed to promote an aspect of human welfare: the temporal for the lesser end, the spiritual for the greater. Man was a social animal, who drew from reason those principles of natural law necessary
to found families and governments. Governments provided the blessings of peace, the essence of temporal felicity according to Augustine, Aquinas, and Dante." Moreover, a Christian society was the best peacemaking agency, since good government required the true justice inspired by Christ. Similarly, man could not attain temporal perfection, the life of virtue, without also seeking the spiritual perfection promoted by Scripture and the Church. The temporal power thus best achieved its end in collaboration with the spiritual. Turrecremata also believed that the Church needed the services of the State to supplement with coercion its own persuasive efforts. Only thus could Christian ideals be put into practice; moreover, the clergy would not need to perform unworthy labors or stain their hands with blood. Ideally the two powers were coordinate, each promoting the other's end while serving its own. Turrecremata compared the two powers to the pillars of Solomon's temple, composed of different materials but supporting the same edifice.

While working out this doctrine, Turrecremata tackled several disputed topics—first, the basis of secular power. Papalists had never agreed on the role of the Roman see in the creation of secular regimes. The more extreme, including Alanus Anglicus and Giles of Rome, argued that the pope played a major constitutive role in this process. Others, like Huguccio and Aquinas, thought the pope guided princes in their exercise of God-given powers. In Turrecremata's day, both he and Nicholas of Cusa taught the latter doctrine, while Antoninus of Florence and Rodrigo Sanchez de Arévalo taught the former. According to Turrecremata the secular power had been valid from its inception. He defended in particular the Roman empire against Arévalo's contention that it was a mere usurper of royal powers. Peter, said Turrecremata, had been born the empire's subject; thus the papacy had played no role in the creation of the empire. The empire's legitimacy was founded on natural law, its conquests being legitimized by the consent of subject peoples to its just rule. Moreover, Christ himself had recognized the legitimacy of the Roman empire when he submitted to Pilate's sentence. The appeal to natural reason aligned Turrecremata with Aquinas, Innocent IV, and Zabarella in defense of the legitimacy of
pagan regimes. He attacked the contrary argument of Hostiensis, Duns Scotus, and Falkenberg that belief was a precondition for valid tenure of political power (pagan kings could even rule Christians, so long as they did not tamper with the true faith). The pope could not simply abolish pagan principates, though he could turn back their attacks on Christendom and stop persecutions. This line of argument was adopted from Turrecremata's works by Francisco de Vitoria for his defense of the Indians.22

The structure of civil society was also the subject of many disputes. On one side the empire had a broad claim to supremacy over all princes—a claim based on Roman law and past history. (Dante was the most noted apologist for the idea of a universal empire as the guardian of peace.) But a strong body of support for the autonomy of local rulers developed among the canonists, encouraged by Innocent III's decretal Per venerabilem, which mentioned the French king's refusal to acknowledge a temporal superior.23 Turrecremata tried to balance these conflicting claims, arguing that local governments and laws provided for local needs without needing a higher power's intervention. Christendom did not need a temporal monarch with sweeping powers like those held by the pope in spiritual affairs. For, as Per venerabilem demonstrated, the kings of France and Spain (Castile) were autonomous princes, though the emperor did have a supranational role as guardian of the Church and promoter of peace.24 Late in life, when attacking Arévalo's antiimperial polemics, Turrecremata placed added emphasis on the emperor's peacemaking duties and even suggested (as Johannes Teutonicus had said in his gloss on Per venerabilem) that kings had an autonomous status de facto, not de iure.25 Yet Turrecremata still insisted that the French and Spanish kings had autonomy, since they had averted heathen invasions without imperial aid. In Turrecremata's thought the emperor appears more as a mediator than as a universal monarch.26 Within his own realm, each prince had the sovereign rights of legislation, justice, and maintenance of order through coercion. The prince was master of his subjects so long as he did not become a tyrant, whose commands could rightly be resisted. Perhaps from lack of interest in the question, or out of deference to princes whose goodwill the papacy needed,
Turrecremata said little about remedies for the abuse of secular power.  

Papal Power in Temporal Affairs

Since Turrecremata considered the two powers part of one Christian society, he felt free to make a point about one (usually the value of monarchy) with analogies drawn from the other. Nonetheless, he devoted much more attention to the difficult problem of the interrelationship of the two powers. As we have seen, any writing on that subject involved picking one's way through a tangle of conflicting opinions that had arisen from past controversies and were supported by a mass of authoritative source materials: Scripture, the Fathers, theology, philosophy, and law. Moreover, few past authors had presented schemas of possible opinions on this subject. The most famous schema was produced by John of Paris in his defense of Philip the Fair—an attempt by that Dominican theologian to present his doctrine as a via media between Herodian papalism and Waldensian denial of any ecclesiastical direction of temporal affairs. John of Paris described the two powers as coordinate, interacting only indirectly in their pursuit of distinct ends. Petrus de Palude adapted this schema to prove that the pope could direct the actions of princes without usurping their powers. Turrecremata, though familiar with John of Paris's works, adopted Palude's version of this schema as a means of giving order to all the diverse materials on the relationship of the two powers. He seemed pleased to think of himself as a moderate caught between two extremes.

In Turrecremata's times, these extreme opinions were not mere stalking horses. The Herodian doctrine was present in the works of such distinguished fellow papalists as Antoninus and Arévalo. The Waldensian doctrine was represented by the Hussites, many of whom were influenced by Manicheism and thought papal temporal power a mark of Antichrist. And the Dominican cardinal countered each in turn.

Turrecremata answered the Herodians on both theological and practical grounds. The two powers had once been united in the Jewish priesthood; but Jesus, a prudent leg-
islator, had severed that bond. Although Christ had possessed all power on earth, he did not grant the temporal aspect of his supreme authority to Peter, sparing the popes excessive concern with temporal goals and allowing them concentration on their spiritual labors. Turrecremata used the Donation of Constantine to illustrate the pope's lack of temporal supremacy, pointing out that it would not have been a donation if the emperor merely returned to the pope something that was his by right. Thus, the papacy bestowed on men neither property rights, as Giles of Rome had argued, nor legitimate governments. Men earned their possessions by the sweat of their brows; kings, though anointed by clerics, founded their governments on natural law.

Turrecremata's answer to the Waldensian doctrine began at Basel, when he collaborated with Juan Polemar to defend ecclesiastical temporal power in open debate with the Hussites. Thereafter Turrecremata was ever ready to argue that power and possessions were necessary for the welfare of the Church. The papacy, according to Bartolus's definition, was a perfect principate, able to enforce its decisions with material coercion (even though it could not actually shed blood). Although Christ had not given him the fullness of earthly power, Peter had possessed this principate. The Church used its property and revenues to support the poor, the clergy, and the liturgy, as well as crusades against enemies like the Turks. The goods of the clergy were subsumed into the ecclesiastical sphere and so passed out of temporal jurisdiction.

Since Turrecremata felt that the temporal, as well as the spiritual, end of man was best fulfilled in a Christian society, he deemed the two powers coordinate (as we have noted): but coordination required some single directive force able to regulate both powers; and, naturally, Turrecremata assigned this role to the pope, head of the spiritual power. His proof of this contention rested on all the old arguments of past papal apologists. Following Boniface VIII's interpretation of Gelasius's doctrine, he argued that the superiority of the spiritual over the temporal involved power as well as dignity. Following Innocent III and James of Viterbo, he claimed that the spiritual power was as superior to the temporal as the soul was to the body, an argument
meant to demonstrate the pope's power over princes. While secular governments were not created by the pope, they could not perform their own work well without his aid. Turrecremata compared the pope's role in these matters to that of an architect, who directs the work of the artisans constructing a building but does not interfere in the practice of their crafts.

Such authority was a secondary aspect of the papal plenitude of power, which was primarily concerned with spiritual matters. The scope of this secondary power was wide but not unlimited, extending to all Christians because of their sins, which included crimes. On this basis, the pope could act anywhere to preserve the unity and peace of Christendom—to repel invading infidels, to promote justice, and to safeguard the clergy. Papal intervention in temporal affairs, when inspired by spiritual motives, was an act of charity and not simply meddling.

But although the pope possessed a perfect principate, he could not wield powers proper to the temporal sphere, particularly those involving bloodshed. Instead, he could move princes to act for the welfare of Christendom by warring against its enemies or imposing capital sentences on malefactors. The temporal sword for the defense of the Church was, therefore, at the pope's disposal, but not in his hand. Any king who could not, or would not, follow these orders was useless to the Church and, accordingly, could be deposed by the pope. The pope was also concerned with preventing dissipation of princely power in useless wars, imposing truces on warring powers, and, as guardian of oaths, overseeing the maintenance of treaties. (This was the doctrine used by Innocent III to justify his intervention in the wars of France and England.) The pope, however, could not meddle in purely secular business, such as cases involving technicalities of feudal law; he might correct any totally unjust decision but could not hear the case in the first instance. Like Innocent III, Turrecremata believed that canon law displaced other legal systems where their jurisdictions overlapped; the pope could strike down laws harmful to the Church, but he could not quash an innocuous law by an arbitrary exercise of his plenitude of power.

Over and above all these powers Turrecremata placed
the judicial supremacy of the Roman see. According to the

canonists, the pope's office made him chief judge of Christendom—a judge able, according to Innocent III in the
decretal Novit, to correct any negligent or unjust judge. Likewise the Roman pontiff had broad authority to decide
all difficult cases involving questions of proper Christian conduct, a spiritual power wielded for the good of the faithfult. Like Innocent IV, Turrecremata also assigned
to the papacy certain specific cases that did not involve
spiritual matters, for example, cases usually reserved to the
emperor, when the imperial throne was vacant.18

As chief judge, the pope could impose severe penalties
on princes, particularly excommunication. If an erring
prince remained unmoved, as had Frederick II,50 other
measures could be taken. Although the pope did not create
kingdoms or kings, he could, as we have noted, depose
rulers guilty of heresy, tyranny, or incompetence. Moreover, he could release the subjects of erring princes from
their oaths of allegiance. (In fact, a heretic king could be
deposed by his subjects even without papal approval.)51 The
pope could even alter the ordering of temporal govern-
ments, Turrecremata wrote in his peculiar account of the
translation of the empire. Because the Byzantine emperors
did not defend Rome against the Lombards, Pope Stephen
deprieved the Greeks of the imperial dignity and bestowed
it on the Germans, thus changing the mode of imperial
election from popular acclamation to the vote of a college
of electors. In this one passage, Turrecremata conflated
the anointing of Pippin the Short, the coronation of Charlemagne, and later constitutional developments. Following Venerabilem, moreover, he described imperial election in
terms of episcopal election, arguing that papal confirmation
of the election bestowed the fullness of imperial dignity
and power.52 Turrecremata believed that the pope could
make further changes in the secular order but did not
consider this the ordinary function of the apostolic see. Nor
did this power, which was to be used for the good of Christendom, imply that the pope bestowed temporal power on
princes.53

Clearly, Turrecremata's doctrine of papal temporal
power was an adjunct to his ideas about papal responsibility
for the welfare of Christian souls. The pope could guide
princes, punish them, and even alter their regimes for the good of Christendom and not because of worldly ambition. This was no theory of direct papal power over temporal affairs, nor was it some new doctrine replacing the theory of papal hierocracy. Rather, Turrecremata drew heavily on Aquinas and on canon law to create a synthesis of the more moderate papalist ideas on the temporal aspects and effects of the plenitude of power. His synthesis, presented in a framework which Petrus de Paludé had adapted from the works of John of Paris, did not win universal acceptance but did have a strong impact on later theologians like Cajetan, Vitoria, and Suarez. Bellarmine dubbed this doctrine the theory of indirect papal temporal power, a term borrowed from Innocent IV. Under that name it has endured to the present day, being adopted by Jacques Maritain as a guide to the proper relationship of Church and State.

**Lay Intervention in Ecclesiastical Affairs**

By contrast to the Dominican cardinal's enduring doctrine of indirect papal power in temporal affairs, his opinions on the reverse question remained a fragmented response to increasing lay intervention in the ecclesiastical affairs of his age.

Long before Turrecremata's time, papal pretensions to temporal power had begun to ring hollow. Boniface VIII was humiliated by Philip the Fair, while Clement V seemed subservient to him. John XXII and Benedict XII waged a long, largely fruitless campaign against Louis of Bavaria. In the conciliar epoch, princes made new advances in the control of the clergy. After the wars and internal chaos of the fourteenth century, strong dynastic governments reappeared, "new monarchs" which resumed the efforts of earlier kings to dominate local ecclesiastical patronage and to tax the clergy. Thus, Charles VII, taking advantage of the conciliar crisis, issued the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (1438), which implemented the Basel reform decrees for the monarchy's benefit but avoided open support of conciliarist ideas. Frederick III, king of the Romans, and other princes as well, sold Eugenius IV and Nicholas V their
Turrecremata realized that the Church faced a serious problem. One of his reasons for opposing the French demands for a third council site was the likelihood that participants would obey their princes and ignore higher considerations. This could be a disaster for the papacy and a threat to the liberty of the Church. However, Turrecremata did not advocate a new bar to lay encroachment on ecclesiastical liberties in the manner of the Investiture Controversy, since his concept of Christendom was oriented toward cooperation between the two powers. Only by cooperation could peace be maintained. For this reason, excommunication of princes and peoples was to be avoided because of its grave temporal and spiritual consequences, namely, disrupting the peace and scandalizing the faithful.

Writers on Turrecremata's thought ordinarily ignore his comments on lay intervention in ecclesiastical affairs. But an examination of the relevant passages reveals his ambivalent and expedient attitude: a denial of lay rights in theory coupled with an acceptance of them in practice to avoid scandal and strife. The temporal power certainly could not judge the spiritual: as proof, Turrecremata cited all the old arguments about the greater dignity of the Church, including Hostiensis's contention that the spiritual power was as much greater than the temporal, as the sun (by Ptolemy's estimate) was greater than the moon. Even the emperor, the greatest layman, could not control the Church, judge the pope, pretend to be the founder of papal power, or, through the Donation of Constantine, claim to be feudal lord of the Roman see; the emperor was primarily the chief defender of Christendom, guided in his actions by papal commands.

Turrecremata nevertheless allowed the emperor, and other princes, a fairly large role in ecclesiastical affairs. Imperial laws that favored the Church could be accepted into canon law, as had been necessary when rulers like Charlemagne were much more feared than the pope. Princes had no real right to confer benefices—this was a spiritual matter beyond lay competence. But Turrecremata advised acceptance of any worthy nominee presented
by a prince, out of respect, to avoid scandal, and to prevent disruption of the peace by angry lay patrons. In the bull Etsi de statu Boniface VIII had conceded to Philip the Fair a discretionary right to tax the clergy for the defense of the realm. Although Turrecremata did not believe princes could do this by right, he cited Christ and Peter, who had humbly submitted to lesser authorities by paying tribute to Rome, as giving examples which permitted taxation of the clergy for the purpose of maintaining peace and order.

Conversely, Turrecremata recognized certain duties of ecclesiastics towards lay authorities. As we have seen, he defended the Church's possession of temporal goods and employment of temporal power, which, if not abused, were useful to the Church; however, possession of temporalities created certain obligations. The Gregorian reformers had deemphasized the feudal obligations of the clergy; Turrecremata accepted them, with some reservations. For example, he said that a bishop could place his feudal duties ahead of such ecclesiastical business as the attendance of synods, unless the synod was called by the pope.

In the matter of councils and possible schisms, finally, Turrecremata did allow for an imperial role—a clear reaction to his own experiences in a troubled era. During the Schism, intellectual currents favorable to lay power over the Church had been much strengthened. Conciliar theorists like Dietrich of Niem and Zabarella had urged the emperor and other princes to convocate a council, citing the example of Constantine, who had assembled the Council of Nicaea. Sigismund of Luxemburg had fulfilled their expectations by helping to compel John XXIII to call the Council of Constance and by playing a role in the early sessions of the Council of Basel. Turrecremata's own presence at Constance, where the Schism was effectively terminated, had been a side effect of Sigismund's successful effort to bring Spanish representatives to Constance. It is thus no surprise that Turrecremata granted the emperor a key role in the convocation of a council, one which—like Constantine's!—derived from a papal mandate: if the emperor tried to call a council without papal authorization, the resulting assembly was illegal. However, if during a vacancy or a crisis caused by an erring pope the cardinals refused to call a needed general council, this duty devolved
upon the emperor and other Christian princes as the Church's temporal guardians. In the *Summa de ecclesia Turrecremata* went a step further, making his greatest concession to temporal power. Any major clerical threat to peace other than schism could be handled by the pope; but when the papacy was at the heart of the problem, the emperor, as the guardian of peace, could call a council to end the schism. Furthermore, at any council the emperor and other princes were present as chief officers of the Church's secular arm, to deal with heretics and other malefactors. This role was so important that the emperor could attend a council even if the pope did not invite him. On a similar basis, the princes could employ force against an antipope or coerce an evil pope to amend his life. And if the pope fell from his see through heresy, he could be seized by the princes.

All in all, Turrecremata's doctrine of lay intervention was admirably suited to an age in which the papacy followed Petrus de Monte's advice to Eugenius IV to "cede a little" to the princes to keep their loyalty. Yet, concessions only whetted the appetites of the more potent princes, whose powers over the clergy increased, and the popes concentrated more and more on local Italian politics. This contributed in turn to the discontents of lesser princes, who received no concessions, and to the alienation of northern Europe from what seemed to be an increasingly distant and worldly Roman court. In the long run this dual trend harmed Europe in general and the papacy in particular, for reformers found a ready audience among the discontented as well as ready support among the German princes, the Swiss cities, and the king of the North. The great princes, who had won much of what they wanted, were reluctant to embrace the Reformation, but their realms, too, were troubled by religious controversy. So, the fabric of Christendom was torn apart, leaving the popes with a stronger position in central Italy and a set of hollow claims to broader temporal power.